中国上市公司管理者的不良会计行为外文翻译

Managers’ Bad Accounting Behaviors of Listed

Companies in China

Abstract

Managers’ unintentional or intentional bad accounting behaviors will result in poor quality of accounting information of listed companies, making a great extent to interfere with investors, causing confusion in the capital market, is not conducive to reflect the performance management responsibility. Research on Managers bad accounting behaviors of listed companies is of great significance to improve management, optimize the allocation of social resources. This paper respectively discusses the

manifestation and the causes both of managers’ unintentional and intentional bad accounting behaviors. It also puts forward recommendations to prevent managers’ bad accounting behaviors of listed companies in China, so as to safeguard the interests of stakeholders and provide good environment for capital market by improving the efficiency and accounting information quality of listed companies.

Key words: Bad accounting behaviors; Managers; Listed companies; the quality of accounting

information

INTRODUCTION

Accounting behaviors refer to the course of conduct highly relevant to accounting information generation, processing and transmission. Accounting behaviors have a significant impact on budgeting, performance evaluation, cost control and decision-making (Hopwood, 1974). From the micro view, accounting behaviors include accounting organization, business accounting, and internal accounting controls. In the accounting process, managers who master business decision-making power and control are important participants in accounting policy choices, decision-making of significant accounting issues, etc. Thus the quality of accounting information of listed companies depends largely on the managers’ behavior. We call the managers’ actions and manifestations involved in corporate accounting practices as managers accounting behaviors.

Managers are usually referred to the human capital owners who join in a business contracts with their management talent and really own the residual rights of control (XIE, 2005). Managers are responsible for determining organizational goals, formulate strategies

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to achieve stated objectives, monitor and explain the external environmental condition, and make decisions on issues affecting the entire organization. General speaking, managers of Chinese listed companies cover president, vice president, department managers, chief financial officer, chief engineer and so on.

The result of accounting behaviors is to produce accounting information, thus accounting practices and accounting information has a direct causal relationship. Standard accounting practices provide true and full accounting information and meet various needs. Nonstandard accounting behaviors will produce false, incomplete accounting information, which ultimately disturbs or even misleads those in need of accounting information to use. Such irregularities may be due to two aspects, one is deviations from accounting objectives or losing the objectives because of people’s bounded rationality, which is summarized as non-subjective bad accounting (ZHANG, 2005). The other is negative affect on accounting information generation and disclosure for certain bad intent or purpose, which accordingly may be called intentional bad accounting. So, management accounting practices can also be divided into two categories: one is the management non-subjective bad accounting behaviors, the managers involved in the process of accounting practices have not any bad intentions but are constrained by bounded rationality, which lead to low quality of accounting information, it is not malicious, and thus may be called the managers unintentional bad accounting behaviors; the other is manager intentional bad accounting behaviors, which means the manager’s participate accounting practices just for their own interests or certain bad purpose. An analysis shows that management is the most fundamental body of financial reporting fraud, and is the real source of financial reporting fraud (CHEN, 2009).

This paper discusses the specific manifestations of managers’ unintentional and intentional bad accounting behaviors respectively, analyzes their causes and proposes recommendations against these two types of managers’ bad accounting behaviors of listed companies in China, which is to promote listed companies to improve management level and accounting information quality.

1. THE MANIFESTATION AND CAUSES OF MANAGERS’ UNINTENTIONAL BAD

ACCOUNTING BEHAVIORS IN CHINA’S LISTED COMPANIES

1.1 The Manifestation of Managers’ Unintentional Bad Accounting Behaviors

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The performance of manager’ unintentional bad accounting can be divided into the following three aspects:

First, the accounting organization is less rigorous. Accounting organization is the basis of accounting. From the micro view, it mainly covers the development and implementation of enterprise accounting system, setting up accounting body, arrangement of accounting personnel and selecting accounting methods, which is to ensure the rational and effective for accounting work.

But in fact some listed companies’ accounting basic work has weak links, the most prominent are: the quality of some company’s accounting staff is not high, resulting in accounting arbitrary, unclear procedures, serious errors, accounting data missing; some company’s accounting staff is not equipped well, accounting methods are not suitable for the unit, making accounting disorder and inefficient.

Second, the accounting process is less standardized Mainly include: managers' unintentional choices of accounting policies are not applicable, resulting in accounting information has less relevant to information users need for economic decision-making; the content of cross-company accounts imputation, books set confusion, accounting treatment was not standardized, leading to mismatch of financial reporting and financial activities, accounting information is not a true reflection of the company operation. China securities news, the Audit Commission reported on May 20, 2011 that, accounts in Aluminum Corporation of China is not standardized, so although it acquired a variety of enterprises, the integration situation is not satisfactory.

Third, the internal accounting control is a mere formality. The main internal accounting controls include internal accounting management system, accounting personnel, job responsibility system, the financial processing system, the internal containment system, audit system, quota management system, measurement inspection system, and property inventory system, the financial revenue and expenditure approval system, cost accounting system , financial analysis, risk early warning system. However, some managers’ design of approval authority and approval process on financial revenue and expenditure is unreasonable, leading to false accounting information; delivery of accounting documents in some companies is not scientific, resulting in inefficient accounting; Job separation in some companies is not clear, causing accountant misrepresent accounting information; some companies’ internal accounting control system is designed by copying others, does not apply to their characteristics and requirements for production and management; some companies’ feasibility studies on foreign investment is not sufficient, resulting in corporate decision-making mistakes, increasing risks and grim financial situation. “New Century Weekly” reported that the National Audit Office claimed in August 2010 after auditing: China Steel Group has financial management confusion and other major problems such as high-risk investment, huge debts. It means there are significant internal accounting control deficiencies in CSG, and there is little internal control and regulation according to the enterprise itself.

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1.2 The Causes of Managers’ Unintentional Bad Accounting Behaviors

Person’s rational behavior is limited rational behavior but not fully rational behavior (Simon, 1947). The root cause of unintentional bad accounting lies in managers’ limited rationality. On the one hand, various managers own different intelligence, ability, personality, temperament, attitudes, values, and different degree in understanding accounting theory and methods; on the other hand, it’s impossible for managers to fully master and comprehensively apply accounting knowledge, while accounting theory is in a dynamic developing process, a variety of accounting codes of conduct and financial regulations constantly change with social development.Combining with the mentioned three manifestations, we analyze the reasons for managers’ unintentional bad accounting behaviors as following:

In the organization of accounting work, many factors should be considered when managers design the accounting organization forms. They should appraise company size, business conditions, related accounting requirements, the number and the ability of accounting personnel; they strive to simplify accounting procedures, deliver accounting information timely and correctly, and save human and material resources while ensure the quality of accounting; they should make relevant departments cooperate to provide consistent accounting data. But there is no fixed standard to evaluate these factors, managers subjective judgments are necessary. While managers’ awareness and capacity is limited, the design of corporate accounting organization is not necessarily of scientific and rational.

As to accounting, appropriate accounting policies and reasonable recognition, measurement and reporting accounting elements require that managers should be familiar with the current financial regulations and accounting standards, has a wealth of practical experience, a positive sense of innovation, keen vision and adequate professional ability to judge. For the existence of bounded rationality which create limitations in managers’ knowledge, ability and experience, continuous development of accounting theory and the relevant laws and regulations in addition, managers can not fully grasp the timely knowledge of accounting and related laws and regulations, it is impossible for them to put their knowledge into practice. Moreover, due to limited time and energy, relearning the accounting knowledge is difficult.

Speaking of internal accounting controls, managers do not pay attention to the internal accounting control system enables the production of accounting information process get out of control, ultimately affect the quality of accounting information. Since bounded rationality exists, there are omissions of the internal control system designed by managers, or corporate internal control system which is no longer meet the new environment has not been revised and improved in time, or the sound internal control system isn’t implemented well. All of these have a direct impact on the reliance of accounting information.

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2. THE MANIFESTATION AND CAUSES OF MANAGERS’ INTENTIONAL BAD ACCOUNTING BEHAVIORS IN CHINA’S LISTED COMPANIES

2.1 The Manifestation of Managers’ Intentional Bad Accounting Behaviors

The feature of managers’ intentional bad accounting behaviors is the managers’ bad intent or purpose. It includes accounting fraud and earnings management. Earnings management contains accounting policy choice, the way of it is to disclosure companies’ earnings for outsider, the final object of it is accounting data, its concrete operation is ultimately reflected in accounting fraud (LIU, 2009). Following studies take accounting fraud as a typical case of managers’ intentional bad accounting behaviors.

According to China Securities Regulatory Commission penalty notice, there are 41 listed companies are punished for untrue disclosure, incomplete or late accounting information from January 2008 to January 2011. Table 1 shows specific tools and the frequency of accounting fraud.

Tracing the reasons why these companies are punished, we can find various means and a huge amount are involved in managers’ intentional bad accounting behaviors.

Firstly, various means are involved in managers’ deliberately bad accounting behaviors. From Table 1 we can find, 41 listed companies reached 7 categories 127 kinds of fraud means as much, in average, every punished company adopts more than three kinds of accounting fraud method. Table 1 also indicates that the most important category of accounting fraud is the seventh one (concealment, late or improper disclosure of material matters), up to 66 cases, accounting for 51.96% of the total samples.10 cases among them are underestimation of liabilities, accounting for 52.63% of this category. There are 16 cases of the third category (inflated assets) and 13 cases of the forth category (false revenue), respectively accounting for 12.60% and 10.24% of the total samples. These accounting fraud methods seriously distort the company’s assets, liabilities and profits.

Secondly, a huge amount of money is involved in managers’ intentional bad accounting behaviors of listed companies. For example: six companies cumulatively fabricate ￥2.23 billion operating revenue. Of which Jinli Technology has reported fictitious revenues for two times and has been punished twice by SEC. Specific circumstances is shown in Table 2.

The distorted accounting information generated by accounting fraud makes serious consequences: on one hand, it may result in financial virtual income, the excessive distribution of national income, inflation of consumption, distortion of economic facts, covering up some contradictions in the economy, and make

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the country’s macro-supervision and regulation lose foundation, leading to significant financial, economic decision-making mistakes; on the other hand, creditors and investors may be led to poor decisions, their interests may be bruised, and reduce the efficiency of allocating resources in capital markets.

2.2 The Causes of Managers’ Intentional Bad Accounting Behaviors

Overall, as the agent of listed companies managers’ objective function is inconsistent with shareholders’ who is the principal, the relation between managers and stakeholders is also complex. Because managers get far more and earlier corporate information than other accounting information users, and the outsiders such as the shareholders, creditors weakly supervise the insiders -the managers which allows managers to actually control the enterprise, when conflict between various parts interests happen, the managers have the opportunity and the ability to engage accounting fraud so as to achieve their own interests (WANG, 2011). Specific analysis on the reasons for managers accounting fraud is as following:

3. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT MANAGERS’ BAD ACCOUNTING BEHAVIORS I N CHINA’ S LISTED COMPANIES

Actually, it is not easy to distinguish unintentional managers’ bad accounting behaviors from intentional ones in practice. But managers can do this themselves. To awaken managers’ social awareness of consciously reducing bad accounting behaviors, suggestions followed are respectively proposed in terms of two types of managers’ bad accounting behaviors.

3.1 Suggestions on Keeping away from Managers’ Unintentional Bad Accounting Behaviors

3.1.2 Strengthen the Continuing Education on Management

Through a variety of job training, study tours outside the listed companies, further education and teaching-himself, we can expand the manager’s professional knowledge and skills, develop their good habits of thinking and behavior, promote them to keep up with the developments of accounting theory, accounting standards and accounting laws and regulations, attach great importance to the construction of basic accounting work, continuously improve the company’s rules and regulations, strengthen the accounting staff in-service training, then accounting standards can be gradually, steadily improved and accounting plays an real important role in the management of listed companies.

3.1.2 Perfect the System of Internal Accounting Controls and Strictly Implement it

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The priority to sound system of internal accounting controls and strict implementation of it is to make managers pay more attention to internal accounting controls, then consciously strengthen the internal audit system which includes these actions: setting up the internal audit institution led by the board of supervisors and audit the daily operations of accounting, guaranteeing a high degree of independence of supervisory staff; ensuring separation of incompatible duties, such as: authorization to execute a particular transaction and executing duties; performing duties on certain business and auditing duties to these; performing a particular transaction and recording the business; custody of certain property, materials and recording them; custody of certain property, materials and checking duties; general ledger and subsidiary ledger duties; journalizing and general ledger duties, etc.

3.2 Precautionary Measures to Managers’ Intentional Bad Accounting Behaviors

3.2.1 Improve Corporate Governance

The quality of accounting information relies on the corporate governance, it is the result of struggle among relative parties of corporate governance. Balancing the strength of variety parties can effectively prevent the managers’ bad accounting behaviors and truly improve the quality of accounting information (XU, 2011). Dargenidou, McLeay and Raonic (2007) considered that more stringent corporate

governance practices can help investors overcome the weaknesses of the legal protection terms in Europe.

First of all, the managerial ownership should be properly handled and appropriate management incentives should be established to avoid short-term behavior of managers. Secondly, the structure of the board members and the independence of the Board must be improved so as to effectively bind the managers’ financial reporting fraud. So, we should not only increase the proportion of independent directors in the Board and continue to improve the independent director system, but also prevent the chairman or vice chairman and general manager duties on one person. To effectively perform the independent director system, we can start from three aspects: First, chose independent directors from external institutional investors, conforming to formal independence and substantial independence. Secondly, provide independent directors with remuneration commensurate with monitoring

responsibilities, in order to mobilize their enthusiasm and sense of responsibility. Third, clearly define the powers and duties of independent directors as well as negligence penalties to ensure the independent directors have full motive power and pressure to supervise the company.

As to “Dandong Chemical Fiber”, the proportion of independent directors was 33.33% from 2003 to 2005, it is 25% in 2006 and increased to 42.86% in 2007. According to China Securities Regulatory Commission administrative penalty notice, Dandong Chemical Fiber were involved in violations of accounting information disclosure from 2003 to 2006 but were not in 2007, indicating a high proportion of independent directors of listed companies had some restraining effect on executives accounting fraud.

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3.2.2 Strengthen the External Oversight

We should improve the social supervision system and steady the comprehensive and authoritative supervision of accounting. First, inspect companies’ accounting practices relying on social forces as CPA and strengthen the supervision of certified public accountants as well as accounting firms, promoting them to increase ethical standards and professional quality. Clear the legal liability of CPA to review and verify accounting information, develop and strictly enforce specific penalties for irresponsible or unethical CPAs to increase the cost of financial fraud (LIU, CHEN, ZHENG, 2010). Secondly, the China securities Regulatory Commission should carry out greater scrutiny, while mobilize tax authorities, financial sector, the public and other intermediaries to monitor the accounting practices of listed companies. Finally, the aforementioned means of accounting fraud in table 1 can be divided into three types: income statement fraud, the balance sheet fraud, concealment or improper and late disclosure of significant issues (LI Si-long, 2008).

Therefore, the internal audit department, accounting firms, regulatory authorities and other relevant agencies can focus on items listed in Table 1 from corporate income statement, balance sheet and the notes as censoring and inspecting accounting information of list companies

3.2.3 Mature the Accounting Regulations System

On one hand, we should build a scientific, rigorous, coordinated and uniform system of accounting regulations after overall planning the system and content of different accounting laws or rules, on the other hand, we should complement and revise the accounting standard in time to avoid leaving vacuum for the innovation business so that minimize the manipulation opportunity by accounting policy choice. At the same time, we need to improve the feedback process of accounting standards. For accounting regulations have been promulgated, the implementation effect and problems reflected should be investigated.

In particular, the views and suggestions fed back from accounting practitioners should be closely concerned, which enable accounting regulations to be timely revised and improved and accommodate themselves to developed economy.

3.2.4 Promote the Healthy Development of Financial Markets

As the advanced form of modern enterprises, listed companies are essentially different from private companies, which are closely related with the financial markets, especially the stock markets. Financial markets are important channels for listed companies and investors and also the occasion of optimal allocation of resources in society as a whole. Darrough and Stoughton (1990) analyzed incentives of voluntary disclosure and found that corporate disclosure of proprietary information would help financial markets to more accurately assess the enterprise although provided information to potential competitors at the same time. Fernandes and Guedes (2010) found that companies fraudulently announced revenue was

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positively related to expected economic performance, but was negatively correlated to economic performance realized. These studies show that healthy, well-established financial markets can truly reflect the past of listed companies and can reasonably predict the future of them. When the financial markets valuation mechanism is perfect day by day and investors gradually rise their overall quality, phenomenon that deceived by false information will be greatly reduced, managers deliberately bad accounting will lose opportunities to gain profits, thereby reducing the illegal motivation; simultaneously, the resources configuration function of financial markets can also force the listed companies with apparent problems to rectify as soon as possible to avoid suspension or delisting, so managers unintentional bad accounting practices can be corrected.

CONCLUSION

This paper breaks the routine that managers’ bad accounting behaviors just means accounting fraud, divides managers’ bad accounting behaviors into intentional bad accounting behaviors and unintentional ones. Then, it discusses respectively the manifestation and the causes of the both. It concludes that the managers’ unintentional bad accounting behaviors of listed companies in China mainly reflect in less rigorous accounting basis, nonstandardized accounting process, formalized internal accounting controls and other aspects. The fundamental reason is that managers are of limited rationality.

Managers’ unintentional bad accounting behavior is an objective reality and can not be completely avoided, but it would be reduced through sound continuing education on managers and improvement of the company’s internal accounting system. As a typical of managers’ intentionally bad accounting behaviors, accounting fraud includes such seven categories as false revenue, false investment income, inflated assets and concealment of important matters and so on. The causes of them contain defective corporate governance, weak external supervision, immature accounting regulations. We can improve corporate governance, strengthen the external oversight, mature the accounting system of norms and promote healthy development of financial markets and other measures to prevent accounting fraud. This paper argues that: in practice, it’s not easy to distinguish managers’ intentional bad accounting behaviors from unintentional ones, but the managers can do. Therefore, the above suggestions are able to play a role.

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中国上市公司管理者的不良会计行为

摘 要

管理者有意或无意的不良会计行为将导致上市公司会计信息质量差，从而在很大程度上干扰投资者，造成资本市场混乱，不利于反映绩效管理责任。研究中国上市公司管理者的不良会计行为具有重要意义，即改善管理，优化社会资源的分配。本文分别讨论了管理者无意和有意的不良会计行为的表现形式和原因。它也提出了防止中国上市公司管理者的不良会计行为的建议，通过提高工作效率和上市公司会计信息质量，来维护利益相关者的利益，并为资本市场提供良好的环。

关键词：不良会计行为；管理者；上市公司；会计信息质量

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引 言

会计行为是指提供高度相关的会计信息的行为，即会计信息的生成、处理和传输的过程。会计行为会对预算，绩效评估，成本控制和决策产生重大影响。从微观角度看，会计行为包括会计机构，会计业务，内部会计控制。在核算过程中，掌握经营决策和控制权的管理者是选择会计政策和重大会计问题的决策的重要参与者。因此，上市公司会计信息质量在很大程度上取决于管理者的行为。我们把企业中，管理者参与会计的行动和表现称为管理者会计行为。

管理者通常被称为与管理人才签订业务合同和真正拥有剩余控制权利的人力资本所有者。管理者负责确定组织的目标，制订策略，实现既定目标，监测和解释外部环境条件，对影响整个组织的问题做出决定。一般来讲，中国上市公司的管理人员包括总裁，副总裁，部门经理，财务总监，总工程师等。

会计行为的结果是产生会计信息，会计实务和会计信息有直接的因果关系。标准的会计实务提供真实和完整的会计信息，满足各种需求。不规范的会计行为，会产生虚假和不完整的会计信息，最终扰乱甚至误导那些会计信息的使用者。这些违规行为，可能是由于两个方面的原因，一个是由于人的有限理性，造成会计目标的偏差或目标的丢失，称为非主观不良会计行为。另一种是为了某些不良意图或目的，对会计信息的生成和披露造成负面影响，因此可称为有意的不良会计行为。因此，管理会计的做法也可以被分为两类：一个是管理者非主观的不良会计行为，在会计实践过程中所涉及的管理者没有任何不良意图，但有限理性的约束，从而导致低质量的会计信息，它是没有恶意的，因此可称为管理者无意的不良会计行为，另一种是管理者有意的不良会计行为，这意味着管理者的参与，只是为自己的利益或某些不良目的的会计行为。分析表明，管理者是财务报告舞弊的最根本的主体，是财务报告舞弊的真正根源。

本文分别讨论了管理者无意和有意的不良会计行为的具体表现，分析其原因，并提出建议，提高上市公司管理水平和会计信息质量。

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第1章 中国上市公司管理者无意的不良会计行为的表

现形式及其原因

1.1 管理者无意的不良会计行为的表现形式

管理者无意的不良会计行为可分为以下三个方面：

首先，会计机构是不那么严格的。会计机构是会计的基础。从微观的角度分析，它的主要内容包括企业会计制度的制定和实施，设立会计机构，安排会计人员和选择会计方法，这是为了确保会计核算工作的合理和有效。但事实上，一些上市公司会计基础工作仍有薄弱环节，最突出的是：一些公司的会计人员素质不高，导致会计任意，程序不清楚，错误严重，会计数据丢失；一些公司的会计人员也没有配备齐全，会计处理方法也不适合单位，造成会计的阻碍和低效。

然后，会计过程不规范，主要包括：管理者无意的选择不适用的会计政策，造成账目混乱，会计处理不规范，导致不匹配的财务报告和财务活动，因为有关信息使用者的经济决策需要会计信息是不是真实地反映了公司的运作。中国证券报，审计署于2011年5月20日报道说，中国铝业公司的账目不规范，虽然它收购各种企业，但是其一体化的情况仍是不能令人满意。

最后，内部会计控制流于形式。主要的内部会计控制包括内部会计管理制度，会计人员岗位责任制，财务处理系统，内部牵制制度，审计制度，配额管理制度，计量检测体系，财产清查制度，财政收入和支出的审批系统，成本会计制度，财务分析，风险预警系统。然而，一些管理者的财政收入和支出的审批权限和审批程序的设计不合理，导致虚假会计信息；在一些企业的会计凭证的传递过程是不科学的，导致会计效率低下。工作中的一些公司的职责分离是不明确的，造成会计人员歪曲会计信息，一些公司的内部会计控制制度是照搬别人的设计，并不适用于他们进行生产和管理的特点和要求，一些企业对外商投资的可行性研究是不

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够的，企业决策失误，导致风险提高和金融形势严峻。新世纪周刊报道，国家审计署于2010年8月审核后声称：中钢集团财务管理混乱和其他重大问题，如高风险的投资，巨额债务。因为企业自身有着内部控制缺陷，导致以上问题，所以要加强内部会计控制，内部会计控制有着显著地意义。

1.2 管理者无意的不良会计行为的原因

人的理性行为是有限理性的行为，即不完全理性的行为。无意的不良会计行为的根本原因在于管理者的有限理性。一方面，各类管理人员拥有不同的智力、能力、性格、气质、态度、价值观，以及对会计理论和方法的不同程度的了解；另一方面，它不可能为管理者充分掌握和综合应用会计知识，同时会计理论是一个动态的发展过程，各种会计守则的行为和金融法规随着社会的进步不断的在改变。通过上述3种表现形式，我们分析了管理者无意的不良会计行为的如下原因：

在会计核算工作的组织中，当经理设计会计组织形式，应考虑诸多因素。他们应该评价公司规模、经营状况、有关会计制度规定的数量和会计人员的能力；他们努力简化会计程序，保证会计信息的及时，准确，节省人力和物力资源，同时确保会计质量；应有关部门的合作，以提供一致的会计数据。目前还没有固定的标准，以评估这些因素，管理者的主观判断是必要的。但是管理者的意识和能力是有限的，不一定是科学合理的企业会计组织设计。

至于会计，要选择适当的会计政策和合理的识别、计量和报告会计要素，就要求管理者应该熟悉当前的金融法规和会计准则，具有丰富的实践经验，积极创新意识，敏锐的眼光和足够的专业能力判断。因为有限理性的存在，在管理者的知识、能力和经验存在局限性。随着会计理论和有关法律法规的不断发展，管理者不能完全及时掌握会计知识及相关法律法规知识，也不可能为他们自己的知识付诸实践。此外，由于有限的时间和精力，重新学习会计知识是很难的。

说到内部会计控制，管理者不重视内部会计控制制度，使会计信息的生产过程失控，最终影响了会计信息的质量。由于有限理性的存在，管理者设计的企业内部控制制度不再符合新的环境并且没有被及时修改和改进，或是内部控制制度不落实，以及内部控制系统设计的疏漏。所有这些都直接影响到对会计信息质量。

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第2章 中国上市公司管理者有意的不良会计行为的表

现形式及其成因

2.1 管理者有意的不良会计行为的表现形式

管理者有意的不良会计行为的特征是管理者的不良意图或目的。它包括会计欺诈和盈余管理。盈余管理包含会计政策的选择，它的方式是向外界披露公司的盈利，它的最终目标是会计数据，其具体操作的最终反映是会计欺诈（刘，2009）。以下采取会计欺诈作为研究一个管理者有意的不良会计行为的典型案例。

首先，管理者有意的不良会计行为涉及各种手段。从表1我们可以发现，41家上市公司达到了7大类127种欺诈手段之多，平均每处罚的公司采用3种以上会计造假方法。表1还表明，会计欺诈的最重要的一类是隐瞒，不及时或披露的重大事项不当，有66例，占51.96％，其中有低估负债的，占52.63％。有16例虚增资产的，第三类和第四类（虚假收入）13例，分别占样本总数的12.60％和10.24％。这些会计造假方法严重歪曲公司的资产，负债和利润。

其次，上市公司管理者有意的不良会计行为涉及金额巨大。例如：六公司累计制造营业收入为22.3亿日元。其中金利科技报道两次虚构收入，并已通过SEC处罚两次。

会计欺诈产生严重后果，及会计信息失真：一方面，它可能会导致虚拟的财政收入，国民收入过度分配，消费的通货膨胀，扭曲经济事实，掩盖了经济中的一些矛盾，使国家的宏观的监督和调控失去了基础，从而导致金融经济决策失误；另一方面，债权人和投资者可能会导致错误的决策，损害他们的经济利益，减少了资本市场资源分配效率

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2.2 管理者有意的不良会计行为的成因

总体而言，作为上市公司管理的代理人，其目标与股东是不一致的，管理者和利益相关者之间的关系也很复杂。因为管理者比其他会计信息使用者得到更为较早的会计信息，如股东和债权人监督弱业，使管理者实际控制的企业，各部分之间的利益发生冲突时，管理者有机会和能力从事会计欺诈行为，以实现自己的利益（王，2011）。管理者会计造假的原因有公司治理结构、外部监督薄弱、法律法规不完善等。

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第3章 提出防止中国上市公司管理者的不良会计行为

建议

实际上，管理者是不是有意或无意的不良会计行为，在实践中不容易分辨。但是管理者自己可以做到这一点。唤醒管理者减少不良会计行为的自觉性，通过提高社会意识来防止不良会计行为，分别就两种类型的管理者的不良会计行为提出了建议。

3.1管理者无意的不良会计行为防范措施

3.1.1加强管理者继续教育

通过各种在职培训，让上市公司的管理者继续教育和学习。可以提高扩大管理者的专业知识和技能，发展思维和行为，养成良好的生活习惯。促进他们为了与会计发展理论，会计准则和会计法律法规，从而高度重视会计基础工作建设，不断提高公司的规章制度，加强会计人员的在职培训。随着会计准则逐步、稳步提高，管理者在上市公司会计工作，才能起到真正重要的作用。

3.1.2完善内部会计控制制度，并严格执行

优先健全内部会计控制和严格执行制度，使管理者更加注重内部会计控制，然后自觉地加强内部审计制度，其中包括这些行动：设立由监事会领导的内部审计机构和审核会计的日常运作，保证监督人员的独立性程度高；保证不相容职务的分离，如：授权执行特定的交易和执行职务的人执行某些业务和审计职责，保管的人不能参加审计检查的职责。

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3.2管理者有意的不良会计行为的防范措施

3.2.1完善法人治理

会计信息质量依赖于公司治理，是公司治理结构之间的斗争的结果。平衡各方的力量，能有效地防止管理者的不良会计行为，切实提高会计信息质量（徐，2011）。 dargenidou，McLeay和Raonic（2007）认为，更严格的企业管治常规，可以帮助投资者克服在欧洲的法律保护方面的弱点。

首先，管理层持股应妥善处理，并应建立适当的管理激励政策，鼓励管理者，以避免短期行为。其次，董事会成员结构和董事会的独立性必须得到改善，从而有效地约束管理者的财务报告欺诈行为。因此，我们不仅应该增加独立董事在董事会中所占的比例，并继续完善独立董事制度，而且还可以防止由一个人担任董事长或副董事长和总经理职务。为了有效地履行独立董事制度，我们可以从三个方面着手：第一，选择了来自外部的机构投资者的独立董事，符合正式独立的和实质性的独立。其次，独立董事提供与监管职责相称的报酬，以调动他们的积极性和责任感。第三，明确独立董事的权力和职责，以及不能疏忽处罚，以确保独立董事有充分的动力和压力，以监督该公司。

至于“丹东化纤”，独立董事的比例为33.33％，从2003年到2005年，它是在2006年的25％增加到2007年的42.86％。根据中国证券监督管理委员会行政处罚通知书，丹东化纤涉及从2003年至2006年会计信息披露有问题，但不是在2007年，这表明上市公司独立董事的比例高了，会对一些高管会计欺诈行为起到制约作用。

3.2.2加强外部监督

我们要完善社会监督体系，实现稳定的、全面和权威的会计监督。首先，检查公司的会计方法，依靠社会力量如注册会计师，并加强监督会计师以及会计师事务所，促进他们提高道德标准和专业素质。明确会计师事务所对会计信息的审查和核实的法律责任，制定并严格执行不负责任或不道德的会计师事务所的具体罚则，以增加金融诈骗的成本（刘，陈，郑，2010）。其次，中国证券监督管理委员会应进行更严格的审查，同时调动税务机关，财政部门，公众和其他中介机构，

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以监管上市公司的会计惯例。最后，上述表1中的会计欺诈手段可分为三种类型：损益表欺诈，资产负债表欺诈，隐瞒或不当后期披露的重大问题（李泗长，2008年）。

因此，内部审计部门，会计师事务所，监管部门和其他有关机构可以专注于企业的损益表，资产负债表和附注的审查和检查公司会计信息从表1中列出的项目清单。

3.2.3成熟的会计法规体系

一方面，我们应该建立整体规划系统和内容不同的会计法律规则，另一方面，建立科学、严谨、协调和统一的会计法规体系，我们应该补充和修订的会计标准时间，以避免创新业务留下的真空，所以，最大限度地减少操纵会计政策选择的机会。同时，我们需要提高会计准则的反馈过程。会计法规已经颁布，实施的效果和反映的问题应进行调查。特别是应该密切关注会计从业人员反馈的意见和建议，使会计法规，及时修订和完善，适应经济发达。

3.2.4促进金融市场健康发展

上市公司作为现代企业的高级形式，与股票市场的本质不同，与金融市场有着密切关系。股票市场和金融市场是上市公司和投资者，还有整个社会资源的优化配置之际的重要渠道。 darrough和斯托顿（1990）分析了信息披露自愿性和发现企业的专有信息披露将有助于金融市场发展，以更准确地评估企业。虽然提供信息的同时，会存在潜在的竞争对手。费尔南德斯和古埃德斯（2010）发现，公司欺诈与宣布预期收入的经济表现呈正相关，但与真实的经济表现负相关。这些研究表明，健康、完善的金融市场能真正反映上市公司的过去，并能合理地预测他们的未来。通过虚假信息欺骗，将大大降低他们的整体素质，为管理者有意的不良会计行为提供机会，当金融市场的估值机制得到完善，上市公司和投资者素质逐渐上升，管理者将失去获利的机会，从而减少非法动机，同时，金融市场的资源配置功能，也可以迫使上市公司凸显其存在的问题，并尽快纠正，以避免暂停或退市，从而可以矫正管理者无意的不良会计行为。

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结 论

本文打破了常规，管理者的不良会计行为只是意味着会计欺诈，分为管理者有意的不良会计行为和无意的不良会计行为。然后，分别讨论两者的表现形式和原因。它得出结论认为，中国上市公司管理者无意的不良会计行为主要体现在不太严格的会计基础，非标准化的会计处理，非正式的内部会计控制和其他方面。其根本原因是管理者的有限理性。

管理者无意的不良会计行为是客观存在的，并不能完全避免的，但它会通过加强对管理人员继续教育和完善公司的内部会计制度来降低。作为一个典型管理者有意的不良会计行为，会计欺诈行为包括虚假收入，虚假的投资收益，虚增资产，隐瞒重要事项等七大类。其中的原因包含有缺陷的公司治理结构，外部监督薄弱，不成熟的会计法规。我们可以改善公司治理，加强外部监督，规范会计制度，并促进金融市场健康发展和其他措施，以防止会计欺诈行为。本文认为：在实践中，不容易区分有意或无意的管理者的不良会计行为，但管理者可以做到的，因此，上述建议是能够发挥作用的。

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