cfc-1中英整理

Public Discussion Draft BEPS ACTION 3：STRENGTHENING CFC RULES

强化受控外国企业规则

引言

1. Action Item 3 of the BEPS Action Plan recognises that groups can create low-taxed non-resident affiliates to which they shift income and that these affiliates may be established in low-tax countries wholly or partly for tax reasons rather than for non-income earned by foreign subsidiaries where certain conditions are met. However, some countries do not currently have CFC rules and others have rules that do not always counter BEPS situations in a comprehensive manner. Action Item 3 mandates Working Party 11 (WP 11) to “develop recommendations regarding the design of controlled foreign company rules”. The objective is to develop recommendations for CFC rules that are effective in dealing with base erosion and profit shifting. 《税基侵蚀与利润转移行动计划》第三项项行动认为，跨国企业集团可以通过创建低税非居民附属企业以向其转移所得，而且这些附属企业的创建可能完全或部分出于税收原因而不是非税业务原因。受控外国企业（简称“CFC”）规则旨在通过授权各司法管辖区，对符合特定条件的外国子公司所赚取的所得予以课税，从而打击这种避税行为。但是，当前部分国家并没有实施受控外国企业规则，而那些已经实施受控外国企业规则的国家也并不能总是以一种综合性的方法打击BEPS行为。《税基侵蚀与利润转移行动计划》之行动3授权第11工作小组“就受控外国企业规则的设计制定建议”。其宗旨在于，就有效应对税基侵蚀和利润转移的受控外国企业规则制定建议。

2. CFC rules have existed in the international tax context for over five decades, and dozens of countries have implemented these rules. This discussion draft considers all the constituent elements of CFC rules and breaks them down into the “building blocks” that are necessary for effective CFC rules. These building blocks would allow countries without CFC rules to implement recommended rules directly and countries with existing CFC rules to modify their rules to align more closely with the recommendations, and they include: I. Definition of a CFC II. Threshold requirements III. Definition of control

IV. Definition of CFC income V. Rules for computing income VI. Rules for attributing income

VII. Rules to prevent or eliminate double taxation

2. 国际税收背景下的受控外国企业规则至今已经存在超过50年，且数十个国家已经实施了这些规则。本讨论草案考虑了受控外国企业规则所有的构成要素，并将这些要素分别归入有效的受控外国企业规则所必需的不同的 “构成要件”。这些构成要件既允许那些没有受控外国企业规则的国家直接实施所建议的规则，也允许那些已经存在受控外国企业规则的国家修改各自的规则以与这些建议更加密切地相互匹配，这些构成要件包括： I. 受控外国企业的定义 II. 门槛要求 III. 控制的定义

IV. 受控外国企业所得的定义 V. 计算所得的规则 VI. 所得归属的规则

VII. 防止以及消除双重征税的规则

3. Before discussing these seven building blocks, this discussion draft first addresses the policy considerations to be considered in the context of Action Item 3. These include some fundamental policy considerations that need to be considered when designing CFC rules such as how to strike a balance between the need to tax foreign income and the need to maintain

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competitiveness, how to limit administrative and compliance burdens while ensuring that CFC rules are effective, and the avoidance of double taxation. It also considers the role of CFC rules; that is their role as preventative measures, the scope of base stripping prevented by CFC rules, and the interaction between transfer pricing rules and CFC rules. These are all briefly considered in Chapter 1. The following chapters then set out the building blocks.

在讨论上述七大构成要件之前，本讨论草案首先论述了在行动3背景下需要考虑的政策因素。这些政策考量因素包括在设计受控外国企业规则时所需考虑的基本的政策因素，比如：如何平衡对境外所得课税的需要和保持竞争力的需要；在确保受控外国企业规则有效实施并防止双重征税的同时，如何控制管理负担与遵从负担。同时，本讨论草案还考虑了受控外国企业规则的作用，即：作为预防性措施的作用；受控外国企业规则防止税基剥离的适用范围；以及转让定价规则与受控外国企业规则的相互影响。所有这些考量因素均在第一章中进行了简要概述。随后的各章节则列举了这些构成要件。

CHAPTER 1: POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

第一章：政策考量因素

6. The design of CFC rules intended to combat base erosion and profit shifting raises a number of policy considerations: (i) the purpose of CFC rules, (ii) how to strike a balance between taxing foreign income and maintaining competitiveness, (iii) how to limit administrative and compliance burdens while not creating opportunities for avoidance, (iv) the role of CFC rules as preventative measures, (v) the scope of base stripping prevented by CFC rules, (vi) how to ensure that CFC rules do not lead to double taxation, and (vii) the interaction between CFC rules and transfer pricing rules. These policy issues must be considered in order to develop recommendations for CFC rules.

6. 设计旨在打击税基侵蚀与利润转移的受控外国企业规则，引发了大量的政策考量因素：(i)受控外国企业规则的目标，(ii) 在对境外所得课税的需要与保持竞争力的需要之间如何取得平衡，(iii)在不产生避税空间的同时，如何控制管理负担和遵从负担， (iv) 作为预防性措施的受控外国企业规则的作用，(v)受控外国企业规则防止税基剥离的适用范围， (vi) 如何确保受控外国企业规则不导致双重征税，以及(vii)受控外国企业规则与转让定价规则之间的相互影响。这些政策问题必须予以考虑，以便制定有关受控外国企业规则的建议。

I. Purpose of CFC rules

I. 受控外国企业规则的目标

7. CFC rules tax the income of controlled foreign subsidiaries in the hands of resident shareholders. For most countries, they are used to prevent shifting of income either from the parent jurisdiction or from the parent and other tax jurisdictions. Some countries which give more importance to the principle of territoriality do not currently apply CFC rules. For those countries CFC rules would have to be limited to targeting profit shifting. However, where countries have worldwide tax systems, they may also be concerned about long-term deferral and therefore their rules may have broader policy objectives (for example, preventing long-term base erosion rather than only preventing profit shifting). 7. 受控外国企业规则对由居民股东控制的受控外国子公司的所得课税。对于大部分国家而言，这些规则被用于防止从其母公司所属司法管辖区或同时从其母公司和其他税收管辖区转移所得。然而，当前更重视属地原则的部分国家并不适用受控外国企业规则。对于这些国家而言，受控外国企业规则不得不限定于针对利润转移行为。但是，对于部分实施全球税制的国家而言，他们同时也会担忧长期递延纳税，因此这些国家的受控外国企业规则可能具有更广泛的政策目标（比如，防止长期税基侵蚀而不仅仅是防止利润转移）。

II. Striking a balance between taxing foreign income and maintaining competitiveness II. 在对境外所得课税的需要与保持竞争力的需要之间取得平衡

8. In designing CFC rules, a balance must be struck between taxing foreign income and the competitiveness concerns inherent in rules that tax the income of foreign subsidiaries. CFC rules raise two primary types of competitiveness concerns.

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First, jurisdictions with CFC rules that apply broadly may find themselves at a competitive disadvantage relative to jurisdictions without CFC rules (or with narrower CFC rules) because foreign subsidiaries owned by resident companies will be taxed more heavily than locally owned companies in the foreign jurisdiction. This competitive disadvantage may in turn lead to distortions, for instance it may impact on where groups choose to locate their head office or increase the risk of inversions, and it may also impact on ownership or capital structures where groups attempt to avoid the impact of CFC rules[1]. CFC rules can therefore run the risk of restricting or distorting real economic activity. Second, multinational enterprises resident in countries with robust CFC rules may find themselves at a competitive disadvantage relative to multinational enterprises resident in countries without such rules (or with CFC rules that apply to a significantly lower rate or narrower base). This competitiveness concern arises because the foreign subsidiaries of the first MNEs will be subject to a higher effective tax rate on the income of those subsidiaries than the foreign subsidiaries of the second MNEs due to the application of CFC rules, even when both subsidiaries are operating in the same country.

8. 在设计受控外国企业规则时，对境外所得课税与对竞争力的担忧之间必须取得平衡，这种平衡本身内含于对境外子公司的所得课税的受控外国企业规则之中。受控外国企业规则引发了两种主要类型的竞争力担忧。首先，广泛适用受控外国企业规则的司法管辖区可能会发现其自身相比于没有实施受控外国企业规则（或者实施相对狭义的受控外国企业规则）的司法管辖区处于竞争劣势，因为由居民公司所拥有的外国子公司相比于在该境外司法管辖区由当地企业所拥有的子公司而言，税负更重。这种竞争劣势可能反过来导致扭曲，比如，它可能影响跨国企业集团选择设置总部的地点，或者增加税收倒置的风险，而且这可能也会影响所有权或资本的架构，因为跨国企业集团试图规避受控外国企业规则的影响。因此，受控外国企业规则可能引发限制或者扭曲真实经济活动的风险。第二，居住在严格实施受控外国企业规则国家的跨国企业可能会发现其自身相比于居住在没有实施这类规则（或者虽然适用受控外国企业规则，但其所适用的税率显著偏低或者税基相对狭窄）国家的跨国企业处于竞争劣势。正是因为适用了受控外国企业规则，导致第一种类型的跨国企业的境外子公司就其所得将适用比第二种类型跨国企业的境外子公司更高的实际税率，从而引发了对竞争力的担忧，即使这两种类型的子公司均在同一个国家从事经营活动。

9. The balance between taxing foreign income and maintaining competitiveness is often discussed in the tax policy literature by referring to the impossibility of achieving both capital export neutrality (CEN) and capital import neutrality (CIN) in the absence of harmonised tax rates. CEN, under which taxes do not distort a domestic taxpayer’s decision to invest capital domestically or internationally, requires taxing foreign income at the same rate as domestically earned income. CIN, under which taxes do not favour domestic over foreign investments of capital, requires that income earned from investments in a particular country is taxed at the same rate regardless of the investor’s residence.

10. To address these concerns, CFC rules typically exempt so-called “active” income that is, or is more likely to be, linked to real economic activity in the foreign subsidiary and has not been, or is less likely to have been, shifted from the parent company. This approach may not be entirely effective in combatting BEPS, but, in developing recommendations for the design of CFC rules, the balance between taxing foreign income and maintaining competitiveness needs to be kept in mind. Another way to maintain competitiveness would be to ensure that more countries implement similar CFC rules. This is therefore a space where countries working collectively and adopting similar rules could reduce the competitiveness concerns that individual countries may have when considering whether to implement CFC rules.

9. 由于在缺乏统一税率的情况下，几乎不可能同时实现资本输出中性（CEN）和资本输入中性（CIN），在一些税收政策文献中经常会讨论如何实现对境外所得课税与保持竞争力之间的平衡。在资本输出中性（CEN）状态下，税收并不会扭曲国内纳税人向国内或国际投入资本的决策，资本输出中性（CEN）要求对境外所得与在境内所赚取的所得以同样的税率课税。但在资本输入中性（CIN）状态下，对境内资本投资的课税并不优于对境外资本投资的课税，资本输入中性（CIN）要求对投资于特定国家所赚取的所得以同样的税率课税，而不论其投资者的居住地。 III. Limiting administrative and compliance burdens while not creating opportunities for avoidance III.

在不产生避税空间的同时控制管理负担和遵从负担

15. 第三个需要考量的政策因素是，如何在实现规则有效性的同时，不会过度增加遵从成本和管理负担。尽管受控外国企业规则的益处之一可能在于其相对机械的使用，但完全机械的受控外国企业规则也许并不如那些允许更多弹性的规则有效，而且由于上述原因也许它们并不适合于欧盟法律。但是，弹性也可能导致不确定性，而不确定性可能

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同时影响使用和遵从受控外国企业规则的成本。在减少机械规则所固有的复杂性和更主观规则的有效性之间，受控外国企业规则必须达成某种平衡。本政策考量因素更清晰地反映在有关所得定义的规则当中。在该背景下，尽管完全基于正式的类别对所得确定归属的方法也许会降低管理和遵从负担，但这样一种方法可能不太有效，而且当前实施受控外国企业规则的各国通常都选择将这一方法与具有更少机械性的实质性分析相结合，以确保所归属的所得事实上源自于税基侵蚀和利润转移。而且，对与实质性基础分析规则相关的管理负担的担忧，也可以通过适当针对性的实体层面的豁免予以降低。

IV. CFC rules as preventative measures IV. 作为预防性措施的受控外国企业规则

16. CFC rules are designed to act as a deterrent. In other words, CFC rules are not designed to raise significant revenue in the form of additional corporate taxation. Instead, they are designed to prevent taxpayers from shifting income into CFCs in the first place, and they therefore protect revenue by preventing tax avoidance rather than subjecting parent companies to tax on their CFCs. CFC rules will, of course, raise some revenue by taxing the income of CFCs, but there is likely to be a reduction in the income shifted to CFCs after the implementation of CFC rules.

16. 受控外国企业规则旨在充当威慑性的规则。换句话说，受控外国企业规则并不是旨在以公司税的附加形式筹集大量的税收。相反，首先这些规则旨在防止纳税人向受控外国企业转移所得，因此这些规则是通过防止避税以保护国家税收，而非对母公司的各受控外国企业强制征税以保护国家税收。当然，受控外国企业规则通过对受控外国企业的所得征税，的确会产生部分税收，但在实施受控外国企业规则以后，也可能减少转移至受控外国企业的所得。 VI. Avoiding double taxation VI. 避免双重征税

20. An additional consideration is how to avoid double taxation. Since CFC rules subject the income of a foreign subsidiary to taxation in the parent jurisdiction, they can lead to double taxation if the subsidiary is also subject to taxation in the CFC jurisdiction. Double taxation concerns can be limited by incorporating low-tax thresholds, which are discussed in the next section, into CFC rules. Existing CFC rules also seek to prevent double taxation through provisions such as foreign tax credits. These provisions are outlined in the discussion of the seventh building block in Chapter 8. 20. 另一个考量因素是如何避免双重征税。由于受控外国企业规则对境外子公司的所得在其母公司所属司法管辖区征税，如果作为受控外国企业的该子公司同时也在其所属司法管辖区被征税，那么就可能导致双重征税。对于双重征税问题，可以通过在受控外国企业规则中置入低税率门槛予以限制，有关低税率门槛的讨论将在下一章节进行。同时，现行受控外国企业规则也试图通过诸如外国税收抵免的条款来防止双重征税。这些条款将在第8章有关第七大构成要件的讨论中进行概述。 VII. CFC rules and transfer pricing VII. 受控外国企业规则与转让定价

21. Transfer pricing rules are intended to adjust the taxable profits of associated enterprises to eliminate distortions arising whenever the prices or other conditions of transactions between those enterprises differ from what they would have been if the enterprises had been unrelated. If transfer pricing rules were to fully achieve this objective, they would restore the taxing rights of all jurisdictions involved. As with CFC rules, transfer pricing rules often achieve this objective by deterring business from entering into certain arrangements. Because controlled foreign company rules by definition address related parties (as the companies that are captured by such rules are controlled by another party), jurisdictions often also use these rules to combat the adjusted prices charged between related parties. In other words, CFC rules are seen as a way for a parent jurisdiction to capture income earned by a foreign subsidiary that may not have been earned had the original pricing of the income-creating asset been set correctly. CFC rules are thus often referred to as “backstops” to transfer pricing rules.That terminology, however, is misleading, in that CFC rules generally do not complement transfer pricing rules in a coherent manner. Instead, CFC regimes applying a sufficiently high rate of tax may make certain transfer pricing outcomes irrelevant to the MNE by removing the benefit of engaging in transfer pricing manipulation. It is generally therefore not that the principle of CFC rules is to capture income from transfer pricing manipulation but that certain CFC provisions may sometimes have this effect.

21. 转让定价规则旨在调整关联企业的应税利润，以消除由于关联企业间交易的价格或其他条件与非关联企业间交易

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的价格或其他条件有任何的不同而导致的利润扭曲。如果转让定价规则要完全实现这一宗旨，就应恢复所有所涉司法管辖区的征税权。与受控外国企业规则一样，转让定价规则通常借助阻止企业达成某些特定的安排以实现这一宗旨。换句话说，受控外国企业规则被视为一种受控外国企业母公司所属司法管辖区捕获外国子公司赚取所得的一种方式，但如果外国子公司产生所得的资产的原始价格已被正确设置，那么这些被母公司所属司法管辖区所捕获的所得则没有被外国子公司真的赚取。因此，受控外国企业规则通常被称之为转让定价规则的“捕手”。但是，这一术语往往产生误导，因为受控外国企业规则通常并不能以一种一贯的方式对转让定价规则予以补充。相反，适用足够高税率的受控外国企业制度由于消除了操纵转让定价的利益，却反而可能会产生与跨国企业无关的某些特定的转让定价后果。因此，一般而言，受控外国企业规则的原则并不是要捕获操纵转让定价的所得，但受控外国企业规则的某些特定条款有时却会产生这种效果。

22. CFC rules may target the same income as transfer pricing rules in some situations, but it is unlikely that either CFC rules or transfer pricing rules in practice eliminate the need for the other set of rules. Instead, while CFC rules may capture some income that is not captured by transfer pricing rules (and vice versa), neither set of rules fully captures the income that the other set of rules intends to capture for a number of reasons.

22. 在某些情形下，受控外国企业规则可能与转让定价规则会针对同一项所得，但在实践中，受控外国企业规则与转让定价规则均不大可能消除对其他一系列规则的需要。相反，尽管受控外国企业规则可能捕获转让定价规则不曾捕获的某些所得（反之亦然），但两套规则均不可能完全捕获其他一系列规则基于各种各样的原因所试图捕获的所得。 23. Firstly, the type of CFC rule that would most effectively replace transfer pricing rules for transactions within the same control group would be a full-inclusion system. Given a sufficiently high tax rate, such a system, where there is no exemption for income arising from economic activity undertaken by the CFC (and all income is therefore included as attributable CFC income), provides the most complete example of the backstop effect because it removes the benefit to related parties of engaging in transfer pricing manipulation. In fact, full inclusion removes the benefit associated with any type of intragroup arbitrage because all income from such transactions will be taxed at the parent company level under a full-inclusion system. Partial-inclusion systems, particularly those that focus on formal classification of income, often only capture transfer pricing schemes haphazardly, since the determination of which income is attributed for CFC purposes does not align with the determination of what prices should be charged.

23. 首先，对于同一控制集团内部的交易而言，能够最有效替代转让定价规则的受控外国企业规则，应该是一种全面参与制度。如果适用足够高的税率，且对于受控外国企业从事经济活动所产生的所得均没有豁免，这样一种全面参与制度提供了捕手效果的最完整案例，因为它消除了关联企业从事转让定价操纵的利益。事实上，在全面参与制度下，这种全面参与消除了与任何类型集团内部套利交易相关的利益，因为所有的此类交易所得均在母公司层面课税。而对于部分参与制度而言，尤其是那些专注于正式类别所得的部分参与制度，通常只能偶然捕获部分转让定价规划，因为确定哪些所得应归属于受控外国企业与确定应支付何种价格并不完全一致。

24. Secondly, to the extent that CFC rules do not fully deter BEPS, they only restore (or transfer) taxing rights to parent jurisdictions, which are not necessarily the jurisdictions which have suffered the profit shifting.

24. 其次，某种程度上而言，受控外国企业规则并不能完全阻止BEPS行为，因为这些规则只能向母公司所属司法管辖区恢复（或者转移）征税权，而这些母公司所属司法管辖区并不必然已经发生利润转移行为。

25. Thirdly, if the tax rate of the parent state is lower than the tax rate applicable to some of the subsidiaries, it will still be advantageous to the MNE to shift profits away from those higher-tax subsidiaries.

25. 第三，如果母公司所在国的税率低于其部分子公司所适用的税率，那么跨国企业由高税率子公司向低税率母公司转移利润仍然是有利可图的。

26. Fourthly, businesses can avoid the effect of CFC rules by restructuring under companies resident in jurisdictions without CFC rules or with low tax rates while still accessing the same capital markets. Transfer pricing rules, in contrast, can be applied by all countries where economic activity takes place to protect their own tax bases.

26. 第四，企业可以通过重组，将公司设置为在没有受控外国企业规则或者适用低税率的司法管辖区的居民企业，以规避受控外国企业规则的影响，而与此同时仍可进入同一资本市场。与此相反，转让定价规则却可以适用于所有发生经济活动的国家，以保护它们各自的税基。

27. Finally, even a full-inclusion system would not necessarily capture transfer pricing or arbitrage transactions between

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