62年古巴导弹危机，毛泽东的态度令苏联非常难堪 从古巴导弹危机看对危机的处理 八千字电报

62年古巴导弹危机 毛泽东的态度令苏联非常难堪

古巴导弹危机期间，作好应战准备的古巴军队 在中央文献出版社2003年12月首版、由逄先知和金冲及两位著名党史专家主编的《毛泽东传（1949－1976）》在“三十一、中苏论战”一章中写道：“一九六二年十月，苏联在加勒比海危机中，和美国一度剑拔弩张，搞得十分紧张。但在这场危机过后，很快就迁怒于中国。十二月十二日，赫鲁晓夫在苏联最高苏维埃会议上发表讲话，指责中国在中印边境冲突和加勒比海危机中的原则立场。这个讲话，成了苏联指挥一些党对中共发起新一轮围攻的信号。”

在古巴导弹危机（又称加勒比海危机）后，苏联为何迁怒于中国？赫鲁晓夫指责中国在古巴导弹危机中的原则立场，到底中国在该危机中采取了什么原则立场？对此，《毛泽东传（1949－1976）》中没有提及。笔者带着疑惑，又查阅由中央文献出版社、世界知识出版社于1994年12月首版的《毛泽东外交文选》，从中惊奇地发现：在古巴导弹危机当年，文选收入的只有毛泽东同日本禁止原子弹氢弹协议会理事长安井郁谈话的一部分，题为《中间地带国家的性质各不相同》（1962年1月3日），谈话发生在危机前9个月；令人费解的是，《毛泽东外交文选》全书并没有提到古巴导弹危机这一曾经把人类推向核战争边缘的惊心事件，更别说中国政府和毛泽东在这一危机中的原则立场了！笔者又去查阅军事科学出版社1997年7月首版的《中国军事百科全书》的军事历史分册，结果竟然发现：没有“古巴导弹危机”或“加勒比海危机”词条。 为什么？为何在《毛泽东传（1949－1976）》、《毛泽东外交文选》、《中国军事百科全书》中对古巴导弹危机讳莫如深？带着疑问，循着《毛泽东传（1949－1976）》“中苏论战”一章提供的线索，结合查阅大量当年的《人民日报》，笔者一步步揭开了其中的秘密?? 一、赫鲁晓夫企图险中求胜，肯尼迪被迫绝地反击，古巴导弹危机揭幕

1959年初，地处加勒比海的古巴发生了革命，以卡斯特罗为首的革命起义军进行了武装暴动，推翻了亲美卖国、贪污腐化的巴蒂斯塔独裁统治，建立了革命政权。古巴是加勒比海地区最大的岛国，距美国只有140海里。美国一向把拉美地区视为自己的后院，没想到这

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次后院起火，美国如坐针毡，于是，便视古巴革命政权为肉中之刺。而苏联却喜出望外，视古巴为击破美国称霸拉丁美洲的桥头堡。

1961年4月，在美国中央情报局的策划下，制造了著名的“猪湾事件”。由美国海空军提供支持的1400名全副武装的古巴流亡分子在古巴的猪湾海岸登陆，企图突袭并推翻古巴革命政权。结果，这次行动遭到了彻底的失败，古巴军队全歼了这些叛乱分子，粉碎了此次行动，美古关系不断恶化。在这种情况下，弱小的古巴不得不寻求外界的支援。古巴看到了美苏之间的深刻矛盾，于是把目光对准了苏联，向苏联政府发出了请求援助的信息。

美国U-2飞机拍摄下的驻古巴苏军导弹阵地

苏联认为古巴是其在拉美的一个重要阵地，通过对古巴的支援，可以控制古巴，进而扩大自己在拉丁美洲的影响，并且想借此改变苏美军事力量，尤其是核力量的对比。于是，便决定援助古巴，向古巴提供了大批武器装备，并派出了顾问团。同时，苏联领导人赫鲁晓夫也十分清楚：古巴距美国仅有140海里之遥，而距苏联却达10000多公里，并且美国还拥有核优势，苏联没有能力在如此遥远的地方和美国对抗。但是，苏联拥有中程弹道导弹，因此决定在古巴秘密部署中程弹道导弹。1962年6月，苏联和古巴签署了部署苏联导弹的秘密协议，该协议的主要内容是：古巴接受苏联的24个中程和中远程弹道火箭，每个携带两枚导弹和一个核弹头；24个先进的萨姆II型地空导弹发射器；42架米格战斗机和42架伊尔—28轰炸机；加上其他一些海岸防卫武器。这些武器由苏联人掌控，另外派4.2万名军人驻扎在古巴。

1962年10月15日，美国U—2飞机拍摄到了苏联中程弹道导弹的照片，美国很快确认，苏联已经在古巴部署了16至32枚导弹核武器。10月22日，美国总统肯尼迪公开宣布：苏联在古巴部署了导弹，这一行为已经构成了“所有美洲国家和平与安全的明显威胁”，美国对此绝不会听之任之；我已经下令封锁古巴，并对一切正在运往古巴的进攻性军事装备实行海上“隔离”，苏联必须在联合国的监督下撤走进攻性武器。23日，肯尼迪又签署了《禁止进攻性武器运往古巴》的公告，宣布从24日起将拦截可能前往古巴的舰船并勒令这些船只听候美国的检查。与此同时，美国摆出一副核大战的样子，调动了180艘舰船（包括8艘航母），68个空军中队，战略轰炸机携带核弹升空、战略核潜艇出海，另有5个师的部队集结在佛罗里达，全球美军处于核战备状态。

肯尼迪打出他的“王牌”之后，苏联政府马上做出了反应，苏联发表声明：苏联将按照

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9月2日达成的苏联向古巴供应武器和提供技术、专家的协议，继续用核武器“援助”古巴，并坚决拒绝美国军舰的拦截。苏联指责美国实行海上封锁是史无前例的海盗行为，是“朝着热核战争走去”，同时表示，如果美国敢于发动战争，那么苏联将进行“最猛烈的回击”，“苏联有必须的一切”。赫鲁晓夫认为，美国的海上封锁只是虚张声势，它不可能进攻古巴，所以他命令苏联舰只继续向古巴挺进，不要害怕美国的海上封锁；宣布苏联和华沙条约组织国家的武装力量立即进入最高战备状态。双方剑拔弩张，第三次世界大战大有一触即发之势，古巴导弹危机（又称加勒比海危机）爆发。 二、毛泽东放话：“全力支援古巴人民，粉碎美国的战争挑衅。”卡斯特罗心领神会，“竟然敢于向美国提出‘五个条件’” 加勒比海危机爆发时，中苏国家关系已经出现裂痕，且对于苏联在古巴秘密部署导弹一无所知。不过，作为社会主义阵营一分子，美国封锁古巴消息一传出，中国政府和毛泽东就严正声明：坚决支持古巴、反对美国的战争挑衅。“不管在什么样的风浪中，六亿五千万中国人民都永远同古巴人民站在一起，坚决支持古巴革命，团结一致，为反对美帝国主义的战争和侵略政策斗争到底。”对于美国的核讹诈，中国政府重申了毛泽东关于“原子弹是纸老虎”的著名论断。

中国一开始的态度，与苏联保持了一致，为苏联与美国抗衡增添了强有力的砝码，“为国际反美斗争平添了几分声色”。但是，中国这时和印度发生边境战争，苏联领导人认为中国有利用其拖住美国手脚的目的。

1962年10月26日，美国军舰在空军的配合下，拦截进入“隔离区”的苏联船只。在美国强大的军事压力下，赫鲁晓夫改变了主意。他立即命令那些正向古巴行驶的舰只掉头返航，并致电美国总统肯尼迪，希望能够寻找解决这次危机的可行方案。苏联的这一“突变”，引起中国政府和毛泽东的关注。

10月28日，由于苏联实力当时还比不上美国，美国也认识到核大战的可怕后果，双方正式达成妥协：苏联将全部拆除部署在古巴的导弹，并在联合国进行核查之后运回本国；美国允诺拆除前不久刚刚在土耳其部署完毕的导弹基地，并保证不会发动对古巴的军事进攻。但是，美苏的相互妥协并没有征求古巴政府的意见，因此引起古巴政府的不满。一开始，卡斯特罗拒绝撤走苏联的导弹和轰炸机，这一立场得到中国政府和毛泽东的同情和支持。毛泽东联想起一件事：抗日战争后期，美国、苏联签署《雅尔塔协议》，以牺牲中国利益为代价（如允许外蒙古独立等），换取苏联出兵东北；现在，苏联又以牺牲古巴为代价，换取美国在某些方面的让步。古巴和中国在大国博弈中的相同遭遇，引起毛泽东对苏联的不快。就在美苏达成妥协的10月28日，中共中央机关报《人民日报》发表《全世界人民动员起来，支援古巴人民，粉碎美国战争挑衅》一文，“毛泽东对文章进行了多次修改”： “中国人民对于美帝国主义猖狂的战争挑衅感到无比的愤慨。在我国政府发表了关于支持古巴、反对美国战争挑衅的声明之后，我国各人民团体又分别致电古巴人民，表示坚决支持古巴人民反对美国侵略的正义斗争。各地群众纷纷愤怒谴责美帝国主义的侵略罪行，今天首都各界人民，将举行支持古巴人民、反对美国侵略的集会。全国人民正在动员起来，全力支援古巴人民，粉碎美国的战争挑衅。”中国的这一态度，与正企图使卡斯特罗屈服的苏联背道而驰，引起苏联强烈不满。

1962年10月30日至31日，联合国秘书长吴丹亲自访问了古巴，劝卡斯特罗同意撤走苏联的导弹和轰炸机。这时，在“曾经在朝鲜教训过美国人的毛泽东表态全力支持古巴后”，卡斯特罗接受了吴丹的劝说，但断然拒绝联合国观察员进入古巴，并向美国提出了“五个条件”：（一）停止在全世界范围内对古巴进行的经济制裁；（二）停止对古巴进行一切颠覆活动；（三）停止自美国各地和波多黎各对古巴进行海盗袭击；（四）停止美国飞机和军舰侵犯古巴领空领海；（五）撤除关塔那摩基地，并将它归还古巴。赫鲁晓夫听说后，惊叹：“天啦！

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卡斯特罗竟然敢于向美国提出‘五个条件’！难道是毛泽东给他撑腰？” 三、毛泽东通过《人民日报》向国际社会表态：“保卫古巴革命”；赫鲁晓夫一味主张“明智的妥协”

这时，赫鲁晓夫由对美国采取冒险政策，改而采取了几近投降的政策，对卡斯特罗提出的“五个条件”嗤之以鼻，却大谈美国的“和平诚意”。 10月31日，《人民日报》发表了经毛泽东圈阅的社论《保卫古巴革命》，表达了中国政府的原则立场：

“坚决反对美帝国主义对古巴的军事挑衅和战争威胁，坚决抓住美国入侵古巴的魔手，保卫古巴革命，这是全世界一切爱好和平的人民当前最迫切的任务。”“美帝国主义的头子、美国总统肯尼迪，在苏联部长会议主席赫鲁晓夫宣布撤除在古巴的所谓‘进攻性’武器之后，表示美国可以同意马上取消现在实施的对古巴的海上封锁和提供不入侵古巴的保证。现在，美国的海上封锁并没有取消，而入侵古巴的军事部署仍在加紧进行，全世界人民绝不能轻信美国侵略者的空头支票，必须保持最高度的警惕。”

对于卡斯特罗提出的、赫鲁晓夫帮美国搪塞的“五个条件”，社论认为：

“卡斯特罗总理提出的这些条件是完全合理的，完全必要的。古巴人民为了确保加勒比海的和平，完全有理由要求美国停止它威胁古巴安全的一切侵略活动。古巴人民为了维护自己的主权，完全有理由要求美国停止一切侵犯古巴主权的罪恶行为，拒绝一切侵犯古巴主权的无理要求。”

针对古巴不愿意撤走导弹、轰炸机一事，社论予以支持，“面对着美帝国主义的侵略威胁，古巴人民为了保卫革命的果实，不得不努力加强自己的国防力量。古巴人民采取什么样的措施来防御外来的侵略，这完全是古巴人民主权范围内的事情，谁也无权干涉，同时也决不构成对其他国家安全的威胁。”

对于赫鲁晓夫鼓吹美国的“和平诚意”，社论指出：

“看吧，美国陆海空军是多么紧张地准备着对古巴的进攻。据美国的合众国际社报道，在离古巴只有九十海里的美国佛罗里达州基韦斯特基地附近，在一百六十五哩的海岸线上，美国部署了作好战斗准备的军队、卡车、武器和装备，导弹林立，搜寻目标的雷达不断在地平线上瞄射。数以千计的海军陆战队员在加勒比海的美国舰队上，等待在古巴登陆的命令。美国空军一直在加强在南佛罗里达的快速喷气战斗机和战斗轰炸机的力量。美国国防部发言人27日公然宣布，美国飞机将继续侵犯古巴领空进行侦察活动。他并且威胁说：如遭到高射炮射击，将进行还击。同日，美国国防部长下令征召一万四千名空军后备人员服役，这批后备人员28日已纷纷赶到各基地入伍，组成新的运兵飞机联队，准备入侵古巴。这一系列的事实充分证明：美帝国主义入侵古巴的战争部署不是在减弱而是在加强，所谓不入侵古巴的保证完全是骗人的鬼话。” 对赫鲁晓夫“明智的妥协”，社论还以赞扬古巴人民革命精神的方式，表示了极度蔑视： “古巴人民的革命是从七支步枪开始的。从那个时候起，在他们的字典中就没有‘屈服’这个词。古巴人民的革命经验证明：被压迫人民的觉醒和团结，是最伟大、最可靠的力量。决定历史命运的，是觉悟了的、敢于斗争和敢于胜利的、武装起来的人民群众，而不是帝国主义和反动派自以为了不起的任何武器。古巴人民既然能够主要地依靠自己的力量，取得了革命的胜利，巩固了革命的成果，推进了革命的事业，也就一定能够在全世界人民的支援下，依靠自己的英勇顽强的斗争，抵挡住任何袭击，保卫住伟大的社会主义祖国。” 和苏联开始以古巴为对抗美国的前沿阵地、关键时刻却抽身而逃相反，社论表达了中国政府和人民的态度：

“全世界的革命人民，一切爱好和平的人民，都站在古巴人民一边。在反对全世界最凶恶的敌人美帝国主义的正义斗争中，古巴人民是决不会孤立的。我们中国人民，对于面对着

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美帝国主义侵略的古巴人民，怀着最崇高的敬意，表示最坚决的支持。中古人民是经得起任何严重考验的革命战友，不管在怎么样的惊涛骇浪中，我们六亿五千万中国人民都永远同古巴人民站在一起，为保卫古巴的革命而斗争到底。”

但是，古巴最终还是没有能顶住苏联的压力。11月20日，苏联撤走了它部署在古巴的42枚导弹，并且拆除了全部导弹基地；美国也宣布解除对古巴的海上封锁，古巴导弹危机遂告结束。

四、毛泽东认为：赫鲁晓夫既“在战略上犯投降主义的错误”，又“在战术上犯冒险主义的错误”

在处理古巴导弹危机的关键时刻，中国政府发出和苏联不一样的声音，加剧了中苏的紧张形势，扩大了彼此间的裂痕。在苏联操纵下，东、西欧各国共产党纷纷对中国发出指责。《毛泽东传（1949－1976）》记载，“一九六二年冬，一些欧洲的共产党相继召开代表大会。苏共领导人又利用这个机会，向中共代表团发起围攻。首先是一九六二年十一月召开的保加利亚共产党第八次代表大会，由此拉开了在一些党的代表大会上公开指名攻击中国共产党的序幕。随后召开的匈牙利社会主义工人党第八次代表大会、捷克斯洛伐克共产党第十二次代表大会，对中国共产党的攻击调门越来越高，卷入的兄弟党也越来越多。” 《毛泽东传（1949－1976）》中写道，“在这种情况下，毛泽东和中共中央决定发表一系列答辩文章进行反击。第一篇答辩文章，是十二月十五日发表的《人民日报》社论《全世界无产者联合起来，反对我们的共同敌人》。这篇社论原先的标题是‘坚持真理，弄清是非，团结对敌’。毛泽东看了，觉得不够响亮，便重新拟了这个标题。毛泽东是十二月十四日凌晨修改这篇社论的，当时他正在杭州。他在给邓小平的批语中说：‘此文已阅，认为写得很好，有必要发表这类文章。’‘又，题目似宜改一下，更为概括和响亮些，请酌定。’”“从这篇社论起，中国共产党紧紧抓住团结的旗帜，对各种攻击进行有节制的反击。” 在这篇毛泽东“已阅，认为写得很好”、完全能够代表他本人思想的《全世界无产者联合起来，反对我们的共同敌人》文章中，一开始就提出：

“在这里，我们要说一说捷共代表大会上发生的事情。??捷共一些同志和某些兄弟党的同志，攻击中国共产党犯了所谓‘冒险主义’的错误。他们指责中国在古巴问题上反对‘明智的妥协’，要把全世界‘拖入热核战争’。事情果真是像他们所指责的那样吗？” 文章首先重申了中国政府对古巴导弹危机的原则立场：

“中国共产党一贯认为，要维护世界和平，要实现和平共处，要和缓国际紧张局势，首先必须坚决反对美帝国主义的侵略和战争政策，必须发动人民群众同美帝国主义进行针锋相对的斗争。我们相信，正如莫斯科宣言和莫斯科声明所指出的，社会主义力量、民族解放力量、民主力量以及一切和平力量的联合斗争，能够挫败美帝国主义的侵略和战争计划，阻止世界大战的爆发。” 接着，文章对于一些人无理指责中国支持卡斯特罗对美国提出的五个条件是“冒险主义”、要把全世界“拖入热核战争”，作出了激愤的辩解：

“中国共产党、中国政府和中国人民，坚决支持古巴统一革命组织和古巴政府的正确路线，支持古巴人民的五项正义要求和他们的英勇斗争。这是中国履行自己的不容推卸的无产阶级国际主义的义务。如果说中国支持古巴人民反对美国侵略者的正义斗争就是什么‘冒险主义’，那么，我们要问，是不是要中国人民不尽自己的可能支持古巴反对美帝国主义的侵略，才不叫做冒险主义呢？是不是硬要古巴放弃主权、放弃独立、放弃五项正义要求，才不叫做冒险主义，也不叫做投降主义呢？全世界都看到，我们既没有要求把核武器运进古巴，也没有阻挠把所谓‘进攻性’武器撤出古巴，所以对我们来说，根本说不上什么‘冒险主义’，更说不上什么要把全世界‘拖入热核战争’。”

接着，文章不点名地批判了赫鲁晓夫在这一危机中的“冒险主义”和“投降主义”，即“在

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战略上不敢藐视敌人，而在战术上又轻率、鲁莽，那就既会在战略上犯投降主义的错误，又会在战术上犯冒险主义的错误”：

“在如何对待帝国主义和一切反动派这个问题上，中国共产党一贯认为，在战略上要藐视它，在战术上要重视它。这就是说，一方面，从战略上看，从长远的整体的观点来看，归根到底，帝国主义和一切反动派是一定要失败的，人民群众是一定要胜利的。没有这样的认识，就不能鼓励人民群众信心百倍地向帝国主义和一切反动派进行坚决的革命斗争，就不能引导革命走向胜利。另一方面，从战术上看，在当前的每一个具体问题上，又必须认真对待帝国主义和一切反动派，必须严肃谨慎，讲究斗争艺术。没有这种认识，就不能进行胜利的革命斗争，就有遭受挫折和失败的危险，也不能引导革命走向胜利。中国共产党历来坚持的在战略上藐视敌人、在战术上重视敌人的观点，就是我们经常说的帝国主义和一切反动派都是纸老虎的观点，这完全是马克思列宁主义的观点。我们既反对投降主义，又反对冒险主义。一切要革命和要胜利的人，对待敌人只能采取这种态度，而不能采取别种态度。因为，如果在战略上不敢藐视敌人，那就必然会犯投降主义的错误。如果在战术上，在具体斗争中轻率、鲁莽，那就必然会犯冒险主义的错误。如果在战略上不敢藐视敌人，而在战术上又轻率、鲁莽，那就既会在战略上犯投降主义的错误，又会在战术上犯冒险主义的错误。” 文章又以赞扬古巴人民的方式，无情地嘲弄了赫鲁晓夫既“犯投降主义的错误”，也“犯冒险主义的错误”：“我们认为，英勇的古巴人民在反对美帝国主义斗争中，既没有犯投降主义的错误，也没有犯冒险主义的错误。”

五、毛泽东对赫鲁晓夫嬉笑怒骂，意共总书记陶里亚蒂火上浇油

经毛泽东圈阅的《全世界无产者联合起来，反对我们的共同敌人》一文在批判“唯核武器论”的同时，还对苏联不知会中国就“拿核武器作赌注”进行了讽刺：

“在对待核武器问题上，中国共产党人一贯主张全面禁止具有巨大破坏力的核武器，一贯反对帝国主义的罪恶的核战争政策，并且一贯认为，在社会主义阵营拥有强大优势的条件下，通过谈判，通过对美帝国主义的不断揭露和斗争，达成禁止核武器的协议，也是有可能的。但是，一切马克思列宁主义者和各国革命人民，从来没有被帝国主义手里的核武器所吓倒，而放弃反对帝国主义及其走狗的斗争。我们马克思列宁主义者不是唯武器论者，也不是唯核武器论者。我们从来不认为核武器能够决定人类命运。我们深信，人民群众是历史发展的决定性力量。只有人民群众才能够决定人类历史的命运。我们坚决反对帝国主义的核讹诈政策，我们也认为社会主义国家根本不需要拿核武器作赌注，也不需要拿它来吓唬人。如果那样做，就会真正地犯冒险主义的错误。如果迷信核武器，看不到也不信任人民群众的力量，在帝国主义的核讹诈面前仓皇失措，那就有可能从一个极端跳到另一个极端，就可能犯投降主义的错误。”

对于苏联对美国、中国一“和”一“狠”，文章学尽毛泽东嬉笑怒骂之长： “对于共产党人来说，一个起码的要求应该是分清敌我，应该是对敌狠，对己和。可是，有一些人恰恰颠倒过来了。他们同帝国主义就那样‘迎合’、‘彼此让步’；而对兄弟党和兄弟国家却是这样誓不两立。他们对张牙舞爪的敌人可以采取‘明智的妥协’、‘克制’的态度；而对兄弟党和兄弟国家却不愿意采取和解的态度。对敌人是那样‘和’，对兄弟党和社会主义兄弟国家却是这样‘狠’，这显然完全不是马克思列宁主义者所应该采取的立场。” 就在1962年12月初，意大利共产党也举行了第十次代表大会，中国共产党派出代表团参加。12月2日，意共总书记帕尔米罗·陶里亚蒂在题为《劳动阶级团结起来，争取在民主和和平中向社会主义前进》的总报告里，在古巴导弹危机、中印边境冲突上点名攻击中国共产党。谈到刚刚过去的加勒比海危机，他充分肯定苏联的做法：

“在最尖锐的决定性关头，当似乎肯定美国极端分子输了一局，原子冲突就要爆发的时候，伟大的社会主义强国苏联又一次善于采取行动，避免战争，建议并接受一种体面的妥协，

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那就是：用撤走导弹武器来换取帝国主义放弃侵略古巴，因而也就是换取对古巴独立的保证。” 在谈到关于战争与和平问题时，他含沙射影地挖苦了中国： “在帝国主义阵营内部，在那些最极端的准备犯一场罪行的集团同其他那些动摇不定的、归根结底还愿意避免那种可能引起原子战争的狂热的集团之间，是存在分歧的。”“看不到客观形势的这些变化，或者肯定说帝国主义是一只简单的纸老虎，用肩膀一推就倒，都同样是错误的。”

谈到关于和平共处问题时，他极力维护苏联，指责中国有不满：“在古巴冲突中，苏联领导人在最严重关头建议合理妥协，以求拯救和平，这是他们的功绩，而不是他们的罪过。为了这种负责行为，所有人都应当感谢苏联领导人。说什么这种负责行为是出自恐惧，出自抛弃各国人民独立的事业，是不可容忍的、荒唐的、应当毫不犹豫地予以谴责的事。怎么能把苏联在加勒比海危机中执行的政策同慕尼黑会议上对希特勒的投降行为等量齐观呢？”也就是说，他诬蔑中国攻击苏联在加勒比海危机中执行的政策，类似于英国、法国对希特勒德国妥协的慕尼黑政策。

另外，他在关于核战争、关于资本主义经济的趋势、关于争取民主与争取社会主义、关于国际共产主义运动、关于经济和社会的结构改革等问题上，都提出了与中国共产党的截然不同的观点，这些观点史称“欧洲共产主义”。也就是说，对中国在古巴导弹危机中原则立场的批判，已经上升到国际共产主义运动中策略、路线的论战。 六、中国重申：“有人一再攻击中国为加勒比海局势制造困难，要把世界推入热核战争。这是对中国的最恶毒、最卑鄙的诬蔑。”

看到陶里亚蒂为赫鲁晓夫帮腔，毛泽东决定进行反击。 1962年12月4日，中央书记处召开会议，“邓小平传达了毛泽东十二月二日下午召开政治局常委会议的一些决定。他在传达中说：‘意共的会，原以为问题不多，现在看问题很多。意大利??指名攻击中国，陶里亚蒂的报告就攻击，??纸老虎问题、战争与和平问题。这就确定，他们公开批评我们，我们就可以批评他。”他在传达中还说：“写文章的问题，每个问题写一篇，要适合于外国人看。如什么叫冒险主义，现在必须回答。还有纸老虎问题，赫鲁晓夫和陶里亚蒂都攻，主席说，可以就写‘驳陶里亚蒂’。最近要组织一两篇文章，同时要把陶里亚蒂攻击我们的言论摘登出来。”12月29日，邓小平把起草好的《人民日报》社论稿《陶里亚蒂同志同我们的分歧》送毛泽东审定，并在附信中说：“经过多次修改，搞成这个样子。今天下午，将在少奇同志处讨论定稿。少奇同志意见，以在年底（卅一日）以前发表较好。请你看看，是否能用。最好在明（卅）日下午前给予指示。文章题目原想用‘驳陶里亚蒂’。因‘驳’字在外文中有‘反对’的意思，故未采用。”毛泽东收到社论稿，连夜看完，30日凌晨2时写批语给邓小平：“文章已看过，写得很好，题目也是适当的。可以于今日下午广播，明日见报。”

1962年12月31日——1962年的最后一天，《人民日报》发表经毛泽东审阅的社论《陶里亚蒂同志同我们的分歧》一文，专门对陶里亚蒂的错误观点进行批判：

“我们愿意坦率地说，陶里亚蒂同志和意共某些领导人，在马克思列宁主义的一些根本问题上，同我们存在着原则的分歧。”然后，文章对陶里亚蒂的总报告中的错误观点逐条批驳：“那些关于中国共产党低估核武器的破坏力和要把世界拖进核战争的种种说法，都是荒诞无稽的诬蔑。”“陶里亚蒂同志和某些同志，竭力反对中国共产党关于‘帝国主义和一切反动派都是纸老虎’这个马克思列宁主义的论点。”“我们认为，是不是在战略上如实地把帝国主义和一切反动派看作是纸老虎，这是一个如何认识革命力量和反动力量的大问题，是一个关系到一切革命人民敢不敢于斗争、敢不敢于革命、敢不敢于胜利的大问题，是一个关系到全世界人民斗争前途和历史命运的大问题。在任何时候，马克思列宁主义者和革命家，都不应该害怕帝国主义和反动派。在帝国主义横行霸道的时代早已一去不复返的今天，应该是帝

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国主义和反动派害怕革命力量，而不是革命力量害怕帝国主义和反动派。” “那些诬蔑中国反对和平共处的人，还攻击中国人民支持古巴人民反美斗争的正义立场。当英雄的古巴人民和他们的革命领袖菲德尔·卡斯特罗总理坚决拒绝侵犯古巴主权的国际视察，提出五项正义要求的时候，中国人民本着无产阶级国际主义的一贯立场，在全国举行了巨大规模的群众示威游行，坚决支持古巴人民维护独立、主权和尊严，这有什么过错呢？但是，有人一再攻击中国为加勒比海局势制造困难，要把世界推入热核战争。这是对中国的最恶毒、最卑鄙的诬蔑。”“中国人民坚决支持古巴人民反对国际视察、维护主权的斗争，怎么说得上反对和平共处呢？怎么说得上是我们要把别人推入热核战争呢？难道要中国也去向古巴施加压力，迫使他们接受国际视察，才符合所谓‘和平共处’吗？如果有些人口头上也表示支持古巴五项要求，而实际上却又反对中国人民支持古巴，那末，这岂不正是暴露了他们自己支持古巴五项要求的虚伪性吗？”

针对陶里亚蒂诬蔑中国攻击苏联在加勒比海危机中执行的是慕尼黑政策，文章义正词严地指出：

“我们多次说过，我们从来没有主张过在古巴设立导弹基地，也没有阻挠过从古巴撤出所谓进攻性武器。我们从来不认为，玩弄核武器作为解决国际争端的手段是马克思列宁主义的态度。我们也从来不认为，在加勒比海危机中避免热核战争就是‘慕尼黑’。但是，我们过去坚决反对、现在坚决反对、将来也坚决反对用牺牲别国主权的办法，去换取同帝国主义强盗进行妥协，这只能被认为是不折不扣的绥靖主义，不折不扣的‘慕尼黑’。这同我们社会主义国家的和平共处政策，毫无共同之点。” 1963年1月5日，《人民日报》又发表《列宁主义和现代修正主义》（“毛泽东也看过，没有修改，说文章写得很好”）一文，把陶里亚蒂等东、西欧共产党领导人归入现代修正主义一列，并把他们提倡的“欧洲共产主义”大批特批，中共和意共还一度断交。至此，关于中国在加勒比海危机中原则立场的辩驳，发展到点名批判他国共产党领袖的程度，致使党际关系、国际关系更加恶化，使我国的外交工作陷于被动。另外，关于中国在加勒比海危机中原则立场的争论，由于苏联、东欧各国的渲染，使世界部分人民把中国同“好战”划上了等号。 尾声

四十多年过去了，今天看来，当时中国政府在加勒比海危机中的立场也有僵化之处，对世界人民恐惧核战争的心理把握得不好，对国际形势的判断也过于乐观，对苏共、意共的指责也有不够客观之处，这或许是今天我国政府有意回避提起当年原则的原因所在。1980年4月，时任意共总书记恩里科·贝林格率意共中央代表团访华。4月17日，时任中共中央副主席的邓小平在会见贝林格时，意味深长地说过一段话：我们党高度赞赏我们两党恢复关系。过去吵架，没关系，统统作废，一起烧掉。有不同意见，不要紧，当然总会有一些不同的看法。双方都把问题讲清楚，有些问题要通过实践加以检验。过去许多争论，并不是我们讲的都是对的，我想你们认为自己讲的也不一定都对。确实，在古巴导弹危机问题上，中共和苏共、意共都说了许多空话。

不过，苏联在加勒比海危机中的行为，让中国人民认识到：用钱买不来安全，中国必须有自己的原子弹。1964年10月，中国第一颗原子弹爆炸成功。1969年3月，中苏间爆发珍宝岛冲突，面对苏联的核威慑，已经拥有原子弹的中国以成功试爆一颗原子弹为回应，结果双方达成妥协。看来，当时中苏两国都从加勒比海危机中借鉴了核危机处理经验。

从古巴导弹危机看对危机的处理

牛 建 民

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摘要:1962年10月发生的古巴导弹危机是冷战期间美苏两个超级大国之间唯一的一次直接核对抗。危机发生后,在国内政治因素不允许默认这些导弹存在的情况下，同时也考虑到军事打击方案可能导致美苏爆发核冲突的危险前景，双方各自制定和实施了具有弹性的处理危机的政策。结果限制了危机的发展,并最终促使古巴导弹危机和平解决。在核危机和核问题日益凸显的今天，美苏处理古巴导弹危机的作法对当代国际社会处理重大国际危机与缓和地区紧张局势具有重要的现实指导意义。 关键词: 古巴 导弹 危机 处理 引言

古巴导弹危机是人类进入核时代以来，美苏两个超级大国之间进行的第一次大规模的核较量，也是东西方冷战期间国际关系走向缓和的一个转折点。这场危机虽然已经过去了四十余年，但至今人们仍在探讨这样一个问题：到底谁是这场危机的赢家？对此，学术界一般有两种观点，一是认为赫鲁晓夫冒险后又退却，是个彻底的失败者；二是认为美苏之间没有绝对的输赢，结果是不分胜负。笔者认为，评价输赢可以从各个角度来看，视角不同评价的结果就不相同。但是，毋庸置疑的是，这场危机的解决使美苏两国从核战争的边缘撤了回来，最终使人类避免了一场核浩劫，其意义和影响十分重大。

美苏两国在处理危机过程中的具体实践为国际社会在面临激烈冲突、遭遇重大危机时，提供了一种有益的、行之有效的处理危机的模式。危机中双方果断决策、频繁通信、在电视或广播上公开发表声明、建立秘密外交渠道的作法，为解决危机提供了不可多得的机会，成为和平解决危机的关键。美苏两国领导人沉着冷静、彼此妥协的态度和容忍精神，终于使危机落下了帷幕。这场危机在把人类带到核战争的边缘的同时，也使人类经历了一场前所未有的考验。

国际危机是国际政治的微观缩影，当前，国际危机始终伴随着民族国家的发展进程而不断产生。尽管国际关系发展的总体趋势是“以对话取代对抗”，但是国际危机和地区冲突仍时有发生，这些危机和冲突如果处理不当，极有可能引发战争，危及到地区乃至世界的和平与安全。

关于古巴导弹危机的研究成果可谓颇丰，但是鉴于它是处理国际危机的典范，在新的形势下仍有对其进行深入研究和探讨的必要。传统上，运用核威慑理论或博弈论来解析此次危机处理的著述较多，本文试从美苏两国解决危机时的方式和特点入手，来进行深入的分析，以期对当今重大的国际危机（朝鲜核危机和伊朗核危机）的处理和解决有所启示，使研究战争和国际关系的人们能对古巴导弹危机感兴趣，使生活在和平时期的人们去回顾、思考。

一、危机产生的背景

古巴导弹危机亦称加勒比海危机。1962年10月由于美苏两国相互进行核讹诈而在加勒比海地区造成了紧张局势，[1] 结果酿成了一场危机。

20世纪50年代，在世界范围内掀起了一场反对殖民主义、争取民族独立的民族解放运动的高潮，一些前殖民地、半殖民地国家通过各种途径纷纷获得独立。远在加勒比海的古巴也发生了革命，1959年，以卡斯特罗为首的革命起义军进行了武装暴动，推翻了亲美卖国、贪污腐化的巴蒂斯塔独裁统治，建立了革命政权。古巴是加勒比海地区最大的岛国，距美国只有140海里。美国一向把拉美地区视为自己的后院，没想到这次后院起火，美国如坐针毡，于是，便视古巴革命政权为肉中之刺。而苏联却喜出望外，视古巴为击破美国称霸拉丁美洲的桥头堡。

古巴新政权成立初期，美国同古巴的关系还比较好。1959年２月，卡斯特罗出任总理后访问美国，还受到艾森豪威尔政府的热烈欢迎。巴蒂斯塔是美国一手扶植起来的傀儡，美国政府欢迎卡斯特罗，并不是赞赏其反对独裁统治，而是企图把古巴纳入美国的势力范围，巩固它在拉美的统治地位。但是，1959年６月，古巴政府的领导层发生了变化，一些主张实行

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激进政策的人掌握了政府要害部门，美国担心古巴政府政策有变，于是就对古巴新政权产生了怨恨和不满，并且以傲慢的态度对待古巴，企图逼迫新政府就范。但是古巴新政府的领导人并不屈服于美国的压力，美国与古巴关系日益恶化。[2]

1961年1月，美国与古巴断交。4月，在美国中央情报局的策划下，制造了著名的“猪湾事件”。由美国海空军提供支持的1400名全副武装的古巴流亡分子在古巴的猪湾海岸登陆，企图突袭并推翻古巴革命政权。然而这次行动遭到了的失败，古巴军队全歼了这些叛乱分子，粉碎了此次行动，美古关系不断恶化。在这种情况下，弱小的古巴不得不寻求外界的支援。古巴看到了美苏之间的深刻矛盾，于是把目光对准了苏联，向苏联政府发出了请求援助的信息。

苏联认为古巴是其在拉美的一个重要阵地，通过对古巴的支援，可以控制古巴，进而扩大自己在拉丁美洲的影响，并且想借此改变苏美军事力量，尤其是核力量的对比。加之此时的美国除了要挽回猪湾登陆失败的阴影外，还需要认真对待国会的中期选举以及苏联把人类第一颗载人卫星成功地送入太空的严酷现实，相比之下，苏联具有心理上的优势。于是，便决定援助古巴，向古巴提供了大批武器装备，派出了顾问团。同时赫鲁晓夫也十分清楚：古巴距美国仅140公里，而距苏联11000公里，并且美国还拥有核优势，苏联没有能力在如此遥远的地方和美国对抗。但是，苏联拥有中程弹道导弹，因此决定在古巴秘密部署中程弹道导弹。1962年6月，苏联和古巴签署了部署苏联导弹的秘密协议。该协议的主要内容是：古巴接受苏联的24个中程和中远程弹道火箭，每个携带两枚导弹和一个核弹头；24个先进的萨姆II型地空导弹发射器；42架米格战斗机和42架伊尔-２８轰炸机；加上其他一些海岸防卫武器。这些武器由苏联人掌控，另外派4.2万名军人驻扎在古巴。[3] 苏联在古巴的军事部署很快就被美国察觉，美国发现了古巴海岸线上有苏联军事设施和舰艇，美国中央情报局的Ｕ-２侦察机在古巴上空还拍摄到了苏联弹道导弹的照片。10月22日，美国总统肯尼迪发表电视讲话，宣称：苏联正在构筑中距离导弹发射场，部署针对美国的核打击力量。苏联的这一行为已经构成了“所有美洲国家和平与安全的明显威胁”，美国对此绝不会听之任之[4]，所以，“苏联的核导弹部署在古巴，美国肯尼迪总统要不惜一切代价将它除掉”。[5]

就肯尼迪总统而言，猪湾登陆的失败已使其在外交上输了一个回合，威信受到很大影响，挽回猪湾登陆的影响,赢得国会中期选举,是肯尼迪面临的一个十分棘手而又非常迫切的问题。另一方面，肯尼迪对赫鲁晓夫的个性具有一定的了解，即赫鲁晓夫惯于搞一些冒险和投机活动，而在关键的时刻又容易“软”下来。对此美国决定采取强硬的不退让的政策，以打击苏联的锐气。于是，肯尼迪宣布：他已经下令封锁古巴，并对一切正在运往古巴的进攻性军事装备实行海上“隔离”。同时宣布美国的武装部队已经处于最高的戒备状态。苏联必须在联合国的监督下撤走进攻性武器。23日，肯尼迪总统又签署了《禁止进攻性武器运往古巴》的公告。公告宣布从24日起将拦截可能前往古巴的舰船并勒令这些船只听候美国的检查[6]。对此，苏联发表声明：苏联将按照9月2日达成的苏联向古巴供应武器和提供技术、专家的协议继续用核武器“援助”古巴，并坚决拒绝美国军舰的拦截。苏联指责美国实行海上封锁是史无前例的海盗行为。是“朝着热核战争走去”，同时表示，如果美国敢于发动战争，那么苏联将进行“最猛烈的回击”，“苏联有必须的一切” [7]。 这样,一方面美国对苏联的行为认识得较为明确，已经从心理上和军事上做好了反击的准备；而另一方面苏联人抱着一种侥幸的心理,错误地估计形势，大胆冒进。一场围绕着古巴导弹问题的国际危机爆发。

二、危机过程及结果

自1962年7月，第一批苏联导弹运抵古巴开始，到10月15日，由鲁道夫·安德森少校驾驶的美国U-2飞机拍摄到了中程弹道导弹的照片。美国最后确认苏联已经在古巴部属了16

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至32枚导弹核武器。鉴于这种情况，美国国家安全委员会连续召开会议讨论对策，最终采纳了国防部长麦克纳马拉等人提出的海上封锁方案：对一切正在驶往古巴的进攻性军事装备实行海上“隔离”；增加对古巴及其领土上军事集结的监视，如果苏联继续作进攻性准备，美国就有正当理由准备采取进一步的行动；要对苏联做出全面的报复性反应；加强美国在关塔纳摩基地的力量，疏散军事人员的家属；立刻召开美洲国家组织会议，讨论对西半球安全的威胁问题；召开联合国安理会紧急会议，审议对世界和平的威胁；呼吁赫鲁晓夫放弃“统治世界的方针”，共同做出历史性的努力[8]。10月22日，美国总统肯尼迪公开宣布苏联在古巴部署了导弹，美国决定开始封锁。同时，美国摆出一副核大战的样子，调动了180艘舰船(包括8艘航母)，68个空军中队，战略轰炸机带核弹升空、战略核潜艇出海，另有5个师的部队集结在佛罗里达，全球美军处于核战备状态。

肯尼迪打出他的“王牌”之后，苏联政府马上做出了反应，赫鲁晓夫认为美国的海上封锁只是虚张声势，它不可能进攻古巴，所以他命令苏联舰只继续向古巴挺进，不要害怕美国的海上封锁；宣布苏联和华沙条约组织国家的武装力量立即进入最高战备状态，双方剑拔弩张，第三次世界大战大有一触即发之势。

苏美双方在最初三天处于军事对峙状态。10月25日凌晨，克格勃密报赫鲁晓夫，称美国计划在10月29日或30日对古巴进行军事打击。10月26日美军舰在空军的配合下拦截进入“隔离区”的苏联船只。在美国强大的军事压力下，赫鲁晓夫改变了主意。他立即命令那些正向古巴行驶的舰只掉头返航，并致电美国总统肯尼迪，希望能够寻找解决这次危机的可行方案。在以后的几天里，美苏高层交换了很多充满火药味的信件，双方相持不下。10月27日美国U-2飞机在苏联远东地区飞行，几乎引起了美苏空战；在古巴上空，另一架U-2飞机被苏联防空导弹击落。同日，美国准备轰炸古巴进行报复，而苏联试爆了一颗原子弹，一场核大战一触即发。

然而，紧张的局势最终还是在10月28日发生了变化，美国最终同意了苏联的建议，双方迅速达成协议：苏联将全部拆除部署在古巴的导弹并在联合国进行核查之后运回本国，美国允诺拆除前不久刚刚在土耳其部署完毕的导弹基地，并保证不会发动对古巴的军事进攻[9]。美苏双方可谓相互妥协、各让一步，从而化解了这次重大的冲突，使持续了一周的加勒比地区紧张局势得以缓和。

11月20日，苏联撤走了它部署在古巴的42枚导弹，并且拆除了全部导弹基地；美国也宣布解除对古巴的海上封锁。美、苏的相互妥协并没有征求古巴政府的意见，因此，引起古巴政府的不满。卡斯特罗开始拒绝撤走苏联的导弹和轰炸机，为此，联合国秘书长吴丹于10月30日至31日访问了古巴，劝卡斯特罗放弃这一要求。卡斯特罗最后接受了吴丹的劝说，但拒绝联合国观察员进入古巴，并提出了五个条件[10]。至此，古巴导弹危机宣告结束，一场濒临核战争边缘的世界大战就这样避免了。

三、处理危机的启示

古巴导弹危机曾将人类带到核战争的边缘，但人类最终还是避免了一场由核危机引起的战争。这样,在核时代如何处理核危机，使之不至于引起战争，尤其是核战争,是我们必须认真探讨的一个重大课题。通过对古巴导弹危机的历史考察和研究，我们至少可以得到以下几个方面的启示：

1、正确地把握危机的性质和范围

正确地把握危机的性质及其范围是处理危机的前提。自从10月14日，美国Ｕ-2飞机发现苏联在古巴的导弹基地后，肯尼迪总统迅速组成的一个专门的小组,分析事件的性质和范围，研究美国应采取的对策。在对事件性质和范围的分析上主要包括以下几个方面内容：一、苏联人的动机是什么？二、美国苏联较量是否引起核战争。在分析苏联的动机上,美国分析了赫鲁晓夫以下几种可能：①借此机会向美国进一步显示自己的力量；②声东击西以掩饰苏联

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在柏林采取进一步的行动；③保卫古巴，防止美国入侵并以此给卡斯特罗鼓劲；④以古巴为和基地，改变美苏核对抗中苏联方面所处的劣势；⑤以此为砝码，迫使美国在其他方面做出让步[11]。可以肯定，美国学者对苏联方面的行为动机分析是全面的，在他们看来，在这场危机中赫鲁晓夫无意挑起一场核战争，也不敢挑起这场核战争。苏联挑起这场危机的目的就是“蓄意改变现状”。其动机主要集中在第③④⑤点上。

正确地把握危机的性质和范围在某种程度上就是对卷入危机的对方政策的理解,也是做出恰当反映的前提。“在判断危机的危险性时,某一国家的决策者不能仅仅将自己的政策行为置于自身愿望的基础上，而必须同时将自己放在对手和潜在对手的地位上，尝试从对手的视角上看待危机发展的各种可能性”。[12]正是在充分估计危机的性质和范围的基础上，美国决策者做出了较为明智的选择。美国政府明确表示：如果苏联将导弹撤出古巴，美国将不会入侵古巴。美国总统从未同意过“利用”古巴挑起一场入侵战争以结束卡斯特罗统治这种观点。美国总统认为，危机的实质是与苏联政府的争端，而引起争端最根本的原因是苏联以欺骗的手段将导弹秘密运进古巴。据此,美国没有做出入侵古巴的决定，在封锁期间，也极力避免发生直接的武装冲突。这样没有使这场危机进一步升级。因为从根本上讲美国只要求“恢复原状”。 2、慎重做出选择，有节奏地推进目标 在国际危机中，任何缺少充分考虑的决策都会使危机进一步升级，使危机发展到无法控制的地步。这也就是说，有关各方面的最初反映应对危机未来的发展，以及最后的结局都是非常重要的，甚至是具有决定性的影响，有关各方面对于危机的恰当的初步反应将创造出一种有利于危机和平解决的环境和方式，而任何失当的处置又往往导致整个危机局势复杂化与失控。乃至导致灾难性的结局。应该说在古巴导弹危机上，美国的决策是慎重的，最初的反应是恰当的。10月14日当美国侦察机发现了苏联正在古巴建造地对地导弹发射台时，肯尼迪总统首先做的是组成一个特别小组，进行了全面、认真、审慎的研究，提出各种方案进行选择。在美国看来，这场危机在其第一周的瞬间里未被公众知晓，这一事实显然使得肯尼迪总统易于在尽可能少受外界压力的情况下，全神贯注地考虑他的行动选择。经过充分的酝酿，决定选择通过外交手段解决此次危机，排除了对古巴入侵和对古巴导弹基地进行轰炸的可能性。但是纯粹通过外交途径美国也面临一个难以解决的难题。这就是采取外交的手段则必须将此事过早的公布于众，使美国面临着国内及西方盟国的较强的压力，进而使美国政府可选择的余地更加缩小；而苏联则尽可能利用谈判拖延时间，加紧建造古巴的导弹基地，也会使美国陷于被动。所以美国必须通过军事的和外交的双重手段来解决这一问题。而军事手段又不能过分，只能恰到好处，进退两能。从当时的局势看，唯一采取的军事行为就是封锁。因为“诉诸武力的最不激烈的方式是封锁”。[13] 在慎重的做出选择后，有节奏稳妥地推进目标仍然是极为重要的。从古巴导弹危机的解决看，美国从最初做出决策到科尼迪总统发表演说；从宣布封锁到动用其它军事力量；从争取国际舆论到公开的秘密的沟通与交流；从海上封锁到海上隔离；从撤走导弹到宣布不入侵古巴；从撤走飞机到解除封锁，从对古巴入境检查到关闭军事基地等这一系列的步骤，美国掌握了很好的节奏，使得其目标得以全方位地推进，步步为营。 3、充分考虑对方的利益，给对手留有余地 在处理国际危机中，充分考虑对方的利益给对手以行动的余地是十分重要的在处理危机的过程中某一当事国不仅将自身的政策性为置身于自身的愿望基础上，它必须充分考虑到对方的利益，在这里就是进行某种妥协。在处理古巴导弹危机中，美国决策者认为：封锁是一种最为灵活的方式，是退可守，进可攻的办法。具体到这次危机上，封锁可以阻止苏联进一步向古巴输入武器，“冻结”现状，同时是赫鲁晓夫有充足或者说是起码的时间考虑它的行动。另外，封锁可以在必要时扩大非军事物资成为一种逐渐增加压力的办法。如果封锁获得成功，

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美国可以保持选择军事行动的自由。后来封锁改成了海上隔离，进一步减少对抗色彩。同时，美国又公开或秘密地做出了一系列的妥协，其中包括美国在苏联撤走导弹之后美国不会入侵古巴，从而结束卡斯特罗的统治；一旦古巴导弹危机解除，美国也将拆除在土耳其部署的导弹。美国认为他们没有入侵古巴；撤回了在土耳其（包括意大利）的那些易受打击的导弹，并经盟国同意，代之以不易受攻击的北极星潜艇。这两个结果显然是美方受益。这样也使得苏联政府更容易撤走他们的导弹。事实证明，美国采取这一政策是十分稳妥的，这种妥协没有将对手逼到死角，使之有一定的回旋余地，最终使得危机能够得到解决。 4、公开和秘密的渠道并行，保持情报和信息的准确和畅通

一般说来，国际危机期间敌对双方的联系会因各种原因中断，彼此之间的联系受阻。而各种情报和信息会骤然增多，使情报和各种信息的准确也就难以把握。在古巴导弹危机爆发前，美国的许多情报并不十分明确，而其中掌握很重要的一点是苏联采取了秘密行动。这正如美国所说得那样：如果我们对于苏联在西半球部署核武器的问题上早就阐明了我们的立场，并且更加明确而又强硬的政策，或者苏联政府对这一问题上确实存在着迹象作为更为审慎估计的话，那么导弹或许就根本不会被运到古巴。危机在根本上是能够而且是应该避免的。美国直到1962年10月14日才真正获知苏联在古巴建造的是真正具有进攻性的导弹发射场，所以危机已经迫在眉睫。而在以后的日子里美国加大了Ｕ-２飞机的飞行次数，直到最后在Ｕ-２飞机的监督下导弹从古巴撤走，才暂时停止了对苏联的监视。同时，赫鲁晓夫和肯尼迪通过电话和信件，公开和秘密的渠道加强了联系，增强了彼此的了解，为双方采取更为切实的措施创造了条件。与此同时保证各种情报的准确和畅通在核时代其重要性极为突出。这是因为核时代由于武器的灾难性的杀伤力和时间的超短，一旦人类有半点模糊和迟疑，稍有不慎就将造成灭顶之灾。

结语

1962年的古巴导弹危机，曾将人类带到核战争的边缘，但人类还是最终避免了这场危机。此次危机把美苏推到核战争的边缘的同时，最后双方又不得不妥协，使核问题拿到谈判桌上来解决，从而开创了美、苏关系既对抗又对话，既斗争又妥协的新阶段。无论双方公开说法如何，由于涉及核武器这种国家核心机密，很多真实情况外界是永远无法知道的。但是可以肯定，双方都有各自的成果与失误，而且都不希望再发生类似事件了。古巴导弹危机的解决虽然使核大战得以避免，但是，其巨大的震荡及其冲击波却是相当深远的。此后两国最高领导人之间建立了热线联系，结束了美苏冷战中一个特别危险的时期，也在一定程度上促成了1963年的部分核禁试条约。因而，在核时代如何处理核危机，使之不至于引起战争，尤其是核战争,就成了我们必须认真研究探讨的一个重大问题，对解决今天的朝鲜核危机和伊朗核危机无疑具有多方面的借鉴意义。 注 释

[1]颜声毅、俞正梁.《世界政治经济与国际关系词典》.吉林人民出版社,1988年2月第1版,第99页.

[2]周良.《古巴导弹危机大揭秘》.环球 , 1998年第4期,第23页.

[3] 君凡.《古巴导弹危机说明了什么》.历史学习, 1998年 第4期,第14页. [4] 钱其琛.《世界外交大辞典》.世界知识出版社,2005年版,第712页.

[5]颜声毅、俞正梁.《世界政治经济与国际关系词典》.吉林人民出版社,1988年2月第1版,第100页.

[6]孔寒冰.《1962年加勒比海危机的背后---肯尼迪同赫鲁晓夫二十五封通讯揭秘》.国际政治学研究,1993年第3期,第42页.

[7]颜声毅、俞正梁.《世界政治经济与国际关系词典》.吉林人民出版社，1988年2月第1版第100页.

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[8]陈熙伟、苏向东.《我参加了古巴导弹危机谈判》.环球, 1993 年第4期,第27页. [9]高兴祖、沈学善.《战后世界政治与国际关系》.南京大学出版社, 1987年版,236页.

[10]韩兵,洛礼译.《1962年古巴导弹危机期间赤鲁晓夫与肯尼迪的二十五封通信(续二)》.世界史研究动态, 1993年第4期,第38页.

[11] 郝承敦.《古巴导弹危机新论—关于赫鲁晓夫决策动机及政局的分析》.拉丁美洲研究, 2002年第2期,第12页. [12]陈兼.《德国英国与七月危机—-关于国际危机处理的一项个案研究》.世界历史,1990年第6期,第55页.

[13] [美]卡尔·多伊奇.《国际关系分析》.世界知识出版社,1992年2月第一版,第229页.

long telegram(by George Kennan)1

861.00/2 - 2246: Telegram

The Charge in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State SECRET

Moscow, February 22, 1946--9 p.m. [Received February 22--3: 52 p.m.]

511. Answer to Dept's 284, Feb 3 [13] involves questions so intricate, so delicate, so strange to our form of thought, and so important to analysis of our international environment that I cannot compress answers into single brief message without yielding to what I feel would be dangerous degree of over-simplification. I hope, therefore, Dept will bear with me if I submit in answer to this question five parts, subjects of which will be roughly as follows: (1) Basic features of post-war Soviet outlook. (2) Background of this outlook

(3) Its projection in practical policy on official level. (4) Its projection on unofficial level.

(5) Practical deductions from standpoint of US policy.

I apologize in advance for this burdening of telegraphic channel; but questions involved are of such urgent importance, particularly in view of recent events, that our answers to them, if they deserve attention at all, seem to me to deserve it at once. There follows

Part 1: Basic Features of Post War Soviet Outlook, as Put Forward by Official Propaganda Machine Are as Follows:

(a) USSR still lives in antagonistic \encirclement\with which in the long run there can be no permanent peaceful coexistence. As stated by Stalin in 1927 to a delegation of American workers:

\centers of world significance: a socialist center, drawing to itself the countries which tend toward socialism, and a capitalist center, drawing to itself the countries that incline toward capitalism. Battle between these two centers for command of world economy will decide fate of capitalism and of communism in entire world.\ 1

http://www.historyguide.org/europe/europe.html#table

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(b) Capitalist world is beset with internal conflicts, inherent in nature of capitalist society. These conflicts are insoluble by means of peaceful compromise. Greatest of them is that between England and US.

(c) Internal conflicts of capitalism inevitably generate wars. Wars thus generated may be of two kinds: intra-capitalist wars between two capitalist states, and wars of intervention against socialist world. Smart capitalists, vainly seeking escape from inner conflicts of capitalism, incline toward latter.

(d) Intervention against USSR, while it would be disastrous to those who undertook it, would cause renewed delay in progress of Soviet socialism and must therefore be forestalled at all costs.

(e) Conflicts between capitalist states, though likewise fraught with danger for USSR, nevertheless hold out great possibilities for advancement of socialist cause, particularly if USSR remains militarily powerful, ideologically monolithic and faithful to its present brilliant leadership.

(f) It must be borne in mind that capitalist world is not all bad. In addition to hopelessly reactionary and bourgeois elements, it includes (1) certain wholly enlightened and positive elements united in acceptable communistic parties and (2) certain other elements (now described for tactical reasons as progressive or democratic) whose reactions, aspirations and activities happen to be \favorable to interests of USSR These last must be encouraged and utilized for Soviet purposes.

(g) Among negative elements of bourgeois-capitalist society, most dangerous of all are those whom Lenin called false friends of the people, namely moderate-socialist or social-democratic leaders (in other words, non-Communist left-wing). These are more dangerous than out-and-out reactionaries, for latter at least march under their true colors, whereas moderate left-wing leaders confuse people by employing devices of socialism to seine interests of reactionary capital.

So much for premises. To what deductions do they lead from standpoint of Soviet policy? To following:

(a) Everything must be done to advance relative strength of USSR as factor in international society. Conversely, no opportunity most be missed to reduce strength and influence, collectively as well as individually, of capitalist powers.

(b) Soviet efforts, and those of Russia's friends abroad, must be directed toward deepening and exploiting of differences and conflicts between capitalist powers. If these eventually deepen into an \war, this war must be turned into revolutionary upheavals within the various capitalist countries.

(c) \elements abroad are to be utilized to maximum to bring pressure to bear on capitalist governments along lines agreeable to Soviet interests.

(d) Relentless battle must be waged against socialist and social-democratic leaders abroad.

Part 2: Background of Outlook

Before examining ramifications of this party line in practice there are certain aspects of it to which I wish to draw attention.

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First, it does not represent natural outlook of Russian people. Latter are, by and large, friendly to outside world, eager for experience of it, eager to measure against it talents they are conscious of possessing, eager above all to live in peace and enjoy fruits of their own labor. Party line only represents thesis which official propaganda machine puts forward with great skill and persistence to a public often remarkably resistant in the stronghold of its innermost thoughts. But party line is binding for outlook and conduct of people who make up apparatus of power--party, secret police and Government--and it is exclusively with these that we have to deal.

Second, please note that premises on which this party line is based are for most part simply not true. Experience has shown that peaceful and mutually profitable coexistence of capitalist and socialist states is entirely possible. Basic internal conflicts in advanced countries are no longer primarily those arising out of capitalist ownership of means of production, but are ones arising from advanced urbanism and industrialism as such, which Russia has thus far been spared not by socialism but only by her own backwardness. Internal rivalries of capitalism do not always generate wars; and not all wars are attributable to this cause. To speak of possibility of intervention against USSR today, after elimination of Germany and Japan and after example of recent war, is sheerest nonsense. If not provoked by forces of intolerance and subversion \peace with itself and with Russia. Finally, no sane person has reason to doubt sincerity of moderate socialist leaders in Western countries. Nor is it fair to deny success of their efforts to improve conditions for working population whenever, as in Scandinavia, they have been given chance to show what they could do.

Falseness of those premises, every one of which predates recent war, was amply demonstrated by that conflict itself Anglo-American differences did not turn out to be major differences of Western World. Capitalist countries, other than those of Axis, showed no disposition to solve their differences by joining in crusade against USSR. Instead of imperialist war turning into civil wars and revolution, USSR found itself obliged to fight side by side with capitalist powers for an avowed community of aim.

Nevertheless, all these theses, however baseless and disproven, are being boldly put forward again today. What does this indicate? It indicates that Soviet party line is not based on any objective analysis of situation beyond Russia's borders; that it has, indeed, little to do with conditions outside of Russia; that it arises mainly from basic inner-Russian necessities which existed before recent war and exist today. At bottom of Kremlin's neurotic view of world affairs is traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity. Originally, this was insecurity of a peaceful agricultural people trying to live on vast exposed plain in neighborhood of fierce nomadic peoples. To this was added, as Russia came into contact with economically advanced West, fear of more competent, more powerful, more highly organized societies in that area. But this latter type of insecurity was one which afflicted rather Russian rulers than Russian people; for Russian rulers have invariably sensed that their rule was relatively archaic in form fragile and artificial in its psychological foundation, unable to stand comparison or contact with political systems of

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Western countries. For this reason they have always feared foreign penetration, feared direct contact between Western world and their own, feared what would happen if Russians learned truth about world without or if foreigners learned truth about world within. And they have learned to seek security only in patient but deadly struggle for total destruction of rival power, never in compacts and compromises with it.

It was no coincidence that Marxism, which had smoldered ineffectively for half a century in Western Europe, caught hold and blazed for first time in Russia. Only in this land which had never known a friendly neighbor or indeed any tolerant equilibrium of separate powers, either internal or international, could a doctrine thrive which viewed economic conflicts of society as insoluble by peaceful means. After establishment of Bolshevist regime, Marxist dogma, rendered even more truculent and intolerant by Lenin's interpretation, became a perfect vehicle for sense of insecurity with which Bolsheviks, even more than previous Russian rulers, were afflicted. In this dogma, with its basic altruism of purpose, they found justification for their instinctive fear of outside world, for the dictatorship without which they did not know how to rule, for cruelties they did not dare not to inflict, for sacrifice they felt bound to demand. In the name of Marxism they sacrificed every single ethical value in their methods and tactics. Today they cannot dispense with it. It is fig leaf of their moral and intellectual respectability. Without it they would stand before history, at best, as only the last of that long succession of cruel and wasteful Russian rulers who have relentlessly forced country on to ever new heights of military power in order to guarantee external security of their internally weak regimes. This is why Soviet purposes most always be solemnly clothed in trappings of Marxism, and why no one should underrate importance of dogma in Soviet affairs. Thus Soviet leaders are driven [by?] necessities of their own past and present position to put forward which [apparent omission] outside world as evil, hostile and menacing, but as bearing within itself germs of creeping disease and destined to be wracked with growing internal convulsions until it is given final Coup de grace by rising power of socialism and yields to new and better world. This thesis provides justification for that increase of military and police power of Russian state, for that isolation of Russian population from outside world, and for that fluid and constant pressure to extend limits of Russian police power which are together the natural and instinctive urges of Russian rulers. Basically this is only the steady advance of uneasy Russian nationalism, a centuries old movement in which conceptions of offense and defense are inextricably confused. But in new guise of international Marxism, with its honeyed promises to a desperate and war torn outside world, it is more dangerous and insidious than ever before.

It should not be thought from above that Soviet party line is necessarily disingenuous and insincere on part of all those who put it forward. Many of them are too ignorant of outside world and mentally too dependent to question [apparent omission] self-hypnotism, and who have no difficulty making themselves believe what they find it comforting and convenient to believe. Finally we have the unsolved mystery as to who, if anyone, in this great land actually receives accurate

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and unbiased information about outside world. In atmosphere of oriental secretiveness and conspiracy which pervades this Government, possibilities for distorting or poisoning sources and currents of information are infinite. The very disrespect of Russians for objective truth--indeed, their disbelief in its existence--leads them to view all stated facts as instruments for furtherance of one ulterior purpose or another. There is good reason to suspect that this Government is actually a conspiracy within a conspiracy; and I for one am reluctant to believe that Stalin himself receives anything like an objective picture of outside world. Here there is ample scope for the type of subtle intrigue at which Russians are past masters. Inability of foreign governments to place their case squarely before Russian policy makers--extent to which they are delivered up in their relations with Russia to good graces of obscure and unknown advisors whom they never see and cannot influence--this to my mind is most disquieting feature of diplomacy in Moscow, and one which Western statesmen would do well to keep in mind if they would understand nature of difficulties encountered here.

Part 3: Projection of Soviet Outlook in Practical Policy on Official Level

We have now seen nature and background of Soviet program. What may we expect by way of its practical implementation?

Soviet policy, as Department implies in its query under reference, is conducted on two planes: (1) official plane represented by actions undertaken officially in name of Soviet Government; and (2) subterranean plane of actions undertaken by agencies for which Soviet Government does not admit responsibility.

Policy promulgated on both planes will be calculated to serve basic policies (a) to (d) outlined in part 1. Actions taken on different planes will differ considerably, but will dovetail into each other in purpose, timing and effect. On official plane we must look for following:

(a) Internal policy devoted to increasing in every way strength and prestige of Soviet state: intensive military-industrialization; maximum development of armed forces; great displays to impress outsiders; continued secretiveness about internal matters, designed to conceal weaknesses and to keep opponents in dark.

(b) Wherever it is considered timely and promising, efforts will be made to advance official limits of Soviet power. For the moment, these efforts are restricted to certain neighboring points conceived of here as being of immediate strategic necessity, such as Northern Iran, Turkey, possibly Bornholm However, other points may at any time come into question, if and as concealed Soviet political power is extended to new areas. Thus a \Persian Government might be asked to grant Russia a port on Persian Gulf. Should Spain fall under Communist control, question of Soviet base at Gibraltar Strait might be activated. But such claims will appear on official level only when unofficial preparation is complete.

(c) Russians will participate officially in international organizations where they see opportunity of extending Soviet power or of inhibiting or diluting power of others. Moscow sees in UNO not the mechanism for a permanent and stable world society founded on mutual interest and aims of all nations, but an arena in which aims just mentioned can be favorably pursued. As long as UNO is considered here to serve

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this purpose, Soviets will remain with it. But if at any time they come to conclusion that it is serving to embarrass or frustrate their aims for power expansion and if they see better prospects for pursuit of these aims along other lines, they will not hesitate to abandon UNO. This would imply, however, that they felt themselves strong enough to split unity of other nations by their withdrawal to render UNO ineffective as a threat to their aims or security, replace it with an international weapon more effective from their viewpoint. Thus Soviet attitude toward UNO will depend largely on loyalty of other nations to it, and on degree of vigor, decisiveness and cohesion with which those nations defend in UNO the peaceful and hopeful concept of international life, which that organization represents to our way of thinking. I reiterate, Moscow has no abstract devotion to UNO ideals. Its attitude to that organization will remain essentially pragmatic and tactical.

(d) Toward colonial areas and backward or dependent peoples, Soviet policy, even on official plane, will be directed toward weakening of power and influence and contacts of advanced Western nations, on theory that in so far as this policy is successful, there will be created a vacuum which will favor Communist-Soviet penetration. Soviet pressure for participation in trusteeship arrangements thus represents, in my opinion, a desire to be in a position to complicate and inhibit exertion of Western influence at such points rather than to provide major channel for exerting of Soviet power. Latter motive is not lacking, but for this Soviets prefer to rely on other channels than official trusteeship arrangements. Thus we may expect to find Soviets asking for admission everywhere to trusteeship or similar arrangements and using levers thus acquired to weaken Western influence among such peoples.

(e) Russians will strive energetically to develop Soviet representation in, and official ties with, countries in which they sense Strong possibilities of opposition to Western centers of power. This applies to such widely separated points as Germany, Argentina, Middle Eastern countries, etc.

(f) In international economic matters, Soviet policy will really be dominated by pursuit of autarchy for Soviet Union and Soviet-dominated adjacent areas taken together. That, however, will be underlying policy. As far as official line is concerned, position is not yet clear. Soviet Government has shown strange reticence since termination hostilities on subject foreign trade. If large scale long term credits should be forthcoming, I believe Soviet Government may eventually again do lip service, as it did in 1930's to desirability of building up international economic exchanges in general. Otherwise I think it possible Soviet foreign trade may be restricted largely to Soviet's own security sphere, including occupied areas in Germany, and that a cold official shoulder may be turned to principle of general economic collaboration among nations.

(g) With respect to cultural collaboration, lip service will likewise be rendered to desirability of deepening cultural contacts between peoples, but this will not in practice be interpreted in any way which could weaken security position of Soviet peoples. Actual manifestations of Soviet policy in this respect will be restricted to arid channels of closely shepherded official visits and functions, with

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superabundance of vodka and speeches and dearth of permanent effects.

(h) Beyond this, Soviet official relations will take what might be called \course with individual foreign governments, with great stress being laid on prestige of Soviet Union and its representatives and with punctilious attention to protocol as distinct from good manners.

Part 4: Following May Be Said as to What We May Expect by Way of Implementation of Basic Soviet Policies on Unofficial, or Subterranean Plane, i.e. on Plane for Which Soviet Government Accepts no Responsibility

Agencies utilized for promulgation of policies on this plane are following:

1. Inner central core of Communist Parties in other countries. While many of persons who compose this category may also appear and act in unrelated public capacities, they are in reality working closely together as an underground operating directorate of world communism, a concealed Comintern tightly coordinated and directed by Moscow. It is important to remember that this inner core is actually working on underground lines, despite legality of parties with which it is associated. 2. Rank and file of Communist Parties. Note distinction is drawn between those and persons defined in paragraph 1. This distinction has become much sharper in recent years. Whereas formerly foreign Communist Parties represented a curious (and from Moscow's standpoint often inconvenient) mixture of conspiracy and legitimate activity, now the conspiratorial element has been neatly concentrated in inner circle and ordered underground, while rank and file--no longer even taken into confidence about realities of movement--are thrust forward as bona fide internal partisans of certain political tendencies within their respective countries, genuinely innocent of conspiratorial connection with foreign states. Only in certain countries where communists are numerically strong do they now regularly appear and act as a body. As a rule they are used to penetrate, and to influence or dominate, as case may be, other organizations less likely to be suspected of being tools of Soviet Government, with a view to accomplishing their purposes through [apparent omission] organizations, rather than by direct action as a separate political party.

3. A wide variety of national associations or bodies which can be dominated or influenced by such penetration. These include: labor unions, youth leagues, women's organizations, racial societies, religious societies, social organizations, cultural groups, liberal magazines, publishing houses, etc.

4. International organizations which can be similarly penetrated through influence over various national components. Labor, youth and women's organizations are prominent among them. Particular, almost vital importance is attached in this connection to international labor movement. In this, Moscow sees possibility of sidetracking western governments in world affairs and building up international lobby capable of compelling governments to take actions favorable to Soviet interests in various countries and of paralyzing actions disagreeable to USSR

5. Russian Orthodox Church, with its foreign branches, and through it the Eastern Orthodox Church in general.

6. Pan-Slav movement and other movements (Azerbaijan, Armenian, Turcoman, etc.) based on racial groups within Soviet Union.

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7. Governments or governing groups willing to lend themselves to Soviet purposes in one degree or another, such as present Bulgarian and Yugoslav Governments, North Persian regime, Chinese Communists, etc. Not only propaganda machines but actual policies of these regimes can be placed extensively at disposal of USSR

It may be expected that component parts of this far-flung apparatus will be utilized in accordance with their individual suitability, as follows:

(a) To undermine general political and strategic potential of major western powers. Efforts will be made in such countries to disrupt national self confidence, to hamstring measures of national defense, to increase social and industrial unrest, to stimulate all forms of disunity. All persons with grievances, whether economic or racial, will be urged to spelt redress not in mediation and compromise, but in defiant violent struggle for destruction of other elements of society. Here poor will be set against rich, black against white, young against old, newcomers against established residents, etc.

(b) On unofficial plane particularly violent efforts will be made to weaken power and influence of Western Powers of [on] colonial backward, or dependent peoples. On this level, no holds will be barred. Mistakes and weaknesses of western colonial administration will be mercilessly exposed and exploited. Liberal opinion in Western countries will be mobilized to weaken colonial policies. Resentment among dependent peoples will be stimulated. And while latter are being encouraged to seek independence of Western Powers, Soviet dominated puppet political machines will be undergoing preparation to take over domestic power in respective colonial areas when independence is achieved.

(c) Where individual governments stand in path of Soviet purposes pressure will be brought for their removal from office. This can happen where governments directly oppose Soviet foreign policy aims (Turkey, Iran), where they seal their territories off against Communist penetration (Switzerland, Portugal), or where they compete too strongly, like Labor Government in England, for moral domination among elements which it is important for Communists to dominate. (Sometimes, two of these elements are present in a single case. Then Communist opposition becomes particularly shrill and savage. [)]

(d) In foreign countries Communists will, as a rule, work toward destruction of all forms of personal independence, economic, political or moral. Their system can handle only individuals who have been brought into complete dependence on higher power. Thus, persons who are financially independent--such as individual businessmen, estate owners, successful farmers, artisans and all those who exercise local leadership or have local prestige, such as popular local clergymen or political figures, are anathema. It is not by chance that even in USSR local officials are kept constantly on move from one job to another, to prevent their taking root.

(e) Everything possible will be done to set major Western Powers against each other. Anti-British talk will be plugged among Americans, anti-American talk among British. Continentals, including Germans, will be taught to abhor both Anglo-Saxon powers. Where suspicions exist, they will be fanned; where not, ignited. No effort will be spared to discredit and combat all efforts which threaten to lead to any sort

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of unity or cohesion among other [apparent omission] from which Russia might be excluded. Thus, all forms of international organization not amenable to Communist penetration and control, whether it be the Catholic [apparent omission] international economic concerns, or the international fraternity of royalty and aristocracy, must expect to find themselves under fire from many, and often [apparent omission].

(f) In general, all Soviet efforts on unofficial international plane will be negative and destructive in character, designed to tear down sources of strength beyond reach of Soviet control. This is only in line with basic Soviet instinct that there can be no compromise with rival power and that constructive work can start only when Communist power is doming But behind all this will be applied insistent, unceasing pressure for penetration and command of key positions in administration and especially in police apparatus of foreign countries. The Soviet regime is a police regime par excellence, reared in the dim half world of Tsarist police intrigue, accustomed to think primarily in terms of police power. This should never be lost sight of in ganging Soviet motives.

Part 5: [Practical Deductions From Standpoint of US Policy]

In summary, we have here a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with US there can be no permanent modus vivendi that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be secure. This political force has complete power of disposition over energies of one of world's greatest peoples and resources of world's richest national territory, and is borne along by deep and powerful currents of Russian nationalism. In addition, it has an elaborate and far flung apparatus for exertion of its influence in other countries, an apparatus of amazing flexibility and versatility, managed by people whose experience and skill in underground methods are presumably without parallel in history. Finally, it is seemingly inaccessible to considerations of reality in its basic reactions. For it, the vast fund of objective fact about human society is not, as with us, the measure against which outlook is constantly being tested and re-formed, but a grab bag from which individual items are selected arbitrarily and tendenciously to bolster an outlook already preconceived. This is admittedly not a pleasant picture. Problem of how to cope with this force in [is] undoubtedly greatest task our diplomacy has ever faced and probably greatest it will ever have to face. It should be point of departure from which our political general staff work at present juncture should proceed. It should be approached with same thoroughness and care as solution of major strategic problem in war, and if necessary, with no smaller outlay in planning effort. I cannot attempt to suggest all answers here. But I would like to record my conviction that problem is within our power to solve--and that without recourse to any general military conflict.. And in support of this conviction there are certain observations of a more encouraging nature I should like to make:

(1) Soviet power, unlike that of Hitlerite Germany, is neither schematic nor adventunstic. It does not work by fixed plans. It does not take unnecessary risks.

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Impervious to logic of reason, and it is highly sensitive to logic of force. For this reason it can easily withdraw--and usually does when strong resistance is encountered at any point. Thus, if the adversary has sufficient force and makes clear his readiness to use it, he rarely has to do so. If situations are properly handled there need be no prestige-engaging showdowns.

(2) Gauged against Western World as a whole, Soviets are still by far the weaker force. Thus, their success will really depend on degree of cohesion, firmness and vigor which Western World can muster. And this is factor which it is within our power to influence.

(3) Success of Soviet system, as form of internal power, is not yet finally proven. It has yet to be demonstrated that it can survive supreme test of successive transfer of power from one individual or group to another. Lenin's death was first such transfer, and its effects wracked Soviet state for 15 years. After Stalin's death or retirement will be second. But even this will not be final test. Soviet internal system will now be subjected, by virtue of recent territorial expansions, to series of additional strains which once proved severe tax on Tsardom. We here are convinced that never since termination of civil war have mass of Russian people been emotionally farther removed from doctrines of Communist Party than they are today. In Russia, party has now become a great and--for the moment--highly successful apparatus of dictatorial administration, but it has ceased to be a source of emotional inspiration. Thus, internal soundness and permanence of movement need not yet be regarded as assured.

(4) All Soviet propaganda beyond Soviet security sphere is basically negative and destructive. It should therefore be relatively easy to combat it by any intelligent and really constructive program.

For those reasons I think we may approach calmly and with good heart problem of how to deal with Russia. As to how this approach should be made, I only wish to advance, by way of conclusion, following comments:

(1) Our first step must be to apprehend, and recognize for what it is, the nature of the movement with which we are dealing. We must study it with same courage, detachment, objectivity, and same determination not to be emotionally provoked or unseated by it, with which doctor studies unruly and unreasonable individual.

(2) We must see that our public is educated to realities of Russian situation. I cannot over-emphasize importance of this. Press cannot do this alone. It must be done mainly by Government, which is necessarily more experienced and better informed on practical problems involved. In this we need not be deterred by [ugliness?] of picture. I am convinced that there would be far less hysterical anti-Sovietism in our country today if realities of this situation were better understood by our people. There is nothing as dangerous or as terrifying as the unknown. It may also be argued that to reveal more information on our difficulties with Russia would reflect unfavorably on Russian-American relations. I feel that if there is any real risk here involved, it is one which we should have courage to face, and sooner the better. But I cannot see what we would be risking. Our stake in this country, even coming on heels of tremendous demonstrations of our friendship for Russian people, is

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remarkably small. We have here no investments to guard, no actual trade to lose, virtually no citizens to protect, few cultural contacts to preserve. Our only stake lies in what we hope rather than what we have; and I am convinced we have better chance of realizing those hopes if our public is enlightened and if our dealings with Russians are placed entirely on realistic and matter-of-fact basis.

(3) Much depends on health and vigor of our own society. World communism is like malignant parasite which feeds only on diseased tissue. This is point at which domestic and foreign policies meets Every courageous and incisive measure to solve internal problems of our own society, to improve self-confidence, discipline, morale and community spirit of our own people, is a diplomatic victory over Moscow worth a thousand diplomatic notes and joint communiqués. If we cannot abandon fatalism and indifference in face of deficiencies of our own society, Moscow will profit--Moscow cannot help profiting by them in its foreign policies.

(4) We must formulate and put forward for other nations a much more positive and constructive picture of sort of world we would like to see than we have put forward in past. It is not enough to urge people to develop political processes similar to our own. Many foreign peoples, in Europe at least, are tired and frightened by experiences of past, and are less interested in abstract freedom than in security. They are seeking guidance rather than responsibilities. We should be better able than Russians to give them this. And unless we do, Russians certainly will.

(5) Finally we must have courage and self-confidence to cling to our own methods and conceptions of human society. After Al, the greatest danger that can befall us in coping with this problem of Soviet communism, is that we shall allow ourselves to become like those with whom we are coping. KENNAN

800.00B International Red Day/2 - 2546: Airgram

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