Danaher-harvard business review 上（中文）

英文原文1-8页

Danaher 公司

在2008年1月24日的大清早，Danaher公司的首席执行官Larry Culp翻阅桌上的一些简报。他即将与分析师和投资者开始年终电话会议，回顾公司过去一年的表现。Culp自1990年从哈佛大学商学院毕业后就加入了Danaher公司，并在2001年被任命为CEO，那年他38岁。他接管的公司，自1985年成立以来年复合股票收益率已超过25%。在Culp领导的前五年，公司的表现依然持续向好。Danaher公司的营业收入和纯收益增加了一倍多，兼并了50多家企业并不断壮大。因为丰厚的利润，它的股价持续高于同行（见图表1）。事实上，对于总部在华盛顿哥伦比亚特区的产业集团，2007年已经又是一个创纪录的年份。 Culp对“企业集团”这个提法很谨慎，他把Danaher公司看作战略成长平台而不是家族。公司管理层把战略成长平台定义为“在一个几十亿美元的市场中，Danaher公司可以获得10亿或更多的收入，并且是市场中排名第一或第二。”在2007年，Danaher公司的投资组合包含六个这样的战略成长平台，贡献了80%的收入。此外，这公司还在运营七种集中的利基市场业务——一种“在分散的或小的市场上的业务，Danaher公司在这市场中有足够的市场份额和令人满意的利润和回报”（见图表2，Danaher公司报告结构图）。

Danaher公司的投资组合随着时间在不断演进。Danaher公司曾经买过一家公司，它所在的市场周期性较强。最近几年成为一个仪器的增值供应商，从而进入一个市场周期性较弱的领域。这些变革在公司的四个核心成长平台——电子测试、环保、医疗技术和产品识别——上表

现得最为明显。到2007年，Danaher公司自豪地公布自己在多个业务领域中的市场领先地位（见图表3）。在过去十年，很多这类公司都通过成功并购获得这样的领先地位。

Culp被广泛地赞誉为“亲力亲为”CEO。Culp相信“CEO的角色是确保公司有清晰和明确阐述的战略，再加上合适的人执行战略。”对于Danaher公司，战略最重要最核心的是Danaher公司的商业对策管理系统，或者称为DBS（图表4说明系统的核心原则）。一位分析师介绍，“DBS处理系统是Danaher公司的灵魂，它指导着计划、部署和执行。”Culp在2011年的第一份股东年度报告中肯定公司“改善”、或“持续改进”理念的重要意义。他在报告中说：“公司的基石是Danaher公司商业对策管理系统（DBS）。DBS为所有运营管理人员提供了追求世界一流质量、交货和成本的衡量标准，以及卓越的客户满意度和利润成长的方法。

Danaher公司在并购过程中成功执行DBS，促使它快速成长。事实上，Danaher公司的管理团队有一个骄人的成绩，扩大了并购公司的营业利润（见图表5）。股票研究公司还指出，他们“整个投资组合推出新产品的数量相当令人惊讶。”到2007年初，Danaher公司仍然为取得进一步的成功做好准备。

然而，尽管Danaher公司取得了巨大的成功，它依然面临着一系列的挑战。首先，随着公司发展到超过120亿美元的营业收入，拥有强劲的现金流，它是否能够继续识别和实施有吸引力、增值的并购？其次，虽然投资组合中明显减少了周期产品，但一部分还是会受到垂直市场

需求波动的影响。第三，Danaher公司跟其它公司一样，受到美国经济衰退——也是全球经济衰退的征兆的影响。最后，一些观察者担心，“持续改进”的模式到底能够持续多久。

Culp 在任职Danaher公司17年期间，见证了这公司应对各种各样的挑战。他非常有信心，Danaher公司会再次成功应对挑战。 Corporate History公司历史

Steven和Mitchell Rales是四兄弟中的两个，在马里兰洲贝塞斯达长大。在1980年，他们成立了初期的投资引擎，即证券集团控股(Equity Group Holdings),目的是并购具有以下特征的业务：（1）特定利基市场下可理解的业务；（2）能带来现金利润的可预测收入；（3）有企业家精神的经验丰富的管理团队。在1981年，他们并购了硕士盾公司（Master Shield），一家位于德克萨斯州的乙烯基壁板制造商。接着，他们并购了美国俄亥俄州哈得逊的莫霍克橡胶公司，用了自己的200万美元和借来的9000万美元。

很快，一家名为DMG的房地产投资信托基金(REIT)公司引起了多个投资集团的注意，其中包括Rales。DMG自1975年就没有公告它的利润，但是有超过1.3亿美元的税损结转。在1983年，Rales兄弟获得了DMG公开上市交易的控制权，并于次年出售该公司的房地控股。然后，他们把硕士盾公司和莫霍克橡胶公司并入了REIT，通过税收抵免保护制造业的收入。他们还把公司的名字改为Danaher公司。Danaher公司，源于蒙大拿州西部有名的假蝇钓鱼。Danaher河的名字要追溯到凯尔特字根“达纳”，或者“飞流”。

从那时起，两兄弟把最新重组的Danaher公司作为并购的工具。利用数量可观的债务开展一系列友好的或敌意的并购。他们对准低调的工业企业，在Danaher公司成立的前两年又并购了12家公司。早期的并购涵盖了工具、控制装置、精密零部件和塑料等各种制造公司。在这种兼并中，Danaher公司的重点是削减成本和通过剥离表现不佳的资产来支付债务。到1986年，Danaher公司以4.56亿的收入被列入财富500强企业。14家子公司就在那时候被重组成四大业务部：汽车/运输、仪器仪表、精密零部件和挤压产品。

尽管他们成长速度很快，但Danaher公司的并购战略一点也不含糊。正如1986年年度报告的概述：“我们追求的目标是成为我们所提供的产品中最具创新意识和最低成本的制造商，我们寻求的市场地位是每个产品线都是第一、第二或是非常独特的利基市场。在14家子公司中，至少有12家是市场领导者。Danaher公司认为自己的战略与1980年代中期众多的并购者是不同的：“如果有一样东西可以把我们与企业并购领域的其它竞争者区分开，那就是我们与企业保持联系，‖Steven Rales在1986年评论说。无论如何，他继续说，“在长远看来，我们还很年轻。” 持续改进

1988年左右，Rales兄弟在三个显著的方面转移策略。第一，把注意力放在内部——包括子公司的运作和整个公司实体的运作。Danaher公司的一个部门——皆可博车辆系统的经理们很成功地学习了丰田汽车公司的精益生产。不久，Rales兄弟在全公司贯彻这个系统。这变化就如

后来某些Danaher公司的经理人形容的“他们对精益生产有一种近乎本能的喜爱”。对精益生产的喜爱是“改善”广阔的哲学中的首要表现。改善，或者说持续改进，接近于后来大家熟知的DBS——Danaher公司的标志。

第二，Rales兄弟关注到垃圾债券市场的预警信号，促使他们减少债务。结果是，他们成功地渡过1990年代初的经济衰退。最后，Steven和Mitchell选择退出首席执行官和总裁的职务。虽然两兄弟保留董事会主席和执行委员会主席的职位，但他们依靠他人执掌日常事务。 谢尔曼时代

1990年2月，Danaher公司任命George M. Sherman为总裁和CEO。Sherman在任命时48岁，是受过培训的工程师，也是一位MBA。Sherman加入Danaher公司前是百得公司（Black & Decker）的执行副总裁和电动工具和家居装饰集团的总裁。Sherman是有名的高效领导者。一位分析师评论说，“他是我见过最有能量的CEO，他会竭尽全力投入。”在百得公司，因为电动工具业务的转机，他广受赞誉。在他任职其间，电动工具业务以两倍于市场的速度增长。在此之前，Sherman还曾任职通用电气公司和爱默生电气公司。

在加盟Danaher公司前，Sherman说过希望“加强战略计划的市场导向，以巩固Danaher公司令人钦佩的市场地位。”此外，他期待投资组合重新定位为更有吸引力、更少周期性的业务。这公司开始“寻找国际机遇，在海外产品销售和选择性并购两方面扩张。”他还开始出让那些为汽车产业生产轮胎、工具和部件的企业，因为Danaher公司既没

有品牌特色也没有足够的规模去承受产业的价格压力。除此以外，Danaher公司投资新的“平台”，重新关注企业并购的方法，在生产和分销上都形成规模经济。最初的平台包括环境控制、电子测试仪器和精密电机。最后，Sherman集中在“更少但更大的并购，许多家族企业在差劲的财务下有很好的产品和可观的市场份额。”

1986年，Danaher公司有16家运营公司。到1995年，它有24运营公司，而到了2000年，它拥有51家运营公司。当Danaher公司进入电子测试仪器、水质仪器、食品和制药温压传感器，以及企事业单位硬件时，他们的管理团队“被证明是擅长于将各企业整合到现有的运营中的。”这些并购也巩固了Sherman 1990年推动的公司业务组合的转变。在1985年，86%的收入来自轮胎和橡胶制品；1991年，78%的销售额来自工具和汽车设备。到2001年，超过一半的收入来自环保、电子测试和运动控制平台（见图表6，2004-2006年部门或区域的收入和利润百分比）。

在Sherman任职期间，Danaher公司的销售额从7.5亿美元增长到38亿美元。在Sherman最后五年的领导下，Danaher公司实现了复合年增长率超过20%，每年约15%的收入增长。Danaher公司还努力扩大和加深创始人引进的持续改进的经营技术。DBS被认为是公司不断成功的基石。一位分析师在1997年评论说，“Danaher公司内部和并购共同成长，这是一个非常好的平衡。”投资界赞扬了Sherman的领导力，认为Danaher公司在1990到2001年间已经“从中型公司的地位发展为首屈一指的大型产业公司。”

Danaher, 2001–至今 投资组合

在早些年，Danaher公司在选择企业时追求财务目标，根据投资回报率（ROIC）分配资源。从九十年代开始，Culp提出，公司的投资组合转变为“更少更好的业务”，建立基于在有吸引力的市场上有强势地位的领先企业的“平台”，在这平台可以进行额外的并购。Danaher公司在1998年并购福禄克(Fluke)，这是一次重大的并购，证明了这种方法的价值。

业务的选择受“市场第一，企业第二”的信念驱动。对此，这家公司遵循巴菲特的名语“当一个行业处在困难条件下，即使遇到一位声名昭著的卓越的经理人，也完全无法改变原来的困境。”Danaher并不是先识别出有潜质的目标然后评估它的市场潜力，而是采取一种自上而下的分析方式，即从市场分析开始到公司评估，再到尽职调查、定价、谈判，最后是整合。

行业是经过一定的合理标准进行筛选的。“首先，市场规模应超过10亿美元。第二，核心市场成长率应至少5%至7%，没有不适当的周期和波动。第三，寻找参与长尾的分散行业，有2500万到1亿美元的销售额，可以获得他们的产品而不用必要的管理开销。第四，尽量避免优秀的竞争对手，如丰田或微软。第五，目标领域要有适用DBS的可能性，这样我们发挥Danaher公司的经营技术。最后，须是以实际的产品为中心的企业。如金融服务业，就不符合这些原则。总而言之，这套标准有个简单的前提：“我们寻找有规模的市场，而且是我们可

以赢的市场。”

根据上面的标准，以目标和现有业务为基础，并购可以分成三类： 新平台

正如分类建议的，一个新平台的并购代表一次重大的扩张，Danaher公司投资组合进入新的市场和产品。切入点可以是大企业的一部分、一个独立的公众公司或一家私人企业。“建立平台的并购”，2001年度报告上解释道，“引入‘Danaher型’业务，我们的经营技巧和能力可以产生价值。”总结这些平台的重要性时，Culp说：“不在一个已建立的重心上，想通过之后的并购串成一条珍珠链是很困难的。”并购的目标趋向于大并且在具有战略重要性的部门上。Danaher公司进入一个属于吸引力市场的平台的实例是最近扩展了一个医疗部门。2006年，这公司已经投资了超过26亿美元进行并购，致力于建立医疗技术平台。现在，这个平台的收入接近总收入的25%，并被作为一个独立的部分。 协同

“协同”是为了寻找Danaher公司现有业务和新目标之间协同作用的小交易。被并购的企业在管理、组织和分销上被全面整合到核心业务。例如，2004年，Danaher公司以0.5亿美元并购了哈里斯公司（Harris）的各个产品线，把它们协同到电子测试平台上。 邻接

与“协同”不一样，尽管它们与一个特定的平台关联，邻接更多的是在并购之后作为独立的业务。例如，Danaher公司在2004年以1.91亿美元并购木马技术(Trojan Technologies)。虽然木马技术作为环保平台

运营的一部分，它的水处理产品占据一个特定的利基市场，在并购后或多或少地作为独立的组织运作。

尽管在2007年，Danaher公司以每月完成一项并购案的步调在进行，但是平台并购仍然是少有的。他们制定了一个目标名单，由包括首席执行官、首席财务官、战略发展部门和企业并购团队负责人在内的团队来维护，并由董事会定期回顾检查。通常情况下，Danaher公司在准备投资一个公司之前，已经对其有所了解。例如，Culp指出，―美国Sigma公司（1995年被并购）是我们所熟悉的，因为我们旗下的Veeder Root公司已经在使用其废水取样产品。同样的，Gilbarco公司（2002年被并购）曾是我在1990年的第一个客户。‖ 但是Danaher公司仍然在广泛搜寻合适的商业机会。例如，进入牙科市场的想法就是早在2002年确定的。

Danaher公司选择适当目标的时候，乐于并购那些―未必已经具备优秀的领导团队、关键设备、或是极好的基础设施的入门级公司‖。唯一选择终止交易的原因是当我们不能确定管理是否能够填补预期的差距。即便Danaher公司没有获得这样一个合适的公司，Culp也相信―由于我们的前期准备，当进入一个新的业务平台时，我们仍然具有战略优势。例如，我们在2004年决定竞标KaVo公司，因为我们已经对牙科市场进行了调查，并且董事会已将之作为2002-2003年的发展目标。‖ 把小的并购企业纳入现有的平台业务是比进入新业务领域更为普遍的方式。协同并购是运营公司的职责，由（原）企业并购团队通过法律、

定价、交易知识技能方面对原企业的运作施加影响。实施这种并购通常涉及到将现有平台上与目标企业的组织和业务进行整合。尽管这会远远高于该公司最终达成的交易，这一业务领域的交易机会每个月都会进行评估。

从头到尾的并购流程揭示了，各种不同类型的并购都是不一样的。事实上，判断基准是并购后的模式。正如2011年年度报告所述，―我们审议了所有并购案的投资资本回报率（ROIC），我们要求三年内平均的最低收益率要达到税后投资回报率的10%，协同并购更容易实现这个目标，但是建立平台并购需要更长的时间，但这个时间不会超过五年。

自90年代中期的投资组合的重塑并没有导致资产剥离，相反，业务的削减主要发生在边缘行业。

Danaher公司的并购策略并没有遭到忽视。一位战略咨询家在《商业周刊》中如此赞道：―那些人有一个非常精妙的企业并购模型。‖在早些年，Danaher公司已将业务拓展至西欧、东欧、亚洲、拉美以及中东地区。初期的扩张是在原有的美国业务上增加一些小型欧洲公司，以建立国际市场通道。后来，公司的国际化经验增强，便使用了一定的欧洲并购方式作为它进入理想区域的核心方式（如丹麦Radiometer公司和德国莱卡公司）。事实上，Culp考察了德国中小企业——中型的、通常是家庭式的、德国工程公司——作为理想的并购对象，这些公司遍及欧洲，但也是―能够做更多‖的典型，这样Danaher公司也许会做出并购决定。Culp相信Danaher公司的操作模式已在海外得到有效的传播：

―它也许需要花更多时间来改变事情，但如果你调整体系使之适应新的环境，并一直尊重项目利益相关者的需要和要求，它就能做到。‖迄今，Danaher公司在亚洲的并购较少，看到那里的公司规模太小导致附加值偏低，反而强调在它们的成长平台上有机地开展商业活动。例如，截止2008年，Danaher公司在中国的销售额快速增长，达到10亿美元。到2007年，Danaher公司由6个战略平台组成，分成4个商业领域：专业仪器、工业科技、工具及零件、医疗设备（见Exhibit 7关于平台的详细描述，见Exhibit 8关于多年来在各种平台的并购）。Culp大概构建了关于未来可能性的草图：―我们不认为Danaher公司的操作模式自身对于公司规模有任何强制约束。我们目前的平台主要在B2B工业，但我们相信可以在广泛的工业领域中潜在地参与竞争。‖

组织

Danaher公司总部设在华盛顿，在距白宫以北六个街区一栋不起眼的写字楼里。公司的名字并未标示在大楼前面，甚至也没有列明在楼层指示上。大约有45位员工的办公室装修简约。华盛顿代表处的职能包括财务，会计、法律、税务、资产、人力资源、以及并购交易。 2008年，Danaher公司活跃于不同的业务领域，销售增长超过120亿美元。它拥有45-55个自负盈亏的独立业务单元，分属于三个执行副总裁（EVP）进行管理并向首席执行官（CEO）汇报。Danaher公司喜欢精简的汇报架构（向管理层直接汇报的人数较少），而不像类似Dover 和 Illinois工具厂等企业集团那样，当企业日益发展壮大时，它们就分

拆为更多的子系统。Danaher公司始终依赖于把各个较小单位聚合为一个经营实体。

Culp（H. Lawrence Culp, Jr. Danaher CEO兼总裁）每周大概花费半天时间处理对外事务（投资者关系），一天半至两天时间处理战略和并购问题，其余大半周时间用于处理经营管理和人力资源事务。尽管在过去，他和其他公司高管卓有成效地运营了Danaher公司的一系列业务，但他指出，―如今，我不会直接做出许多经营决策，我所做的一切都是与组织和个人真正相关的，以一种发展的方式影响人、以及构建一种对话框架。‖

在Danaher公司，另一个重要的机构是DBS办公室（Danaher Business System，业务管理系统），它由15-20个高官组成，他们不在总部而在业务部门工作。作为业务拓展的角色，他们在DBSO工作的工作时间有限，但是这个职位的最基本要求是他必须是一个高级运营管理人员。例如，DBSO当前的负责人，就是Danaher公司的前任总经理。DBSO的职责是培训Danaher商务系统的管理人员，无论是被Danaher公司并购的公司还是现有的公司。DBSO参与了所有新并购活动中的初期培训和持续改善。尽管DBSO现有业务在多数情况下是服务于企业本身，但有时候，它也会被要求协助特定业务。DBSO刻意保持小规模，因为它并不是为了取代那些希望将DBS的思想和文化根植于己身的直线经理的职权。

企业人力资源部门由前公司总裁来管理。各个业务部门管理自己的人

员，但从企业人力资源部门中也有人才输送来填补高级的职位。然而从流程上来讲，企业人力资源和管理是密切相关的。任何一个新的职位都要从约2000人的企业人才库中筛选，所有重要的职位变动都要经过CEO和人力资源主管的审核。人才的审核是公司运营的一个关键环节。虽然Danaher公司认为，在单一业务下可以培养一个部门的专家，但是倾向于在公司内部提拔或者保留管理人员。因此，每年大约四分之三的高级职位由内部人员填补，每年大约有五分之一高级管理人员被提拔到新的位置。 被提拔的机会不仅存在于原有的Danaher公司的业务部门，也存在公司的其他业务部门中。一项任命并没有预先设定时间长短，作为人才的审查过程的一部分，当一个雇员掌握了所需的能力，有达到或超过预期的表现时，公司就会考虑或者计划进一步升迁。高级管理人员被寄望于可以实现持续发展，绩效管理，并提升自己的团队成员。不过，没有设定目标来裁减表现靠后的员工，而是通过个人的表现和DBS价值观来考核个人的业绩。

这个公司的招聘流程包括一个心理测评以及更具代表性的面试程序。候选人被期望具备有这样的素质―和团队一起共赢，展现个人的谦逊，同时富有创造改变的激情和能量。‖从外部招聘的管理人员要通过一个严格的8-12周的熏陶，以了解更多有关DBS的工具和文化。在此期间，新进管理人员集中沉浸式培训，不需要在他们的岗位上工作。雇佣的本科生主要来自像伊利诺伊州和弗吉尼亚理工大学这样的级别。在MBA的水平（层面），Danaher公司招聘来自于像达顿商学院、哈佛商学院、凯洛格商学院、斯坦福大学、IMD和欧洲工商管理学院等顶

级学校的学生，他们关注的是一个员工长期的领导潜力。Danaher公司为新员工提供工作轮换机会，但在早期阶段期望他们能够管理Danaher公司的部分业务，无论是作为生产部门的轮值经理还是作为一个区域销售经理。

公司的并购团队是由交易员组成的一个小团队，该小组开展了和业务拓展部及战略发展部的广泛合作。业务拓展部门旨在发现和培养其行业内和邻近行业的潜在目标，而战略发展部门则将重心关注在潜在的新平台上。在过去四年中，Danaher公司并购了8-12公司。

高级管理人员的薪酬包括基本工资，奖金，并参股。Danaher公司的薪酬在同行业及同类职位上是具有竞争力的，没有统一的Danaher公司的标准化薪酬体系，但高级职务（如总裁及其直接下属）的薪资差异不大。 随着资历增加，奖金等于基本工资的四分之一到一半。奖金的发放基于业务表现以及员工自身年度目标的实现情况。后者的设定是为了明确具体目标，如在中国的收入增长，或新产品的数量和成功发布，或者培养了多少潜在的总裁候选人。长期股权补偿的目的是为了激励高管长期创造财富。鉴于Danaher公司的股价表现，Danaher高管创造的财富确实超过了同业的其他高管。

下半部分：

Danaher Business System (DBS)

At the core of Danaher‘s operating model and acquisition strategy was the Danaher Business System (DBS). The firm‘s investor presentations described DBS as ―defining our high-performance culture. DBS is who we are and how we do what we do.‖ Outsiders noted that DBS ―is a set of management tools borrowed liberally from the famed Toyota Production System. In essence it requires every employee, from the janitor to the president, to find ways every day to improve the way works get done.‖34 While such programs were ―de rigeur for manufacturers for years, the difference at Danaher (was) the company started lean in 1987, one of the earliest U.S. companies to do so, and it has maintained a cultish devotion

to making it pay off.‖35 The lean approach replaced a traditional ―batch-and-queue‖ manufacturing system with a ―single-piece flow‖ that minimized inprocess time and so reduced inventory and other overhead costs. ―In a typical Danaher factory, floors are covered with strips of tape indicating where everything should be, from the biggest machine to the humblest trash can. Managers determine the most efficient place for everything, so a worker won‘t have to walk an extra few yards to pick up a tool, for instance.‖36

Danaher业务管理系统（DBS）

Danaher的操作模型和并购计划的核心便是Danaher商业体系（DBS）。公司投资者的介绍中如此描述DBS：给了我们优越的文化一个定义。我们就是DBS，DBS就是我们的行为准则和奋斗目标。外界人士称DBS是从著名的丰田生产体系完整地借用过来的一套管理工具，本质上来说，就是每一个员工包括从最基础部门的到最高总裁，每天都要不懈地寻找改进工作的方式。尽管这套体系被生产厂商要求使用多年，Danaher的区别在于公司在1987年开始采用精细生产管理，是美国最早投身于此的公司之一，并且维持了一种热爱精神使之最终赢得回报。精细生产管理途径用单件生产流程替代了传统的批量生产的体系，缩短了生产过程，并且减少了库存量和其他管理费用。“在一个典型的Danaher工厂里，地板上都铺着胶带，指示了从最大的机器乃至最不起眼的垃圾桶应该摆放的位置。经理决定所有事物最有效率的摆放位置，因此当工人取一件工具时都无需多走一步。”

Over time, DBS came to represent a broader approach than simply lean manufacturing, and had taken these same principles to transactional processes. More recently, Danaher had been expanding DBS to include ―Ideas to Execution‖—which expanded DBS tools and capabilities into innovation, new product development, marketing, and sales.

The DBS approach embodied ―four P‘s—people, plan, process, and performance.‖ These four elements were applied rigorously and unemotionally both to current businesses and new acquisitions.

一段时间之后，DBS用更广泛的方式取代了简单的精细管理，并且在业务程序中也得以应用。近期，Danaher拓宽了DBS的概念，使之包含了“执行理念”——这将DBS工具和能力拓展至创新、新产品研发、市场和销售等方面。

DBS包含了4P：人、计划、程序和执行。这四个要素在当今商业和并购中都得到了充分的应用。

PEOPLE Talent assessment was a major component of acquisition due diligence as well as of ongoing

reviews of existing businesses. Managerial retention rates differed across acquisitions, but Danaher typically transitioned out between zero and 50% of senior management within a couple of years of ownership. For an acquisition like Videojet, replacing the management team might have been seen as part of the value-creation opportunity. In other deals, like Radiometer, no one was asked to leave. Personnel decisions were made not only on the basis of interviews during the due-diligence process but after observing managers in operation, and were made as quickly as possible to sort among executives who were either unlikely to succeed or unlikely to fit in the Danaher culture. As Culp noted, ―you get a different view of someone when you spend a week or a month working with them, than in a three- or four-hour interview.‖ If, before completing the deal, it was known that certain key personnel would leave, a plan to replace them, either with a pre-identified internal candidate or an outsider (preferably a Danaher proven manager) would have been developed.

人

才能评估是并购和对现有商业的回顾的主要组成部分。管理保留率在各种并购中并不相同，但Danaher在几年所有权期间内，将高层管理保留率在0-50%之间过渡。像Videojet并购案，管理团队的更替被认为是价值

创造机会的一部分。在其他案例中，如Radiometer，没有人被要求离开。人员决定不仅仅取决于尽职调查程序中的面试，并且要在执行者中尽快跳出那些不太可能成功或者不太可能适应Denaher文化的人群。就像Culp所说，与其花三四个小时的面谈，不如花一个星期或者一个月与人共事，那样你会对他们产生更不一样的观点。如果在并购完成之前，已知某些人将要离开，会事先拟出一个更替这些人员的计划，也许选用预先指定的内部候选人，或一个外来的（最好是经过Danaher认可的经理人）。

PLAN The second element of DBS was creating a strategic plan for every business (existing or acquired)

that would address two questions: ―What game are we playing‖ and ―how do we win?‖

Although Danaher executives obtained some idea of a preferred strategy for an acquisition target during the due-diligence process, Culp noted that ―it was only after the deal was completed, and the bankers and lawyers are out of the room, that we can have an honest strategic conversation with management. At that point, we throw out the 180-page strategy manuals and create a plan for the new acquisition that is due within 100 days of purchase that is intended to produce a shared longterm vision. No sacred cows are left unchallenged, and our due-diligence findings are shared with the company. This entire conversation is usually very important.‖ The Danaher team involved in this process included the CEO, EVP of the segment, head of HR, CFO and two members of the M&A deal team. The intent was to encourage managers to realize that substantial improvement in performance was possible, and to challenge them to identify the gaps that were preventing them from reaching such a stretch target.

计划

DBS的第二个要素便是为每一宗商务活动（现行的或已经办结的）制定一个战略性计划，这样会产生两个问题：“我们正在玩什么游戏”和“我们怎样赢”。尽管Danaher的执行官们在尽职调查过程中对某一并购目标的偏好策略有一定想法，Culp却说：“这只能是在交易完成之后，银行家和律师都已走出房间，我们才能跟管理层诚挚地交流战略性问题。那时，我们会扔出一本180页的战略手册，制定一个100天内即将到期的并购案的新计划。我们的发现会与公司分享。整个对话通常都是非常重要的”。与此程序相关的Danaher团队人员包括首席执行官、部门执行副总裁、人力资源领导、首席财务官以及两名企业并购小组成员。目的是鼓励这些经理人们，取得实质进步是可能的，并且给他们指出取得这种进步所会面临的挑战。

PROCESS A key element of the integration process was introducing DBS to new managers. This first occurred through ―one week of a training session for executives followed by a one-week kaizen event.‖ Danaher‘s CEO himself taught a full day in the training program, with the DBSO teaching the remainder. The week-long ―kaizen‖ event usually took place in one of the target‘s manufacturing facilities and was designed to improve the process flow of a single piece, as in the Toyota Production System. The goal for such an exercise would be set high, such as halving the floor space required, but managers found they typically exceeded even that aggressive goal. Culp noted that ―we really don‘t care if it‘s manufacturing focused or not, the goal is to get newcomers to appreciate elements like single piece flow, visual maps, and so on. It is action learning. Furthermore, having the president of the company put on jeans and work boots and get involved with a broom on the shop floor can be powerful in setting expectations. It is an opportunity to touch a lot of people quickly.‖

程序

整合程序的一个关键元素在于将DBS介绍给新的经理人。第一件事便是一周的领导层培训和接下来一周的改善事件。Danaher的CEO亲自讲授一整天的培训课程，DBSO讲授其余部分。为期一周的“改善”事件通常发生在目标的生产设施之一，旨在改善一个单件的工艺流程，例如在丰田生产系统。这项工作的目标会被设置的比较高，如减半所需的楼面面积，但管理人员发现，他们通常甚至超过了积极的目标设定。Culp指出，“我

们真的不在乎它的制造业集中与否，目的是让新人认识到像单件流，可视化地图等元素。这是行动学习。此外，如果公司有一位穿牛仔裤和工作靴、并且会参与车间清扫工作的总裁，可以被寄予更大的期望，因为这是一个可以快速接触很多人的机会。

Since the Leica acquisition in 2005, Danaher had added an additional step in the training process that took roughly 12 mid-level managers away from their jobs on a three-month Danaher world tour to immerse them in DBS and drive cultural integration. This immersion exercise involved several kaizen events and managers were expected to ―get the mindset‖ if not yet become experts in certain Danaher tools, like accelerated product development.

自从2005年的Leica并购案以来，Danaher在训练过程中增加了一个额外步骤，将大约12名的中层管理人员从工作岗位上抽离出来，参加为期三个月的Danaher世界巡回考察，从而使他们沉浸在DBS中并推动文化整合。这种沉浸式训练涉及若干改善活动，管理者被寄望于获得一种心态，如果尚未在某些Danaher工具方面的成为专家，例如加快产品开发。

After the initial training period, the process shifted into a ―maniacal focus on DBS which seeks to drive sustainable improvement over an indefinite time period.‖ This involved both an operating philosophy and ongoing management development. The intent was to create a culture where every executive was continually looking for opportunities to improve any and every aspect of the business. While specific tools (such as value-stream mapping, and ―kaizen‖ events, where a team dedicated a week to developing and implementing a solution to an identified problem) were the most visible manifestations of DBS, Danaher believed that building a managerial mindset of continuous improvement was ultimately the most important result of the process.

最初的训练期后，这个进程转移到“关于DBS的，在不确定的时间期限内，旨在推动可持续改善的疯狂专注”，这涉及到经营理念和持续发展管理。这样做的目的是创造一种文化，使每一个管理人员不断寻找机会以提高业务的任何方面。虽然具体的工具是DBS最明显的表（当一个团队决定用一个星期的时间制定和实施一个解决方案，例如价值流程图、“改善”事件，用于改善已经发现的问题）。Danaher相信，最终建立一个持续改

善的管理理念，是整个过程最重要的结果。

PERFORMANCE Once the strategy for a business was agreed upon, a policy deployment (PD) tool

was used to drive and monitor its implementation (see Exhibit 9 for a Top-Level Policy Deployment Chart). The core of this system was the Policy Deployment Review (PD), ―a literal but perhaps awkward translation of the Japanese term ―Hoshin Kanri‖ which really means guiding light.‖37 PD reviews took place once a month for every business and PD objectives were directly linked to the strategic plan. First, were a series of three to five year objectives that would dramatically improve firm performance. Next were annual objectives that had to be met in order to keep the strategy on path, particularly those objectives that tracked the breakthrough initiatives essential to achieving a step change in performance. In turn, these objectives triggered a series of process improvements that were needed, and whose performance was tracked against specific output measures. HR, for example, would end up with targets for items such as ―time to fill a vacant position‖ or ―internal fill rate of positions‖, rather than input measures, such as completing the design of a talent development plan. Culp offered additional detail on the nature of the monthly reviews:

表现

商业战略一旦商定，策略部署工具（PD）被用于驱动并监督其实施。该系统的核心是策略部署回顾，按照字面但或许 的解释，日本名词“Hoshin Kanri”（策略管理）的真正意义是指路明灯。每一个与战略计划直接相

关的业务和战略部署目标，都会在每个月执行一次回顾。首先是一个三至五年的目标，将极大改善公司的业绩。其次，是年度目标，必须符合保持战略路径的目的，尤其是跟踪那些为实现阶跃变化的至关重要的突破性举措目标。反过来，这些目标引发了一系列需要的改进过程，并对其具体输出措施的表现进行跟踪。例如人力资源，项目的最终目标是“填补空缺职位时间”或“内部岗位填充率”，而不是输入的措施，例如完成人才发展计划的设计。卡尔提供了更多关于月度回顾的细节：

First, there are the financial variables we focus on: profit/loss, balance sheet, and cash, with particular emphasis placed on achieving a target ROIC in the case of a new acquisition. In addition, there are key performance indicators for each business—on-time delivery, yield,etc.—which number around 15 for each business and are derived from the plan. Then there are the elements driving breakthroughs. Last, there are the intangibles we examine by walking through the shop floor, or having skip-level lunches. These meetings are hands-on. They are d signed to ensure that the numbers are real, as well as to build process and organization for the longer term.

首先，我们关注财务数字的变化，利润/亏损、资产负债表、以及现金流，特别是把重点放在一个新的收购项目下实现的目标资本收益率。此外，还有每个业务部分的关键性能指标——按时交货、产量等——其中每个业务大约有15个指标来源于计划。然后是驱动突破的要素。最后我们审核无形的部分，例如深入车间、或是跨级别人员间共进午餐。这些会议都事必躬亲，其目的是确保数字真实，以及建立更长远的流程和组织。

PDs don‘t just involve senior managers but are cascaded through the organization. For example, if a business level objective were the doubling of R&D productivity, one PD goal might be to improve the product development process. In turn, that objective would trigger a series of objectives for other parts of the R&D organization (see Exhibit 10 for an Improvement Priorities Cascade Slide).

通过组织内的级联系统，策略部署不只是涉及高级管理人员。例如，如果一个业务级别的目标是增加一倍的研发生产能力，则策略部署的目标可能是改进产品开发过程。反过来，这一目标将会引发研发机构其他部分的一系列目标。

We capture the PD review objectives on a single piece of paper. Progress against goals is color coded: red if off-track, green if on-track, yellow if questionable. Red numbers receive the most attention naturally, but we don‘t always start with these—we may talk through the greens first . . . to ensure that they are really greens. For the red indicators, we do a root cause analysis of the failure, asking the ―five why‘s‖ in order to understand what needs to be corrected and to propose a series of

countermeasures. The number of red metrics in a business is not by itself important, but neither is it acceptable for a red metric to continue for long.

我们将策略部署回顾的目标记录在一张纸上。对目标进展情况进行彩色标记：偏离轨道标记为红色，遵循轨道标记为绿色，疑问部分标记为黄色。红色标记的数量自然最被关注，但我们并不总是这些开始——我们可以通过讨论绿色标记开始??以确保它们是真正按照轨道运作的。对于红色标志，我们做一个导致失败的根本原因分析，追问“五个为什么”，以了解什么需要纠正，并提出一系列应对措施。业务上红色指标的数量本身并不重要，但也并不意味着一个长期持续的红色指标可以被接受。

Analysts noted how DBS arose from a firm belief at Danaher that ―everything is measurable.‖ At the same time, Culp noted that:

PD reviews are not simply ―managing by the numbers,‖ as some people think. We iteratively start with the numbers, then talk through process, then cycle back to the numbers. Performance is not just

painting by numbers, it‘s understanding how those numbers were achieved that is important. We may be as focused on the numbers as any company but we combine this with a Toyota-like drive around operational improvements. Indeed, what is critical about PD reviews is that tools and processes are being deployed to address the metrics. As a result, red metrics can be good since it is through these that we build processes for the longer term. Conversely, there would be as much concern if all the metrics are green because it would indicate that there was no further potential for improvement.

分析人士指出，在Danaher ，DBS如何建立 “一切皆可衡量” 的坚定信念。与此同时，Culp指出：

策略部署回顾并不像某些人认为的那样，是简单的“基于数字的管理”。我们从数字开始，然后讨论过程，然后循环回到数字。数字不仅是描绘工作表现，更重要的是了解这些数字是如何取得的。我们可能像其他公司一样聚焦于数字，但是我们会围绕运营改善，将这些数字用一种类似丰田模式的方法结合起来。事实上，策略部署回顾的关键是，工具和流程被重点部署到关键的衡量标准上。因此，红色指标可以是好的，因为我们将通过它们建立更长远的流程。相反，如果所有指标都是绿色的，将会被尽可能多地关注，因为它表明没有进一步改善的潜力。

Over time, Danaher had internally developed a series of over 50 tools (see Exhibit 11 for a sample) that covered processes from general management, human resources, growth tools (ideas to execution, or I2E), operating lean within your own four walls (manufacturing), problem solving (six sigma) and working through suppliers (supply chain). This set of tools had evolved over time with a conscious effort to develop processes that were applicable beyond manufacturing as well. Use of the particular tool was left up to managers who were expected to choose the tool that helped solve their problem, rather than just to check the boxes (―I‘ve done six sigma‖).

Culp concluded by summarizing the role of PD reviews in DBS more broadly:

随着时间的推移，Danaher内部已开发出了一系列的超过50个工具，涵盖了一般管理，人力资源，增长工具（执行计划，或I2E），内部运营（制造），解决问题（六西格玛），以及通过供应商工作（供应链）。随着时间推移，这套工具已经有意识地努力演变为超越制造流程。通过使用特定工具，预计可以帮助管理人员解决他们的问题，而不只是为了检查框架（“我已经完成了六西格玛”）。

Culp更广泛地总结策略部署回顾在DBS中的作用：

Our objective is a blameless culture: we try to attack the problem, not the person. At the same time, these conversations can be intense. But that is how we build muscle and culture in the organization. Indeed, if there were only one DBS tool to use, it would be PD. This is at the root of sustained performance improvement since it does not accept a low bar as sufficient. We set very high expectations and have a bias for action while maintaining a competitive sense of winning. It demands that management have experience and commitment to DBS to lead from the front, as well as the confidence and the thick skin required to truly stretch the organization. 我们的目标是一个无可指责的文化：我们试图攻击问题，而不是人。同时，这些谈话可以激烈。但这是我们如何在组织内建立肌理和文化。事实上，如果DBS只有一个工具可以使用，它将是PD（策略部署）。这是持续性改善的根本，因为它不满足于接受一个低标准，我们设定很高的期望和有所侧重的行动，同时保持一种求胜的竞争意识。它要求管理人员首先感受并信奉DBS，以及对组织信心和厚皮肤需要真正的弹力组织。

DBS in Action: The Radiometer Acquisition

In January 2005 Danaher acquired Radiometer, a Danish firm that had been family controlled since its

founding in 1935 and publicly traded since 1984. Radiometer made instruments for testing and measuring blood gases (oxygen and carbon dioxide) for acute care patients, and was the world leader in a $1 billion global niche market. During the previous five years, sales had grown at 6.5% per year, and return on sales had grown to almost 20%. Peter Kurstein, CEO of Radiometer, also recalled that ―the management team had an average tenure of 16 years in the company. We loved the company, but also thought we were pretty good and were skeptical that anybody, without detailed knowledge about our niche, could make us any better. There were many bidders for our company, including private equity. They all worked through the ?data room‘ as did Danaher‘s M&A team. The only real difference between the buyers was that two Danaher executives asked for a three-hour walk through one of our plants in order to understand its potential for ?lean manufacturing.‘‖38 Kurstein continued:

Radiometer公司并购案

2005年1月，Danaher 并购 Radiometer公司，Radiometer是一家成立于1935年，并于1984年上市的丹麦家族公司，主要研制应用于危急病人的血气分析仪（检测血液中氧气和二氧化碳的含量），并以全球利基市场上10亿美金的业绩处于世界领先地位。在过去五年，Radiometer的销量以每年6.5%的比例增长，销售收益率已经增长近20%。Radiometer公司的CEO Peter Kurstein先生回忆道：“公司管理团队的平均任期达到了16年，我们热爱这个公司，我们也认为我们很好，并对那些并未详细了解我们优势的人能使公司变得更好表示怀疑。我们的公司面临很多买家，也包括私人股本。他们都通过Danaher企业并购团队提供的数据库来工作。不同买家之间唯一的真正区别是， Danaher的两个管理人员步行三小时，就是为了通过实地考察一个工厂来了解其潜在的精益制造。” Kurstein补充道。

The first key event, that took place four weeks after the acquisition, was the Executive Champion Orientation (or ECO). That was a positive, teambuilding eye-opener. Having the top 40 managers at Radiometer split into six groups to do a value-stream mapping and seeing the absolutely obvious improvement opportunities from simple changes was very powerful. In our group, we discovered that a little plastic part which took 18 days to move from raw material to shipping, actually took only 1,447 seconds of operating time to produce. We came up with improvements that reduced that in-process time to less than two days by creating a one-piece work flow and eliminating the planning department and IT infrastructure that had previously managed work scheduling. Similarly, the head of R&D came to me a couple of days after the ECO and said ―We can use the same way of thinking in R&D. I suggest that we set the goal of reducing development time by 33%.‖ What more can you ask for—a commitment from the person who is in charge, and the tools readily available to get started. The experience has been the same since.

在并购四个星期后，发生的第一个关键事件是实施冠军训练，这是一次积极的、令人眼界大开的团队建设活动。Radiometer公司的40名高管被分成六组，通过绘制价值流程图，我们发现，通过简单改变实现

绝对明显的改善的机会是非常大的。我所在的小组发现：一个小小的塑料部件，从原材料到运输环节需

要耗费18天，但事实上只需要花1447秒的时间来生产。我们提出一个改善措施，即：将生产一个单件的流程缩短到2天以内，并取消了以往负责管理调度的规划部门和基础IT设施。类似的，在ECO结束的几天后，研发部门负责人找到我说“我们可以将同样的思维应用在研发管理上。我建议以缩短33%的研发时间作为目标。”你还能要求什么更多的——来自负责人的承诺，以及容易上手的工具，因为经验已经是相同的。

The next major event was the ―strat plan‖—two months after the acquisition. It was really not a new strat plan, it was our existing information, analysis, and strategy. But what came through for us, was

that Danaher really wanted to understand our market and why we have succeeded. Danaher was not going to tell us what to do differently, rather they were going to challenge us on whether we are getting enough out of our opportunities. For example, in some segments Radiometer has more than 40% market share, which we thought was pretty good. But Danaher management challenged us and asked: why do 60% prefer other products? We gave them our standard answer which is that the remaining 60% are really not attractive customers. They buy at low prices, don‘t care about quality, and are not really competent.

在并购的两个月后，下一个重要事件是“启动计划”，这并非真的启动一个新计划，而是我们现有的信息、分析、和战略，Danaher真的想通过我们了解市场，以及我们成功的原因。Danaher不会告诉我们要做什么不同的事，而是要基于我们是否获得了足够的机会来挑战我们。例如，在一些细分市场上，Danaher拥有40%以上的市场份额，我们认为这已经相当好了。但是Danaher的管理层挑战我们，问道：为什么另有60%的市场偏好其他产品？我们给出了我们的标准答案：剩下的60%真的是不具备吸引力的客户，他们购买廉价的产品，并不关心质量和是否真正满足使用。

Well, they weren‘t really happy with our answer, and asked when was the last time we had systematically asked these 60% why they buy something different. Well, the answer was pretty weak, for certain segments we might have done something 3–4 years ago, for most we were pretty blank. Through the strat plan discussions, it became clear to us that we probably knew our own existing customers very well, but we did not know our competitors‘ customers. And once you realize this, you also see that you don‘t have a growth strategy because converting the competitors‘ accounts is where the growth is. So rather than protecting the leading segment share and profitability, the strat plan discussion got us thinking about how we can further win in the market.

当然，他们并不满意我们的答案，并问我们最后一次有计划地研究这60%的客户为什么要购买其他产品是在什么时间。答案非常缺乏说服力，就某些部分，我们可能在3-4年前做过研究，但大部分仍是相当空白。通过对启动计划的讨论，我们对于现有客户的了解可能变得更加清晰，但我们仍然不知道竞争对手的客户情况。一旦认识到这一点，你还会看到，你缺少一个发展战略，因为转化 竞争对手的客户是在不断成长的。相对于保持领先的市场份额和盈利，启动计划的讨论让我们思考我们如何能够进一步赢得市场。

With the strategic plan in place, an organizational review allowed Danaher to identify necessary

organizational and personnel changes. At Radiometer, two executives were brought in from Danaher—the head of U.S. sales and the vice president of marketing—otherwise it received the equivalent of 3–4 FTEs of time from Danaher personnel in the transition, including a week that several senior team members spent with Peter Kurstein working to ―kaizen‖ the shop floor of a Michigan plant. In return, Kurstein was obliged to spend one week a year involved in a kaizen project at another Danaher company.

有了适当的战略计划，审查组织允许Danaher公司确定必要的组织和人事变动。两位Danaher公司高管被派入 Radiometer公司——一个是美国市场的销售负责人，一个是营销副总裁。另外，在过渡期间，他被认为等效于3-4个Danaher正式员工的时间，包括几位资深的团队成员与Peter Kurstein花了一周时间来“改善”密歇根州的工厂车间。作为回报，Kurstein不得不每年花一周时间参与Danaher公司其他项目的改善工作。

Kurstein believed that Policy Deployment was perhaps the biggest and most important change at

Radiometer after the acquisition. Indeed, he had previously been looking ―to employ some way to improve execution of strategy through the application of a systematic process, like the Balanced Scorecard.‖ He went

on to note that:

Kurstein认为，策略部署也许是Radiometer公司被并购后的最大和最重要的变化。事实上，他以前也在寻找一种“通过某种系统进程的应用来提高战略执行力的颁发，例如平衡计分卡”。他接着指出：

Radiometer used to make three-year strategic plans every year. Lots of work went into it and they were always strictly confidential documents which ended up well protected in some closets, secrets also from our own employees. Frankly, those plans were not bad but it is awfully difficult to execute a secret plan. Policy deployment is pure logic, pushing consistent execution of the breakthrough priorities from the overall strategic level to the factory floor. I did not see it at first, and it took me a while to understand the finer mechanics of this tool.

Radiometer曾经制定为期三年的战略计划（每年），他们经手大量的工作（进入它），并总是把文件保管在储藏柜里进行严密保护，包括来自于员工的秘密。坦率地说，这些计划不坏，但它是很难作为一个秘密计划来执行。战略部署是纯粹的逻辑，是从整体战略层面到工厂车间对于重点（优先）突破的统一推动执行，我首先并没有看到这一点，我花了一些时间，以便找到使用这个工具的方法。

Policy deployment does not happen automatically. It takes a lot of hard work in the beginning to set it up, it takes several iterations and a lot of discipline to establish throughout level one, two and three and most importantly to get the right action plans developed. If you do it half way, it does not work well. If sloppily done, it just becomes a paper game with no improvement. For me the monthly PD meetings became the key. If these monthly meetings become inquisitions where we try to find somebody to blame for the misses, PD will start working against you. You have to be intent to use the meetings to direct the relevant resources to where they matter the most. Catch the misses early and hit them hard. And when misses are discussed, it is imperative that root causes and countermeasures are defined by those who really know what is going on. . . . Today, I am not in doubt: PD is the most powerful execution tool around and you get it for free—except for the initial investment in setting it up and keeping the discipline.

战略部署不会自动发生，前期设置需要投入大量而艰苦的工作，需要多次反复和大量试炼，建立一套可贯穿于一、二、三层级的??，最重要是找到正确的开发行动计划。如果半途而废，就不会取得好的效果；如果草率而为，它就只会是一个纸面计划而无法取得实质改善效果。对于我来说，每月的PD会议成为关键。每当我们试图将错误归咎于某些人，从而将月会演变为一场审判会议时，PD就会出面干涉。你必须将注意力直指会议上那些有重大意义的、最受关注的信息。尽早发现错误并全力纠正。一旦围绕错误展开讨论，至关重要的是：哪些人真正了解情况，能分析根本原因并提出对策。到今天，我不再怀疑：除了最初在设立和维持管理上需要投入的成本，PD是你能免费获得的最强大的执行工具。

Not every PD initiative succeeded: for example, dividing the manufacturing floor into 47 cells had been undertaken too quickly and had disrupted purchasing to the extent that production halted on several occasions. But three years after the acquisition, Kurstein noted the results: ―Danaher has been able to help us improve not by a little, but by a lot. You can look at almost any aspect of the business, strategy, execution, growth, market share, working capital, inventory—improvements have been accelerated in all areas. Most importantly we have been able to improve our growth from low single digits to high single digits and our operating margin by another 4%, while at the same time increasing our R&D spending for further growth by 2%.‖ Despite these successes, Kurstein felt that ―only half the potential improvement has actually been achieved. We have not used at least half of the tools available through the Tool Box since we only use them when they are relevant.‖

并非PD的每一个倡议都是成功的：例如，将生产车间划分为47个小组来加快生产，就在某种程度上扰乱了采购，进而屡次导致生产中断。但是在并购后的三年，Kurstein提出结论：在Danaher公司的帮助下，我们的改进不只一点，而是很多。透过业务、战略、执行、增长、市场份额、营运资金、库存等任何方面，你几乎都可以看到改善在加速。最重要的是，我们已经将增长率从low single digit提升至high single digit，并且营业毛利也增长了4%。而在同一时间，我们的研发支出进一步增长了2%。” 尽管取得了这些成功，kurstein觉得，只有一半的潜在改进获得了实现。工具箱中至少有一半工具未被使用过，因为只有当这些工具之间相互有关联时我们才会使用它。

Building on the success of Radiometer, Danaher expanded into Dental and Life Sciences. In 2007, revenues from Medical Technology were $3 billion or 25% of the total, growing at high single digits.

基于Radiometer的成功，Danaher将业务扩大到牙科和生命科学。2007年，来自于医疗技术的收益是30亿美元，占到总收益的25%，以高倍的水平增长。

Performance

Between 1986 and 2006, Danaher‘s revenues grew from $296 million to $9.6 billion, an annual percentage growth rate of nearly 50% (see Exhibit 12). Profitability also increased: Danaher‘s net margins grew from 3.5% in 1986 to 11.7% in 2006 (See Exhibit 13 for Revenue, Operating Profit and Capital Expenditure Year over Year). For the decade 1996–2006, operating cash flows increased from $217 million to $1.5 billion. Between 1987 and 2007, the compound annual growth rate in Danaher‘s share price was 23%.

表现

1986至2006年间，Danaher的总收入从2.96亿美元增长至96亿美元，每年的增长率接近50%（见表12），盈利能力也在增强：Danaher的净利润率从1986年的3.5％增长到2006年的11.7％（见表13，营业收入，营业利润和资本支出较去年同期比），在1996-2006年的十年中，经营性现金流量从2.17亿美元增加至15亿美元。1987至2007年间，Danaher股价的复合年均增长率达到了23%。

Danaher‘s performance since 2001 was similarly impressive. Between 2001 and 2006, Danaher‘s revenues increased from $3.8 billion to $9.6 billion—an annual percentage growth rate of over 20%.39 Operating cash flows increased by nearly $1 billion between 2001 and 2006, and Danaher‘s share price increased by 180% between May 2001 and September 2007 (see Exhibit 14 for Annual Balance Sheet from 2002–2006). In 2007, Danaher‘s trailing twelve month gross margin was 45%, approximately 10% higher than the average for its peer group (see Exhibit 15 for Annual Ratio Report). One business journalist dubbed

Danaher ―probably the best-run conglomerate in America,‖ pointing out that over the previous 20 years the firm had returned a ―remarkable 25% to shareholders annually, far better than GE (16%), Berkshire Hathaway (21%), or the Standard & Poor‘s 500-stock index.‖40 Another analyst simply noted that Danaher had ―made process improvement an art.‖41 丹纳赫公司自2001年以来的表现同样令人印象深刻。2001至2006年间，丹纳赫公司的收入从38亿美元增长到96亿美元——年度百分比增长率超过20%。经营流动资金2001至2006年间增长近10亿美元，丹纳赫公司的股票价格在2001年5月至2007年9月间增长180%。在2007年，丹纳赫公司连续12个月的毛利率为45%，大约比同行平均水平高出10%。一位商业记者把丹纳赫公司称为“可能是美国运行最好的企业集团”，指出在过去20年这家公司每年回报“股东非凡的25%，远远超过GE（16%）、Berkshire Hathaway （21%），或者标准普尔 500种股票指数。”另一位分析师只指出，丹纳赫公司已经使“过程改进成为一种艺术”。

Going Forward 展望未来

Between 2001 and 2007, Danaher had undergone various changes. More than 50% of its revenues now came from markets outside the U.S., with a significant presence in emerging economies. Over $3 billion in revenues came from its Medical Technologies platform that enjoyed high single digit constant currency growth in 2007. Danaher had seen a significant

expansion in its leadership positions in Water, Test, and Measurement, and Product Identification. And, the Danaher Business System continued to evolve and extend, from the manufacturing floor to innovation, marketing, R&D, sales, and the back office. Cumulative returns on Danaher‘s stock from 2001–2007 exceeded 150%, in comparison with S&P 500 returns of about 25%. Indeed, when managers of other large broadly diversified firms were asked ―?Which company do you emulate?‘ the consistently reply was, ‘Danaher.‘‖42

在2001至2007年间，丹纳赫公司经历了各种变化。随着新兴市场的明显出现，丹纳赫公司现在超过50%的收入来自美国以外的市场。2007年超过30亿美元的收入来自医疗技术平台，享有高个位数的固定汇率增长。在水、测试和测量，以及产品标识方面，丹纳赫公司的领先地位明显扩张。同时，丹纳赫业务系统持续发展和延伸，从生产车间到创新、营销、研究开发、销售和后台。丹纳赫的股票从2001至2007年累积回报超过150%。事实上，当各种其它大型企业的经理们问“哪家企业你要效仿？”一贯的回答都是，“丹纳赫公司”。 Despite this success, Danaher faced a number of challenges. 尽管有这些成功，但丹纳赫面临一系列的挑战

Growth 成长

Danaher‘s historical revenue growth had been largely driven by acquisition (see Exhibit 16). From 1992 to 2006, the compound annual organic growth rate was approximately 5%, versus total growth of 18%. Maintaining its

high growth rates required that Danaher confront certain challenges. First, it （P14）

would have to continue to put its strong cash flow to work with attractive value-added acquisitions. Second, a slowing U.S. economy, together with some signs of a weakening world economy, placed natural limits on organic revenue growth. Third, while cyclicality had been reduced, parts of Danaher‘s portfolio were still exposed to swings in end-markets.

丹纳赫的历史收入增长主要由并购促成。从1996年到2006年，复合年均有机增长率大约为5%，而总增长率为18%。保持其高增长率需要丹纳赫面临必然的挑战。首先，它必须继续用强大的现金流进行有吸引力的增值并购。第二，美国经济放缓，以及全球经济疲软的迹象，有机增长受到自然限制。第三，虽然周期性已经减少，丹纳赫公司的投资组合中的一部分依然受到终端市场的波动影响。

Some of Danaher‘s platforms were poised for organic expansion in 2007: for example, analysts predicted that the environmental and medical platforms would benefit from expanding end-user markets. However, other Danaher businesses, such as Mechanics‘ Hand Tools, served more mature markets. One analyst acknowledged that even though the Hand Tools business had a ―decade-plus track record of outpacing the market, [. . .] the ―underlying market growth projections [ran] in the less-than-inspiring 2%–3% range.‖43

丹纳赫公司的一些平台准备好在2007年进行有机扩张：例如，分析师预测，环保和医疗平台将受益于终端用户市场。然而，其它丹纳赫业务，如机械手工工具，服务更成熟的市场。一位分析师承认，即使手工工具业务“有十多年赶超市场的纪录”，潜在市场成长预测在低于鼓舞人心的2%-3%的范围内。

Growth in acquisitions presented other challenges. As Danaher continued to be active in its search for new targets, it faced the prospect of going head-to-head with a different type of competitor: private equity firms. In October 2006, the Wall Street Journal characterized private equity firms as ―on a tear,‖ noting that 15 of the top 20 buyouts on record had been announced in the previous year and a half by players such as Kohlberg, Kravis, and Roberts, Bain Capital, and the Blackstone Group.44 As recently as 2005, the largest fund was worth $6 billion, but by 2007 Blackstone's fund was worth some $20 billion,45 and its initial public offering was widely covered even in non-financial media outlets.46 Large buy-out firms were increasingly being referred to as the ―new conglomerates,‖ and observers began to question the role of the old ones. The Financial Times summarized this view: ―The conglomerate business model, which looked so visionary in the deal fever of the 1980s, appears more and more endangered. . . . Many [conglomerates] are either disappearing or struggling to justify their existence. Their predicament is made all the more serious by the rise of nimbler predators—privateequity

groups.‖47

并购的增长存在其它的挑战。当丹纳赫继续积极寻找新的目标时，它面临的前景是与不同类型的竞争对手正面交锋：私人股权投资公司。在2006年10月，华尔街日报把私人股权投资公司定义为“一个裂口‖,指出就记录中的前20个并购企业中15个在过去一年已经被公布，其中一半是Kohlberg，Kravis等运动员，还有Roberts， Bain Capital，以及黑石集团（Blackstone Group）。直到2005年，最大的基金价值60亿美元，但到2007年黑石集团的基金价值大约200亿美元，首次公开募股广泛地覆盖到即便是非金融的媒体经销商。大量的收购公司越来越多地被称为“新企业集团”，观察家开始质疑旧企业集团的角色。金融时报总结这观点：“这些企业集团业务的模式在20世纪80年代被狂热地认为有远见，现在出现越来越多的濒危。许多企业集团正在消失或挣扎着证明它们的存在。它们的困境因更灵活的捕食者——私人股权投资集团的崛起而更变得更严重。”

In the second-quarter 2007 earnings results conference call, Culp fielded a specific question regarding private equity, replying that:

在2007年第二季度业绩电话会议上，Culp接到一个关于私人股权的问题，答复如下：

. . . obviously there is a lot of private equity money out there with some smart people looking to put it to work. They tend, I think . . . to focus on properties that aren't necessarily high on our list. When we take the long view—because we're building businesses and we're not buying to

sell -- when we look at our synergies and the other things that we would bring to a transaction, we tend to see, frankly, other strategics as really the relevant competitive set, much more so than private equity. Not that they won't be there, but we find they, more often than not, are going to set a floor in a process as opposed to be a finalist in a sale process with a company like Danaher, particularly around properties that we covet.48 明显有很多私人股本资金放在那里，有一些聪明的人希望把它利用起来。他们倾向于，我认为??重点放在我们清单上不是很必要的资产。当我们用长远的眼光——因为我们在建立业务，我们不是做买卖——当我们看待自己的协同作用以及其它我们会用来交易的东西，我们往往会看到，坦率地说，其它作为真正竞争力布署的战略，远远超过了私人股权。并不是说他们不会那样，但我们发现他们常常不是，他们会在一个过程设置底线，而不是跟像丹纳赫这样的公司在销售过程中竞争，特别是对于那些我们垂涎的资产。 In addition to the challenges posed by a more heated market for acquisitions was the risk of acquiring bigger targets. A recent BusinessWeek article cautioned that ―as M&A gets more expensive, Danaher must either increase the pace of its deals or swallow bigger fish. And it may be more difficult to convert bigger companies with established traditions, entrenched cultures, and larger workforces to its fervent brand of lean manufacturing.‖49 Some analysts noted the potential to bolster Danaher‘s acquisition prospects through the infusion of cash that could come through divestment. Yet Danaher‘s divestments had been infrequent: between January 1984 and July 2007, Danaher consummated 79 acquisitions, with only 12 divestitures (see Exhibit 17 for a chart of Danaher‘s acquisitions over time). Despite this, Danaher management maintained in 2007 that the conglomerate had plenty of free cash flow to sustain forthcoming deals, and that the acquisition pipeline remained full. 给并购带来更加激烈的挑战的是并购更大目标的风险。《商业周刊》最近的一篇文章警告说：“当M&A（并购）变得更加昂贵，丹纳赫必须提高其交易的步伐，或吞下更大的鱼。而且，它可能更难以把有着既定传统、根深蒂固的文化和更多员工的企业转变为它的有名的品牌——精益生产。一些分析师注意到从撤离投资得到的现金注入的潜力，可以巩固丹纳赫公司的并购预期。然而，丹纳赫公司的撤离投资已经很稀少：在1984年1月到2007年7月期间，丹纳赫公司完成了79次并购，其中仅有12次撤离投资。尽管如此，丹纳赫公司管理层保持在2007年企业集团有大量的自由现金流去保证即将到来的交易，并且使并购管道保持饱和。

Sustaining the Culture 维持文化

The success of DBS, and Danaher, had been built on mantra of ―continuous improvement.‖ More than two decades after the firm‘s founding, it was natural to ask how for long this platform could sustain itself. Was it feasible for a firm like Danaher to continue to add value on an ongoing

basis? Indeed, could ―continuous improvement‖ continue indefinitely? DBS和丹纳赫的成功已经建立了“持续改善”的口号。这公司成立超过二十多年，自然要问这个平台是怎样自我维持那么久的。像丹纳赫这样的公司在不断前进的基础上继续增值是可行的吗？“持续改进”可以无限期地继续下去吗？

In addition, despite all its success, Danaher had remained remarkably unfamiliar to the public eye. Twenty years after its founding, Danaher did not have its own public relations staff, and senior managers granted only the occasional interview.50 As one analyst put it, ―[Danaher] is kind of a . . . below-the-radar company. . . . They don‘t look for publicity. They just do a great job.‖51 But, as Danaher‘s market capitalization grew, so did its coverage. In 1992, 10 analysts had covered the firm; by 2007, 23 analysts followed it. Indeed, BusinessWeek noted that ―a continued ascent into the rarefied air of large conglomerates carries one big risk: It makes [Danaher] all the more conspicuous for their success.‖52 With coverage came attempts at emulation.

此外，尽管丹纳赫很成功，但它对公众来说一直是相当的陌生。成立二十余年，丹纳赫公司没有自己的公共关系人员，而管理层则只偶尔接受采访。正如一位分析师所说的那样，“丹纳赫公司是一个怎样的??不引人注目的公司??他们不期望得到公众的注意。他们就是做伟大的工作。”但是，随着丹纳赫公司的市值增长，它的新闻报道量也增长了。在1992年，10位分析师报道了这家公司；到了2007年，

23分析师密切注意它。事实上，《商业周刊》指出，“持续攀登到大型企业集团的稀薄空间带来巨大的风险：它使丹纳赫公司的成功更为突出。”新闻报道带来一些仿效的尝试。

Danaher‘s senior management team recognized that evolving and sustaining the culture of DBS was necessary to ensure continued high value add across all businesses. But, they remained quietly confident that the core value of kaizen, or continuous improvement, would continue to provide strong performance. Indeed, Culp believed that the biggest threat to sustained performance at Danaher lay not in external factors, but in the firm‘s ability to create a large enough pool of managerial talent internally: 丹纳赫的高级管理团队认识到不断发展和维持DBS的文化是必要的，以确保各业务持续高增值。但是，他们仍然相当有信心，“改善”或持续改善的核心价值会持续发挥强大的功能。事实上，Culpsh相信持续在丹纳赫发挥作用的最大威胁不是外部因素，而是在于公司内部创建足够大的管理人才池的能力：

DBS is basically just applied common sense, but it will succeed only if we are staffed by leaders who live and breathe it. DBS is a differentiator that those who have worked with it really grasp. Bringing outsiders into the system is hard since they have to learn a new culture and approach. Therefore, practice, making mistakes, and learning how to use DBS are critical to their success. For this reason, we believe that the real value of Danaher lies in the accumulated experience of operating with DBS that

enables leaders to understand the interrelationships between the hard and soft elements of our system. Time is hard to buy . . . no one else has had 20 years of experience with our system.

DBS基本上只应用于常识，但它只有当我们被与它共存的领导者雇佣时才会成功。DBS是一个微分器，曾与它工作过的人会真正抓住它。让外来者进入这个系统是很难的，因为他们不得不学习新的文化和方法。因此，实践、失误，学习怎样运用DBS是他们成功的关键。出于这个原因，我们相信丹纳赫公司的真正价值在于DBS运营的经验积累，这些经验使得领导们了解我们系统硬件与软件的相互关系。时间难买??没有其他人具有我们系统20多年的经验。

As Culp ended the earnings call he pondered what the company should do in the months ahead.

Culp结束财务报告电话时沉思，公司在未来几个月应该做什么。 (P16)

Appendix 附录

Strategic Platforms1 战略平台 Medical Technologies

The medical technologies business was Danaher‘s newest strategic platform comprising businesses with leading positions in dental technologies, life sciences, and acute care diagnostics. It was also created with a series of platform-establishing transactions, beginning in 2004 with

the acquisitions of Radiometer, the Gendex business of Dentsply International Inc., and Kaltenbach & Voigt GmbH & Co KG (KaVo). In 2005 Leica Microsystems was added to the growing portfolio, and in 2006 Sybron Dental Specialties and Vision Systems Limited were acquired. 医疗技术

医疗技术业务是丹纳赫最新的战略平台，由在牙科技术、生命科学、急性护理诊断方面具有领先地位的业务组成。它同样是由一系列“建立平台”交易建立，以2004年并购Radiometer，即登士柏国际公司的Gendex业务以及Kaltenbach & Voigt GmbH & Co KG (KaVo) 开始。在2005年，徕卡显微系统（Leica Microsystems）加入了这支成长中的投资组合。在2006年，并购Sybron牙科专业（Sybron Dental Specialties）和可视系统有限公司（ Vision Systems Limited）。

Danaher was a global leader in dental technologies and consumables including treatment units, hand pieces, dental imaging and diagnostic systems, dental materials, orthodontic systems, and infection control products. These products were marketed primarily under the KaVo, Gendex, Dexis, Pelton & Crane, Kerr, Ormco, and ISI brands.

丹纳赫公司在牙科技术和消费品领域全球领先，这包括治疗单位、手把件、牙科成像和诊断系统、牙科材料、口腔正畸系统，以及感染控制产品。这些产品主要在KaVo， Gendex， Dexis， Pelton & Crane， Kerr，Ormco和 ISI brands品牌下销售。

Danaher‘s acute care diagnostics business began in 2004 with the

acquisition of Radiometer. While two subsequent acquisitions expanded their involvement in the market, most products were still marketed under the Radiometer brand. The business primarily produced critical care applications for blood gas analysis and related services in hospitals and point-of-care locations.

凡纳赫的急性护理诊断业务开始于2004年收购Radiometer。虽然随后的收购扩展了市场，但多数产品仍然在Radiometer的品牌下销售。这业务主要生产血气分析重症监护和在医院以及医疗点的相关的服务。 Entry into life sciences instrumentation came in 2005 with the addition of Leica Microsystems to the platform‘s portfolio, and was expanded the next year with the acquisition of Vision Systems Limited (which was combined with a division of Leica Microsystems to create Leica Biosystems). These businesses made high precision optimal instruments, solutions and related consumables for life sciences and medical applications, pathology diagnostics products, laboratory and surgical microscopes, and workflow solutions for clinical histopathology laboratories.

进入生命科学仪器是在2005年，平台的投资组合中加入了莱卡微系统，次年通过收购可视系统有限公司（这家公司的一个部门与莱卡微系统结合成莱卡生物系统）进行扩大。这些业务制造高精密度最佳仪器、，生命科学和医疗应用的解决方案和相关耗材、病理诊断产品、实验室和外科手术显微镜，以及临床病理组织学实验室工作流程解决方案。 The investment community responded favorably to Danaher‘s expansion

into the medical technologies industry, and to their concerted growth of the business. While rising healthcare costs became a much discussed issue throughout 2006 and 2007, most agreed that the healthcare market would continue to balloon as the United Stated underwent demographic shifts and saw an increase in the application of innovative medical technology. 53 投资界积极回应丹纳赫公司在医疗技术产业的扩张以及他们业务合作的增长。虽然医疗卫生保护费用上涨成为2006年和2007年整年的热论问题，但是多数人同意医疗卫生保健市场会持续膨涨，因为美国经历了人口结构变化，看得到新医疗技术应用的增长。

Professional Instrumentation 专业仪器

Test and Measurement In 2007, Danaher acquired Tektronix, a global leader in Test & Measurement (T&M), doubling the size of one of its strongest platforms. They entered the T&M market with the acquisition of Fluke Corporation in 1998. Additional acquisitions bolstered the business, which produced and serviced compact professional test tools and calibration equipment for electrical, industrial, and electronic applications. Test products measured voltage, current, resistance, power quality, frequency, temperature, pressure, and air quality. Additionally, the Fluke Networks business provided both software and hardware for the testing, analysis, and monitoring of local and wide area networks. This business

area expanded in 2006 with the acquisition of Visual Networks. 测试与测量

2007年，丹纳赫公司并购了泰克公司（Tektronix），一家在测试与测量（T&M）领域全球领先的企业。这次并购使丹纳赫公司其中一个最强的平台的规模翻了一翻。他们在1998年通过并购福禄公司（Fluke Corporation）进入了T&M市场。额外的并购加强了用于电器、工业和电子应用的小型专业测试工具和较准设备的生产和服务业务。测试产品测量电压、电流、电阻、电能质量、频率、温度、压力和空气质量。此外，福禄网络公司（fluke Networks）的业务为局域网和广域网的测试、分析和监测提供软件和硬件。2006年并购可视化网络公司（Visual Networks）后，这一业务领域得到扩大。 （P17）

Environmental The environmental businesses operated primarily in water quality analytical, disinfection, and treatment systems/solutions and petroleum. Danaher entered the water quality market via a series of acquisitions, starting with American Sigma in 1996 and recently with ChemTreat in 2007. Operations in these businesses provided a range of instruments, consumables and services that detected, measured, and treated various water characteristics. Users generally included municipal drinking water and water treatment plants, industrial plants, environmental monitoring and regulatory agencies, and third-party testing laboratories. The company had numerous established water quality brands, including

Hach-Lange, Hach Ultra Analytics, Trojan UV, ChemTreat, Buhler Montec, and McCrometer. 环保

环保业务主要经营水质分析、消毒、处理系统/解决方案和石油。丹纳赫公司通过一系列的并购进入水质市场，从1996年并购美国哈希公司（American Sigma）开始，最近的是，2007年并购美国化学处理公司（Chem Treat）。这些业务的运营提供一系列的仪器、耗材和服务，用于检测、测量和处理各种水特性。用户一般包括城市饮用水、水处理厂、工业厂房、环境监测和监管机构，以及第三方测试实验室。这家公司有众多已建立的水质品牌，包括哈希朗格（Hach-Lange），哈希超纯分析（Hach Ultra Analytics），Trojan UV，美国化学处理（Chem Treat），Buhler Montec，以及McCrometer。

Danaher‘s retail and commercial petroleum business, by contrast, had been in operation since the mid 1980s, and consisted of a smaller collection of businesses and brands. The Gilbarco Veeder-Root business products included monitoring and lead detection systems, vapor recovery equipment, fuel dispensers, point-of-sale and merchandising systems, and submersible turbine pumps. Service offerings included outsourced fuel management, compliance, fuel system maintenance, and inventory planning and supply chain support. Users of such products and services included independent and company-owned retail petroleum stations, high-volume retailers, convenience stores, supermarkets, and commercial vehicle fleets.

丹纳赫公司的零售和商业石油业务，相比之下，自20世纪80年代就已经开始运作了，它由一些小的业务和品牌集合组成。Gilbarco Veeder-Root业务产品包括监测和铅检测系统、油气回收设备、加油机、销售点和销售系统，以及潜水涡轮泵。提供的服务包括外包燃料管理、合规性、燃油系统维修，以及库存计划和供应链支持。这类产品和服务的用户包括独立的或公司所有的石油零售站、大容量零售商、便利店、超市和商业车队。

Industrial Technologies 工业技术

Product Identification Danaher acquired Videojet (previously Marconi Data Systems) in 2002, thus entering the product identification business. Subsequent acquisitions rapidly expanded the platform, which produced a variety of equipment used to print and read bar, date, and lot codes, as well as other information on primary and secondary packaging. Customers typically included food and beverage manufacturers, pharmaceutical manufacturers, retailers, commercial printing and mailing operations, and package and parcel delivery companies, including The United States Postal Service. Danaher‘s Videojet, Linx, Accu-Sort, and Alltec were all well-known brands within the industry. 产品标识

丹纳赫公司在2002年并购了伟迪捷（Videojet）（原马尼可数据系

统公司（Marconi Data Systems），从而进入产品标识业务。随后的并购迅速地扩大这个平台，生产一系列用于打印和读取条形码、日期和批号，以及首次和二次包装上的其它信息的设备。客户通常包括食品和饮料制造商、医药制造商、零售商、商业印刷和邮寄业务，以及封装和包裹投递公司，其中包括美国邮政服务（The United States Postal Service）。丹纳赫公司的伟迪捷（Videojet）、Linx、Accu-Sort，还有Alltec都是行业内有名的品牌。

Motion Danaher entered the motion control industry in 1998 with the acquisition of Pacific Scientific Company. Subsequent acquisitions further expanded the business‘s footprint and product lines, which grew to include controls, drives, motors, and mechanical components. Such products were sold in various precision motion markets such as packaging, medical, or circuit board assembly equipment; robotics; elevators; and electric vehicles (such as lift trucks). Key brands included Kollmorgen, Thomson, Dover, Portescap, and Pacific Scientific. 机动

丹纳赫公司在1998年并购太平洋科学公司（Pacific Scientific Company），进入机动控制行业。随后的并购进一步扩大这业务的范围和产品线，产品线增长到涵括控制、驱动、发动机和机械部件。这些产品在各种精密机动市场出售，例如封装、医疗或、电路板组装设备；以及出售到机器人、电梯、以及电动车辆（如叉车）等市场中。主要品牌包括Kollmorgen、汤姆逊（Thomson）、多佛尔（Dover）、

波特斯卡普（Portescap）以及太平洋科学（Pacific Scientific）。

Tools and Components 工具和部件

Mechanics’ Hand Tools Danaher‘s Hand Tools platform was primarily made up of the Danaher Tool Group (DTG) and Matco Tools. Danaher was one of the largest global producers of general-purpose tools, including ratchets, sockets, and wrenches. These products were used throughout the retail, automotive, and industrial sectors. Danaher‘s position was well-established in what most analysts believed to be a mature market. DTG, for example, had been the principal manufacturer of Sears Holdings Corporation‘s Craftsman line of tools for over 60 years. Matco manufactured and distributed professional tools and equipment. Beyond DTG and Matco, Danaher marketed under the Allen, Armstrong Tools, GearWrench, Holo-Krome, Iseli, K-D Tools, NAPA, Sata, and Lowes brands. 机械手工工具

丹纳赫公司的手工工具平台主要由丹纳赫工具集团（DTG）和Matco Tools组成。丹纳赫公司是全球最大的通用工具——包括棘轮、插座和扳手——生产商之一。这些产品的使用遍及零售、汽车和工业部门。丹纳赫公司的市场地位在多数分析师认为将是一个成熟的市场中根深蒂固。DTG，举例说，已经是西尔斯控股公司（Sears Holding Corporation）

工匠（Craftsman）工具线的主要生产商60余年了。Matco生产和分销专业工具和设备。除了DTG和Matco，丹纳赫公司在Allen、Armstrong Tools、GearWrench、Holo-Krome、Iseli、K-D Tools、NAPA，Sata和Lowers这些品牌下销售。

本文来源：https://www.bwwdw.com/article/0jbp.html