The_Core_Competence_of_the_Corporation

企业核心竞争力

The Core Competence of the Corporation 企业核心竞争力

by C.K. Prahalad and Gary Hamel 由香港金融管理局 Prahalad 和加里哈梅尔

C.K.Prahalad and Gary Hamel, The Core Competence Of the Corporation [J]. Harvard Business Review,May-June,1990 P79-93, C.K.Prahalad 和加里 Hamel[J] 企业的核心竞争力。 哈佛商业评论 5-6 月 1990 P79-93

C. K. Prahalad is professor of corporate strategy and international business at the University of Michigan. Gary Hamel is lecturer in business policy and management at the London Business School. Their most recent HBR article "Strategic Intent" (May June 1989), won the 1989 McKinsey Award for excellence. This article is based on research funded by the Gatsby Charitable Foundation. C.K.Prahalad 是公司战略和国际业务在密歇根大学的教授。 加里哈梅尔是业务政策和在伦敦商学院管理讲师。 其最新的 HBR 文章"战略目的"（5 1989 年 6 月） 荣获 1989年麦肯锡卓越。 这篇文章根据由盖茨的慈善基金资助的研究。

The most powerful way to prevail in global competition is still invisible to many companies. During the 1980s, top executives were judged on their ability to restructure, declutter, and delayer their corporations. In the 1990s, they'll be judged on their ability to identify, cultivate, and exploit the core competencies that make growth possible indeed, they'll have to rethink the concept of the corporation itself. 在最强有力的方式，在全球竞争中取胜是对很多公司仍不可见的。 在 1980 年代中高层管理人员被认为对其进行重组，declutter，和精简其公司的能力。 在 1990 年代中他们会判断的能力对其确定，培养，并利用使增长确实，可能的核心能力他们将不得不重新考虑该公司本身的概念。

Consider the last ten years of GTE and NEC. In the early 1980s, GTE was well positioned to become a major player in the evolving information technology industry. It was active in telecommunications. Its operations spanned a variety of businesses including telephones, switching and transmission systems, digital PABX, semiconductors, packet switching, satellites, defense systems, and lighting products. And GTE's Entertainment Products Group, which produced Sylvania color TVs, had a position in related display technologies. In 1980, GTE's sales were $9.98 billion, and net cash flow was $1.73 billion. NEC, in contrast, was much smaller, at $3.8 billion in sales. It had a comparable technological base and computer businesses, but it had no experience as an operating telecommunications company. 考虑低和 NEC 的十年。 在八十年代初期有能力低成为在不断变化的信息技术行业的主要参与者。 这是活跃于电讯。 其业务横跨的行业包括电话、 交换和传输系统、 数字程控交换机、 半导体、 分组交换、 卫星、 防御系统和照明产品的品种。 低的娱乐产品集团生产西尔彩色电视机，已在有关的显示技术中的位置。 1980 年，通用的销售额 9.98 亿元，及净现金流量为 1.73 亿元。 NEC，在相反是小得多，在销售的 3.8 亿元。 它有一个类似的技术基础和计算机业务却没有作为经营的电讯公司的经验。

Yet look at the positions of GTE and NEC in 1988. GTE's 1988 sales were $16.46 billion, and NEC’s sales were considerably higher at $21.89 billion. GTE has, in effect, become a telephone operating company with a position in defense and lighting products. GTE's other businesses are small in global terms. GTE has divested Sylvania TV and Telenet, put switching, transmission, and digital PABX into joint ventures, and closed down semiconductors. As a result, the international position of GTE has eroded. Non U.S. revenue as a percent of total revenue dropped from 20% to 15% between 1980 and 1988. 但在 1988 年看低和 NEC 的位置。 通用的 1988年销售额 16.46 亿元和 NEC 的销售额高达 21.89 亿元。 在对低成为经营公司与防御中的位置和照明产品的电话。 小全球条款中通用的其他业务。 低了剥夺西尔电视和远程、 把开关，

企业核心竞争力

传输和数字程控用户交换机到合资企业和关闭半导体。 作为一个结果已经削弱了通用的国际地位。 非美国税收收入总额的百分比从 20%降至 1980 年至 1988年的 15%。

NEC has emerged as the world leader in semiconductors and as a first tier player in telecommunications products and computers. It has consolidated its position in mainframe computers. It has moved beyond public switching and transmission to include such lifestyle products as mobile telephones, facsimile machines, and laptop computers bridging the gap between telecommunications and office automation. NEC is the only company in the world to be in the top five in revenue in telecommunications, semiconductors, and mainframes. Why did these two companies, starting with comparable business portfolios, perform so differently? Largely because NEC conceived of itself in terms of "core competencies," and GTE did not. NEC 出现了作为全球领先的半导体和电讯产品或计算机中的第一层球员。 它巩固了其在大型计算机的地位。 它已经超出公共交换和传输包括手提电话、 传真机器和膝上型计算机之间通讯及办公自动化的桥梁等生活方式产品。 NEC 是世界唯一的收入在电信、 半导体和大型机的前五名的公司。 为什么这些类似的业务组合从开始的两个公司等以不同的方式是否执行？ 主要是因为 NEC 构思本身的"拿手好戏"和低了不。

Rethinking the Corporation 该公司的再思考

Once, the diversified corporation could simply point its business units at particular end product markets and admonish them to become world leaders. But with market boundaries changing ever more quickly, targets are elusive and capture is at best temporary. A few companies have proven themselves adept at inventing new markets, quickly entering emerging markets, and dramatically shifting patterns of customer choice in established markets. These are the ones to emulate. The critical task for management is to create an organization capable of infusing products with irresistible functionality or, better yet, creating products that customers need but have not yet even imagined) 一次，多元化的公司可以只点及其业务部门，在特定的最终产品市场并劝戒他们成为世界各国领导人。 但市场与以往任何时候都更快地改变的边界的目标是可望而不可及处于最佳的临时捕获。 几个公司已证明自己擅长发明新的市场、 快速进入新兴市场和显著转变的客户可以选择在既定的市场格局。 这些都是模仿的。 管理的关键任务是创建一个组织能对输注产品具有不可抗拒的功能或更好地尚未创建客户需要，但还未有甚至想象的产品）

This is a deceptively difficult task. Ultimately, it requires radical change in the management of major companies. It means, first of all, that top managements of Western companies must assume responsibility for competitive decline. Everyone knows about high interest rates, Japanese protectionism, outdated antitrust laws, obstreperous unions, and impatient investors. What is harder to see, or harder to acknowledge, is how little added momentum companies actually get from political or macroeconomic "relief." Both the theory and practice of Western management have created a drag on our forward motion. It is the principles of management that are in need of reform. 这是一个走困难的任务。 最终，它需要彻底的改变大公司的管理。 第一次的所有它意味着西方公司的高层管理人员必须承担竞争力下降的责任。 大家都知道有关高利率、 日本的保护主义、 过时的反托拉斯法、 恣意工会和不耐烦的投资者。 什么是难见的或难以承认，是多么少添加动力公司实际上得到从政治或宏观经济"救济。" 理论与实践的西方管理已创建一拖上我们前进的运动。 它是管理的有需要改革原则。

NEC versus GTE, again, is instructive and only one of many such comparative cases we analyzed to understand the changing basis for global leadership. Early in the 1970s, NEC articulated a strategic intent to exploit the convergence of computing and communications, what it called

企业核心竞争力

"C&C" Success, top management reckoned, would hinge on acquiring competencies, particularly in semiconductors. Management adopted an appropriate "strategic architecture," summarized by C&C, and then communicated its intent to the whole organization and the outside world during the mid 1970s. NEC 与低，又有教育意义，只有一个的很多这种情况比较下我们分析，以了解全球领导地位不断变化的基础。 早在的七十 NEC 阐述利用的计算收敛性的战略意图和它所要求的最高管理层认为，"科技-"成功的通信将取决于获得特别是在半导体的能力。 管理通过一个适当"战略结构，"由 C 科技统计汇总，然后在 70 年代中期传达其意图整个组织和外面的世界。

NEC constituted a "C&C Committee" of top managers to oversee the development of core products and core competencies. NEC put in place coordination groups and committees that cut across the interests of individual businesses. Consistent with its strategic architecture, NEC shifted enormous resources to strengthen its position in components and central processors. By using collaborative arrangements to multiply internal resources, NEC was able to accumulate a broad array of core competencies. NEC 构成一个科技-委员会"的高层管理人员监督的核心产品和核心能力的发展。 NEC 放的地方协调组之间的个体工商户的利益的委员会。 根据其战略体系结构 NEC 转向巨大资源，加强其在组件和中央处理器的地位。 通过使用要乘的内部资源的协作安排，NEC 得以积累了广泛的核心能力。

NEC carefully identified three interrelated streams of technological and market evolution. Top management determined that computing would evolve from large mainframes to distributed processing, components from simple ICs to VLSI, and communications from mechanical cross bar exchange to complex digital systems we now call ISDN. As things evolved further, NEC reasoned, the computing, communications, and components businesses would so overlap that it would be very hard to distinguish among them, and that there would be enormous opportunities for any company that had built the competencies needed to serve all three markets. NEC 仔细确定了三个相互关联的流的技术和市场的发展。 最高管理层已确定计算将分布式处理集成电路，从简单的 ic 组件逐渐从大大型机和复杂的数字系统从机械的交叉线交换通信我们现在称之为 ISDN。 事情演变进一步，NEC 议论，计算，通讯，以及组件业务等相互重叠，将很难区分他们，而有巨大的机会，建立了能力的任何公司需要为所有的三个市场服务。

NEC top management determined that semiconductors would be the company's most important "core product." It entered into myriad strategic alliances over 100 as of 1987 aimed at building competencies rapidly and at low cost. In mainframe computers, its most noted relationship was with Honeywell and Bull. Almost all the collaborative arrangements in the semiconductor component field were oriented toward technology access. As they entered collaborative arrangements, NEC’s operating managers understood the rationale for these alliances and the goal of internalizing partner skills. NEC's director of research summed up its competence acquisition during the 1970s and 1980s this way: "From an investment standpoint, it was much quicker and cheaper to use foreign technology. There wasn't a need for us to develop new ideas.” NEC 最高管理层已确定半导体将是该公司的最重要"核心产品"。 它进入了无数的战略联盟，为 1987 年的超过 100 个旨在迅速建立能力和低成本。 其最著名的关系在大型计算机与霍尼韦尔和牛。 在半导体组件字段中的几乎所有协作安排是面向技术访问。 并输入当局就这些参数的协作安排 NEC 的经营管理人员明白这些联盟和目标的内在化合作伙伴技能的理由。 总结在七十年代和八十年代期间能力取得这种方式的 NEC 的研究部主任："从一个投资角度来看它是得又快又便宜使用国外技术。 有不是我们发展新的想法。

No such clarity of strategic intent and strategic architecture appeared to exist at GTE. Although

企业核心竞争力

senior executives discussed the implications of the evolving information technology industry, no commonly accepted view of which competencies would be required to compete in that industry were communicated widely. While significant staff work was done to identify key technologies, senior line managers continued to act as if they were managing independent business units. Decentralization made it difficult to focus on core competencies. Instead, individual businesses became increasingly dependent on outsiders for critical skills, and collaboration became a route to staged exits. Today, with a new management team in place, GTE has repositioned itself to apply its competencies to emerging markets in telecommunications services. 这种不清晰的战略意图和战略体系结构似乎存在于低。 虽然高层管理人员讨论不断变化的信息技术产业的影响，不普遍接受的能力将需要竞争在这行业被广泛传达的视图。 而做重大工作人员工作的目的是为了确定关键技术，高级管理人员将继续采取行动，如果他们管理独立的业务单位。 权力下放，因此难以专注于核心能力。 相反，个体经营成为越来越多地依赖于外界的重要技能和协作成为分阶段退出的路由。 重新今天，在地方一个的新的管理团队与低了定位本身将其能力应用于电讯服务的新兴市场。

The Roots of Competitive Advantage 根的竞争优势

The distinction we observed in the way NEC and GTE conceived of themselves a portfolio of competencies versus a portfolio of businesses was repeated across many industries. From 1980 to 1988, Canon grew by 264%, Honda by 200%. Compare that with Xerox and Chrysler. And if Western managers were once anxious about the low cost and high quality of Japanese imports, they are now over;whelmed by the pace at which Japanese rivals are inventing new markets, creating new products, and enhancing them. Canon has given us personal copiers; Honda has moved from motorcycles to four wheel off road buggies. Sony developed the 8mm camcorder, Yamaha, the digital piano. Komatsu developed an underwater remote controlled bulldozer, while Casio's latest gambit is a small screen color LCD television. Who would have anticipated the evolution of these vanguard markets? NEC 和低设想自己的一套完整的能力与企业的投资组合的方式，我们发现的区别被重复许多行业。 从一九八 ○ 至 1988年佳能增长 200%本田 264%。 施乐公司和克莱斯勒公司进行比较。 而一旦担心日本进口的低成本、 高质量西方经理要是他们现在 ； whelmed 由日本的竞争对手是发明新的市场、 创造新产品和提高他们的步伐。 佳能给了我们个人复印机 ； 本田已从摩托车移至四轮路 buggies 关闭。 索尼开发数码钢琴雅马哈，8mm 摄像机。 小松开发远程水下控制的推土机卡西欧的最新开场白时小屏幕彩色液晶电视。 谁将预期这些先锋市场的演变？

In more established markets, the Japanese challenge has been just as disquieting. Japanese companies are generating a blizzard of features and functional enhancements that bring technological sophistication to everyday products. Japanese car producers have been pioneering four wheel steering, four valve-per cylinder engines, in car navigation systems, and sophisticated electronic engine management systems. On the strength of its product features, Canon is now a player in facsimile transmission machines, desktop laser printers, even semiconductor manufacturing equipment. 在更多建立市场，日本的挑战就是一样令人担忧。 日本公司正在生成的功能和功能的增强功能，使日常产品技术先进的暴风雪。 日本的汽车生产商都已开拓四轮转向，四个阀每缸引擎，汽车导航系统和先进的电子发动机管理系统中。 它的产品功能的力量佳能现在是一个传真传送机、 桌面激光打印机、 甚至半导体制造设备的球员。 In the short run, a company's competitiveness derives from the price/performance attributes of current products. But the survivors of the first wave of global competition, Western and Japanese alike, are all converging on similar and formidable standards for product cost and quality

企业核心竞争力

minimum hurdles for continued competition, but less and less important as sources of differential advantage. In the long run, competitiveness derives from an ability to build, at lower cost and more speedily than competitors, the core competencies that spawn unanticipated products. The real sources of advantage are to be found in management's ability to consolidate corporatewide technologies and production skills into competencies that empower individual businesses to adapt quickly to changing opportunities. 在短期内公司的竞争力源自性价比属性的当前产品。 但西方和相似，日本的全球竞争的第一波的幸存者都会聚类似和强大的标准，为产品成本和质量最低关卡继续比赛，但不重要的差异优势的来源。 长远竞争力源自一个能够以较低的成本和更迅速比竞争对手，构建产卵未预料到的产品的核心能力。 优势的真正来源都能发现管理的能力将 corporatewide 技术和生产技能整合到授权个别企业能够快速适应不断变化的机会的能力。

Senior executives who claim that they cannot build core competencies either because they feel the autonomy of business units is sacrosanct or because their feet are held to the quarterly budget fire should think again. The problem in many Western companies is not that their senior executives are any less capable than those in Japan nor that Japanese companies possess greater technical capabilities. Instead, it is their adherence to a concept of the corporation that unnecessarily limits the ability of individual businesses to fully exploit the deep reservoir of technological capability that many American and European companies possess. 高级行政人员声称他们不能建立核心能力，因为他们觉得业务单位的自治神圣不可侵犯或因为他们的脚举行，每季度预算火灾应再想一想。 在许多西方公司问题不是其高层管理人员也不能比日本无日本公司拥有更大的技术能力。 这是他们坚持不必要地限制了个别企业能够充分利用深部储层的很多美国和欧洲公司拥有的技术能力的法团的概念。

The diversified corporation is a large tree. The trunk and major limbs are core products, the smaller branches are business units; the leaves, flowers, and fruit are end products. The root system that provides nourishment, sustenance, and stability is the core competence. You can miss the strength of competitors by looking only at their end products, in the same way you miss the strength of a tree if you look only at its leaves. (See the chart "Competencies: The Roots of Competitiveness.”) 多元化的公司是一个大的树。 躯干和四肢主要是核心产品较小的分支机构是业务单位 ； 叶、 花和水果是最终产品。 提供营养、 寄托和稳定的根系统是核心竞争力。 你可以错过竞争对手的实力只看他们的最终产品，你错过强度的一棵树，如果你只看其叶方式相同。 （请参阅图表"能力： 竞争力的根。"）

Core competencies are the collective learning in the organization, especially how to coordinate diverse production skills and integrate multiple streams of technologies. Consider Sony's capacity to miniaturize or Philips's optical media expertise. The theoretical knowledge to put a radio on a chip does not in itself assure a company the skill to produce a miniature radio no bigger than a business card. To bring off this feat, Casio must harmonize know how in miniaturization, microprocessor design, material science, and ultrathin precision casing the same skills it applies in its miniature card calculators, pocket TVs, and digital watches.核心能力是在该的组织集体学习特别是如何协调不同的生产技能和集成技术的多个数据流。 考虑到 miniaturize 索尼公司的能力或飞利浦的光学媒体专门知识。 芯片上放一台收音机的理论知识并不在本身向一家公司生产不大于一张名片的微型无线电技术。 卡西欧必须协调，使关闭此专长，知道在小型化、 微处理器设计、 材料学和套管相同技能的超薄精密它如何应用在其微型卡计算器、 口袋电视和数字手表。

If core competence is about harmonizing streams of technology, it is also about the organization

企业核心竞争力

of work and the delivery of value. Among Sony's competencies is miniaturization. To bring miniaturization to its products, Sony must ensure that technologists, engineers, and marketers have a shared understanding of customer needs and of technological possibilities. The force of core competence is felt as decisively in services as in manufacturing. Citicorp was ahead of others investing in an operating system that allowed it to participate in world markets 24 hours a day. Its competence in provided the company the means to differentiate itself from many financial service institutions. 关于协调技术流核心竞争力是否它也是值的工作的有关安排和提供。 索尼公司的能力是小型化。 要使其产品小型化，索尼必须确保技术专家、 工程师和营销人员有共同的理解客户的需求和技术的可能性。 如在制造服务，果断地感觉到的核心力量。 花旗其他人是在操作系统允许它参与世界投资市场一天 24 小时。 其能力提供公司本身区别很多的金融服务机构的手段。

Core competence is communication, involvement, and a deep commitment to working across organizational boundaries. It involves many levels of people and all functions. World class research in, for example, lasers or ceramics can take place in corporate laboratories without having an impact on any of the businesses of the company. The skills that together constitute core competence must coalesce around individuals whose efforts are not so narrowly focused that they cannot recognize the opportunities for blending their functional expertise with those of others in new and interesting ways. 核心竞争力是跨组织间的沟通、 参与和工作的坚定承诺。 它涉及到很多级别的人和所有功能。 世界类研究中的，，例如激光器或陶瓷可以在公司实验室而无需对任何公司的业务的影响。 一起构成核心竞争力的技能必须合并周围人的努力如此狭隘地集中他们无法识别新的和有趣的方式混合功能与其他人的专业知识的机会。 Core competence does not diminish with use. Unlike physical assets, which do deteriorate over time, competencies are enhanced as they are applied and shared. But competencies still need to be nurtured and protected; knowledge fades if it is not used. Competencies are the glue that binds existing businesses. They are also the engine for new business development. Patterns of diversification and market entry may be guided by them, not just by the attractiveness of markets. 核心竞争力与使用并不会减少。 与做恶化随着时间的推移的有形资产不同能力得到了增强，他们是应用和共享。 但能力仍需培育和保护 ； 如果未使用的知识会慢慢淡。 胶绑定已有的业务能力。 他们也是新的业务发展的动力。 不只是由市场的吸引力，可以通过它们，指导的多样化和市场进入模式。

Consider 3M's competence with sticky tape. in dreaming up businesses as diverse as "Post it" notes, magnetic tape, photographic film, pressure sensitive tapes, and coated abrasives, the company has brought to bear widely shared competencies in substrates, coatings, and adhesives and devised various ways to combine them. Indeed, 3M has invested consistently in them. What seems to be an extremely diversified portfolio of businesses belies a few shared core competencies. 考虑用胶带 3m 的能力。 在发布它"备注、 磁带、 摄影电影、 压敏胶带和涂附磨具等不同创业梦想，公司施加在衬底、 涂料和胶粘剂广泛共享的能力，并设计了各种方法，将它们组合。 事实上，在他们一贯投资 3 米。 什么似乎是一个非常多样化的投资组合的企业证明几个共享的核心能力是错误的。

In contrast, there are major companies that have had the potential to build core competencies but failed to do so because top management was unable to conceive of the company as anything other than a collection of discrete businesses. GE sold much of its consumer electronics business to Thomson of France, arguing that it was becoming increasingly difficult to maintain its competitiveness in this sector. That was undoubtedly so, but it is ironic that it sold several key

企业核心竞争力

businesses to competitors who were already competence leaders Black & Decker in small electrical motors, and Thomson, which was eager to build its competence in microelectronics and had learned from the Japanese that a position in consumer electronics was vital to this challenge. 在相反是有可能建立核心能力但没有这样做，因为最高管理层是无法想象的作为一个集合的离散企业以外的任何公司的大公司。 GE 出售其消费电子业务的很多法国汤姆逊争论正在成为越来越难以维持在这一领域的竞争力。 这无疑是这样，但具有讽刺意味的是它售予已经在小电机和汤姆逊急切地想要生成及其在微电子的能力，并已学了从日本消费类电子产品中的一个位置对这一挑战至关重要的能力领导人黑科技德克尔的竞争对手发来的几个关键业务。

Management trapped in the strategic business unit (SBU) mind set almost inevitably finds its individual businesses dependent on external sources for critical components, such as motors or compressors. But these are not just components. They are core products that contribute to the competitiveness of a wide range of end products. They are the physical embodiments of core competencies. 被困在几乎不可避免地设置的战略业务单位 (SBU) 心目中的管理查找其个别企业依赖于外部源如电机或压缩机的关键组件。 但这些都不是公正的组件。 它们有助于广泛的最终产品的竞争力的核心产品。 它们的核心能力的物理体现。

How Not to Think of Competence 如何不思考的能力

Since companies are in a race to build the competencies that determine global leadership, successful companies have stopped imagining themselves as bundles of businesses making products. Canon, Honda, Casio, or NEC may seem to preside over portfolios of businesses unrelated in terms of customers, distribution channels, and merchandising strategy. Indeed, they have portfolios that may seem idiosyncratic at times: NEC is the only global company to be among leaders in computing, telecommunications, and semiconductors and to have a thriving consumer electronics business. 在建立确定全球领导地位的能力的一种比赛是公司成功的公司已停止想象自己作为束生产产品的企业。 佳能、 本田、 卡西欧或 NEC 似乎主持的业务无关的客户、 分销渠道和销售战略的投资组合。 事实上，他们有可能有时似乎特质的组合： NEC 是唯一的全球公司是计算、 电信和半导体的领袖之一，并具有蓬勃发展消费电子业务。

But looks are deceiving. In NEC, digital technology, especially VLSI and systems integration skills, is fundamental. In the core competencies underlying them, disparate businesses become coherent. It is Honda's core competence in engines and power trains that gives it a distinctive advantage in car, motorcycle, lawn mower, and generator businesses. Canon's core competencies in optics, imaging, and microprocessor controls have enabled it to enter, even dominate, markets as seemingly diverse as copiers, laser printers, cameras, and image scanners. Philips worked for more than 15 years to perfect its optical media (laser disc) competence, as did JVC in building a leading position in video recording. Other examples of core competencies might include mechantronics (the ability to marry mechanical and electronic engineering), video displays, bioengineering, and microelectronics. In the early stages of its competence building, Philips could not have imagined all the products that would be spawned by its optical media competence, nor could JVC have anticipated miniature camcorders when it first began exploring videotape technologies. 但看起来是欺骗性。 在 NEC 数字技术特别是集成电路和系统的集成技能，是根本。 在他们的基本的拿手好戏完全不同的企业成为协调一致。 它是为它提供了一个独特的优势，在汽车、 摩托车、 草坪割草机和发电机的企业的本田的核心能力在发动机和电力火车。 佳能的光学、 成像和微处理器的控件中的核心能力，使它进入，甚至是主宰市场，

企业核心竞争力

看起来不同如复印机、 激光打印机、 照相机和图像扫描仪。 飞利浦工作 15 年以上完善职权光介质 （激光光盘） 而合营公司中建立在录像中的领先地位。 核心能力的其他例子可能包括 mechantronics （结婚机械和电子工程的能力）、 视频显示、 生物工程和微电子。 在其能力建设的早期阶段飞利浦不会想到会的职权光介质产生的所有产品也不能合营公司预期微型摄像机第一天就开始探索录像带技术。

Unlike the battle for global brand dominance, which is visible in the world's broadcast and print media and is aimed at building global "share of mind,” the battle to build world class competencies is invisible to people who aren't deliberately looking for it. Top management often tracks the cost and quality of competitors' products, yet how many managers untangle the web of alliances their Japanese competitors have constructed to acquire competencies at low cost? In how many Western boardrooms is there an explicit, shared understanding of the competencies the company must build for world leadership? Indeed, how many senior executives discuss the crucial distinction between competitive strategy at the level of a business and competitive strategy at the level of an entire company? 与不同的是在世界上的广播和打印介质中可见，旨在建设全球"分享的心"的全球品牌优势之战看不到不刻意寻找的人建立世界类能力的战斗。 最高管理层通常用于跟踪成本和质量的竞争对手的产品，但多少经理理清联盟网站日本对手建造获得低成本的能力吗？ 在多少西方会议室有明确、 共享理解能力的公司必须建立世界领导吗？ 事实上，多少高级行政人员讨论业务一级的竞争战略与整个公司一级的竞争战略之间的关键区别？

Let us be clear. Cultivating core competence does not mean outspending rivals on research and development. In 1983, when Canon surpassed Xerox in worldwide unit market share in the copier business, its R&D budget in reprographics was but a small fraction of Xerox's. Over the past 20 years, NEC has spent less on R&D as a percentage of sales than almost all of its American and European competitors. 让我们是清楚的。 培育核心竞争力并不意味着 outspending 研究和发展的竞争对手。 当佳能超过富士施乐在世界范围内的单元的市场份额，复印机业务的 1983 年复印在其研发预算是但施乐的一小部分。 在过去 20 年 NEC 已用了减少对研发的销售比几乎所有的美国和欧洲的竞争对手一个百分比。

Nor does core competence mean shared costs, as when two or more SBUs use a common facility a plant, service facility, or sales force or share a common component. The gains of sharing may be substantial, but the search for shared costs is typically a post hoc effort to rationalize production across existing businesses, not a premeditated effort to build the competencies out of which the businesses themselves grow. 也没有核心竞争力并表示分担的费用，如当两个或多个 SBUs 使用常见的设施一厂、 服务设施或销售力或共享共同的组件。 共享的收益可能会很大，但搜索的分担费用通常是事后努力使生产合理化跨现有业务不是一种有预谋的努力，建立自己的业务增长其中的能力。

Building core competencies is more ambitious and different than integrating vertically, moreover. Managers deciding whether to make or buy will start with end products and look upstream to the efficiencies of the supply chain and downstream toward distribution and customers. They do not take inventory of skills and look forward to applying them in nontraditional ways. (Of course, decisions about competencies do provide a logic for vertical integration. Canon is not particularly integrated in its copier business, except in those aspects of the vertical chain that Support the competencies it regards as critical.) 建立核心能力是更加雄心勃勃和不同于集成垂直，此外。 管理人员决定是否进行或买将开始与结束的产品，并查找分布和客户对上游供应链和下游的效率。 他们不要采取技能清单并期待应用在非传统的方法中。 （的当然决定的能力

企业核心竞争力

并提供一个逻辑的垂直整合。 佳能不是特别被集成在它的复印机业务除了在垂直链的那些支持能力的方面，它认为为关键。)

Identifying Core Competencies And Losing Them 确定核心竞争力与流失对策

At least three tests can be applied to identify core competencies in a company. First, a core competence provides potential access to a wide variety of markets. Competence in display systems, for example, enables a company to participate in such diverse businesses as calculators, miniature TV sets, monitors for laptop computers, and automotive dashboards which is why Casio's entry into the handheld TV market was predictable. Second, a core competence should make a significant contribution to the perceived customer benefits of the end product. Clearly, Honda's engine expertise fills this bill. 至少三个测试可用于确定在一家公司的核心能力。 首先，核心竞争力提供范围广泛的市场潜在访问。 显示系统的能力，例如使一参与该等计算器、 微型电视机、 显示器的便携式计算机和汽车仪表板的各种业务的公司，这就是为什么手持电视市场卡西欧的进入是可以预测。 第二，核心竞争力应作出重大贡献，感知的客户带来的好处的最终产品。 显然，本田发动机专业知识填充此条例草案。

Finally, a core competence should be difficult for competitors to imitate. And it will be difficult if it is a complex harmonization of individual technologies and production skills. A rival might acquire some of the technologies that comprise the core competence, but it will find it more difficult to duplicate the more or less comprehensive pattern of internal coordination and learning. JVC’s decision in the early 1960s to pursue the development of a videotape competence passed the three tests outlined here. RCA’s decision in the late 1970s to develop a stylus based video turntable system did not. 最后，核心竞争力应很难模仿的竞争对手。 如果它是一个复杂的协调，个别的技术和生产技能很难。 一个竞争对手可能会获得一些包括在核心的技术，但它会发现更难以复制的内部协调和学习更多或更少的综合模式。 合营公司的决定，在六十年代初期追求录像带能力的发展在这里通过所概述的三项测试。 在七十年代末开发基于手写笔视频转台系统的 RCA 的决定是没有的。

Few companies are likely to build world leadership in more than five or six fundamental competencies. A company that compiles a list of 20 to 30 capabilities has probably not produced a list of core competencies. Still, it is probably a good discipline to generate a list of this sort and to see aggregate capabilities as building blocks. This tends to prompt the search for licensing deals and alliances through which the company may acquire, at low cost, the missing pieces. 几家公司有可能建立在超过五或六个基本能力的世界领先地位。 一家公司，编译 20 至 30 功能的列表可能不产生了核心能力的列表。 仍然，可能是一个良好的纪律，生成这类的列表，并看到作为构造块的聚合功能。 这往往提示许可证交易和联盟通过该公司可能获得，以低成本丢失的件搜索。

Most Western companies hardly think about competitiveness in these terms at all. It is time to take a tough minded look at the risks they are running. Companies that judge competitiveness, their own and their competitors', primarily in terms of the price/performance of end products are courting the erosion of core competencies – or making too little effort to enhance them. The embedded skills that give rise to the next generation of competitive products cannot be "rented in" by outsourcing and OEM-supply relationships. In our view, too many companies have unwittingly surrendered core competencies when they cut internal investment in what they mistakenly thought were just "cost centers" in favor of outside suppliers. 大部分西方公司很难想想竞争力在本条款中在所有。 现在是时候采取强硬态度的看看他们正在运行的风险。 判断的竞争力，他们自己的公司和其对手的最终产品的价格/性能的主要的条款是求爱的核心

企业核心竞争力

能力 — — 侵蚀或太少努力提高他们。 引起的具有竞争力的产品的下一代的嵌入式的技能不能"租用中"外包和 OEM 供应关系。 在我们的视图中时他们砍什么他们误以为只是"成本中心"的外部供应商的内部投资太多的企业不自觉地有交的核心能力。

Consider Chrysler. Unlike Honda, it has tended to view engines and power trains as simply one more component. Chrysler is becoming increasingly dependent on Mitsubishi and Hyundai: between 1985 and 1987, the number of outsourced engines went from 252,000 to 382,000. It is difficult to imagine Honda yielding manufacturing responsibility, much less design, of so critical a part of a car's function to an outside company which is why Honda has made such an enormous commitment to Formula One auto racing. Honda has been able to pool its engine related technologies; it has parlayed these into a corporate wide competency from which it develops world beating products, despite R&D budgets smaller than those of GM and Toyota. 考虑克莱斯勒。 与本田，不同的是它有倾向于视图引擎和动力火车作为只是一个更多的组件。 克莱斯勒正变得越来越依赖于三菱与现代： 1985年至 1987年外判的引擎数从去 252,000 382,000。 很难想象本田屈服少得多的设计如此重要的一辆车一以外的公司，这就是为什么本田已这样一个巨大的承诺，为 f1 赛车的自动功能部件的制造责任。 本田已能够池其引擎相关技术 ； 它有 parlayed 这些公司的广泛能力，从中得清楚了，尽管研发预算较通用汽车、 丰田的世界心脏不停跳产品。

Of course, it is perfectly possible for a company to have a competitive product line up but be a laggard in developing core competencies at least for a while. If a company wanted to enter the copier business today, it would find a dozen Japanese companies more than willing to supply copiers on the basis of an OEM private label. But when fundamental technologies changed or if its supplier decided to enter the market directly and become a competitor, that company's product line, along with all of its investments in marketing and distribution, could be vulnerable. Outsourcing can provide a shortcut to a more competitive product, but it typically contributes little to building the people embodied skills that are needed to sustain product leadership. 当然，这是完全可能为一家公司，以有竞争力的产品线最多，但会在发展中的大屏核心能力至少一段时间。 如果一家公司想要今天输入复印机业务，它会找出一打日本公司乐意提供一个 OEM 的私人标签的基础上的复印机。 但基本技术问题发生更改时，或如果其供应商决定直接进入市场，成为竞争对手可能受到一起的所有营销和销售，在其投资表示的该公司的产品线。 外包可以提供一个更具竞争力的产品的快捷方式，但它通常有助于少建设人民体现，以保持产品领先地位的技能。

Nor is it possible for a company to have an intelligent alliance or sourcing strategy if it has not made a choice about where it will build competence leadership. Clearly, Japanese companies have benefited from alliances. They've used them to learn from Western partners who were not fully committed to preserving core competencies of their own. As we've argued in these pages before, learning within an alliance takes a positive commitment of resources- travel, a pool of dedicated people, test bed facilities, time to internalize and test what has been learned. A company may not make this effort if it doesn't have clear goals for competence building. 也不可能有智能联盟或采购策略，如果未有一个选择，它将生成能力领导的公司。 显然，日本公司受惠的联盟。 他们用他们学习西方的伙伴而没有完全致力于维护自己的核心竞争力。 我们已经认为在这些页之前，联盟内的学习需要积极的承诺的旅游资源、 一池的专用的人、 测试床设施、 时间内在化和测试已学到什么。 如果它没有明确的目标，进行能力建设，一家公司可作出这种努力。

Another way of losing is forgoing opportunities to establish competencies that are evolving in

企业核心竞争力

existing businesses. In the 1970s and 1980s, many American and European companies like GE, Motorola, GTE, Thom, and GEC chose to exit the color television business, which they regarded as mature. If by "mature" they meant that they had run out of new product ideas at precisely the moment global rivals had targeted the TV business for entry, then yes, the industry was mature. But it certainly wasn't mature in the sense that all opportunities to enhance and apply video based competencies had been exhausted. 失去的另一种方法放弃现有业务的建立不断变化的能力的机会。 七十年代与八十年代成熟了很多美国和欧洲公司，像 GE、 摩托罗拉、 低、 同，和通用选择退出他们视为的颜色电视业务。 如果通过"成熟"他们就意味着他们已经在正是全球竞争对手了有针对性的条目的电视业务的时刻运行出的新产品的想法，然后，业界是成熟。 但肯定不是成熟用尽了所有的机会，提高并应用视频的基于的能力的意义上。 In ridding themselves of their television businesses, these companies failed to distinguish between divesting the business and destroying their video media based competencies. They not only got out of the TV business but they also closed the door on a whole stream of future opportunities reliant on video based competencies. The television industry, considered by many U.S. companies in the 1970s to be unattractive, is today the focus of a fierce public policy debate about the inability of U.S. corporations to benefit from the $20 billion a year opportunity that HDTV will represent in the mid to late 1990s. Ironically, the U.S. government is being asked to fund a massive research project in effect, to compensate U.S. companies for their failure to preserve critical core competencies when they had the chance. 在消除自己的电视业务，未能归属业务和销毁其视频媒体区别这些公司根据能力。 他们不只走出电视业务，但他们也对未来的机会依赖于视频的基于能力的整个流把门关上。 被认为很多美国公司在七十年代是不吸引人的电视业今天是关于美国公司无法从 20 亿元高清晰度电视将会代表在的年机会中获益的激烈的公共政策辩论的焦点，年年中至 1990 年代后期。 讽刺的是，被要求美国政府实际上资金大量研究项目，以补偿他们未能时他们有机会保留关键核心能力的美国公司。 In contrast, one can see a company like Sony reducing its emphasis on VCRs (where it has not been very successful and where Korean companies now threaten), without reducing its commitment to video related competencies. Sony's Betamax led to a debacle. But it emerged with its videotape recording competencies intact and is currently challenging Matsushita in the 8mm camcorder market. 在相反，人们可以看到像索尼公司，而不会降低其视频相关能力的承诺减少重点放在摄像机 （在它不是非常成功和韩国公司现在威胁）。 索尼 Betamax 导致一溃逃时。 但它出现其录像带录制能力保持不变，当前挑战松下 8 毫米便携式摄像机市场。

There are two clear lessons here. First, the costs of losing a core competence can be only partly calculated in advance. The baby may be thrown out with the bath water in divestment decisions. Second, since core competencies are built through a process of continuous improvement and enhancement that may span a decade or longer, a company that has failed to invest in core competence building will find it very difficult to, enter an emerging market, unless, of course, it will be content simply to serve as a distribution channel. 有两个明显的教训。 首先，失去核心竞争力的成本可以仅部分计算提前。 婴儿可能会引发带洗澡水中分拆出售的决定。 第二，由于核心能力构建的持续改进和增强，可能会跨越了十年的过程或再，未能在核心能力建设投资的公司会发现它很难，输入一个新兴的市场除非当然，将内容只是为了作为分销渠道。 American semiconductor companies like Motorola learned this painful lesson when they elected to forgo direct participation in the 256k generation of DRAM chips. Having skipped this round, Motorola, like most of its American competitors, needed a large infusion of technical help from

企业核心竞争力

Japanese partners to rejoin the battle in the 1 megabyte generation. When it comes to core competencies, it is difficult to get off the train, walk to the next station, and then reboard. 他们放弃 DRAM 芯片 256 k 代直接参与选举时，美国半导体公司 （如摩托罗拉学到这个惨痛的教训。 有跳过本轮摩托罗拉，其美国的竞争对手最喜欢所需技术帮助从 1 mb 代重新投入战斗的日本伙伴的大的输液。 以核心能力时很难下车、 步行往下的站，然后 reboard。 From Core Competencies to Core Products. 从核心产品的核心竞争力。

The tangible link between identified core competencies and end products is what we call the core products- the physical embodiments of one or more core competencies. Honda's engines, for example, are core products, linchpins between design and development skills that ultimately lead to a proliferation of end products. Core products are the components or subassemblies that actually contribute to the value of the end products. Thinking in terms of core products forces a company to distinguish between the brand share it achieves in end product markets (for example, 40% of the U.S. refrigerator market) and the manufacturing share it achieves in any particular core product (for example, 5% of the world share of compressor output). 确定的核心能力与最终产品之间的有形联系是我们所说的核心产品-物理的体现形式的一个或多个的核心能力。 本田的引擎设计和开发的技能，最终导致的最终产品的扩散之间的重要支柱的核心产品，例如。 核心产品是组件或确实有助于最终产品的价值的子组件。 核心产品部队的角度思考区分它实现的最终产品市场 （为例的美国冰箱市场的 40%） 的品牌共享和制造份额的公司达到在任何特定的核心产品 （为例的世界共享的压缩机输出的 5%）。

Canon is reputed to have an 84% world manufacturing share in desktop laser printer "engines," even though its brand share in the laser printer business is minuscule. Similarly, Matsushita has a world manufacturing share of about 45% in key VCR components, far in excess of its brandshare (Panasonic, JVC, and others) of 20%. And Matsushita has a commanding core product share in compressors worldwide, estimated at 40%, even though its brand share in both the air conditioning and refrigerator businesses is quite small. 佳能是被誉为有一个共享桌面激光打印机"引擎，"中的 84%世界制造，尽管其在激光打印机业务的品牌占有率是微不足道的。 同样地，松下在关键 VCR 组件大大超过其 brandshare (松下、 合营公司，和其他人） 的 20%的约 45%的世界制造份额。 松下已在全球范围内，估计在 40%的压缩机共享的指挥核心产品，即使在空调和冰箱企业及其品牌共享是很小。

It is essential to make this distinction between core competencies, core products, and end products because global competition is played out by different rules and for different stakes at each level. To build or defend leadership over the long term, a corporation will probably be a winner at each level. At the level of core competence, the goal is to build world leadership in the design and development of a particular class of product functionality be it compact data storage and retrieval, as with Philips's optical media competence, or compactness and ease of use, as with Sony's micromotors and microprocessor controls. 至关重要的是，使这种核心能力、 核心产品和最终产品之间的区别，因为全球竞争发挥不同的规则和不同赌注的每个级别。 若要生成，或长期维护领导公司可能会在每个级别的冠军。 在核心能力的各，目标是建立世界领导在设计和发展的某一类产品的功能是它压缩数据存储和检索，飞利浦的光学媒体能力或压实度和易用性、 与索尼公司的微电机和微处理器控件一样。

To sustain leadership in their chosen core competence areas, these companies seek to maximize their world manufacturing share in core products. The manufacture of core products for a wide variety of external (and internal) customers yields the revenue and market feedback that, at least partly, determines the pace at which core competencies can be enhanced and extended. This

企业核心竞争力

thinking was behind JVC's decision in the mid 1970s to establish VCR supply relationships with leading national consumer electronics companies in Europe and the United States. In supplying Thomson, Thorn, and Telefunken (all independent companies at that time) as well as U.S. partners, JVC was able to gain the cash and the diversity of market experience that ultimately enabled it to outpace Philips and Sony. (Philips developed videotape competencies in parallel with JVC, but it failed to build a worldwide network of OEM relationships that would have allowed it to accelerate the refinement of its videotape competence through the sale of core products.) 若要维持其所选择的核心能力领域的领导，这些公司寻求最大限度地在核心产品世界制造份额。 各种不同的外部和内部客户的核心产品研制产生收入和市场反馈，至少部分用于确定哪些核心可以加强和扩展能力的步伐。 这一思想是合营公司的决定，在 1970 年代中期设立 VCR 提供领先的国家消费电子公司在欧洲和美国的关系。 供应汤姆逊、 刺，和德律风根 （当时的所有独立公司），以及美国伙伴合营公司得以获得现金和市场经验，最终使它超过了菲利浦和索尼的多样性。 （飞利浦开发与合营公司，同时录像带能力但它无法生成的就让它加速通过核心产品销售的录像带权限细化的 OEM 关系的全球网络。

JVC's success has not been lost on Korean compames like Goldstar, Sam Sung, Kia, and Daewoo, who are building core product leadership in areas as diverse as displays, semiconductors, and automotive engines through their OEM supply contracts with Western companies. Their avowed goal is to capture investment initiative away from potential competitors, often U.S. companies. In doing so, they accelerate their competence building efforts while "hollowing out" their competitors. By focusing on competence and embedding it in core products, Asian competitors have built up advantages in component markets first and have then leveraged off their superior products to move downstream to build brand share. And they are not likely to remain the low cost suppliers forever. As their reputation for brand leadership is consolidated, they may well gain price leadership. Honda has proven this with its Acura line, and other Japanese car makers are following suit. 不像金星、 三宋、 起亚和大宇，建筑在显示、 半导体和通过其 OEM 供应合同的汽车发动机等不同的领域领导核心产品与西方公司韩国 compames 上失去了合营公司的成功。 他们宣称的目标是捕获从潜在的竞争者往往美国公司投资倡议。 这样做他们加快建设努力"独木舟"其竞争对手的同时其权限。 能力为重点，并将其嵌入在核心产品亚洲竞争对手第一次建立了组件市场的优势，然后利用其优质的产品，将移动到生成品牌共享的下游关闭。 而且，它们不可能永远保持低成本的供应商。 随着整合了其品牌领导的声誉，他们也可能会获得价格领导。 本田已证明这是与它的极品行和其他汽车制造商效仿。

Control over core products is critical for other reasons. A dominant position in core products allows a company to shape the evolution of applications and end markets. Such compact audio disc related core products as data drives and lasers have enabled Sony and Philips to influence the evolution of the computer peripheral business in optical media storage. As a company multiplies the number of application arenas for its core products, it can consistently reduce the cost, time, and risk in new product development. In short, well targeted core products can lead to economies of scale and scope. 出于其他原因，有关键核心产品的管制。 在核心产品的主导地位使形状应用程序的演变和结束市场的公司。 这种结构紧凑的音频光盘相关核心产品作为数据驱动器和激光器已启用索尼和飞利浦光介质存储计算机外围设备业务的演化的影响。 作为一家公司增加了其核心产品的应用领域的数目可以一直减少成本、 时间和新产品开发中的风险。 在短期目标明确的核心产品可能会导致规模经济和范围。

Two Concepts of the Corporation: 该公司的两个概念：

SBU or Core Competence SBU 或核心竞争力

企业核心竞争力

SBU Core Competence Basis for competition Competitiveness 竞争竞争力 SBU 核心能力基础

of today’s products Interfirm competition to build competencies Corporate structure Portfolio of businesses related in product-market terms Portfolio of competencies, core products, and businesses Status of the business unit Autonomy is sacrosanct; the SBU “owns” all resources other than cash SBU is a potential reservoir of core competencies Resource allocation Discrete businesses are the unit of analysis, capital is allocated business by business Businesses and competencies are the unit of analysis: top management allocates capital and talent Value added of top management Optimizing corporate returns through capital allocation trade-offs among businesses Enunciating strategic architecture and building competencies to secure the future 今天的产品企业的竞争，建立企业结构的相关产品市场方面的能力、 核心产品和企业的业务单元自治地位的企业的能力是神圣不可侵犯 ； 该 SBU"拥有"所有资源以外现金 SBU 是一个潜在的资源分配离散企业的核心能力水库是分析单位、 资本分配业务的商业企业和能力是分析单位： 最高管理层分配资金和人才价值的最高管理层优化公司返回通过业务资金拨付权衡增加 Enunciating 战略体系结构和建立安全的未来的能力

The Tyranny of the SBU 在 SBU 的 Tyranny

The new terms of competitive engagement cannot be understood using analytical tools devised to manage the diversified corporation of 20 years ago, when competition was primarily domestic (GE versus Westinghouse, General Motors versus Ford) and all the key players were speaking the language of the same business schools and consultancies. Old prescriptions have potentially toxic side effects. The need for new principles is most obvious in companies the corporation are summarized in "Two Concepts of the Corporation: SBU or Core Competence.” 不能使用分析工具来管理 20 年前当竞争是主要是国内的多元化的公司制定与西屋 GE 通用汽车与福特） 理解竞争聘用的新条款，主要说这种语言的同一商业学校和咨询。 旧处方有可能有毒副作用。 需要新的原则是最明显中概述了该公司的公司"，公司的两个概念： SBU 或核心竞争力。"

Obviously, diversified corporations have a portfolio of products and a portfolio of businesses. But we believe in a view of the company as a portfolio of competencies as well. U.S. companies do not lack the technical resources to build competencies, but their top management often lacks the vision to build them and the administrative means for assembling resources spread across multiple businesses. A shift in commitment will inevitably influence patterns of diversification, skill deployment, resource allocation priorities, and approaches to alliances and outsourcing. 很明显，多元化的公司有一套的产品和企业的投资组合。 但我们相信，公司的视图中作的能力以及组合。 美国公司做不是缺乏技术的资源建设能力，但其最高管理层通常缺乏远见，建立他们和装配资源分布在多个企业的行政手段。 转而承诺不可避免地会影响模式的多样化、 技能部署、 资源分配的优先事项和联盟和外判的方法。

We have described the three different planes on which battles for global leadership are waged core competence, core products, and end products. A corporation has to know whether it is winning or losing on each plane. By sheer weight of investment, a company might be able to beat its rivals to blue sky technologies yet still lose the race to build core competence leadership. If a company is winning the race to build core competencies (as opposed to building leadership in a few technologies), it will almost certainly outpace rivals in new business development. If a company is winning the race to capture world manufacturing share in core products, it will probably outpace rivals in improving product features and the price/performance ratio. 我们描

企业核心竞争力

述的全球领导地位的战斗是进行的核心竞争力、 核心产品和最终产品的三个不同的平面。 公司已知道它是打赢还是失去每架飞机。 按投资的纯粹的重量，一家公司可能能打败对手为蓝色天空的技术，但仍会失去建立领导核心能力竞赛。 如果一家公司赢得建立核心能力 （相对于建设中几个技术领导) 竞赛，它几乎肯定会超过新业务发展的竞争对手。 如果一家公司赢得竞争的核心产品份额世界制造，它可能会超过竞争对手在改进产品功能和性价比。

Determining whether one is winning or losing end product battles is more difficult because measures of product market share do not necessarily reflect various companies' underlying competitiveness. Indeed, companies that attempt to build market share by relying on the competitiveness of others, rather than investing in core competencies and world core-product leadership, may be treading on quicksand. In the race for global brand dominance, companies like 3M, Black & Decker, Canon, Honda, NEC, and Citicorp have built global brand umbrellas by proliferating products out of their core competencies. This has allowed their individual businesses to build image, customer loyalty, and access to distribution channels. 确定一个是赢得的还是失去最终产品的战斗是更难的因为产品市场占有率的措施并不一定反映各公司基础竞争力。 事实上，尝试生成市场的公司依靠他人，竞争力共享而不投资的核心能力及世界核心产品领导可能踩流沙。 全球品牌优势局竞选的公司 （如 3 米、 黑科技德克尔、 佳能、 本田、 NEC 和花旗的增殖细胞核的产品，其核心能力的建立了全球品牌雨伞。 这使他们建立形象、 客户忠诚度和分销渠道获得的个人业务。

When you think about this reconceptualization of the corporation, the primacy of the SBU an organizational dogma for a generation is now clearly an anachronism. Where the SBU is an article of faith, resistance to the seductions of decentralization can seem heretical. In many companies, the SBU prism means that only one plane of the global competitive battle, the battle to put competitive products on the shelf today, is visible to top management. What are the costs of this distortion? 当你想到此重新法团时，一个组织的教条的一代 SBU 的首要地位现在显然是不合时宜。 在 SBU 有一个信条的权力下放诱惑耐看起来是邪教。 在许多公司中 SBU 棱镜意味着全球竞争场战役战斗今天把架子上的竞争对手的产品，只有一个平面，对于最高管理层是可见的。 这种扭曲行为的成本是什么？

Under investment in Developing Core Competencies and Core Products. When the organization is conceived of as a multiplicity of SBUs, no single business may feel responsible for maintaining a viable position in core products nor be able to justify the investment required to build world leadership in some core competence. In the absence of a more comprehensive view imposed by corporate management, SBU managers will tend to under invest. Recently, companies such as Kodak and Philips have recognized this as a potential problem and have begun searching for new organizational forms that will allow them to develop and manufacture core products for both internal and external customers. 根据发展的核心竞争力和核心产品的投资。 当组织的构想，是繁多的 SBUs 时，没有单一的业务可能觉得负责维持核心产品中的一个可行的位置，也能够证明构建世界领导的一些核心竞争力所需的投资。 如果没有一个更全面的视图所施加的企业管理 SBU 管理人员会根据投资。 最近，如柯达和飞利浦公司承认这是一个潜在的问题，并开始寻找新的组织形式，使他们能够开发和生产的内部和外部客户的核心产品。 SBU managers have traditionally conceived of competitors in the same way they've seen themselves. On the whole, they've failed to note the emphasis Asian competitors were placing on building leadership in core products or to understand the critical linkage between world manufacturing leadership and the ability to sustain development pace core competence. They've

企业核心竞争力

failed to pursue OEM supply opportunities or to look across their various product divisions in an attempt to identify opportunities for coordinated initiatives. SBU 经理传统上有相同的方式，他们已看到自己的竞争对手构思。 整体上他们已经没有注意到亚洲竞争对手放在建设中的核心产品领导的重视，或了解世界制造领导和维持发展步伐核心竞争力的能力之间的重要联系。 他们已经没有追求 OEM 供应机会，或试图确定协调的主动行动的机会看跨其各种产品部门。

Imprisoned Resources. As an SBU evolves, it often develops unique competencies. Typically, the people who embody this competence are seen as the sole property of the business in which they grew up. The manager of another SBU who asks to borrow talented people is likely to get a cold rebuff. SBU managers are not only unwilling to lend their competence carriers but they may actually hide talent to prevent its redeployment in the pursuit of new opportunities. This may be compared to residents of an underdeveloped country hiding most of their cash under their mattresses. The benefits of competencies, like the benefits of the money supply, depend on the velocity of their circulation as well as on the size of the stock the company holds. 被监禁的资源。 一个 SBU 随着它往往开发独特的能力。 通常，体现了这种能力的人被视为他们长大了的业务的专有财产。 另一个 SBU 经理询问借有天赋的人很容易冷的钉子。 SBU 经理人不仅不肯借给他们能力运营商，但他们实际上可能会隐藏人才来防止其重新部署，在追求新的机会。 这可比作一个隐藏其床垫下其现金最不发达国家的居民。 像在银根的好处的能力的好处取决于其循环的速度，以及公司持有的股票的大小。

Western companies have traditionally had an advantage in the stock of skills they possess. But, have they been able to reconfigure them quickly to respond to new opportunities? Canon, NEC, and Honda have had a lesser stock of the people and technologies that compose core competencies but could move them much quicker from one business unit to another. Corporate R&D spending at Canon is not fully indicative of the size of Canon's core competence stock and tells the casual observer nothing about the velocity with which Canon is able to move core competencies to exploit opportunities. 西方公司传统上有优势的技能，他们所拥有的股票。 但他们已经能够重新配置他们迅速回应新的机会吗？ 佳能、 NEC 和本田有较小的人和技术，撰写的核心能力但可以动得更快地从一个业务单位为另一种股票。 佳能公司研发开支不充分表明佳能的核心能力股票的大小，什么也不告诉临时观察员，关于佳能是能够移动核心能力利用机会的速度。

When competencies become imprisoned, the people who carry the competencies do not get assigned to the most exciting opportunities, and their skills begin to atrophy. Only by fully leveraging core competencies can small companies like Canon afford to compete with industry giants like Xerox. How strange that SBU managers, who are perfectly willing to compete for cash in the capital budgeting process, are unwilling to compete for people the company's most precious asset. We find it ironic that top management devotes so much attention to the capital budgeting process yet typically has no comparable mechanism for allocating the human skills that embody core competencies. Top managers are seldom able to look four or five levels down into the organization, identify the people who embody critical competencies, and move them across organizational I boundaries. 当能力成为被监禁时，执行能力的人做不获取分配给最令人兴奋的机会，和他们的技能开始萎缩。 只有通过充分利用核心能力像佳能小公司能够像富士施乐行业巨头与竞争。 如何很奇怪那些很愿意争夺资本预算过程中的现金的 SBU 经理不愿意人公司争夺的最宝贵的资产。 我们觉得很讽刺的是最高管理层这么多关注资本预算过程，但通常有没有可比的机制，用于分配人类体现的核心能力的技巧。 高层管理人员很少能看

企业核心竞争力

四个或五个级别不起到组织、 标识体现关键能力的人和跨越组织我的边界。

Bounded Innovation. If core competencies are not recognized, individual SBUs will pursue only those innovation opportunities that are close at hand marginal product line extensions or geographic expansions. Hybrid opportunities like fax machines, laptop computers, hand held televisions, or portable music keyboards will emerge only when managers take off their SBU blinkers. Remember, Canon appeared to be in the camera business at the time it was preparing to become a world leader in copiers. Conceiving of the corporation in terms of core competencies widens the domain of innovation. 有界的创新。 如果不能识别的核心能力个别 SBUs 将追求只是在附近边际产品线扩展或地理扩展这些创新机会。 混合机会喜欢传真机、 便携式计算机、 手提电视机或便携式音乐键盘在他们 SBU 眼罩经理起飞时，才会出现。 请记住佳能，似乎在它准备成为全球领先的复印机的时间是在相机业务。 构想的核心能力的公司扩大了创新的域。

Developing Strategic Architecture 发展战略体系结构

The fragmentation of core competencies becomes inevitable when a diversified company's information systems, patterns of communication, career paths, managerial rewards, and processes of strategy development do not transcend SBU lines. We believe that senior management should spend a significant amount of its time developing a corporatewide strategic architecture that establishes objectives for competence building. A strategic architecture is a road map of the future that identifies which core competencies to build and their constituent technologies. 多元化的公司的信息系统、 通信、 职业发展、 管理奖励和战略发展过程的模式不会超越 SBU 行时，不可避免的核心能力的碎片。 我们相信，高级管理层应花了大量的时间发展 corporatewide 的战略体系结构建立能力建设的目标。 战略体系结构是标识生成和其组成的技术的核心能力的未来的路线图。

By providing an impetus for learning from alliances and a focus for internal development efforts, a strategic architecture like NEC’s C&C can dramatically reduce the investment needed to secure future market leadership. How can a company make partnerships intelligently without a clear understanding of the core competencies it is trying to build and those it is attempting to prevent from being unintentionally transferred? 通过提供从联盟和内部发展努力的重点学习的动力，像 NEC 的-科技的战略体系结构可以大大减少需要确保未来的市场领导地位的投资。 一家公司如何可以智能地不清楚它尝试生成的核心能力和那些试图防止无意中传输的伙伴关系？

Of course, all of this begs the question of what a strategic architecture should look like. The answer will be different for every company. But it is helpful to think again of that tree, of the corporation organized around core products and, ultimately core competencies. To sink sufficiently strong roots, a company must answer some fundamental questions: How long could we preserve our competitiveness in this business if we did not control this particular core competence? How central is this core competence to perceived customer benefits? What future opportunities would be foreclosed if we were to lose this particular competence? 当然，所有这一切都恳求问题的一种战略体系结构应该是什么样子。 答案是每个公司的不同。 但再想一想这树围绕核心产品的法团的并最终核心能力很有帮助。 若要沉足够有力的根，一家公司必须回答一些基本问题： 多长时间可以我们维持我们的竞争力在这项生意如果我们不能控制此特定的核心竞争力？ 如何中央是感知的客户带来的好处，此核心竞争力？ 如果我们失去这种特定的能力，将排除什么未来的机会？

The architecture provides a logic for product and market diversification, moreover. An SBU

企业核心竞争力

manager would be asked: Does the new market opportunity add to the overall goal of becoming the best player in the world? Does it exploit or add to the core competence? At Vickers, for example, diversification options have been judged in the context of becoming the best power and motion control company in the world (see the insert "Vickers Learns the Value of Strategic Architecture").体系结构此外产品和市场多样化提供一个逻辑。 一个 SBU 经理会问： 不能添加成为世界上最好的球员的整体目标的新的市场机会吗？ 它不会利用或将添加到核心竞争力吗？ 在维氏，，例如多样化的选项已被判断成为最佳的电源和运动控制公司在世界范围内 （请参见插入"维氏学价值的战略建筑"）。

The strategic architecture should make resource allocation priorities transparent to the entire organization. It provides a template for allocation decisions by top management. It helps lower level managers understand the logic of allocation priorities and disciplines senior management to maintain consistency. In short, it yields a definition of the company and the markets it serves. 3M, Vickers, NEC, Canon, and Honda all qualify on this score. Honda knew it was exploiting what it had learned from motorcycles how to make high revving, smooth running, lightweight engines when it entered the car business. The task of creating a strategic architecture forces the organization to identify and commit to the technical and production linkages across SBUs that will provide a distinct competitive advantage. 战略体系结构应使资源分配的优先事项透明到整个组织。 它提供了一个模板分配决定的最高管理层。 它有助于了解分配的优先事项和学科高级管理层以保持一致性的逻辑的较低级别管理人员。 在短它会生成一个定义的公司，它的市场。 3 米、 维氏、 NEC、 佳能和本田所有合格的这个分数。 本田知道它利用它已经从中学到什么摩托车如何使高转速、 运行平稳、 轻量级引擎输入汽车业务时。 创建一个战略体系结构的任务强制标识并承诺技术和生产的联系将提供显著的竞争优势的 SBUs 跨组织。

It is consistency of resource allocation and the development of an administrative infrastructure appropriate to it that breathes life into a strategic architecture and creates a managerial culture, teamwork, a capacity to change, and a willingness to share resources, to protect proprietary skills, and to think long term. That is also the reason the specific architecture cannot be copied easily or overnight by competitors. Strategic architecture is a tool for communicating with customers and other external constituents. It reveals the broad direction without giving away every step. 它是一致性的资源分配和适当给它一个行政基建，呼吸到战略体系结构的生命并创建管理文化、 团队精神、 有能力改变，愿意共享资源保护专有技能，并认为长期发展。 这也是特定的体系结构不能复制轻松地或一夜之间的竞争对手的原因。 战略体系结构是一种工具用于与客户和其他外部的成分进行通信。 它揭示大方向不让走每一步。

Redeploying to Exploit Competencies 重新部署到开发能力

If the company's core competencies are its critical resource and if top management must ensure that competence carriers are not held hostage by some particular business, then it follows that SBUs should bid for core competencies in the same way they bid for capital. We've made this point glancingly. It is important enough to consider more deeply. 如果公司的核心竞争力是非常重要的资源，并最高管理层必须确保能力承运人不由某些特定的业务持有人质然后因此，SBUs 应以相同的方式，他们竞投资本竞投的核心能力。 我们 glancingly 了这一点。 它是重要的是更深入地考虑。

Once top management (with the help of divisional and SBU managers) has identified overarching competencies, it must ask businesses to identify the projects and people closely connected with them. Corporate officers should direct an audit of the location, number, and quality of the people

企业核心竞争力

who embody competence. 一旦最高管理层 （与部门的帮助和 SBU 经理），确定了总体能力，它必须要求企业以确定项目和与他们有密切的人。 公司的人员应指示位置、 数量和体现能力的人的质量的审核。

This sends an important signal to middle managers: core competencies are corporate resources and may be reallocated by corporate management. An individual business doesn't own anybody. SBUs are entitled to the services of individual employees so long as it is pursuing yields the highest possible pay off on the investment in their skills. This message is further underlined if each year in the strategic planning or budgeting process, unit managers must justify their hold on the people who carry the company's core competencies. 将一个重要的信号发送给中层管理人员： 核心能力是公司的资源，可由公司管理层重新分配。 一个单独的业务不会自己的任何人。 SBUs 有权个别雇员的服务，只要它追求的产量最高可能还清对投资的他们的技能。 此消息进一步强调指出，如果每年战略规划或预算编制过程中单位管理人员必须证明他们坚持执行公司的核心能力的人。

Elements of Canon's core competence in optics are spread across businesses as diverse as cameras, copiers, and semiconductor lithographic equipment and are shown in "Core Competencies at Canon.” When Canon identified an opportunity in digital laser printers, it gave SBU managers the right to raid other SBUS to pull together the required pool of talent. When Canon's reprographics products division undertook to develop microprocessor-controlled copiers, it turned to the photo products group, which had developed the world's first microprocessor controlled camera. 佳能的核心竞争力在光学中的元素分布在照相机、 复印机和半导体制版设备等不同的企业和所示"在佳能的核心竞争力"。 佳能在确定数字激光打印机中的机会它给予 SBU 管理人员搜查其他 SBUS 一起拉人才的需要的池的权利。 当佳能的复印产品部门着手开发微机控制复印机时，结果到了世界上第一个微处理器控制摄像机的照片产品组。 Also, reward systems that focus only on product line results and career paths that seldom cross SBU boundaries engender patterns of behavior among unit managers that are destructively competitive. At NEC, divisional managers come together to identify next generation competencies. Together they decide how much investment needs to be made to build up each future competency and the contribution in capital and staff support that each division will need to make. There is also a sense of equitable exchange. One division may make a disproportionate contribution or may benefit less from the progress made, but such short term inequalities will balance out over the long term. 此外，只侧重于产品线结果和很少跨越 SBU 边界的职业发展道路的奖励系统产生破坏性具竞争力的单位管理人员之间的行为的模式。 NEC，部门经理一起找出下一代的能力。 一起他们决定多少投资需要对其进行建立的每个未来的能力和在资本和工作人员的支持，每个分部将需要进行的贡献。 也是交流的一种公平。 一个司可能作出不成比例的贡献或可获益少，进展，但长远来看将平衡这种短期内不平等。

Incidentally, the positive contribution of the SBU manager should be made visible across the company. An SBU manager is unlikely to surrender key people if only the other business (or the general manager of that business who may be a competitor for promotion) is going to benefit from the redeployment. Cooperative SBU managers should be celebrated as team players. Where priorities are clear, transfers are less likely to be seen as idiosyncratic and politically motivated. 顺便提一句，SBU 经理所作的积极贡献应可见整个公司。 一个 SBU 经理不投降的关键人物，如果只其他的业务 （或总经理该业务可能促进竞争对手的人） 将受益于重新部署。 合作 SBU 管理人员应作为团队的球员庆祝。 有明确的优先事项，转让不太可能被视为特质和政治动机。

企业核心竞争力

Transfers for the sake of building core competence must be recorded and appreciated in the corporate memory. It is reasonable to expect a business that has surrendered core skills on behalf of corporate opportunities in other areas to lose, for a time, some of its competitiveness. If these losses in performance bring immediate censure, SBUs will be unlikely to assent to skills transfers next time. 转让，为了建立核心竞争力必须记录和公司的内存中表示赞赏。 它是合理的期望已失去一次其竞争力的一些其他地区企业机会的名义移交的核心技能的业务。 如果这些损失性能带立即谴责，SBUs 将可能同意技能转移到下一次。

Finally, there are ways to wean key employees off the idea that they belong in perpetuity to any particular business. Early in their careers, people may be exposed to a variety of businesses through a carefully planned rotation program. At Canon, critical people move regularly between the camera business and the copier business and between the copier business and the professional optical products business. In midcareer, periodic assignments to cross divisional project teams may be necessary both for diffusing core competencies and for loosening the bonds that might tie an individual to one business even when brighter opportunities beckon elsewhere. Those who embody critical core competencies should know that their careers are tracked and guided by corporate human resource professionals. In the early 1980s at Canon, all engineers under 30 were invited to apply for membership on a seven person committee that was to spend two years plotting Canon's future direction, including its strategic architecture. 最后，有小儿关闭他们属于永久任何特定的业务理念核心员工的方法。 在他们的职业生涯早期人可能会接触到各种精心规划的旋转程序通过业务。 佳能，在关键的人定期移动相机业务及复印机业务以及复印机商业与专业光学产品业务。 在 midcareer，定期的分配，以跨部门的项目团队在地理位置上可能需要传播的核心能力和松动可能配合一个人在一个业务，即使在明亮的机会招手其他地方的债券。 体现的关键核心能力的人应该知道自己的事业是跟踪和指导企业人力资源专业人员。 于八十年代初期，在佳能所有工程师 30 获邀申请，是要花两年绘制佳能的未来方向的七人委员会的成员包括其战略的体系结构。

Competence carriers should be regularly brought together from across the corporation to trade notes and ideas. The goal is to build a strong feeling of community among these people. To a great extent, their loyalty should be to the integrity of the core competence area they represent and not just to particular businesses. In traveling regularly, talking frequently to customers, and meeting with peers, competence carriers may be encouraged to discover new market opportunities. 能力承运人应定期一起从跨公司贸易说明和想法。 目标是社会的建立一个强烈的感觉的这些人之间。 一个很大的程度上，他们的忠诚应该是他们所代表的核心能力方面的完整性，并不只是特定的业务。 在定期旅行，经常交谈的客户，并与同行，满足能力载体可鼓励发现新的市场机会。

Core competencies are the wellspring of new business development. They should constitute the focus for strategy at the corporate level. Managers have to win manufacturing leadership in core products and capture global share through brand building programs aimed at exploiting economies of scope. Only if the company is conceived of as a hierarchy of core competencies, core products, and market focused business units will it be fit to fight. 新业务发展的箱底的核心能力。 他们应该是在企业层面战略的重点。 管理人员必须赢得制造领导核心产品和品牌建设程序通过全球份额旨在开发范围经济的捕获。 仅当为核心能力、 核心产品和市场重点业务单位层次结构的构想是，公司将适当的打击。

Nor can top management be just another layer of accounting consolidation, which it often is in a regime of radical decentralization. Top management must add value by enunciating the strategic

企业核心竞争力

architecture that guides the competence acquisition process. We believe an obsession with competence building will characterize the global winners of the 1990s. With the decade underway, the time for rethinking the concept of the corporation is already overdue. 也不能最高管理层，它通常是激进的权力下放的制度中的会计整合只是另一层。 最高管理层必须通过阐述指导能力习得过程的战略体系结构添加值。 我们相信能力建设的迷恋将描述在 1990 年代的全球得奖者。 在十年进行，为法团的概念的再思考时间已过期。

Vickers Looms the Value of Strategic Architecture 维氏织机战略体系结构的价值

The idea that top management should develop a corporate strategy for acquiring and deploying core competencies is relatively new in most U.S. companies. There are a few exceptions. An early convert was Trinova (previously Libbey Owens Ford), a Toledo based corporation, which enjoys a worldwide position in power and motion controls and engineered plastics. One of its major divisions is Vickers, a premier supplier of hydraulics components like valves, pumps, actuators, and filtration devices to aerospace, marine, defense, automotive, earth moving, and industrial markets. 最高管理层应发展取得和部署的核心能力的企业战略的想法是大多数美国公司在较新的。 有一些例外情况。 早期的转换是 Trinova （以前 Libbey 欧文斯福特) 的电源和运动的控件中的全球地位和工程塑料的一个基于托莱多法团。 维氏总理像阀门、 泵、 执行机构和航空航天、 船舶、 防御，汽车、 地球移动，和工业市场的过滤装置的液压系统组件供应商是其主要的部门之一。

Vickers saw the potential for a transformation of its traditional business with the application of electronics disciplines in combination with its traditional technologies. The goal was "to ensure that change in technology does not displace Vickers from its customers.” This, to be sure, was initially a defensive move: Vickers recognized that unless it acquired new skills, it could not protect existing markets or capitalize on new growth opportunities. Managers at Vickers attempted to conceptualize the likely evolution of (a) technologies relevant to the power and motion control business, (b) functionalities that would satisfy emerging customer needs, and (c) new competencies needed to creatively manage the marriage of technology and customer needs. 维氏看见其传统的业务与电子学科及其传统技术结合的应用程序的转换的潜力。 目标是"以确保其客户从技术改变不会取代维氏。 这，以确保最初是防御性的一步： 维氏承认除非它获得新技能，它无法保护现有市场或利用新的增长机会。 维氏管理人员试图概念化可能演变的 (a) 有关电源和运动控制业务，(b) 功能以满足新出现的客户需要和 (c) 新的能力，创造性地管理技术和客户需求的婚姻所需的技术。

Despite pressure for short term earnings, top management looked to a 10 to 15 year time horizon in developing a map of emerging customer needs, changing technologies, and the core competencies that would be necessary to bridge the gap between the two. Its slogan was "Into the 21st Century." (A simplified version of the overall architecture developed is shown here.) 尽管短期收益的压力最高管理层期望在发展新出现的更改科技有必要两者之间的差距的核心能力的客户需求的地图的 10 至 15 年时间范围。 它的口号是"到了 21 世纪。 （开发的总的体系结构的简化的版本是显示在这里。

Vickers is currently in fluid power components. The architecture identifies two additional competencies, electric power components and electronic controls. A systems integration capability that would unite hardware, software, and service was also targeted for development. 流体传动组件当前维氏。 体系结构标识两个额外的能力、 电力组件和电子控制。 此外为发展目标是将团结起来的硬件、 软件和服务的系统集成能力。

The strategic architecture, as illustrated by the Vickers example, is not a forecast of specific

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