高华证券-全球经济周评：财政整顿：依然有损增长-120328

财政整顿: 依然有损增长

Dominic Wilson

dominic.wilson@

+1 212 902 5924

Kamakshya Trivedi

kamakshya.trivedi@

+44 (0)20 7051 4005

Jose Ursua

jose.ursua@

+1 212 855 9705

Constantin Burgi

constantin.burgi@

+44 (0)20 7051 4009

Stacy Carlson

stacy.carlson@

+1 212 855 0684

George Cole

george.cole@

+44 (0)20 7552 3779

对大部分发达经济体而言，是否需进行财政 整顿已成为各国政治辩论的核心。欧洲采取 的政策措施最引人瞩目，其中边缘国家面临 的危机正迫使其进行大刀阔斧的调整。 我们曾经指出，此种形式的财政整顿往往 有损经济增长，尤其是在汇率和利率无法 起到缓冲作用的情况下。这并不是规避 此类政策的理由—合理的政策有时会带来 伤痛—但我们也不认同对政策影响持更 乐观的看法。 整顿措施已持续了两年的时间，我们来 分析近期表现是如何与过去经历相对应的。 有证据表明，那些进行最大幅调整的国家 其经济所受的损伤也最严重，即便考虑到 其他能够解释这一关联的因素也是如此。 此外，还有证据表明这些影响高于正常水平， 这与部分市场的利率和货币政策受到制约 相符。 就欧元区边缘国家而言，切实可行的政策 方案较其他地区面临更多制约。正如我们 所预计的，财政整顿的确会显著拖累增长，

这意味着边缘国家应慎重考虑行之过快的

风险，尤其是那些受欧洲货币联盟(EMU)

约束的国家。鉴于EMU之外的部分国家已

用尽了常规货币政策、且仍存在大量过剩

产能，因此这些国家对财政整顿操之过急

的风险也高于以往。相反，在进行稳健但

温和的整顿前确保自身经济的可持续复苏

或许是更可取的方式。

重要信息披露见本报告最后一页

Global Economics Weekly

Issue No: 12/13

March 28, 2012

Dominic Wilson

dominic.wilson@

+1 212 902 5924

Kamakshya Trivedi

kamakshya.trivedi@

+44 (0)20 7051 4005

Jose Ursua

jose.ursua@

+1 212 855 9705

Constantin Burgi

constantin.burgi@

+44 (0)20 7051 4009

Stacy Carlson

stacy.carlson@

+1 212 855 0684

George Cole

george.cole@

+44 (0)20 7552 3779 Research Report Gao Hua Economics Research at https:// Fiscal Consolidation: Still Hurting Across most developed economies, the need for fiscal consolidation has become a central pillar of the political debate. The most More Fiscal Consolidation Has Been dramatic action is in Europe, where the crisis 7Associated With Lower Growthin the periphery is forcing significant 6adjustments. )%Sweden(5 11-04We have shown before that these kinds of 1023 Canadafiscal consolidations have tended to hurt ,hSwitz.AustraliaUStw2growth in the past, particularly where orNew JapanFranceUKG1ZealandItalySpain exchange and interest cannot cushion the PD0Gadjustment. That is not an argument for IcelandPortugall-1aeavoiding them—sensible policy is sometimes R-2 evA-3painful—but we have disagreed with some of -4y = -1.05x + 2.22R² = 0.74the more optimistic views of the impact that -5Greecethese adjustments may have. -20246Ave Change in Structural Govt Balance, 2010-11 (% GDP)Source: IMF, GS Global ECS ResearchTwo years into this consolidation phase, we can look at how recent experience has matched the past. The evidence supports the idea that Recent Consolidation Efforts in the European

those who are cutting most are suffering most, %Periphery Have Had a Potentially Large

even after accounting for other factors that 4Impact on Growth

Impact of FiscalConsolidation on the Level of

may explain the link. There is some evidence 2Real GDP

that these effects are larger than normal,

consistent with the exchange rate and 0

monetary policy constraints in several places. -2

For the Euro area periphery, the feasible

-4

options are more constrained than elsewhere.

-6But the reality that fiscal consolidations do Greece

Ireland

appear to be a significant drag on growth, as

-8Italy

Portugal

we expected, suggests that the risks of moving Spain

too fast should be taken seriously, particularly -10091011121314

for those within the constraints of EMU. Given Source: IMF, GS Global ECS Research

that several of the countries outside of EMU

have exhausted conventional monetary policy

and still have significant excess capacity, the

risk of premature fiscal consolidation is also

greater than in the past in those places. Instead,

assuring a self-sustaining recovery before

embarking on a steady but moderate

consolidation would appear to be the advisable

course.

Goldman Sachs Global Economics, Commodities and Strategy Research Global Economics Weekly Fiscal Consolidation: Still Hurting

Across the vast majority of the developed economies, the The effects are larger with fixed exchange rates... need for fiscal consolidation has become a central pillar As theory would predict, floating exchange rates have of the political debate. The most dramatic action is in proved a useful cushion to the growth impact of fiscal Europe, of course, where the crisis in the periphery is consolidations. The effect of a 1%-of-GDP planned forcing significant adjustments. But elsewhere, restraint fiscal adjustment for those with fixed exchange rates has been the norm to some degree over the last year. was 0.9% after two years, about 50% larger than the We have shown before that these kinds of fiscal average effect (Chart 1). This again replicates what the consolidations have tended to hurt growth in the past (see IMF study found.

Global Economics Paper 207—The Speed Limit of Fiscal ...and when interest rates do not (or cannot) adjust. Consolidation). That is not an argument for avoiding We found that those episodes where interest rates fell them—sensible policy is sometimes painful—but it does alongside fiscal consolidations were on average less mean that we have disagreed with some of the more damaging to growth than those where they did not, and optimistic views of the impact that these adjustments may this turns out to be the key reason why spending-led have. It is also true that this growth damage has meant adjustments have historically been less damaging to that attempts to consolidate too quickly have often growth. Specifically, we estimated that the effect of a achieved much less than desired. 1%-of-GDP planned fiscal adjustment rises to 1-1½% We are now two years into this consolidation phase, so it after two years when monetary policy is unavailable to is starting to be possible to look at how recent experience cushion the effect—independently of whether the has matched the past. As we show below, the evidence adjustment occurs through higher taxes or lower supports the idea that those who are cutting most are spending (Chart 2).

suffering most, even after accounting for other factors This analysis has informed our view that ongoing that might explain the link. consolidations would likely be a meaningful drag on

growth. Particularly since many countries have

History Shows Fiscal Adjustments Weaken constrained monetary policies (given the zero bound) and Growth… EMU countries have, on an individual basis, both fixed Our earlier work on past fiscal consolidations in exchange rates and no monetary policy independence, developed countries—which built on an IMF study1—our prior analysis suggests that the impact on growth drew three main conclusions in terms of the links from fiscal consolidation could, if anything, be higher between consolidations and growth: than normal.

Fiscal consolidations hurt GDP growth. Consistent …Even After Accounting for Crises and Global

with the IMF’s results, we found that whatever their Fiscal Backdrop other merits, fiscal consolidations tend to hurt growth.

On average, a 1% of GDP planned fiscal adjustment Since publishing our initial results, we have been asked a was associated with a 0.3% drop in the level of GDP range of questions about these impacts. Two in particular all else equal within a year, and a 0.6% drop within seem relevant to the current setting. two years (Chart 1).

Chart 1: Growth Hit from Fiscal Consolidation

%Worse for Countries with a Fixed Exchange %Chart 2: …and at the Zero Bound

0.0Rate…1.0

Impact of a 1% Consolidation on theLevel of Impact of a 1% Consolidation on the Level of

-0.1Real GDP 0.5Real GDP without a Monetary Policy Response

-0.20.0

-0.3-0.5

-0.4

-0.5-1.0

-0.6-1.5

-0.7-2.0All

-0.8BaselineSpending-based

Fixed Ex Rate

-0.9Banking Crisis/Yields-2.5Tax-based

Consolidation Wave

-1.0-3.0

01230123

Source: GS Global ECS ResearchYearsSource: GS Global ECS ResearchYears

1. See “Will it Hurt? Macroeconomic Effects of Fiscal Consolidation,” World Economic Outlook, October 2010.

Goldman Sachs Global Economics, Commodities and Strategy Research Global Economics Weekly The first question is whether we can be confident that the The results are not unlike those for crisis and spread impacts that we have estimated are evidence of the impacts, as the impact of a country’s own consolidation impact of fiscal consolidations on growth, or whether on its own growth is not very different in either case2. instead a crisis in the economy or market pressure on

sovereigns might lead to both fiscal retrenchment and

lower growth, without one actually causing the other. Those Who Have Cut Hardest Lately Have Seen

Weakest Growth…

To examine that issue, we have re-run our models of the After the big fiscal expansions of 2008-2009, fiscal impact of consolidations, attempting to control in simple consolidation efforts have been underway to varying ways for those factors in a way that our earlier work (and degrees in large parts of the developed world since 2010. that of the IMF) did not do. As a reminder, our original Although those efforts have a long way to go—and even work (as the IMF’s study) involved estimating a panel the impact of what has already been delivered is unlikely model of GDP growth across 15 developed countries over to be fully visible yet—we are now far enough into those the last 30 years, using lags of GDP growth and a measure episodes to be able to take a preliminary look at how the of intended fiscal consolidation that the IMF developed current experience aligns with our estimates from history. through detailed analysis of national budget documents. To

that, we now add dummies for whether a country was We focus on the experience of a sample of 23 developed deemed to be in crisis (from the Reinhart-Rogoff data set) countries, including each of the Euro area members and the change in long-term bond yields. We do find that, individually, relying on IMF World Economic Outlook all else equal, rising yields are associated with lower data for consistency. This is a somewhat broader growth, as are measures of whether an economy is in a grouping than those we included in our modelling work, banking crisis (other crisis measures are less important). but it has the benefit of including all the countries But, reassuringly, these do not affect the estimates for the relevant to understanding the current episode. Chart 3 impact of fiscal consolidation on growth in a material way shows the changes in both the actual budget balance and (see Chart 1). More complicated interactions between these what is known as the structural (or cyclically-adjusted) variables cannot be ruled out, but these controls suggest government balance for those countries.

that what we have attributed to fiscal policy is not picking

up the impact of some broader problem. The cyclically-adjusted balance measures are commonly

used as an estimate of deliberate changes in government

The second question is whether it matters that other policy, abstracting from the impact that changes in countries are consolidating at the same time. To answer growth naturally have on non-discretionary spending that question, we looked at various ways of controlling programs (when growth falls, tax revenues tend to for the presence of other countries consolidating: the decline and transfer payments rise). We argued before most broad-based was to split the sample and look (following the IMF) that using changes in cyclically-separately at episodes where a significant number of adjusted balances to estimate the impact of fiscal policy countries were consolidating (defined as more than five on growth was flawed, and so used an IMF database on countries, a third of the countries in the sample) and those consolidation efforts instead. This is due to two main where they were not. reasons.3 First, identifying consolidations using the

cyclically-adjusted budget balance fails to pick up

% GDPChart 3: Wave of Fiscal Consolidation, episodes where an effort to consolidate led to a sharp

Centered in Europedownturn and a quick reversal of policy. Second, changes

7in the cyclically-adjusted budget balance are often 6Average Change between 2009 and 2011 in:Structural Balancethemselves undertaken in response to the cycle, and thus 5Overall Balancemake it difficult to disentangle the cause and effect of

4consolidations (known as the ‘endogeneity problem’ in 3economic jargon).

2Improving Budget

1The IMF database circumvents both problems by looking

0at intended consolidations that were not undertaken

-1because of cyclical concerns (and thus ‘exogenous’ with respect to growth). But once the relationship between -2eldndessnddayykand

caninmylcdma

igrowth and fiscal adjustments has been estimated, we can

lennard

egaaoatenir

eulpanuiadaatltdItnwaanpaSegaagrattuse changes in the structural balance to trace the growth

rr

erllelrlsar

Go

rIcrs

P

InFwenumiomanalJaieeuS

KhBAdSztFAreNnaeeeffect. It is still true that the measurement of cyclically-

i

te

det

iwGDCZ

eSweadjusted deficits can be inaccurate. A better, but much

tNn

iN

nU

Umore complicated, exercise would look at the

Source: IMF, GS Global ECS Researchdiscretionary changes in policy that have actually been delivered in national budgets. But in the absence of this

2. As our regressions include period fixed effects it is difficult to disentangle the effect of consolidations elsewhere on growth in a given country.

Our results do, however, suggest that the marginal effect of consolidation does not depend closely on consolidations elsewhere.

3. The other is that changes in the cyclically-adjusted balance sometimes suffer from one-off transfers. But this issue can be eliminated by using the

OECD’s database for one-off budget adjustments.

Goldman Sachs Global Economics, Commodities and Strategy Research Global Economics Weekly

Chart 4: More Fiscal Consolidation Has Been

Associated with Lower Growth...Chart 5: ...Particularly After Controlling for

the Cycle

77

6

2010-11

)6)%

(Sweden%(5Sweden 5111

-04Finland1

-1004123 ,023 ,h

tUSAhSwitz.w2tUS

w2or1New DenmarkJapan

o

rNew Japan GPItalyNorwayUK1

SpainD0IrelandP G

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ea

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Av-3Av-3y = -1.05x + 2.22

-4y = -1.20x + 2.67Greece-4R² = 0.74

-5R² = 0.47

-2234-5Greece

-101

Ave Change in Overall Govt Balance, 2010-11 (% GDP)-20246

Ave Change in Structural Govt Balance, 2010-11 (% GDP)

Source: IMF, GS Global ECS ResearchSource: IMF, GS Global ECS Research

kind of detailed case-by-case, the cyclically-adjusted average countries that improved their structural balance balances are the simplest proxy for deliberate shifts in by 1 percentage point of GDP more saw roughly 1% fiscal policy. So acknowledging those caveats, we treat a lower GDP growth in the same year. This is a sizable positive shift in the structural balance as a percentage of impact, even larger than the multipliers found in the GDP as a proxy for deliberate fiscal consolidation. regressions for countries with fixed exchange rates/at the As Chart 3 shows, budget deficits across our sample of zero bound (Charts 1 and 2).

developed countries have generally fallen between 2009

and 2011 on both measures. The biggest adjustments …Also After Accounting for Other Crisis Channels have been in Europe, led by Greece (with an average This simple relationship does not prove that fiscal improvement in the cyclically-adjusted balance of close consolidation efforts are responsible for weaker GDP to 6% in 2010 and 2011), as well as Portugal, Ireland, growth, only that the two have generally been found Spain and Iceland (with an average adjustment of around together. As we mentioned earlier, one possibility is that

2.5% per year). The UK also stands out for having something else is responsible for both of these outcomes. enacted a relatively sizeable structural consolidation of The most obvious candidate in the current episode—about 1% per year, with much of this coming in 2011. A where the Euro area peripheral economies have small number of non-European countries in the sample—epitomised consolidation and growth problems—is that including New Zealand and Japan, which both enacted what we are seeing is the impact of a loss of confidence disaster-related reconstruction spending plans—were still in these economies and a sharp tightening in credit expansionary between 2009 and 2011. conditions. This sovereign credit shock is likely to have

hurt growth and at the same time prompted pressure for

Chart 4 shows the relationship between average real GDP fiscal consolidation, creating an association between the growth in 2010 and 2011 and the changes in the two that might be accidental.

government budget balance as a percentage of GDP. The

slope is negative, implying that those that saw a reduction Without much more complex models—and probably a in their budget deficits—on average—experienced slower longer sample—it is difficult to rule out that possibility. growth. In the absence of discretionary changes in

government policy, weaker growth would, all else equal, Chart 6: Negative Relationship between

Fiscal Consolidation and Growth, Even When

normally lead to deterioration in budget balances and a the European Periphery Is Excluded

positive relationship between the two. So this is already 7an indication that consolidations may be an important )

%

(6factor in the weak growth performance across the 11

-

European periphery and elsewhere. 015Sweden02 ,

h4Finland

Chart 5 shows the same relationship, this time between ty = -0.73x + 2.22

w

o

r3GermanyR² = 0.22average real GDP growth and changes the cyclically- G

adjusted balance. It suggests that those that have cut P

D2SwitzerlandBelgium

fiscal policy more aggressively on that basis have also G

laNew seen weaker GDP growth. For instance, Greece has e

R1Zealand eNorwayUK

improved its structural balance by nearly 6% per year Av0

over the past two years and has seen GDP fall an average

of 5% annually, while Sweden—which has not enacted -1-2-10123

any fiscal consolidation efforts—has grown over 5% per Ave Change in Structural Govt Balance, 2010-11 (% GDP)

year. The slope of this simple scatter implies that on Source: IMF, GS Global ECS Research

Goldman Sachs Global Economics, Commodities and Strategy Research Global Economics Weekly

Chart 7: Recent Consolidation Efforts in the

%European Periphery Have Had a Potentially Chart 8: Downside Surprises to Growth in

4Large Impact on GrowthCountries with Greater Fiscal Consolidation

)7

Impact of FiscalConsolidation on the Level of %n ,

Real GDP is6

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i-4y = -0.27x + 0.66

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1R² = 0.20Greece

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Spainr--5

G01

-100-42091011121314Cum. Change in Structural Govt Balance, 2010-11 (% GDP)04812Source: IMF, GS Global ECS ResearchSource: IMF, GS Global ECS Research

But simple exercises suggest that even accounting for the structural adjustments falls from 1 to 0.8, when all effects of crises and spread tightening, fiscal variables are included) but it remains significant. consolidation is associated with lower growth. One Looking at just the impact on GDP growth in 2011 from simple way is to drop the Euro area peripheral economies consolidation efforts in 2010 and 2011, it appears that (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) from the roughly three-quarters of the impact is associated with sample. This weakens the negative relationship between consolidation in the same year and around one-quarter fiscal policy and growth—but it remains (Chart 6). from the ongoing impact of the previous year’s efforts. But this is too harsh a test: these countries are among the Although these estimates are not directly comparable to major recent examples of consolidations and the our models (because in the models the impact of fiscal information they provide is relevant. Mirroring the policy plays out over several years), the size of the approach described above, we can estimate the same impact seems to lie somewhere between our estimates of relationship across countries between average real GDP the “average” experience and the much larger growth growth and the average change in the structural budget impact from consolidations with fixed exchange rates or balance. But we now control for a crisis in the periphery without an interest rate response. Given that a large and for the change in sovereign CDS spreads—as a proxy number of countries are currently either in fixed for market pressure—and for both together. Table 1 exchange rate regimes or have limited room for shows the results of these simple regressions. They show conventional policy, a higher-than-average growth that both dummies for the periphery and rises in spreads impact makes sense.

appear to be associated with negative growth. But they

also show that a significant association between fiscal Models Point to Similar Growth Hits

consolidation and lower GDP growth remains in place. An alternative way of looking at the growth impact is to

rely instead on our prior estimates that are based on the

As in our own models, accounting for these variables IMF database - and underpin charts 1 and 2 - and use lowers the impact on growth a little (the coefficient on them to project and decompose the likely hit to GDP

Goldman Sachs Global Economics, Commodities and Strategy Research Global Economics Weekly from the plans that have been put in place, including the important to think about the risks of excessive growth lagged impact of the previous year’s adjustments as damage as well as those of excessive debt.

suggested by the dynamics of the model. Chart 7 shows

the impact of this for the Euro area periphery, using the For those countries not facing the constraints of a fixed estimates from the updated models for countries with exchange rate or the same high costs of alternative fixed exchange rates, after accounting for spread and options that face the Eurozone periphery, the risks are crisis impacts. even clearer. The reality that fiscal consolidations do

appear to be the drag on growth that we expected

It confirms that the likely impact on GDP from suggests that the costs of moving too fast should be taken consolidation efforts seen so far is potentially quite large. very seriously. And given that many of these economies The estimates suggest that the fiscal consolidation have exhausted conventional monetary policy, the risk of undertaken in Greece has depressed output by around 8% premature fiscal consolidation is likely to be even larger so far. The fiscal hit in Ireland, Spain and Portugal are than normal. Markets continue to send a strong signal smaller but still sizable, at around 4%. The output hit in through borrowing rates that the urgency for immediate Italy, so far, is around 1%. These estimates are consolidation in many of these countries is low. Instead, comparable to the simple relationships that the cross-assuring a strong self-sustaining recovery before sectional experience points to, which is reassuring. embarking on a steady but moderate consolidation would While the experience so far looks broadly consistent with appear to be advisable, both for themselves and for our earlier work, on average it appears to have been supporting the more urgent consolidations elsewhere.

worse than expected. The difference between the IMF’s

forecasts in early 2010 for average GDP growth in 2010 Dominic Wilson, Jari Stehn and Stacy Carlson

and 2011 and what actually occurred is (modestly)

correlated with the extent of both the actual and the

attempted fiscal consolidation (Chart 8). That tendency is

far from universal. But there does appear to have been

some bias to be overly optimistic about the trade-offs

between fiscal consolidation and growth so far.

Still Worried about Excessive Pace

These results shows that the damage to growth from

ongoing fiscal consolidation appears to be significant, as

we expected. Those countries that have improved their

budget balances by more have, on average, seen lower

growth over the past few years, even accounting for

market pressure. And it also appears that the fixity of

exchange rates within EMU and the limits on

conventional monetary policy in several economies are

leading to a larger impact than normal, again as

predicted.

Nothing in that statement leads directly to a view on

optimal fiscal policy. The risks to growth from fiscal

consolidation are an important part of determining the

best path. But they need to be balanced against the risks

of crisis, the impact of long-term growth and the list of

feasible options that each country confronts. Even so, it is

very important not to underestimate the risks to growth,

as we think there has been some tendency to do.

What is feasible and what is advisable in making these

trade-offs inevitably varies with characteristics of the

country and the global environment. The unfortunate

reality for the Eurozone periphery is that the constraints

imposed by EMU and their dependence on external

support leave them with fewer attractive options. And the

pace of consolidation is in the hands of those that are

supporting them now more than it is in their own. Greater

focus on measures to improve growth may be advisable

here though, as the IMF has also argued, and it is

Goldman Sachs Global Economics, Commodities and Strategy Research Global Economics Weekly Key Charts: The GLI, GS FSI, ERP and the Credit Premium %momGLI Momentum vs. Global Industrial Production*IndexGS Financial Stress Index

26

1.5

15

0.54

03

-0.51 standard

-12deviation band

-1.51

-20

-2.5

-3GLI Momentum-1

-3.5Global Industrial Production*, 3mma

00010203040506070809101112-2* Includes OECS countries plus BRICs, Indonesia and South Africa

Source: OECD, GS Global ECS Research Source: GS Global ECS Research

See Global Economics Paper 199

for methodologySee the November 2008 Fixed Income Monthly for methodology

%US Equity Risk Premium%US Equity Credit Premium

5.75

5.3US ERP, calculated daily4

4.9US ERP, 200 Day Moving AverageCredit 31985-1998 relatively

4.5averageexpensive

4.12

3.71

3.30

2.9-1

2.5

2.1-2-3band

1.7

Jan-04Jan-05Jan-06Jan-07Jan-08Jan-09Jan-10Jan-11Jan-1281838587899193959799010305070911

Source: GS Global ECS Research See GEW 02/35 for methodologySource: GS Global ECS Research See GEW 03/25for methodology

We, Dominic Wilson, Jari Stehn and Stacy Carlson, hereby certify that all of the views expressed in this report accurately reflect personal views, which have not been influenced by considerations of the firm’s business or client relationships.

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The World in a Nutshell

THE GLOBAL ECONOMY

OULOOK KEY ISSUES UNITED STATES We expect GDP growth of 2.1% in 2012 and 2.2% in modest growth over the near term. The composition

remain in the 2.0-2.5% range through the end of 2013. We expect the unemployment rate to decline slightly to has decelerated, and the data flow has turned more

output gap should result in renewed disinflation, taking core inflation to 1.5% by late 2013. conditions is sustained.

JAPAN We expect real GDP growth of 2.1% in 2012 and 1.6% in 2013. We expect the economy to return to a gradual expanding its growth-loan program, including a ¥2trn

BoJ deviated from its usual decision-making process

expect exports to recover gradually as the Yen comes down from excessively high levels. government and political pressures.

EUROPE The Euro area has stagnated in recent months, and The latest data suggest that the LTROs have helped to

we expect a recession early this year, followed by a protracted period of weakness. However, stronger core operations (LTROs) have led us to upgrade our 2012 forecasts to –0.4%, followed by below-trend growth of 0.7% in 2013. Cross-country divergence remains a key fundamental political decisions (reform programmes in

weakness expected to be more marked in peripheral economies. We do not expect the ECB to cut rates or announce further non-standard measures at this point. enlarged EFSF / ESM) turns out to be weak or lacking.

NON-JAPAN ASIA In China, we expect slightly below-trend GDP growth

expect below-trend growth throughout the region, while expect China to see a continuation of the moderate

recover to around trend as the external environment offset weak net exports. With growth still below trend,

easing throughout most of the region. inflation should remain at a low level.

LATIN AMERICA We forecast that real GDP growth in Latin America will In Brazil, we recently revised up our growth forecasts

slow to 3.6% in 2012, and then rebound to 4.5% in to 3.1% and 4.6% in 2012 and 2013, from 2.8% and

2013. We expect monetary policy stances to remain 4.1% previously. Brazil is already in the middle of an

easing cycle, including interest rate cuts and macro-

tightening cycles (Colombia). we expect this to continue in the quarters ahead.

CENTRAL & EASTERN We recently revised our growth forecasts for CEEMEA, EUROPE, MIDDLE in response to upside data surprises both globally and EAST AND AFRICA facility on the Euro area financial system. We now see forecast horizon. We expect the small open economies

of the CE-3 and the more leveraged Turkish economy

expect CEEMEA to grow at a slower pace than Latin to slow somewhat more than elsewhere. On the other

America and Non-Japan Asia due to the risks posed by the Euro area crisis. more resilient.

CENTRAL BANK INTEREST RATE POLICIES

CURRENT SITUATION NEXT MEETINGS EXPECTATION

UNITED STATES: FOMC The Fed cut the funds rate to a range April 25 We expect the Fed to keep the funds rate

of 0%-0.25% on December 16, 2008. June 20 near 0% through the end of 2013.

JAPAN: BoJ Monetary The BoJ cut the overnight call rate to a April 10 We expect the BoJ to keep the policy rate Policy Board range of 0%-0.1% on October 5, 2010. April 27 near 0% through the end of 2013.

EUROLAND: ECB The ECB cut rates by 25bp to 1% on April 4 Governing Council December 8, 2011. May 3 unlikely for the time being.

UK: BoE Monetary The BoE cut rates by 50bp to 0.5% on April 5 Policy Committee March 5, 2009. May 10 on hold through the end of 2013.

T

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