挑战者号失事案例及决策分析

管理决策期末作业

山西财经大学

管 理 决 策

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翻译 案例分析 项目管理二班 2013/12/23

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管理决策期末作业

翻译 Group Decision Fiascoes Continue: Space Shuttle

Challenger and a Revised Groupthink Framework

Gregory Moorhead,i Richard Ference,i and Chris P. Necki

This paper reviews the decision situation surroun1g the decision to launch the space shuttle Challenger in January 1986 in the light of the groupthink hypothesis. A revised framework is presented that proposes time and leadership style as moderators of the manner in which group characteristics lead to groupthink symptoms.

KEY WORDS: groupthink; Challenger; decision making; group characteristics. INTRODUCTION

In 1972, a new dimension was added to our understanding of group decision making with the proposal of the groupthink hypothesis by Janis(1972).JaIlis coined the term \to refer to \mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group,when the members' striving for unanimity override their motivation torealistically appraise altemative courses of action\1972, p. 8). Thehypothesis was supported by his hindsight analysis of several political-military fiascoes and successes that are differentiated by the occurrence or non-occurrence of antecedent conditions, groupthink symptoms, and decision making defects.

In a subsequent volume,JaniS further explicates the theory and adds an analysis of the Watergate transcripts and various published memoirs and accounts of principals involved, concluding that the Watergate cover-up decision also was a result of groupthink(Janis, 1983). Both volumes propose prescriptions for preventing the occurrence of groupthink, many of which have

群体决策Fiascoes继续：航天飞机 Challenger和经修订的群体思维框架 格雷戈里·穆尔黑德，我理查德·费伦斯，我和Chris P. Necki

本文回顾了形势surroun曲1G到发射挑战者号航天飞机于1986年1月在群体思维假说的光的决定的决定。修改后的框架提出了建议时间和领导风格的方式版主其中群体特征导致群体思维症状。

关键词：群体思维;挑战者;决策;群体特征。 引言

1972年，一个新的层面加入群决策的群体思维假设由贾尼斯（1972 ）建议的理解。 JaIlis创造了“群体思维”一词来指“思维的人从事，当他们的模

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式深深卷入组，当成员的争创一致重写他们的动机评估行动课程“ （詹尼斯， 1972年，第8页）一个有凝聚力的。被他事后几个政治军事fiascoes和成功是由先前的状况的发生或不发生分化，群体思维症状和决策的缺陷分析支持。

在随后的体积，詹尼斯进一步阐述理论，并增加了水门事件的成绩单和各种出版的回忆录，涉及校长的账目进行分析，得出的结论是水门事件掩盖决定也为群体思维（詹尼斯， 1983）的结果。两卷提出处方，以防止群体思维的发生，

management textbooks. Multiple advocacy decision-making procedures have been

adopted at the executive levels in many organizations, including the executive branch of the government. One would think that by 1986, 13 years after the publication of a popular book, that its prescriptions might be well ingrained in our management and decision-making styles. Unfortunately, it has not happened.

On January 28, 1986, the space shuttle Challenger was launched from Kennedy Space Center. The temperature that morning was in the mid-20's,well below the previous low temperatures at which the shuttle engines had been tested. Seventy-three seconds after launch, the Challenger exploded,killing all seven astronauts aboard, and becoming the worst disaster in space flight history. The catastrophe shocked the nation, crippled the American space program, and is destined to be remembered as the most tragic national event since the assassination of John F. Kennedy in 1963.

The Presidential Commission that investigated the accident pointed to a flawed decision-making process as a primary contributory cause. The decision was made the night before the launch in the Level I Flight Readiness Review meeting. Due to the work of the Presidential Commission,information concerning that meeting is available for analysis as a group decision possibly susceptible to groupthink.

In this paper, we report the results of our analysis of the Level Flight Readiness Review meeting as a decision-making situation that displays evidence of groupthink. We review the antecedent conditions, the groupthink symptoms, and the possible decision-making defects, as suggested by Janis (1983). In addition, we take the next and more important step of going beyond the development of another example of groupthink to 其中许多已经出现在大众媒

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体，在对行政决策的书籍，并在管理的教科书。多宣传决策程序，已经通过在许多组织，包括政府的行政部门的行政级别。有人会认为，到1986年，一本畅销书，其处方可能还有根深蒂固在我们的管理和决策风格公布13年后。不幸的是，它并没有发生。

1986年1月28日，挑战者号航天飞机从肯尼迪航天中心发射升空。温度那天早上是在中间20年代，远低于前低的温度在该班车引擎已经过测试。发射后七三秒钟，挑战者爆炸，七名宇航员全部遇难船上，并成为最大的灾难的空间飞行的历史。灾难震惊全国，削弱了美国的太空计划，并注定要被记住作为自约翰· F·肯尼迪1963年遇刺最悲惨的全国性活动。

总统委员会认为调查事故指着一个有缺陷的决策过程中作为主要促成因素。推出的I级飞行准备审查会议前的决定是在晚上。由于总统委员会的工作，是有关该会议的信息可用于分析群体决策可能容易受到群体思维。

在本文中，我们报告我们的水平飞行准备评审会议，会显示群体思维的证据的决策情况的分析结果。我们回顾了先前的条件下，群体思维症状，可能的决策缺陷，所建议的贾尼斯（ 1983） 。此外，我们采取的超越群体思维的另一个例子的发展做出的重新调查小组决策过程的建议下一个更重要的步骤。

recommendations for renewed inquiry into

group decision-making processes. THEORY AND EVIDENCE

The groupthink hypothesis has been 4

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presented in detail in numerous publications other than Janis' books (Flowers, 1977; Courtright, 1978; Leana,1985; Moorhead, 1982; Moorhead & Montanari, 1986) and will not be repeated here. The major categories w01 be used as a framework for organizing the evidence from the meeting. Within each category the key elements will be presented along with meeting details that pertain to each. The meeting(s) took place throughout the day and evening from 12:36 pm (EST), January 27, 1986 following the decision to not launch the Challenger due to high crosswinds at the launch site. Discussions continued through about 12:00 midnight (EST) via teleconferencing and Telefax systems connecting the Kennedy Space Center in Florida, Morton Thiokol(MTI) in Utah, Johnson Space Center in Houston, and the Marshall Space Flight Center. The Level I Flight Readiness Review is the highest level of review prior to launch. It comprises the highest level of management at the three space centers and at MTI, the private supplier of the solid rocket booster engines.

To briefly state the situation, the MTI engineers recommended not to launch if temperatures of the O-ring seals on the rocket were below 53 degrees Fahrenheit, which was the lowest temperature of any previous flight. Laurence B. Mulloy, manager of the Solid Rocket Booster Project at Marshall Space Flight Center, states:

. . .The bottom line of that, though, initially

was that Thiokol engineering, Bob Lund, who is the Vice President and Director of Engineering, who is here today, recommended that 51-L [the Challenger] not be launched if the O-ring temperatures predicted at launch time would be lower than any previous

理论与证实

该群体思维假说已经提出了详细的比Janis的书（花， 1977; Courtright ，1978; Leana ， 1985;穆尔黑德，1982;穆尔黑德和蒙塔纳， 1986）等众多的出版物，也不会在这里重复。大类W01被用作从会议主办证据的框架。在每个类别中的关键要素将随着会议的细节，涉及到每个人都可以提出。

从下午12:36 （美国东部时间），以下为不启动挑战者由于高侧风在发射场的决定的会议上（次）发生在白天和晚上， 1986年1月27日。讨论通过连接肯尼迪航天中心在佛罗里达州，莫顿聚硫橡胶（ MTI ）在犹他，约翰逊航天中心在休斯敦和马歇尔太 空飞行中心电话会议和电传系统继续通过大约午夜12:00 （美国东部时间） 。 I级飞行考前复习是在发射前审查的最高水平。它包括三个空间

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中心和在MTI ，固体火箭的私人供应商管理的最高级别 增压发动机。

简要地说明情况， MTI工程师建议不要启动，如果气温在火箭的O型圈密封件均低于53华氏度，这是以往任何飞行的最低温度。劳伦斯B.马洛伊，固体火箭助推器项目于马歇尔太空飞行中心的经理，说：

。 。 ，那底线，虽然，最初是聚硫橡胶工程，鲍勃·隆德，谁是副总裁兼工程总监，今天谁在这里，建议51 -L [挑战者]无法启动，如果O型圈温度在启动时预测会比以往任何发射低，那是53度。 。 。

launch, and that was 53 degrees . . . (Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle

Accident, 1986, p. 91-92).

This recommendation was made at

8:45 pm,.January 27, 1986 (Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Accident, 1986). Through the ensuing discussions the decision to launch was made. Antecedent Conditions

The three primary antecedent conditions for the development of groupthink are: a highly cohesive group, leader preference for a certain decision, and insulation of the group from qualified outside opinions. These conditions existed in this situation.

Cohesive Group. The people who made the decision to launch had worked together for many years. They were familiar with each other and had grown through the ranks of the space program. A high degree of esprit de corps existed between the members.

Leader Preference. Two top level managers actively promoted their pro-launch opinions in the face of opposition. The commission report states that several managers at space centers and MTI pushed for launch, regardless of the low temperatures. Insulation from Experts. MTI engineers made their recommendations relatively early in the evening. The top level decision-making group knew of their objections but did not meet with them directly to review their data and concerns. As Roger Boisjoly, a Thiokol engineer, states in his remarks to the Presidential Commission:

I was not even asked to participate in gi'ving

any input to the frnal decision charts(Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Accident, 1986, p. 91-92).

This testimonial indicates that the top decision-making team was insulated from the engineers who possessed the expertise regarding the functioning of the equipment. Groupthink Symptoms

(总统委员会对航天飞机事故， 1986

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年，第91-92报告） 。

这个建议是20时45分。 1986年1月27日（总统委员会对航天飞机事故，1986报告） 。通过随后的讨论中，推出决定做出。 先行条件

这三个主要的前提条件，群体思维的发展是：一个高度凝聚力的群体，领导者偏好某种决定，本集团向合格的外部意见的绝缘。这些条件存在这种情况。

凝聚力的群体。谁做的决定，推出的人已经工作多年在一起。他们熟悉彼此，并通过太空计划的行列中长大。的袍泽高度存在的成员之间。

领导者优先。两个顶级经理积极推动他们的亲发射意见反对面前。该

委员会报告指出，不同的基金经理在空间中心和MTI被推为发射，不管低温。

绝缘从专家。 MTI公司的工程师在晚上比较早的提出自己的建议。顶层决策组知道他们的反对意见，但他们并没有直接见面，检讨自己的数据和关注。正如罗杰Boisjoly ，一个聚硫橡胶工程师，在他的言论指出，以总统委员会：

我什至没有要求参加gi'ving任何输入到frnal决定图表（总统委员会对航天飞机事故， 1986年，第91-92报告） 。

这证明表明最高决策层团队从谁拥有有关设备的运作的专业知识的工程师绝缘。

群体思维症状

Janis identified eight symptoms of

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groupthink. They are presented here along with evidence from the Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Accident (1986).

Invulnerability. When groupthink occurs, most or all of the members of the decision-making group have an illusion of invulnerability that reassures them in the face of obvious dangers. This illusion leads the group to become over optimistic and willing to take extraordinary risks. It may also cause them to ignore clear warnings of danger.

The sojid rocket joint problem that destroyed Challenger was discussed often at flight readiness review meetings prior to flight. However,Commission member Richard Feynman concjuded from the testimony that a mentality of overconfidence existed due to the extraordinary record of success of space flights. Every time we send one up it is successful. Involved members may seem to think that on the next one we can lower our standards or take more risks because it always works (Time, 1986).

The invulnerability illusion may have built up over time as a result of NASA's own spectacular history. NASA had not lost an astronaut since 1967 when a flash fire in the capsule of Apoll0 1 killed three. Since that time NASA had a string of 55 successful missions. They had put a man on the moon, built and launched Skylab and the shuttle, and retrieved defective satellites from orbit. In the minds of most Americans and apparently their own, they could do no wrong.

Rationalization. Victims of groupthink collectively construct rationalizations that discount warnings and other forms of negative feedback. If these signals were taken seriously when presented, the group members would be forced to reconsider their assumptions each time they re-commit themselves to their past decisions.

他们在这里提出一起从总统委员会对航天飞机事故（ 1986）报告的证据。

无懈可击的错觉。当发生群体思维，大多数或所有决策小组的成员有刀枪不入的一个错觉，以为可令他们在明显的危险面前。这种错觉导致本集团成为乐观，并愿意承担非常大的风险。它可能也会使他们忽视的危险明显的警告。

该sojid火箭关节的问题，摧毁挑战者往往在讨论之前，飞行飞行准备检讨会议。然而，委员会成员理查德·费曼从过度自信的心态存在由于太空飞行成功的非凡记录的证词concjuded 。我们送一上来它的每一次成功。参与成员似乎认为就下单，我们可以降低我们的标准或冒更大的风险，因为它总是工作（时间， 1986） 。

詹尼斯确定了八个症状的群体思维。

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无懈可击的错觉可能已经建立了随着时间的推移，作为美国航空航天局自己的历史壮观的结果。美国航空航天局自1967年以来，当在Apoll0 1的胶囊火光一闪杀害了三名没有失去一名宇航员。自那时以来，美国航空航天局有55成功使命的字符串。他们把一个人送上月球，建造和发射太空实验室和航天飞机，并回收有缺陷的卫星从轨道上。在大多数美国人显然对自己的头脑，他们可以做的没有错。

合理化。群体思维的受害者共同构造打折警告和其他形式的负反馈合理化。如果这些信号被认真对待的时候提出，小组成员将被迫每次他们重新致力于其过去的决定重新考虑他们的假设。

In the Level I flight readiness meeting when the Challenger was given final launch approval, MTI engineers presented evidence that the joint would fail. Their argument was based on the fact that in the coldest previous launch (air temperature 30 degrees) the joint in question experienced serious erosion and that no data existed as to how the joint would perform at colder temperatures. FJight center officiajs put forth numerous technical rationalizations faulting MTI's analysis. One of these rationalizations was that the engineer's data were inconclusive. As Mr. Boisjoly emphasized to the Commission:Discussions became twisted (compared to previous meetings) and no one detected it. Under normal conditions, MTI would have to prove the shuttle boosters readiness for launch, instead they found themselves being forced to prove that the boosters were unsafe. Boisjoly's testimony supports this description of the discussion: . . . This was a meeting where the determination

was to launch, and it was up to us to prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that it was not safe to do so. This is in total reverse to what the position usually is in a preflight conversation or a flight readiness review. It is usually exactly opposite of thai . . . (Repori of the Presidential

Commission on the Space Shuttle Accident, 1986, p. 93).

Moraliry. Group members often believe, without question, in the inherent morality of their position. They tend to ignore the ethical or moral consequences of their decision.

In the Challenger case, this point was raised by a very high level MTI manager, Allan J. McDonald, who tried to stop the launch and said that he would not want to have to defend the decision to launch. He stated to the Commission:

. . . I made the statement that if we're wrong

and something goes wrong on this flight, I wouldn't

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在一级飞行准备会议时，挑战者给予最终批准上市， MTI公司的工程师提出的证据表明，联合将会失败。他们的论据是基于，在最寒冷的先前推出的（空气温度30度）有问题的联合经历了严重的侵蚀和没有数据存在，如何联合将在较低温度下进行的事实。 FJight中心officiajs提出了许多合理化的技术断层MTI的分析。其中一个合理化的是，工程师的数据是不确定的。由于Boisjoly先生强调委员会：讨论成为扭曲的（相比于以往的会议） ，没有人发现它。在正常情况下， MTI必须证明航天飞机的助推器准备发射，相反，他们发现自己被强迫证明助推器不安全。 Boisjoly的证词支持的讨论这样的描述：

。 。 。这是一个会议的地方是决心发动，这是由我们来证明超出了怀疑，这是不是安全的这样做了一层阴影。这是总的反向到什么位置通常是在预检谈话或飞行准备检讨。它通常是完全相反的泰国。 （总统的Repori委员会在航天飞机事故， 1986年，页。 93 ） 。

道德。集团成员往往认为，毫无疑问，其立场的内在道德。他们往往忽略了他们的决定的伦理和道德后果。

在挑战者的情况下，这点是提出了很高的水平MTI经理，艾伦J.麦当劳，谁试图阻止发射，并表示他不希望要捍卫发射的决定。他说委员会：

我认为，如果我们错了，不顺心的事，这个航班，我不希望必须要站

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want to have to be the person to stand up in front of board in inquiry and say that I went ahead and told them to go ahead and fly this thing outside what the motor was qualified to . . . (Report of the Presideruial Comrrusszon on the Space Shuttle Accidem, 1986, p. 95).

起来的板前的调查，说我继续告诉他们先走的人的声明和飞这个东西之外什么电机是合格的。（该Presideruial Comrrusszon的航天飞机Accidem ，1986年报，第95页） 。

有些成员没有听到这个说法，因 为它休息时发生。谁是听到了三个高层官员忽略了它。

千篇一律他人的意见。群体思维的受害者往往有任何人有竞争的观点的对立的刻板看法。他们认为，反对派是太傻还是太软弱理解或有效地处理这个问题。

两个负责推出的前三名美国航空航天局官员显示这种态度。他们认为，他们完全了解的接头问题的性质和从来没有认真考虑过MTI工程师提出的反对意见。事实上，他们诋毁和纠缠反对派和他们的信息和意见。

Some members did not hear this statement

because it occurred during a break. Three top officials who did hear it ignored it.

Stereotyped Views of Others. Victims of groupthink often have a stereotyped view of the opposition of anyone with a competing opinion. They feel that the opposition is too stupid or too weak to understand or deal effectively with the problem.

Two of the top three NASA officials responsible for the launch displayed this attitude. They felt that they completely understood the nature of the joint problem and never seriously considered the objections raised by the MTI engineers. In fact they denigrated and badgered the opposition and their information and opinions.

Pressure on Dissent. Group members often appjy direct pressure to anyone who questions the validity of the arguments supporting a decision or position favored by the majority. These same two officials pressured MTI to change its position after MTI originally recommended that the launch not take place. These two officials pressured Mrfl personnel to prove that it was not safe to launch, rather than to prove the opposite. As mentioned earlier, this was a total reversal of normal preflight procedures. It was this pressure that top MTI management was responding to when they overruled their engineering staff and recommended launch. As the Commission report states:

_ At approximately 11 p.m. Eastern

Standard Time, the ThiokoUNASA ielecon ference resumed, the Thiokot managemeru stating that they had reassessed the problem, that the temperature

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压力异议。小组成员经常直接压力的人谁质疑的支持，受到广大青睐的决定或位置参数的有效性。这些相同的两位官员施压改变立场后，台扬原本建议推出不会发生。这两位官员施压人员证明它是不是安全启动，而不是为了证明相反。如前面提到的，这是正常的预检程序总的逆转。正是这种压力最重要的是管理是在回应时，他们否决了他们的工程技术人员，

inconclusive . . . (p. 96).

This seems to indicate that NASA's pressure on these Thiokol officials forced them to change their recommendation from delay to execution of the launch.

Self Censorship. Group members tend to censor themselves when they have opinions or ideas that deviate from the apparent group consensus. JaniS feels that this reflects each member's inclination to minimize to himself or herself the importance of his or her own doubts and counter- arguments.

The most obvious evidence of self-censorship occurred when a vice president of MTI, who had previously presented information against launch, bowed to pressure from NASA and accepted their rationalizations for launch. He then wrote these up and presented them to NASA as the reasons that MTI had changed its recommendation to launch.

Iuusion of Unanimiry. Group members falling victim to groupthink share an illusion of unanimity conceming judgments

并建议推出。正如委员会报告指出：

made by members speaking in favor of the majority view. This symptom is caused in part

by the preceding one and is aided by the false assumption that any participant who remains

silent is in agreement with the majority opinion. The group leader and other members

support each other by playing up points of convergence in their thinking at the expense of

fully exploring points of divergence that might reveal unsettling problems.

No participant from NASA ever openly agreed with or even took sides with

大约在晚上11点东部标准时间

MTI in the discussion. The silence from NASA was probably amplified by the fact that

时， 干扰恢复， Thiokot 指出，他们

the meeting was a tejeconference linking the participants at three different locations.

已重新评估的问题，即温度的影响

Obviously, body language which might have

effects

were a concem, but that the data was admittedly

been evidenced by dissenters was not visible c

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但该数据是公认的定论。 。 。 （第96页） 。

这似乎表明，美国航空航天局对这些聚硫橡胶官员的压力迫使他们自己的建议，改变从延迟到执行的发射。

自我检查。集团成员倾向于自我审查时，他们有从组明显偏离共识意见或想法。詹尼斯认为，这反映了各成员的政策倾斜，以减少他或她自己的他或她自己的怀疑和重要性参数。

发生的自我审查的最明显的证据时， MTI副总裁，谁曾提出反对发射信息，垂首来自美国宇航局的压力，并接受他们的合理化发射。然后，他写这些了，并将其提交给美国航空航天局为

这MTI改变了其建议，推出的原因。

统一、一致的错觉。集团成员的牺牲品群体思维份额成员赞成多数人的意见的发言作出一致判断的错觉。此症状是由前一个引起部分，是由错误的假设是谁保持沉默，任何参与者在与多数意见同意资助。领导小组组长和其他成员互相支持打了收敛点在他们的思维在发散的可能揭示令人不安的问题的充分发掘点的费用。

从美国航空航天局没有参加过公开赞同，甚至偏袒与MTI讨论。来自美国宇航局的沉默可能是由以下事实，这次会议是一个tejeconference连接的参与者在三个不同的地点放大。显然，肢体语言可能已被证明反对者是不可见的其他人谁可能也举行了反对意见。

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管理决策期末作业

to others who might also have held a

dissenting opinion. Thus, silence meant agreement.

Mindguarding. Certain group members assume the role of guarding the minds of others in the group. They attempt to shield the group from adverse information that might destroy the majority view of the facts regarding the appropriateness of the decision. The top management at Marshall knew that the rocket casings had been ordered redesigned to correct a flaw 5 months previous to this launch. This information and other technical details concerning the history of the joint problem was withheld at the meeting. Decision-Making Defects

The result of the antecedent conditions and the symptoms of groupthink is a defective decision-making process.JaniS discusses several defects in decision making that can result.

Few Altematives. The group considers only a few alternatives, often only two. No initial survey of all possible alternatives occurs. The Flight Readiness Review team had a launch/no-launch decision to make. These were the only two alternatives considered. Other possible alternatives might have been to delay the launch for further testing, or to delay until the temperatures reached an appropriate level.

No Re-Examination of altematives. The group fails to re-examine alternatives that may have been initially discarded based on early unfavorable information. Top NASA officials spent time and effort defending and strengthening their position, rather than examining the MTI position.

Rejecting Expert Opinions. Members make little or no attempt to seek outside experts opinions. NASA did not seek out other experts who might have some expertise in this area. They assumed that they had all the

information.

因此，沉默意味着同意。

自愿的思想警卫。某些小组成员承担守着别人心目中的组中的角色。他们试图从可能破坏有关的决定恰当的事实，大多数人的意见不良信息屏蔽的组。

高层管理人员在马歇尔知道，火箭外壳已下令重新设计，以纠正缺陷5个月在此之前推出。关于联合的问题历史上的这一信息和其他技术细节被隐瞒了会议。

决策缺陷

这项决策的前提条件和群体思维的症状的结果是有缺陷的决策process.JaniS论述的决策，可导致一些缺陷。

几个Altematives 。该小组认为，

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只有少数的替代品，往往只有两个。所有可能的备选方案没有初始调查发生。飞行考前复习队有一个启动/无发射的决定。这些是仅有的两个备选方案考虑。其他可能的替代方案可能是推迟发射进行进一步的测试，或延迟，直到气温达到适当的水平。

没有复审 。本集团未能重新审视替代品，可能已初步放弃基于早期的不利信息。美国宇航局官员花了时间和精力捍卫和巩固自己的地位，而不是检查MTI位置。

拒绝专家意见。大家做很少或没有尝试寻求外部专家的意见。美国航空航天局并没有找出谁可能有一些专业知识在这一领域的其他专家。他们假设，他们把所有的信息。

Rejecting Negative Information. Members tend to focus on supportive information and ignore any data or information that might cast a negative light on their preferred alternative. MTI representatives repeatedly tried to point out errors in the rationale the NASA officials were using to justify the launch. Even after the decision was made, the argument continued until a NASA official told the MTI representative that it was no longer his concern.

No Contingency Plans. Members spend little time discussing the possible consequences of the decision and, therefore, fail to develop contingency plans. There is no documented evidence in the Rogers Commission Report of any discussion of the possible consequences of an incorrect decision.

Summary of the Evidence

The major categories and key elements of the groupthink hypothesis have been presented (albeit somewhat briefly) along with evidence from the discussions prior to the launching of the Challenger, as reported in the President's Commission to investigate the accident. The antecedent conditions were present in the decision-making group, even though the group was in several physical locations. The leaders had a preferred solution and engaged in behaviors designed to promote it rather than critically appraise alternatives. These behaviors were evidence of most of the symptoms leading to a defective decision-making process. DISCUSSION

This situation provides another example of decision making in which the group fejI victim to the groupthink syndrome, as have so many previous groups. It illustrates the situation characteristics, the symptoms of group think, and decision-making defects as described by JaniS. This situation,however,

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拒绝消极的信息。大家往往把重点放在支持性信息，并忽略可能蒙上了消极的光在他们的首选替代任何数据或信息。 MTI公司的代表多次试图在理论基础美国宇航局官员使用证明发射指出错误。在作出决定后，甚至，争论一直持续到美国宇航局的官员告诉MTI代表，它已不再是他的关注。

没有应急预案。大家花一点时间讨论决定可能产生的后果，因此，未能制定应急计划。有在的一个可能后果的讨论罗杰斯委员会的报告没有任何书面证据 不正确的决定。 证据总结

主要类别和群体思维假说的主要

内容已经呈现（尽管有些是暂时的）以及来自挑战者的开展之前讨论的证据，如报告在总统委员会调查事故。前因条件是存在于决策组，即使该集团在多个物理位置。领导人有一个首选的解决方案，并参与旨在促进它，而不是批判性评价替代品的行为。这些行为都是最领先的，以有缺陷的决策过程中的症状证据。 讨论

这种情况提供了决策中的组中受害者的群体思维症状，因为有这么多以前的组的另一个例子。它说明所描述的詹尼斯的情况特点，集体性思维的症状，和决策的缺陷。这种情况下，然而，还示出的是对群体思维需要被包括在群体思维模型的订正制剂的发

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also illustrates several other aspects of situations that are critical to the development of groupthink that need to be included in a revised formulation of the groupthink model. First, the element of time in influencing the development of groupthink has not received adequate attention. In the decision to launch the space shuttle Challenger, time was a crucial part of the decision-making process. The launch had been dejayed once, and the window for another launch was fast closing. The leaders of the decision team were concerned about public and congressional perceptions of the entire space shuttle program and its continued funding and may have felt that further delays of the launch could seriously impact future funding. With the space window fast closing, the decision team was faced with a launch now or seriously damage the program decision. One top level manager's response to Thiokol's initial recommendation to postpone the launch indicates the presence of time pressure.

With this LCC (Launch Commit Criteria), i.e., do not launch with a temperature greater [siq than 53 degrees, we may not be able to launch until next April. We need to consider this carefully before we jump to any conclusions . . . (Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Accident, 1986, p. 96).

展是至关重要的情况下，其他几个方面。首先，时间在影响群体思维发展的因素并没有得到足够的重视。在发射挑战者号航天飞机的决定，时间是决策过程中的重要组成部分。推出了dejayed一次，再发射窗口是快速关闭。决定团队的领导者关注整个航天飞机计划的公众和国会的看法和其持续的资金，可能都觉得在推出进一步的延误可能严重影响未来的资金。与空间窗口快速关闭，决策小组现在正面临着一个发射或严重损害程序的决定。一个顶级经理人的回应聚硫橡胶的初步建议推迟发射表示时间压力的存在.

Time pressure could have played a and to self-censor their comments. that needs to be highlighted in a role in the group choosing to agree and to self-censor their comments.Therefore, time is a critical variable revised groupthink framework. We propose that time is an important moderator between group characteristics and the development of the groupthink symptoms. That is, in certain situations when there is pressure to make a decision quickly, the elements may combine to foster the development of groupthink.

The second revision needs to be in the role of the leadership of the decision-making

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有了这个LCC （启动提交标准） ，即不带温度更高[ SIQ超过53度启动，我们可能无法启动，直到明年四月。我们需要仔细考虑，才妄下结论。 。 。 （总统委员会对航天飞机事故， 1986年，第96页的报告） 。

时间压力能够发挥和自我审查的意见。需要在组选同意在角色和自我审查他们comments.Therefore加以强调，时间是一个关键的变量修正群体思维框架。我们建议，时间是群特点和群体思维症状的发展之间的重要主持人。也就是说，在某些情况下，当有压力迅速做出决定，该元件可以结合培养群体思维的发展。

第二个版本需要在决策小组的领导作用。在挑战者号航天飞机事故，

group. In the space shuttle Challenger incident,

the leadership of the group varied from a shared type of leadership to a very clear leader in the situation. This may indicate that the leadership role needs to be clearly defined and a style that demands open disclosure of information, points of opposition, complaints, and dissension. Inclusion of leadership in a more powerful role in the groupthink framework needs to be more explicit than in the JaIlis formulation in which leadership is one of several group characteristics that can lead to the development of the groupthink symptoms. We propose the leadership style is a crucial variable that moderates the relationship between the group characteristics and the development of the symptoms.Janis (1983) is a primary form of evidence to support the inclusion of leadership style in the enhanced model. His account of why the same group succumbed to groupthink in one decision (Bay of Pigs) and not in another (Cuban Missile Crisis) supports the depiction of leadership style as a moderator variable. In these decisions, the only condition that changed was the leadership style of the President. In other words, the element that seemed to distinguish why groupthink occurred in the Bay of Pigs decision and not in the Cuban Missile Crisis situation is the president's change in his behavior.

These two variables, time and leadership style, are proposed as moderators of the impact of the group characteristics on groupthink symptoms. This relationship is portrayed graphically in Fig. 1. In effect, we propose that the groupthink symptoms result from the group characteristics, as proposed by JaniS' but only in the presence of the moderator variables of time and certain leadership styles.

Time, as an important element in the model, is relatively straightforward. When a

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该集团的领导从领导的共享类型而异的情况下非常清晰的领导者。这可能表明，领导者的任务需要明确界定和样式，要求公开披露的信息，指出反对，抱怨和纠纷的。领导在群体思维框架更强大的作用列入需要比在制剂，其中的领导是几个群体特征，可导致的群体思维症状发展的一种更明确。我们提出的领导风格是温和派的群体特征和

symptoms.Janis

这两个变量，时间和领导风格，提出作为的群体特征对群体思维症状的影响主持人。这种关系在图以图形方式描绘。 1 。实际上，我们建议群体思维症状的群体特征导致，所建议的Janis的，但只有在时间和一定的领导风格主持人变量的存在。

时间，因为在模型中的一个重要因素，是比较简单的。当必须在很短的时间内，压力在成员同意，以避免

（ 1983）的发展之间的关系是一个证据的主要形式，以支持增强模式纳入领导作风的关键变量。他的帐户为什么同组屈从于群体思维于一体的决定（猪湾），而不是在另一个（古巴导弹危机）支持的领导 风格描绘作为调节变量。在这些决定，改变了唯一的条件是总统的领导风格。换句话说，这似乎区别，为什么发生群体思维在决策猪湾，而不是在古巴导弹危机形势的元素是在他的行为总统的变化。

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decision must be made within a very short time frame, pressure on members to agree, to avoid time-consuming arguments and reports from outside experts, and to self-censor themselves may increase.These pressures inevitably cause group members to seek agreement. In Jams's original model, time was included indirectly as a function of the antecedent condition, group cohesion.Janis (1983) argued that time pressures can adversely affect decision quality in two ways. First, it affects the decision makers' mental efficiency and judgment, interfering with their ability to concentrate on complicated discussions, to absorb new information, and to use imagination to anticipate the future consequences of alternative courses of action. Second, time pressure is a source of stress Fig. 1. Revised groupthink framework. that will have the effect of inducing a policy-making group to become more cohesive and more likely to engage in groupthink. Leadership style is shown to be a moderator because of the importance it plays in either promoting or avoiding the development of the symptoms of the groupthink. The leader, even though she or he may not promote a preferred solution, may allow or even assist the group seeking

agreement by not forcing the group to critically appraise all alternative courses of action. The focus of this leadership variable is on the degree to which the leader allows or promotes discussion and evaluation of alternatives. It is not a matter of simply not making known a preferred solution; the issue is one of stimulation of critical thinking among the group.

Impact on Prescriptions for Prevention

The revised model suggests that more specific prescriptions for prevention of groupthink can be made. First, group members need to be aware of the impact that a short decision time frame has on decision processes.

行自我审查本身可能increase.These压力不可避免地导致组成员寻求协议内作出决定。在果酱的原始模型，时间被列入间接作为前提条件的函数，组cohesion.Janis （ 1983）认为，时间压力可以决定品质在两个方面产生不利影响。首先，它会影响决策者的心理效率和判断，与他们专注于复杂的讨论，吸收新的信息，并用想象力来预测的行动过程的未来后果的能力的干扰。第二，时间 - 压力在应力图的来源。 1 。经修订的群体思维框架。这将有诱导决策集团成为更具凝聚力，更有可能从事群体思维的影响。 领导风格被证明是因为它扮演的重要性，无论是促进或避免的群体思维的症状发展的主持人。领导者，即使他或她可能不会推动首选的解决方案，可以允许或什至协助小组寻求 协议通过不强行集团审慎评估行动的所有替代课程。这种领导变量的重点是在何种程度上的领导者允许或促进

耗时的参数和外部专家的报告，并进

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替代品的讨论和评价。它不是简单地不知道做一个首选的解决方案的问题;问题是这一群体中的批判性思维的刺激之一。

影响对处方预防

修订后的模型表明，预防群体思维的更具体的处方可。首先，小组成员需要知道的是很短的决策时间框架对决策过程的影响。当必须迅速作出决定，将会有更多的压力，同意，即持不同政见者，自我审查，避免专家意

When a decision must be made quickly, there

will be more pressure to agree, i.e., discouragement of dissent, self-censorship, avoidance of expert opinion, and assumptions about unanimity. The type of leadership suggested here is not one that sits back and simply does not make known her or his preferred solution. This type of leader must be one that requires all members to speak up with concerns, questions, and new information. The leader must know what some of these concerns are and which members are likely to have serious doubts so that the people with concerns can be called upon to voice them. This type of group leadership does not simply assign the role of devil's advocate and step out of the way. This leader actually plays the role or makes sure that others do. A leader with the required style to avoid groupthink is not a laissez faire leader or non-involved participative leader. This leader is active in directing the activities of the group but does not make known a preferred solution. The group still must develop and evaluate alternative courses of action, but under the direct influence of a strong, demanding leader who forces critical appraisal of all alternatives. Finally, a combination of the two variables suggests that the leader needs to help members to avoid the problems created by the time element. For example, the leader may be able to alter an externally imposed time frame for the decision by negotiating an extension or even paying late fees, if necessary. If an extension is not possible, the leader may need to help the group eliminate the effects of time on the decision processes. This can be done by forcing attention to issues rather than time, encouraging dissension and confrontation, and scheduling special sessions to hear reports from outside experts that challenge prevailing views within the group.

JaniS presents, in both editions of his book, several recommendations for preventing 21

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见，以及有关的假设一致的沮丧。这里建议领导的类型，不是一个坐在后面，根本不让人知道她或他的首选解决方案。这种类型的领导者必须是一个需要所有成员说话了疑虑，问题和新信息。领导者必须知道其中一些问题是，哪些成员可能有严重的怀疑，这样的人能关注被要求说出来。这种类型的集团领导层的不只是分配魔鬼代言人的角色，走出的路。这实际上是领导者所发挥的作用还是可以确保别人做。与所需风格的领导者，以避免群体思维是不是放任自流的领导者或者非介入参与的领导者。这个领导者是活跃在指挥小组的活动，但不知道做一个首选的解决方案。该小组还必须制定和评估行动过程，但在强大的，要求领导谁迫使所有的替代品批判性评价的直接影响。

最后，这两个变量的组合表明，领导者需要帮助的成员，以避免由时间因素造成的问题。例如，领导者也许可以改变为通过谈判延长，甚至缴纳滞纳金，如果有必要的决定外部强加的时间框架。如果分机是不可能的，领导者可能需要帮助的群体消除时间对决策过程的影响。这可以通过强制关注的问题，而不是时间，鼓励分歧和对抗，并安排特别会议，听取工作要做从外部专家的挑战组内普遍的看法的报告。

詹尼斯介绍，在他的书中，防止群体思维发生了若干建议的两种版

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管理决策期末作业

the occurrence of groupthink. These recommendations focus on the inclusion of outside experts in the decision-making process, all members taking the role of devil's advocate and critically appraising all alternative courses of action, and the leader not expressing a preferred solution. The revised groupthink framework suggests several new prescriptions that may be helpful in preventing further decision fiascoes similar to the decision to launch the space shuttle Challenger.

Much additional research is necessary to test the revised framework. First, Iaboratory research is needed to refine details of how time affects the development of groupthink. Second, the impact of various types of leadership style that may be appropriate for group decision-making situations needs to be investigated. Finally, research which tests the revised framework with real decision-making groups will be needed to refine new prescriptions for preventing groupthink. CONCLUSION

This paper has reviewed the basic tenets of groupthink and examined the decision to launch the space shuttle Challenger in January 1986. The report of the Presidential Commission provided enough evidence of the antecedent conditions, the symptoms, and the decision-making defects to support a conclusion that the decision to launch can be classified as a

groupthink situation. We have proposed, in addition, that other conditions may play important roles in the development of groupthink. These two variables, time and leadership style, are proposed as moderators of the relationship between group characteristics and groupthink symptoms. These two moderators lead to new prescriptions for the prevention of groupthink. Much additional research is needed to test the degree to which the revised framework can be

纳入外部专家，服用魔鬼代言人的作用和严格评价行动所有替代课程，领导不表达的最佳解决方案的所有成员。修订后的群体思维框架，提出了一些新的处方可能有助于防止进一步的决定fiascoes相似，以发射挑战者号航天飞机的决定。

多少额外的研究是必要的，以测试修改后的框架。首先， 研究需要改进的时间如何影响群体思维的发展细节。其次，需要进行调查各种类型的领导风格，可能是适当的群体决策情况的影响。最后，研究哪些测试修改后的框架与真正的决策群体，将需要改进新处方，以防止群体思维。

本。这些建议重点关注在决策过程中

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Time. Fixing NASA. June 9, 1986.

FLOWERS, M. L. A laboratory test of some implications of Jams's groupthink hypothesis.

本文综述了群体思维的基本原理

Joumal of Personaluy and Social Psychol08y, 1977, 35, 888-896.

和研究，推出了挑战者号航天飞机于

JANIS, I. L Wctims of groupthinlc Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972.

1986年1月决定。总统委员会的报告

JAMS, I. L. Groupthink (2nd ed., revised). Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1983.

提供了足够的证据的前提条件，症状，

LEAbfA, C. R. A partial test of Jams's groupthink model: Effects of group

以及决策的缺陷，以支持发起的决定

cohesiveness and

leader behavior on defective decision

可以被归类为一个结论

making. Joumal of Maturgemeru, 1985, 11, 5-17.

群体思维的局面。我们提出，除此之

MOORHEAD, G. Groupthink: Hypothesis in need of testing. Group and O,ganization

外，其他条件可在群体思维的发展起

Studies,

1982, 7 429-444.

着重要的作用。这两个变量，时间和

MOORHEAD, G., & MONTANARI, J. R. Empirical analysis of the groupthink phen-

领导风格，提出了作为群体特征和群

omenon. Human Relations, 1986, 39, 399-410.

体思维症状之间的关系的主持人。这

Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Accident. Washington, D.C.:

两个主持人导致新处方对于预防群体

July

1986.

思维。

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

GREGORY MOORHEAD is Associate

多需要更多的研究，以测试在何种程

Professor of Management at Arizona State University. He attended Texas Tech University

度上修改后的框架可以用来指导处方

and the University of Houston where he received a BS in Industrial Engineering and an

进行预防。

MBA and PhD in Organizational Behavior and Management. His research interests include

group decision making and integrative analysis of organization, group, job, and

person relationships.

RICHARD J. FERENCE is a doctoral 参考

used to guide prescriptions for prevention. REFERENCES COURTRIGHT,

COURTRIGHT ， JA团体迷思的实

J. A. A laboratory investigation of groupthink. Communications Monographs,

验室研究。通信专着，

1978, 45, 229-246.

结论

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管理决策期末作业

1978 ， 45 ， 229-246 。 时间。固定美国宇航局。 1986年6月9日。

鲜花， ML的果酱的群体思维假说一些影响实验室测试。 Joumal Personaluy

和社会

1982年7 429-444 。

MOORHEAD ， G. ， ＆ MONTANARI的群体思维啉- JR的实证分析

omenon 。人际关系，1986 ， 39 ， 399-410 。

总统委员会在航天飞机事故报告。华盛顿特区：七月 1986 简历

GREGORY MOORHEAD是管理的亚利桑那州立大学副教授。他出席了美国德州理工大学和休斯敦的在那里他获得工业工程和工商管理学士学位及博士学位组织行为与管理大学。他的研究兴趣包括：群体决策和组织的综合分析，小组，工作，和人的关系。

理查德干扰是一个博士生在管理

Psychol08y ， 1977 ， 35 ， 888-896的。

JANIS ，为groupthinlc波士顿一L Wctims ：霍顿米夫林，1972。 果酱， I.L.的群体思维（第二版，修订版） 。台北：五南， 1983 。 LEAbfA ，华润的果酱的群体思维模型的部分测试：团体凝聚力的影响和 对有缺陷的决策领导者的行为。 Joumal Maturgemeru ，1985 ， 11 ， 5-17 。

MOORHEAD ， G.团体迷思：假设需要测试的。组和O ， ganization研究，

25

管理决策期末作业

candidate in the Department of Management, College of Business, at Arizona State University. His research interests Iie primarily in the areas of human resource systems and processes. His work experience includes personnel specialist at Motorola and serving as a research assistant at Arizona State University.

CHRIS P. NECK is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Managemem, College of Business, at Arizona State University. His research interests include group decision making and leadership.

系，商学院，亚利桑那州立大学。他的研究在人力资源系统和流程等领域的主要权益IIE 。他的工作经历包括工作人员在摩托罗拉和专家作为研究助理在亚利桑那州立大学。

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管理决策期末作业

CHRIS P.脖子是博士候选人部，商学院，亚利桑那州立大学。他的研究兴趣包括：群体决策和领导能力。

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管理决策期末作业

案例分析

1、案例简要介绍

1986年1月28日，美国挑战者号载人宇宙飞船发射失败，造成7个美国人丧生。事件发生后对事故的分析得出证据：这些宇航员在最初的爆炸中是可能幸存的，而最终导致他们丧生的原因可能是宇宙飞船遇到水时产生的压力和低温状态下不能提供所需的指标而造成系统失灵所造成。摩顿—西奥科是本次飞船发射推动机器的经理人。其工程师们知道系统存在的技术问题，对此次发射充满疑议。管理人员对此也有所了解，但他们一方面感到了来自NASA（国家宇航局）的发射压力，另一方面是基于以前执行类似任务时并未出现问题的侥幸心理，因此，领导者们在工程师们未参与决策的情况下，下达了发射命令。悲剧发生了。

挑战者号升空 从佛罗里达州看见的挑战者号太

空梭事故

挑战者号开始解体 在发射后第73秒时解体

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管理决策期末作业

美国“挑战者”号航天飞机的失事，是人类探索太空史上的一次悲壮的事故。通过对这个案例的分析，我们可以得出一些在组织领导决策和组织沟通中有用的经验。

“挑战者”号航天飞机失事的原因既有技术方面的原因，也有决策沟通方面的原因，而其失事的根本原因还是在于领导层决策的失误，不论是发射前的准备，还是发射的过程，以至发射后对问题的分析，决策都存在严重的问题。这种影响虽然是间接的，但是其影响之大，已经远远超过其技术本身的原因。在这种情况下的决策机制，不可避免的将带来技术上的失误。因此，可以说决策的成败直接影响着整个航天局，而不仅仅是一次飞机的爆炸。

下面，我将从“挑战者”号失事的技术原因，宇航局内部存在的决策沟通问题，以及对于此类问题避免此类措施应采取的措施等方面进行论述。

2、“挑战者”号失事的技术原因

根据罗杰斯委员会的研究报告，“挑战者”号的意外是由右侧固体火箭推进器尾部一个密封接缝的O型环失效，导致加压的热气和火焰从紧邻的外加燃料舱的封缄处喷出，造成结构损坏。O型环的失效则归因于设计上的缺陷，因而太容易损坏，以及发射那几天的低温都是潜在的因素。更明确地说，报告也考虑到了意外的成因。最明显的就是NASA与承包商的疏忽，莫顿·塞奥科公司承认了他们在设计上存在的缺陷。这使得罗杰斯委员总结挑战者号灾难是“一场肇由历史的事故”。

根据以上材料，“挑战者”号失事的技术原因为：

2.1“挑战者”号失事的直接原因是右部火箭发动机上的两个零件联接处出现

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管理决策期末作业

了问题，具体的讲就是旨在防止喷气燃料事时的热气从联接处泄露的密封圈遭到了破坏，这是导致航天飞机失事的直接技术原因。

2.2在航天飞机设计准则明确规定了推进器运作的温度范围，即40°F——90°F，而在实际运行时，整个航天飞机系统周围温度却是处于31°F—99°F的范围。同时，橡胶密封圈从来没有在50°F以下测验过，这主要是因为这种材料是用来承受燃烧热气的，而不是用来承受冬天里发射时的寒气的，而当时”挑战者”反射的时间却正好是在寒冷的冬天。

3、 对“挑战者”号失事的真正原因的分析 3.1信息沟通不足

沟通在整个航天局以及在航天局与外部的沟通上都存在严重的不足。如在跟塞奥科公司的沟通上，存在着等级优越的观念，这是根本不适合于组织发展的。根据记载，过低的温度让莫顿·塞奥科公司的工程师感到担心，在27日晚间的一次远程会议上，塞奥科公司的工程师和管理层同来自肯尼迪航天中心和马歇尔航天飞行中心的NASA管理层讨论了天气问题。部分工程师，如比较著名的罗杰·博伊斯乔利，再次表达了他们对密封SRB部件接缝处的O型环的担心：即，低温会导致O型环的橡胶材料失去弹性。他们认为，如果O型环的温度低于华氏53度（约摄氏11.7度），将无法保证它能有效密封住接缝。他们也提出，发射前一天夜间的低温，几乎肯定把SRB的温度降到华氏40度的警戒温度以下。但是，莫顿·塞奥科公司的管理层否决了他们的异议，他们认为发射进程能按日程进行。而且在注定以灾难告终的“挑战者”号航天飞机发射前的最后几个小时里，美国宇航局的高级官员聚集在发射控制中心的一角，以监督最后的准备工作。他们中有4个人知道，前一天晚上发生了一场关于低温影响飞船火箭推进器运作的激烈争

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