Can Bubbles Also Be Made in China(翻译稿)

Can Bubbles Also Be Made in China?

Mises Daily: Thursday, July 30, 2009 by Tim Swanson

Despite all of the shimmering skyscrapers and industrial output, unless market forces are allowed to truly dictate economic exchanges, today's Chinese megacities and their residents will merely be facades and actors within a 21st-century Potemkin village, and growth will remain stagnant for years to come. This is due in large part to continual state intervention through centrally planned investment.

Roughly eight months ago, Premier Wen Jiabao announced a $586 billion stimulus package to combat a plunge in economic activity.

At the time, analysts such as James Pressler noted that the stimulus might simply be a rebranding of previously known spending packages rolled into a big fancy plan.[1]

Suffice to say, this is not the case. I was wrong.

Beginning in November, lending quotas have been scrapped and interest rates have been held at a four-year low: unsurprisingly, bank lending has surged.[2] According to the People's Bank of China, for the first six months of this year, new lending amounted to more than 7.3 trillion yuan (about $1.1 trillion) — which, according to the Royal Bank of Scotland, is equivalent to two years worth of credit.

Furthermore, Wei Jianing estimates that roughly 20% of the stimulus funds have ended up in the domestic stock bourses, creating a speculative bubble much akin to the previous dotcom and housing-heavy cousins. Another 30% of the funds are believed to have been shuffled into the ailing property markets.[3] [4]

In fact, residential property rates in places like Beijing are once again climbing at a spectacular rate —6.5% in one week alone.[5] What was intended as a means to boost infrastructure improvements has been used instead to continue erecting villas and skyscrapers —with little productive value — in an already oversaturated market created by the previous boom.

For example, at the end of last year, roughly 91 million square meters of apartment space lay empty throughout China. This figure does not include the 587 million square meters of apartment space that has been sold but left vacant over the past five years or the millions more that are built but left off the depressed market.[6] More specifically, since 2006, roughly 152 million square meters of commercial office space has been built in Beijing — more than all of the office space in Manhattan — yet 30 million square meters is still vacant.[7] And in Shanghai, the vacancy rate for commercial space is estimated to have hit 25% at the end of last year.[8]

However, as an illustration of unintended consequences, during this new real estate boom, several investigations have discovered that real estate developers, desperate to offload

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nonperforming properties, have dumped mortgages onto state-run banks that are "facing enormous pressure from Beijing to rapidly increase lending to boost the economy."[9]

Thus, while market forces would have reallocated unused property, pushing prices down, the stimulus has catapulted markets such as Beijing and Shanghai into the top 50 most expensive globally, despite that the average resident earns a fraction of their industrialized peers.[10]

Raw Materials

Economist Andy Xie has arguably written the most concise case as to how the stimulus money has created extremely problematic unintended consequences for a developing China.

For instance, in its objective to jumpstart or simply smooth over the plunge in economic activity (primarily exports), Chinese state-owned industries have gone on a commodity buying binge that actually has worked against them:

But China's imports are mostly for speculative inventories. Bank loans were so cheap and easy to get that many commodity distributors used financing for speculation. The first wave of purchases was to arbitrage the difference between spot and futures prices. That was smart. But now that price curves have flattened for most commodities, these imports are based on speculation that prices will increase. Demand from China's army of speculators is driving up prices, making their expectations self-fulfilling in the short term.

The failure of Chinalco's investment in Rio Tinto has been costly for China. After watching its share price triple, Rio Tinto saw it could raise money more cheaply by issuing new shares to pay down debt. The potential financial loss to Chinalco isn't the point. Rather, higher costs will stem from a further monopolization of the iron ore market because Rio Tinto, after scrapping the Chinalco deal, entered into an iron ore joint venture with BHP Billiton. Even though these two mining giants will keep separate marketing channels, joint production will allow them to collude on production levels, significantly impacting future ore prices.

While the rest of his research is worth reading in length, in a nutshell he suggests that the current commodities boom is entirely unsustainable and counterproductive. How big is this commodity boom?

The NY Times recently noted that among other imports to China, iron ore increased 33% from a year earlier, crude oil increased 14%, aluminum oxide increased 16% and refined copper increased 148%. These jumps have corresponded with similar price increases in the commodities. And as Xie, the Times and others have noted, like all artificial bubbles, it will eventually lead to an unpleasant pop.[11]

Over the past year, both Yasheng Huang and Mark DeWeaver have noted that these soon-to-be-seen ill aftereffects are directly attributed to an economy that is still heavily managed by government planners.[12] [13]

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While huge swaths of state-owned enterprises have been privatized, many more are owned or operated by government officials. Still worse, many companies, while nominally private, operate in markets that are currently being politically right-sized. For instance, over the next decade Chinese policy makers aim to shrink domestic automobile manufactures by forced consolidation.[14]

Furnaces Aflame

As an economy develops and becomes more productive, DeWeaver notes that investment in fixed-capital formation typically decreases as a percentage of GDP. In China the opposite has occurred —increasing from 33% to 42% between 1981 and 2007 —creating what many commentators label as "overcapacity."

Regardless of the debate over identifying what the "proper" level should be, China makes a lot of steel. China has roughly 700 steel companies that produce at least 100 million more tons than the sum total of the United States. In fact, while steel producers in other countries like Germany and Japan have cut back 20–30% due to global stagnation, Chinese producers have turned the dial to the proverbial "eleven," increasing output by 1.2% in the first six months, and breaking the previous record, which was also held by China. Full smelting ahead![15]

This is not due to more efficient technology, creative entrepreneurship or economies of scale, in fact, it is just the opposite.

During the 1950s, as part of Mao's Great Leap Forward to out produce Western capitalists, many provinces and counties subsidized and encouraged the creation of iron smelters. According to Maharshi Patel, between 1958 and 1961, Mao oversaw a policy which encouraged "every commune and neighborhood" to build furnaces. Whereas Roman politicians promised a chicken in every pot, and modern-day American politicians promise suburban houses with white picket fences, political careers in China became intertwined with the construction of smelters and ancillary industries. As Patel noted,

Like the auto industry in North America, steel in China came to be considered an essential industry, too big to fail. It directly employs 3.58 million people. Millions more live off it in support roles. As of 2007, it contributed 4 per cent of China's gross domestic product and 9 per cent of industrial profits.

And realizing that something has to be done, as part of the never-ending crusade to right-size, Chinese planners finally announced in May that they would begin to try to shut down certain refiners and "actively guide" others into merging.

Back to the Future

While Yasheng Huang and others argue that the decentralizing reforms of mainland China in the

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'80s were reversed during the '90s, in the past decade Chinese policy makers have emulated many of the same export-centric programs of other "tiger" economies like Singapore, South Korea and even Japan.[16] Their neo-mercantilist, export-centered preferential policies involved three primary forces: an artificial devaluation of domestic currencies, large inflows of FDI, and most importantly, Western consumers with insatiable appetites.

Unfortunately for most of the East Asian economies, this model was unsustainable and, to paraphrase Mohd El-Erian of PIMCO, this current low is the new normalcy.[17]

Roughly 40% of China's GDP is accounted for by exports, which was not a problem during the boom years. However, in May alone, exports dropped more than 25% from the year before. This drop was not a statistical outlier, as each preceding month for nearly a year had had double-digit drops as well, including a 21% fall last month. And foreign direct investment has also dropped like a rock, nearly 18% alone in the first six months this year compared to last.[18]

Acknowledging that consumption levels in Western countries will not rebound to previously seen highs, China's policy makers have begun executing contingency plans aimed at boosting domestic demand.[19] However, these are unlikely to replace spendthrift Joneses anytime soon.

The War Chest

Surely there is a bright light on the horizon? After all, the government does sit on large holdings of foreign assets.

Gordon Chang recently noted that unfortunately for policy makers in Beijing, the large foreign reserves that China holds cannot be used to any large degree to fend off the ill effects of the current financial order. Chinese agencies such as SAFE are at the complete mercy of the United States, because there is no exit plan with Treasuries.

Despite the recent flurry of eye-popping headlines, if the Chinese unloaded their foreign reserves, they would destroy their own currency, which is pegged to the US dollar. In the event they continue gobbling up commodities, they will simply "inflate" those asset prices too.[20] Furthermore, because their currency remains pegged to the dollar, any yuan appreciation will squeeze exporters that are already reeling from the large drop from overseas.

Thus in order for them to sell any substantial portion of the Treasuries, the Chinese will have to wait until real growth begins to take place in the United States.

Uncertainty and Unpredictability

Over the past 30 years, China has changed dramatically. Despite all of the interventions and misallocations, real, inflation-adjusted growth could still take place. [21] Areas like Yunnan and Guangxi will presumably benefit due to free-trade agreements with ASEAN participants. Previously isolated rural communities will benefit from modern infrastructure links as they can

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finally develop and participate in China's industrial revolution.

Low personal debt and high personal savings can also be a positive factor even if depositors receive very little in return.[22] Furthermore, if the policy makers allows land-owners to actually sell land or use it as collateral, there will be some huge pidends there as well.[23]

However it is the unseen details, the unseen consequences, the unseen opportunity costs that currently dictate and bedevil the economic growth of the world's most populous country. And despite the three decades of reforms, the effects of socialist planning, even the "lite" variety, will still generate business cycles — with prolonged corrections and purges.

中国也会制造经济泡沫？

Mises Daily: Thursday, July 30, 2009

作者：蒂姆?斯旺森

翻译：罗人萍@风灵_

尽管拥有所有这一切闪闪发光的摩天大楼和工业产值，但是除非允许市场力量真正地控制经济交换，当今中国大城市和城市居民们仍将仅仅是波将金村（Potemkin village——指一种人造的徒有其表的幻境，译者注）中的幻象和演员，并且未来几年经济增长将停滞不前。这很大程度上是通过中央计划的投资不断进行政府干预的结果。

大约八个月前，温家宝总理宣布了一个5860亿美元的一揽子刺激政策，以应对经济活动的骤然下降。

当时，像詹姆斯?普莱斯勒这样的分析师表示，这个刺激可能仅仅是重新包装先前已知的一揽子开支政策，这构成了一个巨大的虚幻计划。

足以证明，情况不是这样。我错了。

11月初，借款限额已被取消，利率为四年来最低：不出所料，银行借贷浪潮汹涌。根据中国人民银行数据显示，今年前六个月，新增贷款额总计超过7.3万亿元（1.1万亿美元），相当于苏格兰皇家银行两年的信贷总额。

此外，魏加宁估计这次刺激资金里大约有20%最后会流入国内的股票市场，产生一个投机性泡沫，类似于先前的互联网泡沫和住房泡沫这对难兄难弟。另外30%的资金相信已被投入了境况不妙的房地产市场。

事实上，像北京这样的地方，住宅价格再次以惊人的速度上涨，一个星期就飙涨了6.5%。本打算用于改善基础设施的资金也已被拿来继续建造大量别墅和摩天大楼，在先前的繁荣时期创造的已过度饱和的市场上，这些商品房几乎没有生产价值。

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例如，到去年年末，全中国大约面积为9100万平方米的住宅房产闲置。这个数字不包括5.87亿平方米已销售但被闲置超过5年的住宅，或者更多的数以百万计的已在建造，但由于萧条的房地产市场被迫中止的住宅。特别地，自2006年后，北京大约建造了1.52亿平方米的商业办公楼，超过了曼哈顿的办公楼面积，而曼哈顿还有3000万平方米的办公楼仍在闲置。在上海，去年年末商业房产空置率大约已达到了25%。

然而，作为一个非预期结果的表现，在不动产新一轮暴涨期间，几项调查发现，房地产开发商急切地想要卸掉表现不及预期的资产，已将一大堆按揭贷款丢给了国有银行，而后者正面临着来自北京的巨大压力，要求它们迅速增加贷款以推动经济增长。

因此，如果是市场力量重新分配闲置财产的话，那么将导致房价下降，这个刺激已反射到市场上，例如北京和上海已经进入了全球最贵城市的前五十名，尽管其居民的平均收入只是其他工业化城市居民的一小部分。

原材料

经济学家谢安迪以简明的案例讨论了在发展中的中国，刺激计划的资金是怎样引发了极有问题的意外后果。

例如，为了快速启动或仅仅是平复经济活动的陡降（主要是出口），中国国有企业已在大量购入商品，而这事实上对其不利：

但中国大多是为了投机性的存货而进口。银行贷款如此便宜且容易得到，因此许多商品批发商利用融资来投机。第一波购货浪潮是利用地点和期货价格的差异套汇套利。那是敏锐的。但是，现在大多数商品的价格曲线已变得平稳，这些进口商品是基于在价格还会上涨的投机。来自中国投机者队伍的需求正在抬高价格，短期中实现了他们的期望。

中国铝业公司投资力拓公司的失败，对中国而言代价高昂。看到它的股价增长到3倍后，力拓公司发现，它以增发新股的方式筹集资金去还债更为廉价。中国铝业潜在的财务损失不是重点。相反，更高的代价将阻止铁矿石市场的进一步垄断，因为力拓和中国铝业的交易告吹后，与必拓形成了一个铁矿石的联合企业。虽然这两个采矿业巨头将会保持独立的营销渠道，但联合生产将让他们能串通控制产量，明显地影响未来矿石的价格。

而他其他的研究值得详加阅读，简而言之，他认为当前的商品繁荣完全无法持续，且适得其反。这一次会有多大的行情呢？

纽约时报最近报道了其他进口到中国的商品，铁矿石从一年前到现在增加了33%，原油增加了14%；氧化铝增加了16%；精炼铜增加了148%。这些（数量）的快速增长与商品价格的类似增长相适应。就像谢，纽约时报及其他人所说，和所有人造泡沫一样，它最终将会猛烈爆炸，让人难受。

近一年来，黄亚生和马克?德维尔都曾指出，这些即将可见的不利后果直接归因于经济仍受到政府计划者的过度操控。

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虽然大量的小型国企已被私有化，但更多的国企仍由政府官员拥有或经营。更糟糕的是，许多公司，虽然名义上是私人所有，但其所活动的市场目前仍被政治权力所限定。例如，未来十年，中国政策制定者打算通过强行合并来缩减国内的汽车制造业。

高炉燃烧

德维尔指出，某一经济体发展而提高了产能时，以固定资本形式的投资占GDP的百分比通常会下降。在中国却发生了相反的现象，从1981年到2007年间，固定资产投资占GDP 的份额从33%增加到了42%，产生了许多评论家所指的“产能过剩”。

不管对“适当的”（生产）水平该是什么有何争论，不争的是，中国生产了许多钢铁。中国大约有700家钢铁公司，其产量至少比美国的总产量多了1亿吨，事实上，由于全球不景气，其他国家（如德国和日本）的钢铁生产商已消减了20%-30%的产量，而中国的厂商却将刻度盘转到了众所周知的“11”点（指到达了极限，来源于电影“This Is Spinal Tap,”——译者注），在前六个月增加1.2%的产量，打破了先前由中国所保持的记录。鼓足干劲大炼钢铁。

这并不是因为更高效的技术，富有创造力的企业家精神或规模经济，实际恰与之相反。

在20世纪50年代，作为毛泽东赶英超美的大跃进的一部分，许多省县都资助和鼓励冶炼钢铁的创新。据马哈希?波特尔说，从1958年到1961年间，毛泽东监督执行了一项鼓励“每个公社和街道”搭建高炉的政策。罗马政治家曾许愿人人都有肉吃，而当今美国的政治家承诺人人都有白色木栅栏围绕的郊区别墅，在中国的政治生涯则与修建高炉及其附属产业密切相关。

波特尔指出，如汽车工业之于北美，中国的钢铁业也逐渐被认为是一个必不可少的产业，太大而不能倒。它直接雇佣的员工有3580万。更多的数以百万的人以从事支持它的辅助工作为生。2007年，钢铁产业为中国的国内生产总值贡献了4个百分点，为工业利润贡献了9个百分点。

意识到该采取一些措施了，作为永不停息的调整运动的一部分，中国的计划者最终在五月份宣布，他们将开始试着关闭某些加工厂，并积极引导其他的厂家进行合并。

回归将来

黄亚生和其他人认为，中国大陆在80年代所进行的去集权化改革在90年代被颠覆了，过去十年中，中国决策者仿效“新兴”的经济体，如新加坡，韩国乃至日本等，同样进行了大量以出口为中心的计划。他们的新重商主义，即出口优先政策包括了三大主要力量：本国货币人为性贬值，大量流入的外国直接投资，最重要的是，西方消费者永不满足的欲望。

不幸地是，对于大多数东亚的经济体而言，这种模型无法持续，如太平洋投资管理公司（PIMCO）的穆罕默德?埃里安（太平洋投资管理公司首席执行官兼联合首席投资官——译者注）认为，当前的低迷趋势是一种新常态。

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出口占中国GDP约为40%，这在繁荣时期没有问题。但是，仅仅是五月份，出口量就比去年下降了超过25%。这次的下降并不是统计异常，之前近一年来的每个月几乎也同样有两位数的下降，其中上月下降了21%。外国的直接投资也像一颗陨石般直线下坠，今年仅前六个月，比起去年就下降了近18%。

意识到西方国家的消费水平将不会回升到从前所见的高度，中国的决策者已开始执行应变计划，扩大内需。然而，这些计划看来不大可能很快取代国外那些挥霍无度的败家子。

战略储备

的确，在地平线上有一道强光，毕竟，政府确实持有大量的外国资产。

章家敦最近提到，对北京的决策者而言不幸的是，中国持有的大量外汇储备不能大量地用于抗击目前金融危机的负面作用。像中国国家外汇管理局（SAFE）这样的机构完全得看美国的脸色，因为购买美国国债没有退出计划。

尽管最近吸引眼球的头条让人惊慌，但如果中国卖掉了他们的外汇储备，将会毁掉他们自己与美元挂钩的通货。他们持续抢购商品，也将仅仅是推高了那些资产的价格。此外，由于他们的通货仍然与美元挂钩，任何人民币升值都将会挤压那些因海外需求大减已陷入困境的出口商。

因此，若想要卖出相当部分的美国国债，中国将不得不等待，直到美国经济开始实质性的增长。

不确定性和不可预见性

过去的30年间，中国发生了急剧的变化。除去所有的干预和不当分配，排除通货膨胀因素，仍然产生了真正的增长。像云南，广西等地大概将因与东盟成员国达成的自由贸易协定而受益。之前偏远的农村社区将因现代化的基础设施链而受益，这使他们终于能得到发展，并参与中国的工业革命。

低水平的个人债务和高水平的个人储蓄也能成为一个积极因素，即使存款人只得到很少的报酬。此外，如果决策者允许土地所有者能实际出售土地或作为抵押，同样会产生某种巨大的红利。

然而，这个世界上人口最多的国家目前的经济增长受到不可预见的细节，不可预见的结果，不可预见的机会成本的控制和困扰。尽管有了30年的改革，但是因为社会主义计划的影响，甚至多样性的弱化，仍将产生商业周期——并且其矫正和清除过程会持续很久。

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