4.外文翻译财务111柯聪

本科毕业论文（设计）

外 文 翻 译

题 目 上市银行盈利质量分析与评价 学 院 商 学 院 专 业 财 务 管 理 班 级 财 务 111 学 号 201152425141 学生姓名 柯 聪 指导教师 穆 敏 丽 费 美 玲 完成日期 2015年01月16日

一、外文原文 原文一：

Measuring the quality of earnings

1. Introduction

Generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) offer some flexibility in preparing the financial statements and give the financial managers some freedom to select among accounting policies and alternatives. Earning management uses the flexibility in financial reporting to alter the financial results of the firm (Ortega and Grant, 2003).

In other words, earnings management is manipulating the earning to achieve a predetermined target set by the management. It is a purposeful intervention in the external reporting process with the intent of obtaining some private gain (Schipper, 1989).

Levit (1998) defines earning management as a gray area where the accounting is being perverted; where managers are cutting corners; and, where earnings reports reflect the desires of management rather than the underlying financial performance of the company.

The popular press lists several instances of companies engaging in earnings management. Sensormatic Electronics, which stamped shipping dates and times on sold merchandise, stopped its clocks on the last day of a quarter until customer shipments reached its sales goal. Certain business units of Cendant Corporation inflated revenues nearly $500 million just prior to a merger; subsequently, Cendant restated revenues and agreed with the SEC to change revenue recognition practices. AOL restated earnings for $385 million in improperly deferred marketing expenses. In 1994, the Wall Street Journal detailed the many ways in which General Electric smoothed earnings, including the careful timing of capital gains and the use of restructuring charges and reserves, in response to the article, General Electric reportedly received calls from other corporations questioning why such common practices were “front-page” news.

Earning management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers (Healy and Whalen, 1999).

Magrath and Weld (2002) indicate that abusive earnings management and fraudulent practices begins by engaging in earnings management schemes designed primarily to “smooth” earnings to meet internally or externally imposed earnings forecasts and analysts’ expectations.

Even if earnings management does not explicitly violate accounting rules, it is an ethically questionable practice. An organization that manages its earnings sends a message to its employees that bending the truth is an acceptable practice. Executives who partake of this practice risk creating an ethical climate in which other questionable activities may occur. A manager who asks the sales staff to help sales one day forfeits the moral authority to criticize questionable sales tactics another day.

Earnings management can also become a very slippery slope, which relatively minor accounting gimmicks becoming more and more aggressive until they create material misstatements in the financial statements (Clikeman, 2003)

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued three staff accounting bulletins (SAB) to provide guidance on some accounting issues in order to prevent the inappropriate earnings management activities by public companies: SAB No. 99 “Materiality”, SAB No. 100 “Restructuring and Impairment Charges” and SAB No. 101 “Revenue Recognition”.

Earnings management behavior may affect the quality of accounting earnings, which is defined by Schipper and Vincent (2003) as the extent to which the reported earnings faithfully represent Hichsian economic income, which is the amount that can be consumed (i.e. paid out as dividends) during a period, while leaving the firm equally well off at the beginning and the end of the period.

Assessment of earning quality requires sometimes the separations of earnings into cash from operation and accruals, the more the earnings is closed to cash from

operation, the higher earnings quality. As Penman (2001) states that the purpose of accounting quality analysis is to distinguish between the “hard” numbers resulting from cash flows and the “soft” numbers resulting from accrual accounting.

The quality of earnings can be assessed by focusing on the earning persistence; high quality earnings are more persistent and useful in the process of decision making.

Beneish and Vargus (2002) investigate whether insider trading is informative about earnings quality using earning persistence as a measure for the quality of earnings, they find that income-increasing accruals are significantly more persistent for firms with abnormal insider buying and significantly less persistent for firms with abnormal insider selling, relative to firms which there is no abnormal insider trading.

Balsam et al. (2003) uses the level of discretionary accruals as a direct measure for earning quality. The discretionary accruals model is based on a regression relationship between the change in total accruals as dependent variable and change in sales and change in the level of property, plant and equipment, change in cash flow from operations and change in firm size (total assets) as independent variables. If the regression coefficients in this model are significant that means that there is earning management in that firm and the earnings quality is low.

This research presents an empirical study on using three different approaches of measuring the quality of earnings on different industry. The notion is; if there is a complete consistency among the three measures, a general assessment for the quality of earnings (high or low) can be reached and, if not, the quality of earnings is questionable and needs different other approaches for measurement and more investigations and analysis.

The rest of the paper is divided into following sections: Earnings management incentives, Earnings management techniques, Model development, Sample and statistical results, and Conclusion.

2. Earnings management incentives 2.1 Meeting analysts’ expectations

In general, analysts’ expectations and company predictions tend to address two high-profile components of financial performance: revenue and earnings from

operations.

The pressure to meet revenue expectations is particularly intense and may be the primary catalyst in leading managers to engage in earning management practices that result in questionable or fraudulent revenue recognition practices. Magrath and Weld (2002) indicate that improper revenue recognition practices were the cause of one-third of all voluntary or forced restatements of income filed with the SEC from 1977 to 2000.

Ironically, it is often the companies themselves that create this pressure to meet the market’s earnings expectations. It is common practice for companies to provide earnings estimates to analysts and investors. Management is often faced with the task of ensuring their targeted estimates are met.

Several companies, including Coca-Cola Co., Intel Corp., and Gillette Co., have taken a contrary stance and no longer provide quarterly and annual earnings estimates to analysts. In doing so, these companies claim they have shifted their focus from meeting short-term earnings estimates to achieving their long-term strategies (Mckay and Brown, 2002).

2.2 To avoid debt-covenant violations and minimize political costs

Some firms have the incentive to avoid violating earnings-based debt covenants. If violated, the lender may be able to raise the interest rate on the debt or demand immediate repayment. Consequently, some firms may use earnings-management techniques to increase earnings to avoid such covenant violations. On the other hand, some other firms have the incentive to lower earnings in order to minimize political costs associated with being seen as too profitable. For example, if gasoline prices have been increasing significantly and oil companies are achieving record profit level, then there may be incentive for the government to intervene and enact an excess-profit tax or attempt to introduce price controls.

2.3 To smooth earnings toward a long-term sustainable trend

For many years it has been believed that a firm should attempt to reduce the volatility in its earnings stream in order to maximize share price. Because a highly violate earning pattern indicates risk, therefore the stock will lose value compared to

others with more stable earnings patterns. Consequently, firms have incentives to manage earnings to help achieve a smooth and growing earnings stream (Ortega and Grant, 2003).

2.4 Meeting the bonus plan requirements

Healy (1985) provides the evidence that earnings are managed in the direction that is consistent with maximizing executives’ earnings-based bonus. When earnings will be below the minimum level required to earn a bonus, then earning are managed upward so that the minimum is achieved and a bonus is earned. Conversely, when earning will be above the maximum level at which no additional bonus is paid, then earnings are managed downward. The extra earnings that will not generate extra bonus this current period are saved to be used to earn a bonus in a future period. When earnings are between the minimum and the maximum levels, then earnings are managed upward in order to increase the bonus earned in the current period.

2.5 Changing management

Earnings management usually occurs around the time of changing management, the CEO of a company with poor performance indicators will try to increase the reported earnings in order to prevent or postpone being fired. On the other hand, the new CEO will try shift part of the income to future years around the time when his/her performance will be evaluated and measured, and blame the low earning at the beginning of his contract on the acts of the previous CEO.

3. Earnings management techniques

One of the most common earnings management tools is reporting revenue before the seller has performed under the terms of a sales contract (SEC,SAB No. 101,1999).

Another area of concern is where a company fails to comply with GAAP and inappropriately records restructuring charges and general reserves for future losses, reversing or relieving reserves in inappropriate periods, and recognizing or not recognizing an asset impairment charge in the appropriate period (SEC, SAB No. 100, 1999).

Managers can influence reported expenses through assumptions and estimates such as the assumed rate of return on pension plan asset and the estimated useful lives

of fixed assets, also they can influence reported earnings by controlling the timing of purchasing, deliveries, discretionary expenditures, and sale of assets.

3.1 Big bath

“Big Bath” charges are one-time restructuring charge. Current earnings will be decreased by overstating these one-time charges. By reversing the excessive reserve, future earnings will increase.

Big bath charges are not always related to restructuring. In April 2001, Cisco Systems Inc. announced charges against earnings of almost $4 billion. The bulk of the charge, $2.5 billion, consisted of an inventory write down. Writing off more than a billion dollars from inventory now means more than a billion dollars of less cost in the future period. This an example of what ultra-conservative accounting in one period makes possible in future periods.

3.2 Abuse of materiality

Another area that might be used by accountants to manipulate the earning is the application of materiality principle in preparing the financial statements, this principle is very wide, flexible and has no specific range to determine where the item is material or not. SEC uses the interpretation ruled by the supreme court in identifying what is material; the supreme court has held that a fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that the fact would have been viewed by reasonable investor as having significantly altered the “total mix” of information made available (SEC, SAB No. 99, 1999).

The SEC has also introduced some considerations for a quantitatively small misstatement of a financial statement item to be material:

. whether the misstatement arises from an item capable of precise measurement or whether it arises from an estimate and, if so, the degree of imprecision inherent in the estimate;

. whether the misstatement masks a change in earnings or other trends;

.whether the misstatement hides a failure to meet analysts’ consensus expectations for the enterprise;

. whether the misstatement changes a loss into income or vice versa;

. whether the misstatement concerns a segment or other portion of the registrant’s business that has been identified as playing a significant role in the registrant’s operations or profitability; and

. whether the misstatement involves concealment of an unlawful transaction. 3.3 Cookie jar

“Cookie jar” reserve – sometimes labeled rainy day reserve or contingency reserves, in periods of strong financial performance, cookie jar reserve enable to reduce earnings by overstating reserves, overstating expenses, and using one-time write-offs. In periods of weak financial performance, cookie jar reserves can be used to increase earnings by reversing accruals and reserves to reduce current period expenses (Kokoszka, 2003).

The most famous example of use of cookie jar reserves is WorldCom Inc. In August 2002, an internal review revealed that the company had $2.5 billion reserves related to litigation, uncollectible and taxes. The company used most of them in a series of so-called reserve reversals in order to have higher earnings.

Source: Khaled ElMoatasem Abdelghany, 2005. “Measuring the quality of earnings”, Managerial Auditing Journal, vol.20, no.9, pp.1001 – 1015.

原文二：

Dividend payment and earnings quality: evidence from Indonesia

1. Introduction

Previous studies have examined whether a dividend is a tool chosen by firms to provide information to the market (e.g. signaling) (Bhattacharya, 1979; Miller and Modigliani,1961). Traditional dividend-signaling models predict that a dividend reveals information regarding future earnings (Pettit, 1972; Aharony and Swary, 1980; Asquith and Mullins, 1983; Aharony and Dotan, 1994). The increase (decrease) in dividend provides a good (bad) signal about a firm’s future earnings (Bhattacharya, 1979; John and Williams, 1985; Miller and Rock, 1985; Arnott and Asness, 2003; Lukose and Rao, 2004). However, there are other studies that find contradictory results that indicate a dividend has weak information content regarding a firm’s future earnings (DeAngelo et al., 2006; Benartzi et al., 1997; Brav et al., 2005).

The previous studies examined only the association between dividends and earnings. In addition to these studies, several other studies conducted in developed markets showed that there is an association between dividend and earnings quality (Caskey and Hanlon, 2005; Hanlon et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2007; Tong and Miao, 2011;Skinner and Soltes, 2011).

Indonesia is an emerging economy whose capital market has undergone significant regulatory reforms and has an institutional environment that differs from other countries; such differences have implications for dividend policy and earnings quality. A considerable amount of literature has examined dividend policies (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Rozeff, 1982; Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen et al., 1992), most of which has tended to focus on developed markets, especially the USA. Relatively few empirical studies have addressed the dividend policy in emerging capital markets. Our study contributes to the extant literature by focusing on Indonesia, one of the emerging markets. Glen et al. (1995) and Adaoglu (2000) suggest that there are significant differences in dividend policy behavior between developed markets and emerging markets. This may be due to differences in the level of efficiency and

institutional arrangements between both markets. It is therefore useful to improve our understanding of dividend policy and earnings quality issues from an emerging market perspective.

Following this stream of research, our study examines whether a dividend is an indicator of higher earnings quality in Indonesia, one of the emerging markets. We analyze several features of dividends (dividend-paying status, dividend size, dividend size changes, and dividend persistence) and examine the relationship between these features and earnings quality.

Tong and Miao (2011) also examine the relationship between dividend and earnings quality. They use only three features of dividends (dividend-paying status, dividend size, and dividend persistence). In addition, our study also examines dividend size changes as an additional feature, as in Caskey and Hanlon (2005). Tong and Miao (2011) use accounting-based and market based measures of earnings quality. We focus only on accounting-based measures. Because Indonesian capital market is still emerging, market-based measures may not be the best measures of earnings quality.

2. Previous studies and hypotheses development

Pettit (1972) finds evidence that the market reacts to dividend announcements. This evidence supports the signaling theory. Savov and Weber (2006) also finds a negative relationship between a decrease in dividend and future stock returns, whereas he finds a positive relationship for firms that do not decrease their dividend level.

Current studies go further by examining whether dividends provide information about earnings quality. Hanlon et al. (2007) show that investors can better predict future earnings if firms distribute dividends (i.e. dividend has predictive value). Tong and Miao (2011) also examine the relationship between dividend payment and earnings quality. Firms that distribute dividends have higher earnings quality than firms that do not distribute dividends. A larger size of dividend and dividend persistence also indicates higher earnings quality. Using samples of firms that the SEC accused of committing financial reporting fraud, Caskey and Hanlon (2005) find that fraudulent firms did not pay a dividend and had a smaller increase of dividends

than other firms.

Chen et al. (2007) use the accruals quality (AQ) based on the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model as a proxy of information risk. They conclude that firms that distribute dividends and increase dividend size have lower information risk (more accurate earnings information), smaller analyst forecast dispersion, and lower future stock returns volatility. Investors treat risk-related information (the accuracy of information in the financial statements) as a priced risk factor. This finding indicates that dividend distribution is an indicator of earnings quality. Skinner and Soltes (2011) also find a similar result. Firms that distribute dividends have higher earnings persistence than firms that do not distribute dividends. Miller and Rock (1985) provide an explanation for these findings, arguing that the dividend improves the credibility of reported earnings because it is too costly for managers to distribute cash dividends on a regular basis without the support of underlying cash flows.

Based on the above findings, we expect that dividends could provide signal for earnings quality. Firms that distribute dividends are expected to have higher earnings quality than other firms. There are two arguments to support this notion. First, based on agency theory, a dividend is considered to have a role in minimizing agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. Easterbrook (1984) suggests that dividends play a role in minimizing agency costs by helping the capital market monitor managerial actions and performance, making it difficult for managers to manipulate earnings. Myers (2000) implies that investors have a right to a firm’s assets, but it is difficult to prevent insiders (management) to misuse cash flows. Therefore, management is expected to distribute dividends regularly in sufficient amounts for the investors. Dividends are seen as a means of communication from managers to shareholders to demonstrate the firm’s performance.

The second argument is that it is difficult (too expensive) for managers to distribute cash dividends based on profits that do not reflect the firm’s performance because they need actual cash flow for the distribution of dividends. Breeden (2003) also suggests that the dividend is one of the methods to measure the fairness of reported earnings. Easterbrook (1984) states that firms who manipulate earnings tend

to distribute or increase dividends less often than firms that do not engage in earnings manipulation. Profits from earnings manipulation do not have cash inflow implications and also are not sustainable in the future. Glassman (2005) suggests that firms that pay dividends tend to not manipulate earnings because manipulated earnings do not generate the cash inflows needed to pay dividends. Therefore, managers who manipulate earnings have a tendency to neither distribute nor increase their dividend despite an earnings increase because such an increase is not permanent (Lintner, 1956). Malkiel (2003) also argues that dividends will provide a strong signal to investors about the financial strength and credibility of reported earnings. Skinner and Soltes (2011) find that the reported earnings of dividend-paying firms are more persistent (i.e. higher earnings quality) than those of other firms. They also find that these dividend payers are less likely to report losses and that those losses that they do report tend to be transitory losses driven by special items. Thus, we developed the H1 as follows:

H1. Dividend-paying firms have higher earnings quality than other firms. A dividend has several features, which we expect to have an association with earnings quality. One of these features is the size of dividend payments. Skinner and Soltes (2011) examine the association of dividends and earnings quality (using the persistence of earnings). They conclude that earnings of dividend-paying firms are more persistent (higher earnings quality) and that the effect is more pronounced for firms with larger dividend payouts. Tong and Miao (2011) also find that large dividend-paying firms have higher earnings quality than firms that distribute small dividends or no dividend payment. They argue that firms paying out large cash dividends are certainly supported by cash, which is less likely to come from manipulated profits that do not have a strong cash basis:

H2. Large dividend-paying firms have higher earnings quality than other firms. Firms may change their dividend payout ratio. We predict that firms pay lower dividends due to the lower persistence of earnings (Skinner and Soltes, 2011) and because manipulated earnings have no association with cash flows. Adaoglu (2000) argues that when there is a change in the earnings potential of the firms, firms tend to

change their dividend policies. If they think that there is a good future earnings potential and they can sustain the increase in dividends, they will increase the dividend level.

Firms that increase the size of their dividend payments are considered to have higher earnings quality, as these firms have to assure investors that this rise in the level of dividends can be maintained and they must be supported by a strong cash basis (Caskey and Hanlon, 2005). Lintner (1956) concludes that a manager would not raise a firms’ dividend to a level that cannot be maintained because it will give a bad signal if the firm reduces the dividend size or stops distributing them:

H3. Firms that increase the size of their dividend payments have higher earnings quality than other firms.

A dividend that is distributed regularly is called a persistent dividend. Firms paying dividends on a regular basis should have enough cash, which is supported by firms’ good operational performance (Tong and Miao, 2011). This finding is consistent with Caskey and Hanlon (2005) who suggest that earnings derived from manipulation do not produce cash (no cash basis) and are not sustainable. Hence, only firms with high earnings quality (firms that believe they have good earnings potential in the future and also believe that future earnings can be sustain) will be willing and able to pay dividend regularly:

H4. Persistent dividend-paying firms have higher earnings quality than other firms.

3. Research method

To test the above hypotheses we used the following research model:

EQi;t =α0 +α1DIVi;t +α2SIZEi;t +α3BTMi;t +α4SGROWTHi;t +α5LOSSi;t +α6AGEi;t +α7LEVi;t +α8H_INDEXi;t +α9CFO_STDi;t + εEQi;t

=β0

+β1LARGE_DIVi;t

i;t

+β2SMALL_DIVi;t +β3SIZEi;t +β4BTMi;t

i;t

+β5SGROWTHi;t+β6LOSSi;t+β7AGEi;t+β8LEVi;t+β9H_INDEXi;t+β10H_INDEXi;t +ε

EQi;t =δ0 +δ1DIV_CHANGEi;t +δ2SIZEi;t +δ3BTMi;t+δ4SGROWTHi;t +δ5LOSSi;t +δ6AGEi;t +δ7LEVi;t +δ8H_INDEXi;t+δ9CFO_STDi;t +ε

i;t

EQi;t =γ0 +γ1PDIVi;t +γ2SIZEi;t +γ3BTMi;t +γ4SGROWTHi;t +γ5LOSSi;t +γ6AGEi;t

+γ7LEVi;t +γ8H_INDEXi;t +γ9CFO_STDi;t +εExpected sign: α1＜0, β1＜β2, δ1＜0, γ1＜0 where:

i;t

EQ= earnings quality, measured using absolute value of discretionary accruals (ADA), absolute value of accruals quality (AAQ), and AQ.

DIV = dividend-paying status, 1 if firms paid dividend and 0 if otherwise.

LARGE_DIV= large dividend payment, 1 if firms distribute large cash dividend and 0 if otherwise.

SMALL_DIV = small dividend payment, 1 if firms dividend is not classified as large dividends and 0 if otherwise.

DIV_CHANGE = dividend changes, 1 if firms increase dividend payout ratio and 0 if otherwise.

PDIV = dividend persistence, 1 if firms persistently paid dividend for five years and 0 if otherwise. SIZE = firm size. BTM = book-to-market. SGROWTH = sales growth.

LOSS =financial performance, 1 if firms’ earnings before extraordinary items is negative and 0 otherwise. AGE = firm’s age. LEV= leverage.

H_INDEX = Herfindahl-Hirshman Index.

CFO_STD = standard deviation of cash flows from operating activities.

We use three measures of earnings quality: ADA, AAQ, and AQ. All measures of earnings quality used in this study are accrual-based measures. Earnings consist of two components: accruals and cash flows. Accruals are subject to managerial discretion because they are the product of judgments, estimates, and allocations (Subramanyam, 1996; Francis et al., 2005). Accruals also have lower persistence than cash flows, primarily due to the errors, subjectivity, and opportunism involved in the accrual process (Sloan, 1996; Xie, 2001; Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Hao, 2009).

The first measure of earnings quality is ADA based on the Kothari et al. (2005) model. Kothari et al. (2005) has been used extensively in prior studies, such as Tong and Miao (2011), Chen et al. (2011) and Cheng et al. (2013):

TACCi;t =β0 +β1（ΔSALESi,t-ΔARi;t） +β2PPEi;t +β3ROAi;t-1 +εWhere:

TACC – total accruals, ΔSALES – changes in sales, ΔAR – changes in accounts receivable, PPE – gross property, plant, and equipment (PPE), ROA – return on assets. All variables are deflated by beginning-of-year total assets.

To measure AAQ, we use the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model as modified by McNichols (2002). Extant studies also use this model to measure earnings quality (Li and Wang, 2010; Tong and Miao, 2011; Chen et al., 2011). Larger residuals from the Kothari et al. (2005) model as well as the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model as modified by McNichols (2002) indicate poorer earnings quality:

Source: Febriela Sirait and Sylvia Veronica Siregar, 2014. “Dividend payment and earnings quality: evidence from Indonesia”, International Journal of Accounting, vol.22, no.2, pp.103-117.

i;t

二、翻译文章 译文一：

衡量盈利质量

1、引言

一般公认会计原则（GAAP）提供准备一定的灵活性的财务报表，给财务经理一定的自由空间进行选择会计政策和方案。收入管理使用中的灵活性的财务报告改变公司（奥尔特加和格兰特，2003年）的财务结果。

换句话说，收入管理是操纵收益达到预定目标的管理设置。这是有目的的干预外部报告过程并获得一些私利的意图（席佩尔，1989）。

莱维特（1998）盈余管理的定义是一个灰色地带，其中会计核算是不恰当的；其中，管理人员偷工减料；并在财报反映了管理层的意愿，而不是潜在的财务业绩公司。

大众媒体列出了几个公司从事盈利实例的管理。先讯美资电子对其所售商品加盖装运日期和时间，在一季度的最后一天停止了其时钟，直到客户出货量达到其销售目标。胜腾公司的某些业务部门为了合并虚增收入近5亿美元；随后，圣达特重申和与SEC同意改变收入确认方法。AOL重申收益为3.85亿美元包括递延不正当的营销费用。1994年，华尔街日报详细介绍通用电气平滑收益的许多方法，包括资本收益和使用重组费用和储备的时机。以回应文章中，通用电气据说受到其他公司的质疑-为什么这样约定俗成的做法会变成“头版”的消息。

收入管理发生在管理者判断财务报告和结构性交易时，为了改变财务报表，误导有关该公司的基本经济表现的一些利益相关方或影响会改变合同结果的会计数据（希利和惠伦，1999年）。

马格拉斯和威尔德（2002）指出，一开始从事设计滥用盈余管理和欺诈行为的收益管理方案主要是为了“平稳”，以满足内部或外部强加的盈利财报预测和分析师的预期。

即使盈余管理并没有明确违反会计准则，但它是一个道德上有问题的做法。其盈利的管理组织发送给它的员工的消息是弯曲的真相，但却是一个可以接受的做法。高管这种做法创造一个道德氛围，谁参加就不会出现在其他可能可疑的活

动中。一位经理问销售人员，如果你以丧失1天道德来帮助加快销售，那么另一天你就会被批评质疑。

盈余管理也处在一个十分危险的境地,而相对次要的会计花招越来越咄咄逼人,直到他们创建的财务报表出现重大错报（克利克曼，2003年）。

美国证券交易委员会（SEC）发出了三名员工的会计公报（SAB）以此来对一些会计问题提供指导，以防止有不恰当的盈余管理活动在上市公司中出现：SAB99号“实质性”，SAB第100号“重组费用和资产减值”和SAB第101号“收入确认”。

盈余管理行为可能会影响会计盈余质量，该报告是由席佩尔和温深特（2003）所作，为一定程度反映盈利忠实的代表Hichsian的经济收入，这是量能食用期间（即支付股息），而离开公司在开始和期间的结束同样富裕。

评估收益质量的要求有时就会变成操作现金的分离和收益,收益越不对现金操作,收益质量就越高。由彭曼（2001）指出，会计质量分析的目的是区分“硬”的数字现金流和权责发生制所带来的“软”的数字。

盈利质量可以通过关注盈利持续性进行评估；高品质的市盈率可以让企业做出更持久和更有用的决策。

班尼胥和瓦古斯（2002）调查内幕交易信息是关于是否使用收益持久性的收益质量作为衡量收益的质量，他们发现，相对于没有异常内幕交易的公司，收益更持久的公司内存在异常内幕购买和异常内部销售。

贝奥森（2003）使用可操纵应计利润水平来衡量盈利质量。审计师变更模型是基于回归总收益作为因变量，改变销售和物业，厂房及设备，并且改变现金流运作和公司规模(总资产)作为独立的变量。如果在此模型中的回归系数是显著的，这意味着有收入管理，表示该公司的收益质量低下。

这项研究提供了一个实证，使用三种不同的方法衡量收入在不同行业的质量。这一概念是；如果这三项措施有一个完整的一致性，质量评价收益（高或低）可以达到总体水平，如果没有，表面盈利质量有问题的，需要不同的其他方法进行测量，调查和分析。

本文的其余部分被分为以下几个部分：盈余管理激励，盈余管理技术，发展模式，采样和统计结果，与结论。

2、盈余管理的激励 2.1满足了分析师的预期

一般而言,分析师预期和公司财务业绩的预测倾向于解决两个高调的组件:营运收入和利润。

满足收入预期的压力尤为激烈，管理人员从事的盈余管理行为可能是主要的催化剂，导致不良或欺骗性的收入确认的做法。马格拉斯和威尔德（2002）表明，从1977年到2000年提交给美国证券交易委员会(SEC) 的收入报表中，其中收入确认方法不恰当的，有三分之一都是自愿或被迫的。

有讽刺意味的是,这往往是企业自己创造这种压力来满足市场的盈利预期。这是公司为分析师和投资者提供收益预期的常见的做法。管理层经常面临的任务就是确保他们的目标得到满足。

有几家公司，其中包括可口可乐公司，英特尔公司和吉列公司，以相反的立场，不再提供季度和年度的盈利预测。这样一来，这些公司声称他们已经把他们的注意力从短期的盈利预测转移了，以实现其长期战略（曼克凯和布朗，2002）。

2.2为了避免债务契约的侵犯，并尽量减少政治成本

一些公司必须有避免违反以盈利为基础的债务契约的激励。如果违反了,债权人可以提高债务的利率或要求立即偿还。因此，一些公司可能会使用收益管理技术来增加收入，以避免这种契约行为。另一方面，其他一些公司不得不降低收益，以减少政治成本，以及避免被视为其有利可图。例如，如果汽油价格不断显著增加，石油公司达到创纪录的利润水平，那么有可能会鼓励政府干预和制定利润税或尝试引入价格管制。

2.3为了平滑收益走向长期可持续趋势

多年来它一直认为公司应该试图减少其收入流的波动，以最大限度的提高股价。由于高度侵犯盈利模式存在风险，因此相比其他更稳定的盈利模式的股票就会失去价值。因此，企业有动力管理收益，来帮助平稳增长的收入流（奥尔特加和格兰特，2003年）。

2.4会议奖励计划的要求

希利（1985）的证据表明，收益管理的方向与高管盈利基础的奖金最大化是一致的。当收益将低于最低奖金获得要求时,进行向上收入管理,最终达到要求并

获得奖金。相反, 当收入将超过最大水平，并且没有额外的奖金支付，然后进行向下盈余管理。额外的收益,不会产生额外的奖金，这将用于在未来一个时期来赚取奖金。当盈利在最小和最大之间时，则收入被进行向上管理为了增加当期奖金收入。

2.5变更管理

盈余管理通常发生在改变管理期间，性能指标较差的公司的首席执行官将试图增加报道盈利，以防止或推迟被解雇。另一方面，新的CEO尝试将收入的一部分转移到身边，未来几年他/她进行性能评估和衡量时，并责怪低收入的开始是在他的合同以前，是前任的CEO的行为。

3.收益管理技术

其中最常见的收益管理工具是在卖方根据销售合同的条款进行工作之前报告收入（SEC，SAB101号的条款执行，1999）。

另一个值得关注的是，其中一家公司不遵守GAAP规则和不适当地记录了重组费用及一般储备的未来损失，在不合适的时期逆转或缓解储备，在适当的时期承认或不承认资产减损费用（SEC，SAB第100号，1999年）。

管理人员可以通过假设和估计来影响报告费用，如假设的回报率，养老金计划资产的预计使用寿命，以及固定资产都可以影响费用，也可以通过控制采购，交付时间影响报告盈余和可自由支配的开支，亦可以通过出售资产。

3.1 巨额

“洗大澡”都是一次性重组费用。目前的盈利将减少夸大这些一次性费用。通过扭转过度储备，未来的收益会增加。

巨额冲销不总是重组，2001年4月，思科系统有限公司日前宣布了近$40亿的收益。库存包括留下来的大宗国税费用，二十五亿美元，核销多十亿美元。从目前的库存来看，意味着今后一个时期超过十亿美元的成本可以冲减。一个时期有这样极端保守的会计例子,就可以在以后各期冲减。

3.2滥用物质

被会计师操纵盈利的另一个领域是编制财务报表时应用重要性原则，这个原则是很宽的，灵活的，并且没有具体的范围，用来确定其中材料是否是产品的材料。 SEC使用由最高法院裁决确定是什么材料的解释；最高法院认为，一个事

实是-材料是否有实质性的可能性，实际上会由理性的投资者的信息提供（SEC，SAB的“总组合”第99号，1999年）。

美国证券交易委员会还介绍了一些考虑定量小错报的财务报表项目材料： 误报是否源于能够精确测量或项目是否起因于一个估计，如果是这样，不精确固有的程度估计；

是否误报口罩收益或其他趋势的变化；

误报是否隐藏着一个未能达到分析师对于企业的期望的共识； 误报是否改变亏损为收入或反之亦然；

虚假陈述是否涉及注册的一个部分或其他部分已被确定为打在注册人的一个显著作用业务经营或盈利能力；

错报是否涉及非法交易的隐蔽性。 3.3“饼干罐会计”策略

“饼干罐”储备-有时标记为雨天储备或应急储备，在强劲的财务业绩的时期，饼干罐储备能够减少盈利储备，多列支出，并可以使用一次性注销。在疲弱的财务业绩的时期，饼干罐储备可以用来增加盈利来扭转权责发生制和储备，以减少当期费用（科科什卡，2003）。

用饼干罐储量最有名的例子是世通公司，在2002年8月，内部审查表明，该公司有25亿美元储备诉讼，包括无法收回的和税收。公司使用他们中的大多数在一系列所谓的储备逆转中，是为了有更高的收入。

来源:哈立德，2005年“衡量盈利质量”，管理审计杂志，第20卷，第9号，1001页-1015页。

出处：西拉伊特和维罗尼卡西雷加尔，2014年“红利支付和盈利质量：证据来

自印度尼西亚”，国际会计期刊，第22卷，第2号，103-108页。

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