外文翻译--公司治理对资本结构和企业价值关系的影响

外文文献翻译译文

一、外文原文 原文：

The influence of corporate governance on the relation between

capital structure and value

Capital structure: relation with corporate value and main research streams When looking at the most important theoretical contributions on the relation between capital structure and value, as illustrated in Figure 1, it becomes immediately evident that there is a substantial difference between the early theories and the more recent ones.

Modigliani and Miller (1958), who had originally asserted that there was no relationship between capital structure and value ; in 1963, instead, reached the paradoxical and provocative conclusion that a maximum level of debt would mean a maximum level of firm value, due to the fact that interest is tax deductible . Many later contributions pointed out that this effect is compensated when considering personal taxes (Miller, 1977),an eventual lack of tax capacity, due to the presence of economic loss, the effect of other types of tax shields (De Angelo and Masulis, 1980), as well as the introduction of the costs(direct and indirect) of financial distress; all these situations end up creating a trade-off between debt costs and benefits. Point L? in Figure 1c indicates an optimal level of debt,beyond which any rise in leverage would cause an increase in the benefits of debt that would be less than proportional with respect to the costs of financial distress. Furthermore, this non monotonic relation would be modified even more when considering agency costs as well as the costs of financial distress . Finally, one last stream of research (Myers, 1984,Myers 1984) points out managerial preferences when choosing financing resources . In this case no optimal level of debt becomes ??objectively?? evident, but this is due to the various situations the manager had to deal with over time. The function of managerial

preference has particular relevance due to information asymmetries, therefore the level of firm indebtedness will be determined by the tangent between the firm value function and the curve of manager indifference.

Furthermore, it can be observed that debt increases in correspondence with the better the firm?s reputation is on the market (Chevalier, 1995). Research has shown similarities between firms that belong to the same sector (Titman and Wessels, 1988); in other words, capital structure tends to be industry-specific.

The empirical comparison between the trade-off theory and the pecking order theory seems to be controversial. On one hand, empirical evidence shows moderate coherence with the trade-off theory, when revenue and agency problems are taken into consideration contextually; on the other hand, the negative relation between leverage and firm profit does not seem to support the trade-off theory, as it confirms a hierarchical order in financial decision making.

It is, thus, clear that the topic of capital structure is anything but defined and that there are still many open problems regarding it.

As many authors have noted (Rajan and Zingales, 1995) capital structure is a ??hot?? topic in finance. By analyzing international literature the main research priorities and new analytical approaches are related to:the important comparison between ??rational?? and ??behavioural?? finance (Barberis and Thaler, 2002);a lively comparison made between the pecking order theory and the trade-off theory(Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999);the attempt to apply these theories to small firms (Berger and Udell, 1998, Fluck, 2001);the role of corporate governance on the relation between capital structure and value(Heinrich, 2000, Bhagat and Jefferis, 2002, Brailsford et al., 2004, Mahrt-Smith, 2005).

The behavioural approach, that considers the pecking order of financial resources in terms of ??irrational?? preferences, caused an immediate reaction from Stewart Myers in 2000 and 2001 and jointly with Shyam-Sunder in 1999 (Myers, 2000; 2001; Shyam-Sunder and Myers,1999). Stewart Myers is the founder of the pecking order theory[7]. Problems of information asymmetry, together with transaction costs, would be able to offer a rational explanation to managerial behaviour when financial choices

are made following a hierarchical order (Fama and French, 2002). In other words, according to Myers and Fama, there should be a??rational?? explanation to the phenomenon observed by Stein, Baker, Wrugler, Barberis and Thaler.

Moreover, studies on capital structure have also been done looking at small and medium size firms (Berger and Udell, 1998, Michaelas et al., 1999, Romano et al., 2000, Fluck, 2001),due to the relevant economic role of these firms (in Europe they are 95 percent of the total firms operating). Zingales (2000) as well has emphasized the fact that today ?? . . . the attention shown towards large firms tends to partially obscure firms that do not have access to the financial markets . . . ??. In one of the most interesting studies done on this topic, Berger and Udell (1998) asserted that firm financial behaviour depends on what phase of their life cycle they are in. In fact, there should be an optimal pro-tempore capital structure, related to the phase of the life cycle that the firm is in.

Finally, the observations of Michael Jensen (1986), made throughout his many contributions on corporate governance, as well as those of Williamson (1988), have encouraged a line of research that, revitalized in the second part of the nineties, seems to be quite promising as a means to analyze how corporate governance directly or indirectly influences the relation between capital structure and value (Fluck, 1998, Zhang, 1998, Myers, 2000, De Jong, 2002,Berger and Patti, 2003, Brailsford et al., 2004, Mahrt-Smith, 2005). In synthesis, it is possible to affirm, as it follows, that a joined analysis of capital structure and corporate governance is necessary when describing and interpreting the firm?s ability to create value (Zingales, 2000, Heinrich, 2000, Bhagat and Jefferis, 2002). This type of consideration could help overcome the controversy found when studying the relation between capital structure and value, on both a theoretical and empirical level.

Influence of corporate governance on the relation between capital structure and value.

Capital structure can be analyzed by looking at the rights and attributes that characterize the firm?s assets and that influence, with different levels of intensity, governance activities. Equity and debt, therefore, must be considered as both financial

instruments and corporate governance instruments (Williamson, 1988): debt subordinates governance activities to stricter management, while equity allows for greater flexibility and decision making power. It can thus be inferred that when capital structure becomes an instrument of corporate governance, not only the mix between debt and equity and their well known consequences as far as taxes go must be taken into consideration. The way in which cash flow is allocated (cash flow right) and, even more importantly, how the right to make decisions and manage the firm (voting rights) is dealt with must also be examined. For example, venture capitalists are particularly sensitive to how capital structure and financing contracts are laid out, so that an optimal corporate governance can be guaranteed while incentives and checks for management behavior are well established (Zingales, 2000)[10].

Coase (1991), in a sort of critique on his own work done in 1937, points out that it is important to pay more attention to the role of capital structure as an instrument that can mediate and moderate economical transactions within the firm and, consequently, between entrepreneurs and other stakeholders (corporate governance relations).

As explicitly pointed out by Bhagat and Jefferis (2002), when they pay particular attention to the relations between cause and effect and to their interactions recently described on a theoretical level (Fluck, 1998, Zhang, 1998, Heinrich, 2000, Brailsford et al., 2004,Mahrt-Smith, 2005), a ??research proposal?? that future empirical studies should evaluate should be, how corporate governance can potentially have a relevant influence on the relation between capital structure and value, with an effect of mediation and/or moderation.

The five relations identified in Figure 2 describe:the relation between capital structure and firm value (relation A) through a role of corporate governance ??mediation?? ; the relation between capital structure and firm value (relation A) through the role of capital governance ??moderation?? (relation D);the role of corporate governance as a determining factor in choices regarding capital structure (relation E).

All five relations shown in Figure 2 are particularly interesting and show two threads of research that focus on the relations between:corporate governance and

capital structure, where the dimensions of the corporate governance determine firmfinancing choices, causing a possible relation of co-causation Whether management voluntarily chooses to use debt as a source of financing to reduce problems of information asymmetry and transaction, maximizing the efficiency of its firm governance decisions, or the increase in the debt level is forced by the stockholders as an instrument to discipline behavior and assure good corporate governance, capital structure is influenced by corporate governance (relation E) and vice versa (relation B).

On one hand, a change in how debt and equity are dealt with influences firm governance activities by modifying the structure of incentives and managerial control. If, through the mix debt and equity, different categories of investors all converge within the firm, where they have different types of influence on governance decisions, then managers will tend to have preferences when determining how one of these categories will prevail when defining the firm?s capital structure. Even more importantly, through a specific design of debt contracts and equity it is possible to considerably increase firm governance efficiency.

On the other hand, even corporate governance influences choices regarding capital structure (relation E). Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) show how firmfinancing choices are made by management following an order of preference; in this case, if the manager chooses the financing resources it can be presumed that she is avoiding a reduction of her decision making power by accepting the discipline represented by debt.Internal resource financing allows management to prevent other subjects from intervening in their decision making processes. De Jong (2002) reveals how in the Netherlands managers try to avoid using debt so that their decision making power remains unchecked. Zwiebel(1996) has observed that managers don?t voluntarily accept the ??discipline?? of debt; other governance mechanisms impose that debt is issued. Jensen (1986) noted that decisions to increase firm debt are voluntarily made by management when it intends to ??reassure??stakeholders that its governance decisions are ??proper??.

In this light, firm financing decisions can be strictly deliberated by

managers-entrepreneurs or else can be induced by specific situations that go beyond the will of the management.

Conclusion

This paper define a theoretical approach that can contribute in clearing up the relation between capital structure, corporate governance and value, while they also promote a more precise design for empirical research. Capital structure represents one of many instruments that can preserve corporate governance efficiency and protect its ability to create value.Therefore, this thread of research affirms that if investment policies allow for value creation,financing policies, together with other governance instruments, can assure that investment policies are carried out efficiently while firm value is protected from opportunistic behavior.

In other words, various authors (Borsch-Supan and Koke, 2000, Bhagat and Jefferis, 2002 and Berger and Patti, 2003) point out the necessity to analyze the relation between capital structure and value by always taking into consideration the interaction between corporate governance variables such as ownership concentration, management participation in the equity capital, the composition of the Board of Directors, etc.

Furthermore, there is a problem in the way to operationalize these constructs, due to multidimensional nature of these. It is quite difficult to identify indicators that perfectly correspond to theoretical constructs; it means that proxy variables, or empirical measures of latent constructs, must be used (Corbetta, 1992).

Moreover, it must be considered possible that there may be distortions in the signs and entities of the connections between variables due to endogeneity problems, or rather the presence of co-variation even when there is no cause, and reciprocal cause, where the distinction between the cause variable and the effect variable are lacking, and the two reciprocally influence each other.

From an econometric point of view, therefore, it would seem to be important to further investigate the research proposal outlined above, by empirically examining the model proposed in Figure 2 using appropriate econometric techniques that can handle the complexity of the relations between the elements studied. Some proposals for

study can be found in literature; the use of lagged variables is criticized by Borsch-Supan and Koke(2000) that affirm that it would be better to determine instrumental variables that influence only one of the two elements of study; Berger and Patti (2003), Borsch-Supan and Koke(2000) and Chen and Steiner (1999) promote the application of structural model equations to solve these problems, that is a method appropriate for examining the causal relations between latent, one-dimensional or multi-dimensional variables, measured with multiple indicators (Corbetta, 1992).

In conclusion, this paper defines a theoretical model that contributes to clarifying the relations between capital structure, corporate governance and firm value, while promoting,as an aim for future research, a verification of the validity of this model through application of the analysis to a wide sample of firms and to single firms. To study the interaction between capital structure, corporate governance and value when analyzing a wide sample of firms,the researcher has to take into account the relations showed in Figure 2, look at problems of endogeneity and reciprocal causality, and make sure there is complementarity between all the three factors. Such an analysis deserves the application of refined econometric techniques. Moreover, these relations should be investigated in a cross-country analysis, to catch the role of country-specific factors.

Source: Maurizio La Rocca,2007 “The influence of corporate governance on the relation

between

capital

structure

and

value”.

corporate

gorernance,vol.7,no.3april,pp.312-325.

二、翻译文章 译文：

公司治理对资本结构和企业价值关系的影响

资本结构: 关系到公司价值及其主要研究趋向

当查看关于描述资本结构与企业价值两者之间总体关系的最重要的理论文献时，会明显感觉到早期的理论与新近的理论有实质性的不同。

莫迪里亚尼和米勒(1958年),宣称原本资本结构与价值没有关系的理论者，在1963年得出了与此前自相矛盾的结论,最大程度的债务由于可以申请扣减税项将意味着公司的价值的最大化。很多晚期的文献中指出了这种效果是在考虑补偿个人所得税(米勒,1977),但是由于最终缺少付税能力,以及增进直接或间接的财务危机成本使得最终由于债务资金成本的增加，导致利润的减少。表明了一个最理想水平的债务,由于财务杠杆的增加将导致债务的增长。此外,这个非单调的关系会被修改甚至考虑了代理金融灾难成本。最后,还有研究(麦尔斯,梅尔斯1984年)指出管理偏好在于融资资源的选择。在这种情况下没有最理想客观的水平债务,但这是由于不同的情形而使得经营者不得不这样处理。功能管理的偏好由于特定的相关信息不对称,所以对企业债务水平的切线将会由企业之间的价值功能和管理曲线相切而成。

此外，我们可以观察到，在市场中，企业的债务增加和企业的声誉变好是一致的。研究表明，公司之间的相似在相同的部门，换句话说，资本结构是趋于特定行业的。

实证证明交换理论和顺序理论是有争议的。一方面，研究显示，一贯稳定的交换理论允许考虑收入与代理问题。另外一方面，公司的利润与财务杠杆的负面影响，似乎并没有支持交换理论，因为他在确定财务决策了有了等级的秩序。

这也因此清楚地表明，资本结构除了定义呀还有好多值得研究的话题。 许多作者所著的文献,如拉詹(1995)的资本结构理论是一种“热”的金融话题。通过国际文献的主要研究重点和新的分析方法涉及到：比较重要的“理性行为金融”是一个顺序理论和交换理论(Shyam-Sunder和梅耶,1999),我试图把这些理论运用到中小公司和大公司的治理，最终体现出资本结构与价值的关系。

行为方法认为顺序金融资源的偏好“非理性”条款,造成了斯图尔特在2000年和2001年会同Shyam-Sunder提出在1999年所做出的反映，斯图尔特是顺序融资理论的创始人之一。信息不对称结合交易成本,将提供一个合理的解释，财务管理行为做出选择是分等级的。换句话说,根据梅尔斯的理论,应该有一种“理性”所观测到现象的解释。

此外,有些学者研究过中小企业资本结构的理论(柏格与Udell,1998,Michaelas等,1999,2000年,罗马Fluck等)后发现,由于这些公司有关经济的作用(在欧洲,他们是95%的总数公司经营)，现在强调的是“?这种关注表明大型企业将趋向那些没有进入金融市场的企业??”。最有趣的一个关于这个主题所做的研究是赫和Udell(1998)所宣称的“公司的财务行为取决于他们生活循环的阶段。”事实上, 相关生命周期阶段的公司应该有一个最优的资本结构。

最后迈克尔·杰森(1986年)对资本结构与价值及公司治理关系的研究有许多贡献，威廉姆斯(1988)在90年代也鼓励研究了公司治理与资本结构这两个部分内容,使之很有希望成为公司治理与资本、企业价值的直接或间接关系的分析方法(Fluck,1998年, Jong,2002,柏格与帕蒂,2003, 2004年,等)。确认合成是可能的,因为在解释公司主要创造价值的能力时联合分析公司的资本结构和公司治理是有必要的(Zingales,2000,海因里希,2000,Bhagat和Jefferis,2002)。这方面的考虑可以帮助克服在理论和经验层面之间的研究发现资本结构与价值的争议。

公司治理影响资本结构与价值的关系

资本结构可以在权利和属性的前瞻性特点下进行公司资产以及不同层次的管理活动的影响下进行分析。因此，股票和债券必须被视为两种金融工具与治理工具(威廉姆森,1988): 债券的管理活动更加严格，而股票有更大的灵活性和更多的决策能力，由此可以推测,当资本结构成为企业治理的影响因素,众所周知债务和股权的混合体要考虑税收的影响。现金流量的方法是分配现金(现金流权),更重要的是,做出如何决定对这家公司的管理权(选举权)的管理方法也是必须研究的。例如,风险资本家们对资本结构和金融合同是怎样布局特别敏感,这样，最佳企业管理将得到保证，而管理激励机制和约束机制也可同时建立。

科斯（1991）在他1937完成的一篇文章里，明确指出,它是很重视资本结构的作用,并将其作为可以调整经济业务的工具,因此,企业家之间以及其他利益相关者之间具有很重要的作用。

正如Bhagat and Jefferis (2002)明确指出，当他们重点注意因果关系和在理论水平上的相互作用时，提到一个未来应评估实证研究的“研究计划”。公司治理如何影响公司的资本结构和企业价值之间的关系。

图二中清晰的描述了五种关系：资本结构与企业价值之间的关系通过公司治理来“调解”（关系A）；资本结构与企业价值之间的关系通过角色的资本治理关系稳定（关系D），选择一个确定的因素对资本结构对公司治理的作用进行分析（关系E）。

图二中显示的五种关系特别有趣并且体现两个线性关系：企业治理与资本结构，其中对公司的治理的规模来确定企业的融资的选择，造成了因果关系的可能。无论管理层是否自愿选择使用管理的一种债务融资来降低信息不对称和交易的问题,最大程度的提高公司决策的效率，或迫于股东的行为提高债务水平作为一种政策，以保证公司资本结构的良好发展，资本结构影响公司治理（关系E），反之亦然（关系B）。

一方面，如何处理债务和股权变更，是通过影响公司管理活动改变激励机制和管理来控制的。如果，通过债务和股权的组合，各种不同种类的投资者都在收敛公司，在那里他们对不同类型的治理决定上产生影响，然后经理往往会用自己的偏好决定这些类别的公司资本结构。更重要的是通过具体设计的债务和股权的合同有可能大幅度提升公司治理效率。

另一方面，甚至公司治理影响着资本结构（关系E）。梅尔斯(1984)展示了这种关系，选择都是由管理层的偏好决定的，在这种情况下,，如果经理选择的融资可以认为是可以避免决策能力降低。内部资源融资允许管理者防止其他部门介入他们的决策过程。德容(2002)宣布荷兰经理尽量减少使用债务，使他们的决策权力仍然集中。茨威贝尔(1996)观察到经理不自觉接受“纪律”的债务，其他治理机制实施也是有争议的。杰森(1986)指出，决定自愿增加公司债务由管理当局者“消除”利益相关者的决定，其决定是“正确”的。

有鉴于此，公司融资决策可以严格审议管理人员，企业家或其他可以被超越

的管理将有具体情况引起。

结论

本文定义一种理论方法,可以有助于理清与资产结构、公司治理结构和价值的关系, 同时也推动实证研究的精确设计。公司的资本结构治理代表了保持合适效率和保护它创造价值的能力的许多工具之一。因此,这个论文的研究肯定了在投资政策允许下，价值创造、融资政策,再加上其他的治理方法,可以确保投资政策有效地使公司价值最大化。

换句话说,许多作者(Borsch-Supan和Koke，2000，Bhagat和Jefferis，2002，柏格与帕蒂，2003)指出了分析资本结构与价值关系的必要性，以及分析了公司通过公司价值与治理的交互作用的考虑变量，如股权集中度、管理参与股权资本、组成董事会等。

此外，因为这些装置之间有多维性，处理这些结构存在一定的问题。很难确定具体的指标完全符合理论的构建，意味着代理变量或经验主义的措施潜在的构造风险。

除此之外，它还必须考虑到可能扭曲变量之间的实际问题，或由于在他们面前缺乏区别原因变量和变量的的影响，这两种理论彼此之间产生相互影响。

从经济学的观点来看，进一步探讨实证研究是非常重要的，在图2的模型中建议处理元素关系的复杂研究可以采用适当的经济计量技术。一些研究的建议可以在一些文献中找到；Borsch-Supan and Koke(2000)对采用间隔变量是一种批评的态度，他们认为论证它们最好是使用两个研究原理中的其中一个决定变量。柏格与帕蒂(2003)和陈和纳(1999)引进结构模型方程来应用解决这些问题，那是一种适当的理论，来研究测试多指标的一维或是多维变量的因果关系，

在结论部分,本文定义了一个理论模型,对明确资本结构之间的关系、公司治理与公司价值的研究，从而促进了为今后的研究验证分析企业与公司之间样本范围有效性模型的应用分析。为了研究分析公司的资本结构、公司治理结构与价值之间的相互作用关系，研究者不能不考虑表2所显示出的关系，必须看到外生性和内生性的关系，并确保这三种因素的互补作用，这样的分析是经济学原理精制的应用。此外,在这些关系的研究分析中也要考虑国家宏观经济政策的作用。

出处: 莫里吉?奥拉罗卡, 《公司治理对资本结构和企业价值关系的影响》，公司治理, 第7卷（3），2007：P312-325.

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