金融学专业外文翻译客户角度下的最优选择银行与保险公司联盟

外文题目： A Customer View on the Most Preferred Alliance Structure between

Banks and Insurance Structure

出 处： Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft 作 者：Pekka Korhonen, Lasse Koskinen and Raimo Voutilainen

原 文：

Overview

In this paper, we have studied alternative alliance structures between banks and insurance companies from the point of view of Finnish customer representatives. Seven criteria were introduced for the evaluation of six alternative structure models for such alliances. The evaluation was carried out by an expert panel consisting of customer representatives. As a supporting tool, we used the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP).The alliance models based on plain cross-selling agreements were considered most preferred.

We also studied how familiar the customer representatives were with the alliance problem from the point of view of the bank and insurance executives and that of the supervisory authorities. We observed that the customer representatives did not recognize the problem as well from the point of view of the supervisors as that of the executives. In addition,it was interesting to note that the customer representatives did not consider a risk aspect in the control by ownership alternatives as critical as the executives.

Comparing the results in this study to our previous studies, we may conclude that the best compromise model from all three points of view could be the financial conglomerate on the condition that certain supervisory and customer criteria are satisfied to a sufficient degree.

A. Introduction

Alliance formation in the financial industry has been a growing trend during the last decade.Insurers in an alliance between banks and insurance companies are most

often life insurance companies, but also non-life companies can be found. Financial alliances often include units like mutual fund managing companies, asset management companies, securities brokerages and corporate finance companies. In most European countries, banks are allowed to be “universal”. It is customary that they include the above mentioned functions. The same holds more and more often for insurance companies as well (see, eg. Skipper [2000]).That’s why the various types of alliances on the retail market between banks and insurance companies are of special interest.

In our previous papers (Voutilainen [2005], Korhonen and Voutilainen [2005] and Korhonen, Koskinen, and Voutilainen [2005]), we have studied alliance structure alternatives from different perspectives. In Voutilainen [2005], we introduced six different alliance structure alternatives and nine criteria relevant for evaluating those alternatives from the perspective of the executives of the banks and insurance companies. The alternatives and the criteria were introduced together with bank and insurance experts. Each expert was interviewed individually. The experts were representatives of the top management of Finnish banks and insurance companies.

In the second paper (Korhonen and Voutilainen [2005]), the same group of experts were used as a panel to find the most preferred model for a financial alliance. As a decision support system we used the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) developed by Saaty [1980].The problem was a typical AHP-problem: few alternatives and few qualitative criteria.The use of the AHP focused the discussions on the relevant aspects of the choice problem.The final solution was found in two meetings. The second meeting was the initiative of the panel. The panel felt that the problem required more considerations. The panel preferred the Control by ownership models. On the other hand, a risk-averse manager might also prefer looser alliance alternatives.

In the third paper (Korhonen et al. [2005]), our aim was to find the best financial alliance compromise structure between the executives of the banks and insurance companies and the bank and insurance supervisory authorities in Finland.1 First, we searched for the best alliance structure from the point of view of supervisory authorities. Together with leaders and experts of the supervisory authorities, we introduced eight criteria for the evaluation of the previously defined six alternative

alliance structures. The evaluation was carried out by an expert panel consisting of the representatives of the supervisory authorities.

The alliance alternatives based on plain cross-selling agreements received the highest ranks in the evaluation of supervisory authorities. Under certain conditions, the financial conglomerate might be an acceptable compromise alternative for the supervisory authorities as well.

In this paper, we have approached our problem from the point of view of customers.The importance of this perspective has been emphazised by e.g. Belth [2000]. Customer perspective to mergers is taken in Bank Marketing International [2004]. We did not take a sample from the population of customers, because most customers are not familiar with the problem at all. We were interested in the opinions of “advanced or well informed” customers.To represent those customers, we used leaders and experts of Finnish customerorganizations and labour market organizations (see, Acknowledgements at the end of the paper). As before, each customer representative was interviewed individually. Based on the interviews, we initially introduced seven relevant criteria. The final evaluation was carried out with four criteria. In the evaluation meeting, three out of those seven criteria turned out to be insignificant.

We have also studied how well the customer representatives know the alliance problem from the point of view of the bank and insurance executives and that of the supervisory authorities. We asked them to play the role of executives and supervisory authorities and to make the evaluations by using their most important criteria. We also asked them which they would think were the most important executive and supervisory criteria. This provided us with interesting information about the knowledge of the problem of the customer representatives from the perspectives of the other parties. The analysis revealed us which aspects are not yet well known to the customer representatives. Finally, we compare the prioritizations of all three decision maker groups considered in this and the earlier papers.

The paper is organized as follows. Section B. reviews our main previous results. In Section C., we provide a brief introduction to the theory of the AHP. The decision criteria from the customer point of view are given in Section D., and in Section E., the

results are given and discussed. In Section F., we present the results obtained when asking the experts to assume the roles of executives and supervisors. In section G., we compare the criteria and the prioritizations of all three decision maker groups. Finally, in Section H., we conclude the paper with general remarks.

B. Review of our earlier research on alliance structures

Since this paper is founded on our earlier research on alliance structures, we summarize here our key results.

I. Structuring the problem

Voutilainen [2005] studied alliances between banks and insurance companies. His perspective was that of the top management of a financial enterprise in the retail market.Alliance structures were classified into three main categories depending on the degree of co-operation of the partners. These categories were derived together with representatives of the executive management of Finnish banks and insurance companies. The categories in the increasing order of closeness of the partners were Cross-selling agreements. The parties agree to sell each other’s products to their own customers. The cross-selling is frequently one-sided. Most often a bank sells an insurance company’s products to its customers. In principle, it could be vice versa as well. The alliance category can still be divided into two subcategories depending on whether the parties’ service channels are overlapping or not. Non-overlapping service channels can be achieved, for example, if the parties actively try to organize cross-selling in such a way that there is no competition between the parties.

Here a service channel can be a branch office network, but also a contact center, subside etc. Especially in the case of overlapping branch networks one easily faces channel conflict: the alliance members do not co-operate effectively in the fear of losing their customers to the other party and consequently the sales provisions etc. Non-overlapping service channels often means that the other party has no service channel at all.

Thus the two different sub-models are

? Cross-selling agreement, no overlapping service channels (abbreviated CSA1) ? Cross-selling agreement, overlapping service channels (CSA2)

Alliance of independent partners. The alliance type is a special case of a

cross-selling agreement where the alliance is tightened by cross-ownership and/or joint ownership in third parties. Cross-ownership means a minority stake of the other party’s shares. If the ownership were one-sided, it would probably be a sign of asymmetry and one party’s dominance of the alliance. An example of joint ownership is a mutual fund management company owned jointly by a bank (banks) and an insurance company (insurance companies).One could also think about cross-ownership/joint ownership without a cross-selling agreement, but such a model seldom occurs in practice.

The degree of overlapping is also used to divide this category into two different subgoals:

? Alliance of independent partners, no overlapping service channels (AIP1) ? Alliance of independent partners, overlapping service channels (AIP2)

Control by ownership. In both the previous models, earnings and costs are divided. The third category means the model, where all the control is in the hand of one party: a bank can simply own (a control of) an insurance company or vice versa, or a third party owns the both ones.

This category is divided into two sub-models depending on the controller: ? Control by ownership, when a bank owns an insurance company or vice versa (CBO1)

? Control by ownership (financial conglomerate): a holding company owns one or severalbanks and one or several insurance companies (FC)

We can notice that the classification of the different alternatives is based on the closeness of the alliance and the degree of the overlapping of the service channels. Criteria. The alliance models were compared and eventually prioritized according to the following criteria (the choice of the criteria was also based on the management views).

1. Product development (maximize efficiency),

2. One-door-principle (implement as effectively as possible), 3. Earnings logics (avoid conflicts),

4. Customer relationship management (maximize efficiency), 5. Cost and revenue synergies (maximize),

6. Channel conflicts (minimize),

7. Required solvency capital (optimize the balance), 8. Investor power (maximize),

9. Sales management (maximize efficiency).

According to the interviews the overall importance of earnings logics, synergies and channel conflicts was the greatest one.

II. Evaluating with management criteria

Korhonen and Voutilainen [2005]) studied the above defined six different possible structure models for alliances and the nine criteria. Searching for the most preferred alliance model is a multiple criteria decision making (MCDM) problem. To solve the problem, the AnalyticHierarchy Process (AHP) was used, see Saaty [1980].

The use of the AHP focused the discussions on pairwise comparisons. The panel (the same members as in Voutilainen [2005]) was also willing to consider its evaluations in case the inconsistency was too high. The second meeting was the initiative of the panel.The panel members felt that the problem required more considerations.

During the second meeting the panel first evaluated critically the original criteria and revised some of them. The resulting criteria were 1. Earnings logics (avoid conflicts),

2. Customer relationship management (maximize efficiency), 3. Cost and revenue synergies (maximize), 4. Channel conflicts (minimize),

5. Required solvency capital (optimize the balance), 6. Sales management (maximize efficiency), 7. Economies of scale (maximize), 8. Economies of scope (maximize), 9. Risk.

The panel preferred the Control by ownership models. Actually, the Financial conglomerate was the most preferred. On the other hand, a risk-averse manager might also prefer Cross-selling agreement with no overlapping service channels or even Alliance of independent partners with no overlapping service channels to Financial

conglomerate.

III. Compromise with supervisors

In the third paper, Korhonen et al. [2005] broaden the analysis to include the search for the best alliance compromise structure between the executives of the banks and insurance companies and the bank and insurance supervisory authorities. First, the alternative alliance structures were studied from the point of view of supervisory authorities. The leaders and experts of the supervisory authorities introduced eight criteria for the evaluation of the above presented alternative alliance structures. 1. Equality of the member companies of the alliance, 2. System risk management,

3. Capability of the authorities to supervise the alliance as well as possible, 4. Flexibility of the alliance with respect to changes in its environment, 5. Optimal functioning of insurance and finance markets, 6. Synergies brought about by the alliance, 7. Sufficiency of capital,

8. Dependency of the alliance on the competence of executive management.

The ultimate goal was to search for the alternative which bank and insurance supervisory authorities and bank and insurance executive management might accept as a solution to the alliance problem. The Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) was again used.

The loosely connected alliance models Cross-selling agreements received the highest overall priorities largely because they got very high priorities according to the important criteria System risk management and Capability of the authorities to supervise the alliance as well as possible. The control by ownership models were not considered desirable with respect to these criteria.

The result differs sharply from the prioritization made above by the bank and insurance executives. They favoured very clearly the control by ownership models (if the risk factor was not specially emphasized). The executive point of view is in many ways opposite to the supervisory point of view. Also the criteria were different in seven cases out of eight.

Business-driven consolidation seems to be in conflict with the supervisory

interests.Supervisors seem to think that brought synergies do not outweigh the risk that enters into large and complex financial institutions.

However, the differences between the priorities of the different alliance models in this study were essentially smaller than in the previous study with the executives. Therefore it would be definitely interesting to obtain a compromise solution acceptable for both the executives and the supervisors.

译 文：

客户角度下的最优选择：银行与保险公司联盟

概 述

在本文中，作为芬兰客户代表，我们研究了银行与保险公司之间可选择的合作方式。在对可选择的6种合作方式的评估中我们提供了7个标准。此项评估是由客户代表组成的专家委员会，借助层次分析法这个辅助工具来进行的。经过评估，我们认为基于简单的交叉销售的协议合作方式是最优的。我们同时研究了客户代表、银行和保险公司高层、监管机构三个不同立场对于这个问题的不同看法，发现三者之间存在着差异。此外，很有趣地发现客户代表在所有者管控风险方面的考虑明显少于管理层。此次研究结果与我们前期的研究结果相比，我们认为从三方角度来看，最优的组建方式是在一定程度上满足监管层和客户要求下所进行的金融合作。

一、引 言

在过去的十年中，金融行业的相互合作是个大趋势。大多数银行与保险公司的合资公司是人寿保险公司，但非人寿保险的公司也是可以组建的。金融合作包括组建共同基金管理公司，资产管理公司，证券交易行。在大多数的欧洲国家，银行可以经营多种业务，包括上述公司与保险公司的功能。因此此类金融合作机构能在零售市场上获取高利润。

在我们前期的文章中，已经从不同角度研究了合作方式。

在第一篇文章中，我们从银行及保险公司高层角度提出了6种不同方式和9种评估标准，这些都是由银行和保险公司的专家提出来的，这些专家都是芬兰银行和保险公司的管理高层的代表。

在第二篇文章中，同一批专家组成了委员会来选出最佳的融资合作方式。我们选用了萨蒂的层次分析法来进行分析。这是一个典型的层次分析法问题：由少

数联盟方式和合理标准组成。层次分析法集中讨论该问题的相关方面。专家召开了两次会议，在第二个会议中成立了委员会，认为所有权管控方式是最优的联盟方式。不愿承担风险的专家可能会选择松散的联盟方式。

在第三篇文章中，我们的目标是找到适用于银行及保险公司高层与芬兰监管机构的金融合作方式。首先，我们找到对于芬兰监管者来说最合适的合作方式，同时8个可以用来评估之前所确定的6种可供选择的合作框架。

监管机构专家代表组成的委员会对此进行评估，公认基于这种简单的交叉销售协议是最佳的合作方式。在特定条件下，这种金融合作方式将同样为这些监管机构所认可。

在这篇文章中，我们将从客户的角度来解决这个问题。之前的文章已强调过此角度研究的重要性。《银行国际市场学》（2004）中已经从客户角度提出过金融兼并问题，我们之所以没有提出具体案例，是因为很多人对于这个问题都不了解。我们很想把这些概念提前让客户更好地了解。为了能够更好地反映客户需求，我们邀请了芬兰消费者协会和工人协会的领导人和专家作为客户代表。前期先对这些客户代表进行了单独采访，基于这些采访内容，我们提炼出相关的7个标准，最终评估时我们共提出4个相关的标准，剔除了另外3个重要性相对较低的标准。

我们还研究了客户代表若作为银行高层或监管机构，他们将如何看待金融合并问题。我们要求他们假设自己为银行高层或监管机构，选出自己认为的最重要的考量标准来评估金融合作问题。

二、对联盟结构早期研究的回顾

由于本文是基于我们对联盟结构的早期研究开展的，在这里先总结我们的主要成果。

（一）建构问题

沃特莱恩从零售市场的金融企业的角度研究了银行和保险公司的合作方式， 通过芬兰的银行和保险公司高管代表的讨论，根据合作程度，我们将合作形式分为三种。

第一种是交叉销售协议，它代表双方的合作密切。在这种合作方式中，双方同意出售各自的产品给对方，而交叉客户往往是片面的，最常见的是银行对自己的客户销售保险公司的产品，原则上，它可以同时进行。该联盟仍然可以分为两类，取决于双方的服务渠道是否重叠。非重叠服务渠道可以实现。若当事各方之间没有任何竞争，它们可以尝试这种交叉模式。这种服务渠道可以作为一个分支

结构网络，也可以作为结构中心。当存在交叉分支网络时，容易引起渠道冲突：一双由于害怕被对方抢去原有的客户而取消合作。因此无交叉渠道往往意味着对方没有任何的服务渠道。以下是两种不同的模式：交叉销售原则，无交叉服务；交叉销售原则，有交叉服务。

第二种是独立机构的合作。这种合作形式与交叉所有制和第三方参与所有制紧密相关，是交叉销售协议的特殊情况。交叉所有制意味着对方持有少数股权，如果所有权只属于一方，则表示双方地位的不平等，控股方在合作中有绝对控制地位。基金管理公司就是参与所有制的一个例子，它是银行和保险公司合作的产物。还有另外一种合作形式，在交叉所有制实行过程中不使用交叉销售协议，这种情况虽然可行，但实际操作中很少采用。这种合作方式按合作的交叉程度分为两种：独立合作方的合作，无交叉服务；不独立合作方的合作，有交叉服务。

第三种是所有权管控。前面两种合作形式中的收益和成本都是按比例分配的，而在这种形式中控制权在一方的手里：银行或者保险公司或者是第三方享有全部控制权。又分为两种：所有权管控，银行拥有保险公司或是保险公司拥有银行；所有权管控，一个公司拥有一个或多个银行或是一个或多个保险公司。

由此可以看出，以上三种合作方式是根据合作程度和服务渠道的交叉渠道程度划分的。

我们通过各种合作方式的比较，总结得出以下有关管理方面的标准： 1.产品发展原则（最大效率） 2.单方面原则（最有效实施） 3.盈利原则（避免冲突） 4.客户关系管控原则（最大效率） 5.成本与收益协同管控原则（最大效率） 6.渠道冲突减免原则（最小值） 7.资本偿付原则（收支平衡） 8.投资能力提升原则 9.销售管理原则（最大效率）

其中最重要的是盈利原则、协同原则和渠道冲突减免原则。

（二）管理标准的评估

科尔霍宁和沃特莱恩研究了可选择的六种合作方式提出了九项标准。在不同标准下寻找一个最优的合作模式是很困难的。为此，我们用萨特的层次分析法来

讨论不同模式下通用的合作原则。基于此项研究的重要性，委员会同意展开第二次会议，委员会由之前的成员组成。第二次会议对第一次会议的标准进行了修改和延续。以下就是二次会议的标准：

1.盈利原则（避免冲突） 2.客户关系管控原则（最大效率） 3.成本与收益协同管控原则（最大效率） 4.渠道冲突减免原则（最小值） 5.资本偿付原则（收支平衡） 6.销售管理原则（最大效率） 7.规模经济原则（最大值） 8.机会经济原则（最大值） 9.风险管控原则

该小组首选所有权管控模式的控制。也就是说，金融集团是最优先模式。而风险厌恶者则优先选择无交叉服务渠道的交叉销售协议或无交叉服务渠道的独立机构合作。

（三）监管者的管理评估标准

在第三篇文章中，我们采用层次分析法分析以寻找适用于银行及保险公司高管与监管机构的最优合作方式。首先，我们找到对于监管者来说最合适的合作方式，并提出了八项对以上合作模式的评估标准：

1.合作方公平原则 2.系统风险管控原则

3.主管机构监管能力最大化原则 4.突发事故应变灵活性原则 5.保险与金融市场功能最优化原则 6.合作方协同发展原则 7.资本最优化原则

8.合作独立性原则（不受高层管理能力影响）

我们最终的目标就是寻找金融监管机构与银行和保险公司高管都认可的合作方式，这里我们再次使用层次分析法。最后，监管部门一致认可的是交叉销售协议，因为它符合风险管理标准，而且便于监管。他们认为所有权管控模式是最不可取的。

银行和保险公司高管与监管者的意见存在很大分歧，他们优先选择的是所有权管控模式，这与监管者的观点相反。这主要是因为他们之间的标准完全不同， 商业利益与监管者利益有时是相冲突的。监管者认为协同效应没有增加进入金融机构的风险。然而，监管者对最优合作方式的意见分歧远远小于银行和保险公司高管们的，而我们的最终目的就是寻找令银行和保险公司高管与监管者都满意的合作方式。

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