哈佛商学院案例 阿里巴巴 淘宝 HBS Case Strategy Alibaba&39;s Taobao (A) -2009学习材料

珍贵哈佛商学院案例 阿里巴巴 淘宝 HBS Case Strategy Alibaba's Taobao (A) -2009学习材料

FELIX OBERHOLZER-GEE JULIE WULF

9-709-456

REV: JULY 30, 2009

Alibaba's Taobao (A)

In early 2008, the Hangzhou-based Alibaba Group operated China’s leading online marketplaces: , an international business-to-business (B2B) exchange that assisted small and medium-sized Chinese enterprises in finding overseas trading partners; , the company’s B2B site for domestic trade; and Taobao, a B2C and C2C exchange for Chinese retailers and consumers. The group also ran a web portal (Yahoo! China); an online-payment service provider (Alipay); and a marketplace for online advertising inventory (Alimama). By 2008, Alibaba Group had captured about one-half of B2B e-commerce in China.

The group’s quickly growing consumer site, Taobao (淘宝, “hunting for treasures”), had attracted particular attention after it managed to displace the once dominant eBay, the world’s largest consumer marketplace. After spending hundreds of millions of dollars trying to defend its presence in China, at the end of 2006, eBay management cut its losses and shut its site, acknowledging Taobao’s appeal among consumers and retailers.1 With a market share among C2C players of 84% in 2007, Taobao had become China’s leading consumer e-commerce marketplace, facilitating transactions valued at RMB 43 billion.a

By spring 2006 it had become apparent that Taobao was pulling away from its closest rival eBay. However, the company had little revenue because it offered its services free of charge. In a first move to test a monetization model, Taobao launched a value-added service called Zhao Cai Jin Bao (招财进宝, “bringing wealth and riches”). The service let sellers bid for keywords, ranking paid listings ahead of free listings and collecting a fee when a transaction relating to the paid listing was completed through Taobao. As the company rolled out Zhao Cai Jin Bao, the executive team waited in suspense. Would the service be a success? Had Taobao chosen the right way to monetize its marketplace?

Alibaba’s B2B Platform

Jack Ma founded Alibaba with the support of a group of friends in December 1998. Ma, a former teacher who had experience building websites for Chinese companies, created Alibaba to assist small and medium-sized companies (SMEs) in selling their products on the Internet. Ma explained: “There are more than 40 million SMEs in China. Many of them operate in fragmented markets, with limited access to communication channels and information sources that would help market and promote their products. A critical difficulty is that many SMEs have no way to evaluate the trustworthiness of their trading partners.”

a In mid-2008, 100 RMB equaled US$14.6.

________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Professors Felix Oberholzer-Gee and Julie Wulf prepared this case. HBS cases are developed solely as the basis for class discussion. Cases are not intended to serve as endorsements, sources of primary data, or illustrations of effective or ineffective management.

Copyright © 2009 President and Fellows of Harvard College. To order copies or request permission to reproduce materials, call 1-800-545-7685, write Harvard Business School Publishing, Boston, MA 02163, or go to www.hbsp.harvard.edu/educators. This publication may not be digitized, photocopied, or otherwise reproduced, posted, or transmitted, without the permission of Harvard Business School.

珍贵哈佛商学院案例 阿里巴巴 淘宝 HBS Case Strategy Alibaba's Taobao (A) -2009学习材料

709-456 Alibaba’s Taobao (A)

At the outset, the website offered little more than a bulletin board on which a few businesses posted trade leads. But a decade later, more than 32 million registered users relied on Alibaba’s B2B platform to find trading partners, and the group had built a sophisticated ecosystem around its core business. Posting a trade lead on Alibaba remained free, but about 1% of registered companies purchased premium subscriptions to display their products and storefronts on Alibaba’s marketplaces. Premium subscribers operated their own storefront on Alibaba, and the company assisted them in building and maintaining their websites. (Exhibit 1 shows the site of Zhejiang Sunkey Industrial Co., a manufacturer of aluminum profiles.) Scott Ni, director of site operations at Alibaba, explained: “We visit the factories of our members to shoot videos and take pictures of products. We also create their website and produce promotional materials to showcase our companies at tradeshows.”

The storefronts of premium subscribers provided detailed product information, a virtual tour of the company, and TrustPass verification. Under the TrustPass program, Alibaba asked third parties to verify the corporate registration and banking information of its members. TrustPass members were also able to view and post feedback about other TrustPass companies.

Alibaba’s B2B marketplaces thrived. In 2007, the company tripled its operating profit to RMB 804.3 million on revenues of RMB 2,163 million (see Exhibit 2 for financial information). Premium subscribers using the international marketplace () paid an annual fee of RMB 50,000. These fees generated about 70% of the company’s revenue. With 23 million registered users, the company’s site for domestic trade () was much larger but less important financially, with 266,000 premium subscribers each paying RMB 2,800 for a standard China TrustPass package. As of 2007, the company had 700,000 storefronts on its international marketplace and 2.26 million storefronts on its China marketplace. Additional sources of income were promotional placements, banner advertising, and paid keyword searches. Companies paid up to RMB 120,000 annually to have their name listed first when buyers searched for a popular item. At the end of 2007, Alibaba listed its B2B business (marketplaces and ) in Hong Kong, selling 19.25% of the company’s enlarged share capital and raising US$1.7 billion. The market responded enthusiastically, driving the company’s P/E ratio to 320 in post-IPO trading (see Exhibit 3 for share price information). Taobao and the group’s other businesses remained privately held. Each group company had its own executive team (president, CFO, and vice presidents responsible for the operating units) and its own board of directors. The overriding objective was to encourage the businesses to be best in their industry. Ma explained: “Business unit presidents must have the freedom to do what is right for their business. I want business units to compete with each other.”

With group companies given free reign to develop on their own and capture new opportunities, it was natural that company’s activities would not always be aligned. Joe Tsai, CFO of Alibaba Group, described an example: “Alipay’s primary objective is to be a leader in payment processing, which requires it to develop its own client base of online merchants. However, these clients could be other e-commerce websites that compete directly with Taobao. For example, is a client of Alipay, yet is a subsidiary of Amazon, a company that competes with Taobao.”

Taobao

Porter Erisman, vice president of International Corporate Affairs, remembered the beginnings of Taobao well: “Jack told me in April 2003 that he wanted to pursue a new venture. The project was to be top secret. Seven employees started to work on Taobao that month. The team was hidden off-site

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in Jack’s old apartment where Alibaba was born. They spent day and night there and were not even allowed to tell their families and friends what project they were working on.”

Ma had carefully observed the rise of eBay in China. The U.S. company had entered China by investing US$30 million in EachNet in 2002. EachNet, a Chinese online auction founded in 1999 by Tan Haiyin (HBS 1999) and Shao Yibo (HBS 1999), mostly catered to early Internet users, many of whom were tech-savvy computer enthusiasts (see Exhibit 4 for Internet penetration rates). At the time of eBay’s investment, EachNet commanded an 85% market share with revenues of RMB 12 million. In June 2003, eBay CEO Meg Whitman (HBS 1979) acquired the remaining 67% stake in Eachnet, rebranding the site as eBay EachNet.2 Whitman had high hopes for her company’s venture, predicting that “China could be eBay’s largest local market in a five-to-ten-year period.”3 Ma explained his concern over eBay’s entry:

eBay grew strongly. At that time, there were only two companies in China that understood online marketplaces, eBay and Alibaba. I was particularly concerned that eBay’s power sellers would grow their business to compete in the B2B space. In China, the line between individuals and small businesses is blurry. There are many people with entrepreneurial ambitions. I needed to stop eBay to protect Alibaba.

Marketplace Design

Taobao sought to distinguish itself from eBay in numerous ways. Ma wanted to imbue Taobao with a strong local culture that reflected a deep understanding of Chinese consumers and an attitude of informality. Taobao’s president, Sun Tongyu, explained: “We ask Taobao employees to select a nickname and refer to each other by it. The nicknames come from fictional characters in Jin Yong’s famous kung fu novels.”

Yu Yan, the Taobao nickname of Zhang Yu, vice president in charge of C2C marketplace operations at the company, explained the cultural differences between Taobao and eBay, pointing out differences in the design of the two websites (see Exhibit 5 for sample home pages): “Chinese consumers like busy web designs with strong colors. Westerners prefer sparse sites like Google’s, but Chinese customers want their sites to be noisy, with lots of links.”

Added Erisman: “We got the navigation right. Our design was much more usable for Chinese eyes. It reflected how Chinese shoppers think. Even some small details, such as including a men’s navigational tab and a women’s navigational tab, made the navigation more suitable to China’s online shoppers. It was like being in a Chinese department store.”

Trust

To attract buyers and sellers, the company needed to find a way to engender trust between vendors and customers. This was particularly challenging in the Chinese context. Professor Paul Ingram of Columbia Business School, who studied social networks, explained:

In the West, we tend to reserve trust from the heart (affect-based trust) for family and friends and trust from the head (cognition-based trust) for business partners. We see emotional concerns in business as unprofessional. But in China, affect- and cognition-based trust are highly intertwined, even in business.4 It is important that business partners have an affective bond. Few Chinese business relationships develop without socio-emotional exchanges such as sharing meals, gifts, and socializing with each other’s family.

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Taobao developed a number of mechanisms to help create trust between sellers and buyers:

Taobao sellers needed to register using their national identity card and bank account information.

As on eBay, Taobao allowed buyers and vendors to provide feedback for each other. Taobao distinguished between a person’s reputation as a seller and a buyer. (eBay provided only one score for each user.) Sellers on eBay tended to have more positive reputation scores (almost 50% had no negative scores in a six-month window) compared with sellers on Taobao (14% had no negative scores).5 Taobao sellers who provided feedback on a buyer automatically received a positive rating if the buyer did not respond within 45 days.

In 2004, the company introduced Alipay (支付宝, “payment treasure”), an escrow service designed to eliminate settlement risk among trading parties. Using Alipay, a buyer deposited payment for an outstanding order in an Alipay account; Alipay informed the seller when it received the funds, and the seller then shipped the goods. When the buyer informed Alipay that the merchandise had arrived, it instructed its bank to release the funds to the seller. Erisman explained the significance of Alipay:

Alipay was critical to Taobao’s development. Even when buyers see a seller with high ratings, the lack of trust still creates a big challenge. Alipay eliminates the settlement risk. The payment mechanism itself is not important. Payment is easy in China. People are used to wiring money; they can even do it online. But banks cannot address the settlement risk. This is where Alipay comes in. Now more than 80% of Taobao transactions rely on Alipay.

Taobao members were able to use Alipay free of charge. On eBay, there were many buyers who complained that they did not receive an item. Thanks to Alipay, this problem barely existed on Taobao.6

Taobao invested significant resources to facilitate communication between buyers and sellers and between users and the company. It embedded an instant-messaging service, Wangwang, in its website, allowing buyers to directly haggle with sellers, a process that both sides seemed to enjoy (see Exhibit 6). Yu Yan explained: “Buyers and sellers use our instant-messaging service to provide continuous feedback, ask for assistance, and make suggestions.” As a result, “communication problems” constituted only 8% of Taobao’s non-positive feedback. At eBay, this share stood at 20%.7

Fees

Unlike its U.S. competitor, Taobao did not charge listing or transactions fees. Erisman explained: “E-commerce was new in China. People were wary of scams. Chinese consumers were not familiar with online marketplaces, and merchants were reluctant to sell online without significant incentives. They wanted the marketplace to be free so they could dip their toes in the water.”

Ma directly challenged Whitman: “We call on eBay to do what’s right for this phase of China’s e-commerce development and make its services free for buyers and sellers in China.”

Whitman was not amused: “Free is not a business model. It speaks volumes about the strength of eBay’s business in China that Taobao is unable to charge for its products.”8

Locked into a head-to-head race, in 2004 it remained uncertain whether Taobao or eBay would prevail (Exhibit 7 compares user satisfaction levels during this period).

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Competition

By the time Taobao entered the C2C segment, eBay’s global revenues were US$2,165.1

million and the company had about 5,700 employees. In addition to its dominant position in the U.S., eBay had established a local presence in 19 countries. Creating a global marketplace was critical to eBay’s strategy: “A key element of our growth strategy is to continually expand the eBay marketplace to new communities around the world.” In 2003, international markets accounted for 35% of the company’s net revenues—more than a five-fold increase from 2000.

eBay had successfully expanded into international markets using the same basic business model. In 2001, eBay claimed to be the dominant platform in four of its overseas markets: Australia, Canada, Germany, and the U.K. eBay’s international expansion strategy was to enter countries with a large degree of Internet penetration and computer usage, then on a case-by-case basis, determine whether to start from scratch, do an acquisition, or enter into a partnership. In Germany, eBay entered via acquisition in 1999 by buying Alando.de, the premier auction site in that country. The company achieved similar success in the U.K. where eBay crushed its competition. In 2002, in response to eBay’s achievements, Yahoo! withdrew from the Internet-auction business throughout most of Europe.

In contrast to its success in Europe, eBay struggled and eventually lost the Japanese market to Yahoo! eBay’s failure was due to a series of missteps. Yahoo! managed to enter Japan first, a full five months before eBay. Masahiro Inoue, president and CEO of Yahoo! Japan, explained: “It was critical to be first. We knew catching up with a front-runner is hard in auctions.”9

Inoue was so concerned about achieving quick success that he asked his 120 employees to list items for sale to make the website look busy in the first few weeks. Once eBay entered, Japanese consumers perceived its site as insufficiently localized and expensive. eBay emphasized the used-collectibles business, thinking that the development of the market would mirror that in the U.S. However, Japanese auction users were more interested in new goods. And while Yahoo!’s auction site was free, eBay charged commissions of 1.25% to 5% and required sellers to provide credit card numbers, a hassle for young Japanese who preferred to pay cash on delivery. Two years after its launch, Yahoo! dominated the Japanese auction market, achieving a 95% share. In 2002, eBay conceded defeat and pulled out.

Eager to learn from its experience in Japan, eBay entered the Chinese market early, acquiring the market leader EachNet. eBay gave broad autonomy to the 150-person EachNet team, including Shao Yibo who remained in place as CEO. The company relied on website usability, marketing sophistication and strategic execution to defend its leading position. eBay charged Chinese sellers listing fees (up to 3 RMB) and transactions fees of up to 2% of the item’s value.

In 2005, eBay introduced its PayPal service to China to help transactions close more quickly. PayPal was a free service for all users. The same year, the company formed a strategic alliance with B2B facilitator Global Sources Ltd. The new partnership was aimed at eBay “PowerSellers” worldwide who gained an easy way to source their products directly from manufacturers in China. While Taobao and eBay dominated consumer marketplaces in China, there were several

smaller sites, Paipai being the most significant. was the e-commerce platform owned by Tencent Technology (Shenzhen) Company Limited. Tencent, a company listed in Hong Kong with revenue of RMB 3.8 billion and net profit RMB 1.6 billion, operated China’s most popular instant messaging service, QQ. At the time of Paipai’s launch, QQ had 170 million active accounts. ”Our advantage is our huge community base, which allows us to tap various potentials in mobile and

Internet areas,” Tencent CFO Patrick Tsang said.10 Paipai was seamlessly integrated with QQ.

5

eBay

Paipai

珍贵哈佛商学院案例 阿里巴巴 淘宝 HBS Case Strategy Alibaba's Taobao (A) -2009学习材料

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The site offered its services for free. “We don’t expect Paipai to bring in profits in the short term,” explained Tencent chairman Pony Ma.11

Market Leadership

In 2005, two years after Taobao’s launch, the battle between Ma and Whitman was decided: the mighty eBay had fallen. By the end of 2007, Taobao had achieved a leading position in C2C commerce in China, leaving an ever-smaller share of business to its competitors. (See Exhibit 8 for market share information and Exhibit 9 for patterns of growth.) At the end of 2006, eBay shut its site. The company entered into a joint venture with Hong Kong-based Tom Online, hoping a local partner would enable it to stage a comeback.

By 2007, Taobao had reached a gross merchandise volume (GMV) of RMB 43 billion, making it the second-largest retailer in China. Analysts estimated that online shopping would grow at a rate exceeding 50% in the next five years. Data on Taobao transactions showed that the company continued to deepen its reach. Online shopping, traditionally popular in the more affluent cities along China’s coast, grew quickly in second- and third-tier cities. In addition, the mix of products shifted from higher-end technical gadgets to day-to-day merchandise (see Exhibit 10). Ma’s vision of the company had evolved as well: “The retail infrastructure in China is terrible, extremely inefficient. Taobao will replace these traditional channels. We are now building the new Wal-Mart—online!”

Monetizing Taobao

For all its success, Taobao still had little revenue. Monetizing transactions had not been a priority for the company. Erisman remembered: “Jack was notorious for saying that we have no revenue model. The most important thing is to have critical mass. It gives you time to figure out what customers want. Let people make money. Let them use Taobao before we make money.”

In a first attempt at monetization in May 2006, Taobao developed a new service, Zhao Cai Jin Bao. Similar to Google’s auctions for keywords, sellers on Taobao were offered the opportunity to bid on keywords to influence the order in which search results for listed items would appear. Taobao typically displayed 20 search results on its first page. Zhao Cai Jin Bao would determine the order for the top one-half of these listings. Zhao Cai Jin Bao offered pay-for-performance contracts. Sellers would have to pay their bid only if a customer actually bought the advertised product.

Alibaba’s executive team wondered whether they had taken the right approach to monetizing Taobao. Was Zhao Cai Jin Bao, a hybrid between the approaches pioneered by eBay and Google, the future of online marketplaces?

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Exhibit 1

Zhejiang Sunkey’s Website on Alibaba

Source: Company documents.

Exhibit 2

Ltd.—Financial Information

2007

1,547,695

615,062 2,162,757

(280,113) 1,882,644

(736,813) (131,495) (229,868)

19,877 804,345 345,099 1,149,444

(181,649) 967,795

991,869 371,993 1,363,862

(237,625) 1,126,237

(610,198) (105,486) (159,969)

17,912 268,496 22,892 291,388

(71,450) 219,938 2006

Consolidated Income Statement (RMB ‘000)Revenue

International marketplace China marketplace Total revenue

Cost of revenue Gross profit

Sales and marketing expenses Product development expenses

General and administrative expenses

Other operating income Profit from operations Finance income, net

Profit before income taxes

Income tax charges

Profit attributable to equity owners of the Company

Source: Company documents.

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Exhibit 2 (continued) Ltd.—Financial Information

2007

29,088 158,992 260,311 27,067 10,767 486,225

26,320 48,143 219,229

952,382 4,321,170 5,567,244 6,053,469

486 2,893,132 (55,787) 20,357 119,615 635,278 3,613,081

- 113,304 211,875

4,988 330,167

25,148 36,389 163,392

781 1,051,000 437,804 1,714,514 2,044,681

354,533 3,937 58,223 (271,125) 145,568

2006

Consolidated Balance Sheet (RMB ‘000) Assets

Non-current assets Lease prepayment

Property and equipment Deferred tax assets

Prepayments, deposits and other receivables Deferred costs

Total non-current assets Current assets

Amounts due from related companies

Prepayments, deposits and other receivables Deferred costs Restricted cash

Term deposits with original maturities of over three months

Cash and cash equivalents Total current assets Total assets

Equity

Capital and reserves Share capital Share premium Capital reserve Exchange reserve Statutory reserves

Retained earnings/(Accumulated deficit) Total equity

Liabilities

Non-current liabilities Deferred revenue 70,194 37,146 Current liabilities Deferred revenue and customer advances 1,849,655 1,216,818 Trade payables 12,883 8,698 Amounts due to related companies 17,039 161,538 Other payables and accruals 337,085 172,281 Dividend payable - 195,909 Current income tax liabilities 153,532 106,723

Total current liabilities 2,370,194 1,861,967 Total liabilities 2,440,388 1,899,113 Total equity and liabilities 6,053,469 2,044,681 Net current assets/(liabilities) Total assets less current liabilities

Source: Company documents.

3,197,050 (147,453) 3,683,275

182,714

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Exhibit 3Alibaba and Main Competitors—Share Price Information

Source: Company documents.

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Exhibit 4

Internet Penetration

2002 2003

2004

2005

2006 2007

Internet users (millions) Internet penetration

Broadband users (millions) Broadband penetration

Source: Company documents.

59 76 94 111 137 210

4.6% 6.2% 7.3% 8.5% 10.5% 16.0% 6.6 17.4 42.8 64.3 90.7 163.4 11.2% 21.9% 45.5% 57.9% 66.2% 77.8%

Exhibit 5a

Taobao Home Page, May 2003

Source:

Company documents accessed via Internet Wayback Machine.

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Exhibit 5b

Taobao Home Page, July 2008

Source:

Company documents accessed via Internet Wayback Machine.

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Exhibit 5c

eBay Home Page, January 2003

Source:

Accessed via Internet Wayback Machine.

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Exhibit 6Why Do Buyers and Sellers Use C2C Websites?

Source:

iResearch, Shanghai: China C2C Ecommerce Research Report 2005.

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Exhibit 7User Satisfaction Taobao and eBay (2004)

(in percent) TaobaoeBayVery satisfied 24.3 10.9 Satisfied 52.2 51.5 So so 21.4 31.3 Not satisfied 2.1 6.3

Source: Company documents.

Exhibit 8Market Shares of C2C Marketplaces—by Gross Merchandise Volume (GMV)

(in percent) 2002 2003200420052006 2007Taobao 7.8 29 59 65 84

aeBay (TOM Eachnet) 85 72.4 65 36 26 7

Paipai 4 9Others 15 19.8 6 5 5 0

Source: Company documents.

aTOM Eachnet was a joint venture between eBay and TOM Online, established in December 2006.

Exhibit 9Growth of Online Shopping Sites

20022003200420052006 2007All Online Shopping Sites

Registered users (millions) 8.4 15.2 22.4 32.5 43.1 55.0 GMV (RMB billions) 1.3 1.9 5.1 15.7 25.8 56.1

Source: Company documents.

Exhibit 10Popular Products on Taobao

20062007Most popular products

Rank #1 Mobile handsets Clothes Rank #2 Notebooks Mobile handsets Rank #3 Clothes Cosmetics Rank #4 Cosmetics Home products Rank #5 Cameras Home appliances New products (%) 91

a99Buy it now (%)

Transactions using Alipay (%) 86

Source:

iResearch China Online Shopping Research Report (2007–2008).

a “Buy it now” refers to transactions in which sellers and buyers negotiate a price. The remaining transactions used auctions to

determine prices.

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Endnotes

1 Katie Hafner and Brad Stone, “eBay Is Expected to Close Its Auction Site in China,” New York Times,

December 19, 2006.

2 Lu Jiangyong, Zhigang Tao, and Isabella Chan, “eBay's Strategy in China: Alliance or Acquisition?

”

University of Hong Kong case HKU701, November 27, 2007.

3 “Unlocking the Chinese Internet Market,” China International Business, June 2008.

4 Roy Chua, Michael Morris, and Paul Ingram, “Guanxi versus Networking: Distinctive Configurations of

Affect- and Cognition-based Trust in the Networks of Chinese versus American Managers,” Journal of International Business Studies, forthcoming.

5 Zhangxi Lin and Jun Li, “The Online Auction Market in China: A Comparative Study between Taobao and

eBay,” ACM International Conference Proceeding Series 2005 (113): 123–129.

6 Shuang Li, Jing Luo, Jian He and H.J. Cai, “Trust Build-up in Online Transactions,” Wireless

Communications, Networking and Mobile Computing, 2007: 3513–3516.

7 Ibid.

8 Eric Auchard, “Rivals Taobao, eBay clash on whether free is best,” CRN, October 21, 2005, at

.au/News/20610,rivals-taobao-ebay-clash-on-whether-free-is-best.aspx.

9 Ken Belson, Rob Hof, and Ben Elgin, “How Yahoo! Japan Beat eBay at Its Own Game,” BusinessWeek,

June 4, 2001.

10 Sherman So, “Tencent profit jumps on one-off gain,” The Standard, August 25, 2005. 11 Ibid.

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